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ledge, mind is either the subject or the instrument of research. In metaphysics, ethics, politics, theology, and taste, no progress can be made without a previous analysis of the intellectual and moral faculties; the anatomy of the mind must be studied, before the mental powers can be thoroughly known or successfully exercised; and no one will so profitably employ himself in the examination of the material world, as he who has been accustomed to turn his mind inward upon the course of its own operations, to mark their origin, their connection, and their results.

It is of less consequence, no doubt, to vary a little the order, in which the subjects of study are introduced, than to leave out the most important of them altogether: and it does, I humbly confess, appear to me, that, in the English universities, there is too great a portion of the under-graduate course exclusively devoted to the pursuit of classical literature.

But it is not only the matter of study which engages the attention of him who takes a survey of the present state of university education; the methods also which are adopted in the several se minaries of the kingdom, and which present not less variety than the subjects to which they are directed, claim his serious consideration, and naturally suggest some thoughts on the means of their improvement.

Every one knows that the method of teaching philosophy which is pursued in the Scottish colleges, differs considerably from that which has been long acted upon in the universities of England. In the former, a series of written lectures, composed or compiled by, the professors, are annually delivered from their respective chairs; whereas, in the latter, the business of education is carried on almost entirely by means of private reading, and a species of colloquial examinations. In the prosecution of this last method, the college tutor, instead of lecturing, peruses certain authors along with his pupils, explaining particular passages as he goes along, and conversing with them on the doctrines or facts to which their attention has been directed.

Each plan, no doubt, has its peculiar advantages; but it appears to be easily practicable to combine the best parts of each, without sacrificing anything essential in either. Could this not be effected, I have no hesitation in preferring the tutorial system, limited and restricted as it must be, as infinitely more useful than a mere course of lectures, unaccompanied with examinations and exercises. The leading improvement, then, which I should venture to recommend, is the introduction into the English colleges of lectures, properly so called, to be incorporated, to a certain extent, with their present method of teaching by means of reading and conversation. This addition to their system, so far from obstruct

ing or superseding any of their accustomed processes of intellec tual culture, would, I am convinced, both render them more efficacious, and, at the same time, more agreeable to the student. Indeed, the comparatively small number of pupils, and the full command of their time and arrangements, which is placed in the hands of the college tutor, are circumstances eminently favorable to a successful application of the method of teaching I have endeavored to unfold in the foregoing pages.

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The greatest obstacle which we have to encounter, in this part of the island, in following out the details of our plan, by daily examinations, and themes, arises from our very numerous classes, consisting in some instances of nearly two hundred students. a college, therefore, where not more than thirty or forty generally attend the lectures on mental philosophy and ethics, we have the best reason to conclude that the beneficial effects of this system, would be realised to their fullest extent; that each of the young men would be examined every day on the subjects discussed in the lecture, and that essays would be regularly prescribed on the principal topics thus previously illustrated and brought home to their comprehension. The age, too, of the pupils who enter the English universities, presents another facility for adopting, in such schools, the lecture system, as a means of philosophical instruction. The mind of a youth of seventeen or eighteen is sufficiently mature to follow out a train of reasoning, and to perceive the connection of a discourse; whereas, in Scotland, there are always a number of students in the philosophy classes, who are not qualified, either in respect of age or of previous acquirements, for entering upon such pursuits. In every point of view, then, the method of teaching by lecture, examination, and the performance of essays, is fully more suitable to the circumstances of the English and Irish universities, than to those of Scotland; and seems calculated, of course, to produce still greater advantages in the former, than have ever yet been actually realised in the latter.

But, I am aware, it may still be proposed as a preliminary question, whether the method of teaching, in present use, does not answer all the purposes of education, as well as that which is here recommended, whether a careful perusal of select authors, and a subsequent conversation upon them, between the tutor and his pupils, are not employments as likely to improve the minds of youth, as a formal lecture pronounced in their hearing, even when it is made the ground-work of examination, and converted into materials for exercises in composition.

To decide this point, it is necessary to come to an understanding as to what are, or ought to be, the main purposes of education; and I should imagine, there can be no difficulty in admitting that

these are comprehended, first, in the communication of knowledge; and, secondly, in the cultivation of the mental powers, without a reference to any specific acquirement, in literature or science.

With regard to the communication of knowlege, there can be no doubt that, as far as regards classical learning, mathematics, and the higher parts of arithmetic, the only rational method of conveying instruction is to peruse, with the pupil, the best works in these several departments. No man ever thought of teaching a boy to understand Homer, Euclid, or La Place, by means of lectures. But we are now speaking of philosophical education, as it relates to the science of mind; of morals, and of human life; the principles of reasoning and of taste; the distinction of good and evil, the doctrines of justice, of law, and of government; and, certainly, in this wide field, where opinions have so long remained unsettled, and where no authority is permitted to give a final decision, a very different mode of instruction ought to be pursued. It is here, in short, that the lecture system ought to be introduced, as supplementary to that of individual reading.

For instance, it is only necessary to observe that no one writer contains all that the student ought to know, and that every writer comprehends more than it is either requisite or expedient should be laid before him. Our greatest authors, it is well known, wrote, not for beginners, nor with the view of giving a didactic system, but for the learned world at large, and cominonly, too, with the intention either of attacking or supporting some particular hypothesis. It is impossible, therefore, to find, in any single work, the elementary statements, combined with those general views on which a philosophical education should be constructed and thus it necessarily becomes the office of a teacher to read, to select, and to arrange, for the use of his pupils; and, from the stores of knowledge with which his professional studies must be supposed to have furnished him, to bring forward what shall appear best suited to their previous attainments, as well as to the particular object of his course. In drawing up his lectures in such circumstances, the professor will frequently see it expedient to confine himself to the outlines of subjects, which may be treated by the original author in great detail: he will give, at some length, the history of opinion on the more important questions which present themselves for discussion: he will call the attention of his pupils to the various stages in the progress of the human mind, from its first attempt at generalisation to the accomplishment of a connected system: and, in particular, he will point out the numerous sources of error, whether arising from the nature of certain inquiries, or from the imperfection of human reason, which have at various times materially retarded the advancement of science. Indeed, in many sub

jects of study, such as divinity, law, ethics, and politics, the history of opinion constitutes the sum and substance of our knowledge. Our inquiries after the statement of a few first principles, are directed to little more than the succession of truth and error, to the varying forms which they may have assumed, and to the circumstances which have paved the way for their alternate reception. It must then be abundantly evident, that the perusal of no one work, in these departments, nor, indeed, of all the works, at any one period, would be sufficient for the purposes of instruction.

If, indeed, we shall be allowed to suppose, that the object of the tutor and his pupil is confined to the very limited attainment of knowing what were the opinions of an individual author; of Aristotle, for example, of Bacon, of Locke, or of Reid, on any particular point of philosophy, the plan of education at present pursued is unquestionably the best that could be imagined to gratify their ambition; for, they have only to turn up the chapter and section of the particular work, to examine the argument, and to note down the conclusion. But if, on the other hand, their views extend to the more exalted object of inquiring what are now received as the general opinions, on the various subjects handled so successfully by Aristotle, Bacon, Locke, and Reid, in their respective workswhat were the notions which prevailed as to the object of philosophy, and the principles of human knowledge, in the long interval between the first and last of these distinguished writers-what were the discoveries or modes of thinking which led to the several changes of doctrine on these points, as we find them recorded in the history of science, and upon what particular grounds each succeeding theory was ultimately maintained or rejected, it is manifest that all the reading which the pupil, directed by his tutor, could possibly overtake, during the whole time allotted for college residence, would not enable him to accomplish this end. In short, the reading system of instruction can only be recommended when the teacher wishes to convey to his students the views of some individual philosopher; and, as such a limited undertaking is altogether inconsistent with the present state of science, it follows that, in order to realise the first mentioned purpose of academical education, namely, the communication of knowledge, the tutor ought to prepare, from his own stores of information, a course of lectures for the use of his pupils; containing at once an outline which they should endeavor to fill up, and a guide to the best source of materials.

Let us apply these general observations to the actual practice of the schools where the reading plan of teaching philosophy is adopted. The books usually read in the colleges alluded to, as an introduction to the philosophy of mind, are, I believe, Aristotle's

Analytics, or an abridgement of them in Latin, Locke on the Human Understanding, Reid's Essays, Stewart's Elements, and one or two other works written on the same subjects, and with the same views. Now, it cannot fail to strike every person acquainted with the character of the publications just specified, that, in many respects, they are quite unsuitable for the purpose of elementary instruction; particularly as they contain, even in the first parts of them, much of abstraction, generalisation, and deep reasoning, entirely beyond the comprehension of the youthful mind. I pass over the Analytics, which are now generally considered as altogether unfit to be used as an introduction to the study of Philosophy. But even the Essay of Mr. Locke is little better calculated for the commencement of a philosophical course. He begins with a very argumentative dissertation on the doctrine of innate ideas, and goes on to explain our notions of power, time, space, infinity, &c. which are some of the most abstract conceptions of the human mind. Dr. Reid, again, in his essays on the intellectual powers, after some very judicious observations on the method of studying mind, proceeds almost immediately to certain hypotheses on the nerves and brain, the phenomena of external objects, and the doctrine of ideas illustrated by the theories of Berkley, Leibnitz, and Hume. The work of Mr. Stewart, too, although entitled Elements of Philosophy, can be considered as elements to those only who have already made considerable progress in the study of mind. It requires only to run over the contents of the first part of his first volume, to be satisfied of this fact. The general and enlightened views which he gives on education, on the art of reasoning, and on the theories of perception, cannot be fully comprehended by those to whom the very term philosophy has never been explained, and who are of course completely in the dark as to the precise objects of all their inquiries.

It cannot be necessary to remark, I should hope, that these strictures have no reference whatever to the general merits of the works now mentioned, all of which have so materially extended the bounds of science, and done so much honor to their respective authors. Nothing more is meant, than that from the subjects which are discussed, and the abstract manner in which these works are composed, they are not at all suited, as school-books, to the habits and acquirements of those entering on their first course of philosophy.

But, supposing that the works of an individual philosopher, Mr. Locke, or Dr. Reid, for instance, were completely calculated for a college lesson; that the matter, the arrangement, and the mode of writing, were, in all respects, suitable to the capacity of beginners, it is clear that pupils taught in this way, would only become

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