be necessary, in order to arrive at the natural meaning of the words employed. Hammock v. Loan and Trust Co., 105 U.S. 77, 84-85; United States v. Lacher, 134 U.S. 624, 628; United States v. Oregon &c. Railroad, 164 U.S. 526, 541; Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 480; Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Voelker, 129 Fed. 522, 526–527. Our attention is called to the fact that the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, in reporting the bill which afterwards became the act in question (H.R. 850, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 2-4), agreed with the view that the authority to make rules and regulations was confined to the establishment of tolerances and exemptions; and that the Senate Committee on Manufactures (S.R. 1216, 62d Cong., 3d Sess., pp. 2-4) reported to the same effect. In proper cases, such reports are given consideration in determining the meaning of a statute, but only where that meaning is doubtful. They cannot be resorted to for the purpose of construing a statute contrary to the natural import of its terms. Wisconsin R.R. Comm. v. C., B. & Q. R.R. Co., 257 U.S. 563, 588-589; Penna. R.R. Co. v. International Coal Co., 230 U.S. 184, 199; Van Camp & Sons v. Am. Can Co., 278 U.S. 245, 253. Like other extrinsic aids to construction their use is "to solve, but not to create an ambiguity." Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 421. Or, as stated in United States v. Hartwell, 6 Wall. 385, 396, "If the language be clear it is conclusive. There can be no construction where there is nothing to construe." The same rule is recognized by the English courts. In King v. Commissioners, 5 A. & E. 804, 816, Lord Denman, applying the rule, said that the court was constrained to give the words of a private act then under consideration an effect which probably was "never contemplated by those who obtained the act, and very probably not intended by the legislature which enacted it. But our duty is to look to the language employed, and construe it in its natural and obvious sense." See also United States v. Lexington Mill Co., 232 U.S. 399, 409; Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485.

* *

Moreover, the practical and long continued construction of the executive departments charged with the administration of the act and with the duty of making the rules and regulations therein provided for, has been in accordance with the view we have expressed as to the meaning of the section under consideration. The rules and regulations, as amended on May 11, 1914, deal with the entire subject in detail under the recital, "(i) The following tolerances and variations (italics supplied) from the quantity of the contents marked on the package shall be allowed: Then follows an enumeration of discrepancies due to errors in weighing which occur in packing conducted in compliance with good commercial practice; due to differences in capacity of bottles and similar containers, resulting from unavoidable difficulties in manufacture, etc.; or in weight due to atmospheric differences in various places, etc. These regulations, which cover variations as well as tolerances and exemptions, have been in force for a period of more than 18 years, with the silent acquiescence of Congress. If the meaning of the statutory words was doubtful, so as to call for a resort to extrinsic aid in an effort to reach a proper construction of them, we should hesitate to accept the committee reports in preference to this contemporaneous and long continued practical construction of the act on the part of those charged with its administration. Such a construction, in cases of doubtful meaning,

is accepted unless there are cogent and persuasive reasons for rejecting it. See, for example, United States v. Johnson, 124 U.S. 236, 253. Second. The contention that the act contravenes the provisions of the Constitution with respect to the separation of the governmental powers is without merit. That the legislative power of Congress cannot be delegated is, of course, clear. But Congress may declare its will, and after fixing a primary standard, devolve upon administrative officers the "power to fill up the details" by prescribing administrative rules and regulations. That the authority conferred by the act now under review in this respect does not transcend the power of Congress is not open to reasonable dispute. The effect of the provision assailed is to define an offense, but with directions to those charged with the administration of the act to make supplementary rules and regulations allowing reasonable variations, tolerances and exemptions, which, because of their variety and need of detailed statement, it was impracticable for Congress to prescribe. The effect of the proviso is evident and legitimate, namely, to prevent the embarrassment and hardship which might result from a too literal and minute enforcement of the act, without at the same time offending against its purposes. The proviso does not delegate legislative power, but confers administrative functions entirely valid within principles established by numerous decisions of this court, of which the following may be cited as examples. Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 496; Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531, 542; United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, and authorities reviewed.

Judgment reversed.

Mr. Justice BRANDEIS, Mr. Justice STONE and Mr. Justice CARDOZO concur in the result on the ground that the statute, as punctuated, reads as its legislative history shows Congress intended it to read, and that, so read, it is sufficiently definite to satisfy constitutional requirements.

UNITED STATES v. 186 BOXES OF WHOLE TULLIBEES AND 116 BOXES OF DRESSED TULLIBEES

(District Court, S.D. New York, Feb. 21, 1933)

Two suits by the Government to forfeit certain lots of tullibees received in foreign and interstate commerce, upon the ground that they were adulterated within the meaning of the Food and Drugs Act of June 30, 1906 (21 U.S.C. secs. 1 to 15). By stipulation the suits were tried together before a jury of one and both sides moved for a direction of a verdict; the court thereupon orally stated the specific facts proved by the evidence and at the request of counsel reserved decision upon the motions so as to give opportunity for the submission of briefs. Verdict directed for the Government.

COLEMAN, Judge. Without repeating the statement of specific facts made by the court at the close of the trial, the question presented is whether under the Food and Drug Act of June 30, 1906 (21 U.S.C. secs. 1 to 15) raw fish infested with parasitic worms should be condemned and forfeited in the absence of proof that the parasites would be injurious to the consumer or would impair the taste of the fish,

but where it appears that an ordinary person would have a strong revulsion against eating such fish if aware of the presence of the worms, and where it further appears that only an experienced person would discover them. The worms themselves are threadlike structures difficult to identify, but they are surrounded by a quantity of thick, greenish yellow fluid unpleasantly suggestive of pus, which consists of broken-down fish tissue and to some extent the excreta of the worms. This fluid would readily be observable by anyone eating the fish; but unless he knew its origin, it would probably be unobjectionable.

The Food and Drug Act (title 21, U.S.Č.) bans adulterated foods in foreign and interstate commerce, and section 8, subdivision 6 provides that food shall be deemed adulterated

if it consists in whole or in part of a filthy, decomposed, or putrid animal or vegetable substance, or any portion of an animal unfit for food, whether manufactured or not, or if it is the product of a diseased animal or one that has died otherwise than by slaughter.

It seems to me that the fish in question come within the scope of that subdivision and are not excluded by the absence of proof that their condition would impair the health of the consumer or the flavor of the fish. The subdivision does not expressly prescribe such requisite and the courts have held that it does not imply one (Knapp v. Callaway, 52 Fed. (2d) 476; A. O. Andersen & Co. v. United States, 284 Fed. 542). While the statute is primarily concerned with the health of the consumers, it might well ban "filthy " or " decomposed " animal matter or the " product of a diseased animal" without direct or scientific proof of danger to health. The æsthetic guide frequently precedes the scientific one and the Government might wisely ban food which runs counter to it in the categories mentioned.

The fact that most consumers would not discover the worms and would, therefore, not have their feelings affronted is of no consequence because were it otherwise, the statute would not be needed. The statute is largely intended to protect those consumers who would not be in a position to observe the defect in the food.

Verdict is directed for the Government. Settle order on notice.

167546-36-85

DIGEST OF COURT DECISIONS

ABBOTT BROS. RHEUMATIC REMEDY:

A drug labeled "Abbott Bros. Rheumatic Remedy" held misbranded in that the package and label contained statements regarding the curative or therapeutic effect of the article with respect to certain diseases, which were false and fraudulent. United States v. Abbott Bros. Co‒‒‒‒‒

Affirmed, Abbott Bros. Co. v. United States.

ACETANILID:

Where a derivative of acetanilid, such as acetphenetidin, contained in a drug product, is declared on the label by its proper name, it is unnecessary to state on the label that such derivative substance is derived from acetanilid. United States v. 100 Packages of Antikamnia Tablets___.

Judgment affirmed, United States v. Antikamnia Chemical Co___ Judgment reversed, United States v. Antikamnia Chemical Co--It is a violation of the act and regulations to label a drug as containing acetphenetidin without stating that acetphenetidin is a derivative of acetanilid. United States v. Antikamnia Chemical Co---ACETPHENETIDIN.

See Acetanilid.

ADDED POISONOUS AND ADDED DELETERIOUS INGREDIENTS: Under the act, sections 7 and 8, an article of food other than confectionery is not deemed to be adulterated merely because it contains a poisonous or deleterious ingredient unless such ingredient has been "added", that is, unless it is foreign to the natural or normal composition of the article. United States v. 40 Barrels and 20 Kegs of Coca-Cola____

Judgment affirmed, United States v. 40 Barrels and 20 Kegs of Coca Cola__

Judgment of C. C. A. reversed, United States v. Coca Cola Co--The word "added", in the act, section 7, declaring an article of food adulterated if it contains any added poisonous or other added deleterious ingredient which may render the article injurious to health, implies the existence of a standard, and an element necessarily used to create a standard is not "added", and caffeine, forming a valuable constituent of Coco Cola, made up of water, sugar, caffeine, phosphoric acid, glycerine, lime juice, coloring, and flavoring matter, is not "added", where for 15 years before the act the article containing all the ingredients had been widely used. United States v. 40 Barrels and 20 Kegs of Coco Cola----

Affirming judgment in United States v. 40 Barrels and 20 Kegs
of Coca-Cola___

Judgment of C. C. A. reversed, United States v. Coca Cola Co--The court, in construing the act, section 7, clause 5, declaring an article of food adulterated if it contain any added poisonous or other added deleterious ingredient which may render the article injurious to health, must give effect to the word "added", and not construe the clause in the same way that an almost identical clause relating to confectionery with the exception of the omission of the word "added" must be construed, for the court must give effect to all the words of a statute in their ordinary sense. United States v. Coca Cola Co‒‒‒‒

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