62D CONGRESS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. 2d Session. LEASE OF SCHOOL LANDS FOR PUBLIC PARK PURPOSES. MARCH 28, 1912.-Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed. Mr. TAYLOR of Colorado, from the Committee on the Public Lands, submitted the following REPORT. [To accompany S. 2577.] The Committee on the Public Lands, to whom was referred the bill (S. 2577) to authorize the lease of school lands for public park purposes by the State of Washington for a longer period than five years, having had the same under consideration, respectfully report the same back to the House with the recommendation that it do pass. It appears to the committee that the lands in question were originally surveyed by the Government in 1860, and that at the time the State was admitted into the Union the fee title to this land passed to the State of Washington, under the enabling act of February 22, 1889 (25 Stat., 681). That enabling act, by which the State of Washington came into the Union, contains a prohibition against the leasing of any of the State school lands by the State to any one person or company for a period of more than five years. While the lands belong absolutely to the State as part of their school lands, nevertheless, the State having obtained title to the land under the terms and conditions of an enabling act, which in one sense may be considered an agreement between the State and the Government of the United States, by which it was provided that the school lands would never be leased for more than five years, the question is whether or not the State legislature has the right, without the consent of the Government, to vary the terms of that enabling act. To avoid any question about it, this bill is introduced for the purpose of granting permission to the State legislature to vary the terms of that enabling act by leasing the lands described for public park purposes for such terms and under such conditions as the State legislature may by law prescribe, the understanding being that the object is to give a lease for a term of years. The bill simply waives the right of the Government to complain or object to the variation of the terms of that provision in the enabling act. It being shown to the committee that the uses to which the lands are to be put are meritorious and worthy, and that they will be used for playgrounds, which are absolutely necessary for the nurture and development of the youths, and that this land is the only land available to the cities of Hoquiam and Aberdeen, in the county of Chehalis, State of Washington, and being further shown that the governor of the State and the commercial clubs and business men's organizations and a large number of the prominent citizens of the State, including the legislature, have favored this measure, your committee is of the opinion that the bill should be enacted into law. It appears that the Legislature of the State of Washington passed an act attempting to grant these lands for park purposes and that the governor vetoed the act on the ground that it was a violation of section 2, of article 16, of the State constitution, and in the opinion of the attorney general of the State of Washington, no legislation to this effect, either providing for the sale or leasing of these lands, could be enacted without the permission of Congress, this bill has been introduced to obtain that permission. The bill was submitted by the Senate Committee on Public Lands to the Department of the Interior for report, and the Secretary transmitted two reports, which are as follows: Hon. KNUTE NELSON, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, Chairman Committee on Public Lands, United States Senate. SIR: Your committee has referred to this department, for information as to the law and the facts in relation thereto, Senate bill 2577, entitled "A bill authorizing the lease of school lands for public park purposes by the State of Washington for a longer period than five years.' I have the honor to advise you that report was made upon a similar bill June 1 (S. 2456). A copy of that report is inclosed herewith. This bill merely includes additional lands, and since title to said lands passed to the State many years ago, the question of leasing for public park purposes for a period longer than five years would seem to be a matter primarily for legislative discretion. I see no objection to the passage of the bill. Very respectfully, SAMUEL ADAMS, Acting Secretary. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, Hon. KNUTE NELSON, Washington, June 1, 1911. Chairman Committee on Public Lands, United States Senate. SIR: In response to the request of your committee for report on S. 2456, entitled "A bill authorizing the State of Washington to lease the southeast quarter and the southwest quarter of section 36, township 18 north, of range 10 west, in Chehalis County, for public park purposes," I have the honor to state that said lands were surveyed in 1860, and the fee thereto passed to the State under the enabling act of February 22, 1889 (25 Stat., 681). Said act contains a prohibition against the leasing of any lands thereby granted for educational purposes to any one person or company for periods of more than five years. I see no objection, however, to the passage of this bill. WALTER L. FISHER, Secretary. Very respectfully, O TO ABOLISH THE COMMERCE COURT. MARCH 29, 1912.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union and ordered to be printed. Mr. SIMS, from the Committe on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, submitted the following REPORT. [To accompany H. R. 19078.] The Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, to whom was referred the bill (H. R. 19078) to abolish the Commerce Court, and for other purposes, submits the following report: [H. R. 19078, Sixty-second Congress, second session.] A BILL To abolish the Commerce Court, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That an act entitled "An act to create a Commerce Court, and to amend the act entitled 'An act to regulate commerce,' approved February fourth, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, as heretofore amended, and for other purposes," approved June eighteenth, nineteen hundred and ten, be amended by striking out sections one to six, inclusive, and paragraph twelve of section thirteen thereof, and inserting in lieu of said sections one to six, inclusive, and said paragraph twelve the following: "SECTION 1. That on and after the passage of this act the jurisdiction vested in the Commerce Court in and by said act of June eighteenth, nineteen hundred and ten, shall be transferred to and vested in the district courts of the United States. "Any suit brought to invoke such jurisdiction shall be brought in the circuit of the United States where one of the common carriers who is a party to said suit has its principal operating office, unless said office is in the District of Columbia, in which case said suit shall be brought in the circuit where such carrier has its principal office, and the provisions of an act entitled 'An act to expedite the hearing and determination of suits in equity pending or hereafter brought under the act of July second, eighteen hundred and ninety, entitled "An act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies," "An act to regulate commerce," approved February fourth, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, or any other acts having a like purpose that may be hereafter enacted, approved February eleventh, nineteen hundred and three,' shall apply to any and all such suits. "SEC. 2. That a final judgment or decree of a district court in any such suit may be reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States if appeal to the Supreme Court be taken by an aggrieved party within sixty days after the entry of such final judgment or decree. Such appeal may be taken in like manner as appeals from a district court of the United States to the Supreme Court are now taken in other suits. The Supreme Court may affirm, reverse, or modify such final judgment or decree, as the case may require. Such appeal, however, shall in no case operate to supersede or stay the judgment or decree appealed from. "An appeal may also be taken to the Supreme Court of the United States from an interlocutory order or decree of a district court granting or continuing an injunction restraining, staying, or suspending enforcement of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission provided such appeal be taken within thirty days after the entry of such order or decree. "Appeals to the Supreme Court under this section shall have priority in hearing and determination over all other causes except criminal causes in that court. 66 SEC. 3. That any suit brought to enforce, or to enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, except orders for the payment of money, shall be brought in the name of the commission, or against the commission by name, as the case may be. The pendency of such suit shall not of itself stay or suspend the operation of the order of the commission, but the court may suspend, in whole or in part, the operation of the commission's order pending final hearing and determination of the suit if the court entertains grave doubt concerning the validity of the order and is of the opinion that irreparable injury to the party or parties against whom the order is made will ensue if such order of suspension is not granted. No preliminary injunction, restraining order, or stay order so suspending the operation of an order of the commission shall be made by the court otherwise than as above and on hearing after not less than five days' notice to the commission, and no order of the court so suspending the operation of an order of the commission shall continue in force for more than ninety days. In case the court shall so suspend the operation of an order of the commission, the court shall state in its order of suspension the particular or particulars wherein it entertains such doubt concerning the validity of the commission's order, and point to the evidence upon which it bases its opinion that irreparable injury to the party or parties against whom the order is made will ensue if such order of suspension is not granted, and state the nature of the injury. "SEC. 4. That the Interstate Commerce Commission shall appoint a solicitor, who shall receive an annual salary of ten thousand dollars, payable out of the appropriation for the commission in the same manner that salaries fixed by the commission are paid. "Said solicitor shall, under the direction of the commission, have full charge and control, on behalf of the commission, in the courts of the United States, including the Supreme Court, of any and all suits brought to enforce, or to enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend any order or orders of the commission, except orders for the payment of money, and of any and all other suits instituted in court by or against the commission, and the commission may from time to time employ such attorneys as it may deem necessary to assist said solicitor in the conduct of such suits, and fix the compensation to be paid to such attorneys, which compensation shall be paid out of the appropriation for the commission: Provided, That any party interested in any order involved in any such suit may intervene in and become a party to said suit and be represented by his, its, or their own counsel therein under such rules, regulations, and practices as are now in effect in equity courts of the United States. "Any and all costs taxed against the commission, and any expense incurred on behalf of the commission, in any suit instituted in court as aforesaid, shall be paid out of the appropriation for the commission. "SEC. 5. That all cases pending in the Commerce Court at the date of passage of this act shall be transferred forthwith to said district courts. Each of said cases shall be transferred to the district court wherein it might have been filed at the time it was filed in the Commerce Court if this act had then been in effect, and if it might have been filed in any one of two or more district courts it shall be transferred to that one of said district courts which may be designated by the petitioner or petitioners in said case, or, upon failure of said petitioners to act in the premises within ten days after the passage of this act, to such one of said district courts as may be designated by the judges of the Commerce Court. "SEC. 6. That if any carrier fails or neglects to obey any order of the commission other than for the payment of money while the same is in effect, the Interstate Commerce Commission may apply to any district court of the |