REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF. WAR DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF, SIR: I have the honor to submit my annual report. The fact that we are in the midst of war with a shrewd and powerful enemy makes it undesirable to touch upon some matters which would otherwise be dealt with in this report; moreover, my absence in Russia, the great press of business since my return, and my impending departure for France, have left too little time in which to adequately comment upon all of them were such a course now prudent. I shall, therefore, confine myself to a few general questions which seem of grave importance for the present and future efficiency of the Army. THE GENERAL STAFF. The greatest emergency which has confronted the country since 1860 fortunately found the Army possessed of an organ without which no intelligent preparation for a war is possible and whose absence in previous conflicts has crippled the most patriotic efforts, delayed the decision, and magnified the expense. It may be said that the General Staff is only just growing to man's estate. An act of Congress in 1903 created this organ in name, but that act could not endow a large body of officers with the special education and experience which are the attributes of a General Staff. This education and experience had to be created; the act merely gave the authority to undertake the task. The Staff College and the War College were therefore instituted, but the instructors themselves had to be evolved before these schools could begin to turn out a useful product. Such a process is long, and it is only in the last few years that a small but steady supply of men has passed through the Staff College and the War College and, returning to their regiments, constituted a little reservoir from which could be drawn from time to time and under very strict rules officers understanding at least the theory and trained at least in the theoretical application of general-staff methods. Since war was declared the demand for officers having this education has been enormous; the supply wholly inadequate. But these few officers have worked with a devotion and skill worthy of great praise, and it is without fear of contradiction that I record the belief that had this small category of officers educated in general-staff work never been created the confusion, delay, and disappointments of 1898 would have been repeated and magnified in 1917. When war was declared on April 6 last only 20 officers were available for the huge work suddenly placed upon the General Staff in Washington-work which the law anticipated that it alone should do, work which the General Staff alone was qualified to do. Of these 20 officers 9 were employed by the Chief of Staff in his office on duties prescribed for him by law, viz, the coordination and supervision of the entire Military Establishment; upon the remaining 11 devolved "the study of military problems, the preparation of plans for the national defense, and the utilization of the military forces in time of war." This paucity of officers for work of such unparalleled importance, which can only be described as deplorably unfortunate, was the result of the act of Congress of June 3, 1916, which limited the number of officers who could be assigned to the General Staff to 55, and which prescribed that not more than half of these could at any time be employed upon any duty in or near Washington. During the whole year following this enactment there was pressing need of a large force of officers educated in general-staff work to prepare tentative plans for the very situation which finally arose; but precisely during this period the law made it impossible for me to so employ them. It is not too much to say that a hundred officers could have been usefully occupied on matters for which only 11 were available. Nothing could more clearly show the practical disadvantage to the country of having the law limit so unconditionally the number of officers who even in an emergency may be employed on General Staff work and the number which may be assembled in a given place, as Washington, in order to do that work. An emergency may arise of such delicacy as to make it unwise to request Congress to enact a special law providing the agencies to meet it; the crisis may pass and no harm is done, but if the crisis does not pass but grows into a great war, is it wise to cripple the very instrument of preparation which the law and the country rely upon for protection? THE WAR COLLEGE. The military problems incident to the concentration of the Regular Army and the National Guard along the border as well as the reorganization of the Regular Army under the act of June 3, 1916, had given full occupation to the small body of General Staff officers on duty in Washington up to the outbreak of war. The flood of problems immediately preceding and following the rupture of diplomatic relations with Germany was more than they could cope with, and as a first measure of relief five General Staff officers were taken from duty on the border and sent to the War College, giving it a total of 16 officers. No further increase was possible until Congress, on May 18, 1917, increased the General Staff Corps to 91 officers. These were selected and appointed, and finally 47 of them were assembled at the War College for work. Had they been there in February and the months following, preparations for our entrance into the war would have been improved and hastened. The general staff of most European armies have their problems solved before the outbreak of hostilities; when war comes they have but to execute plans already made. Such was not the case with us. |