Opinion of the Court.

original raw material in this case the tree or log - but the product of a prior manufacture; the finished product of one manufacture thus becoming the material of the next in rank. This case, then, resolves itself into the question whether the materials out of which these boxes were constructed were the boards which were manufactured in Canada or the shooks which were imported into the United States.

While the planing and cutting of the boards in Canada into the requisite lengths and shapes for the sides, ends, tops and bottoms of the boxes, was doubtless a partial manufacture, it was not a complete one, since the boards so cut are not adaptable as material for other and different objects of manufacture, but were designed and appropriate only for a particular purpose, i.e., for the manufacture of boxes of a prescribed size, and were useless for any other purpose. It is not always easy to determine the difference between a complete and a partial manufacture, but we may say generally that an article which can only be used for a particular purpose, in which the process of manufacture stops short of the completed article, can only be said to be partially manufactured within the meaning of this section; nor can we regard the mere assembling and nailing together of parts complete in themselves and destined for a particular purpose as a complete and separate manufacture. Thus, chairs are made of bottoms, backs, legs and rounds, each one of these parts being made separately and in large quantities. If imported in this condition from abroad, and the parts were assembled and glued or screwed together here, we think it entirely clear that such chairs would not be wholly manufactured in the United States; and the same may be said of the staves, heads and hoops which constitute a barrel. Upon the theory of the claimant, if all the parts which constitute a wooden house were made separately, as they sometimes are, and imported from abroad and put together in this country in the form of a house, it would follow that the house must be said to have been wholly constructed in this country.

It may be said generally, although not universally, that a complete manufacture is either the ultimate product of prior

Opinion of the Court.

successive manufactures, such as a watch spring, or a penknife, or an intermediate product which may be used for different purposes, such for instance as pig iron, iron bars, lumber or cloth; while a partial manufacture is a mere stage in the development of the material toward an ultimate and predestined product, such for instance as the different parts of a watch which need only to be put together to make the finished article. If, for instance, the wheels, chain, springs, dial, hands and case of a watch were all imported from abroad, and merely put together in this country, we do not think it could be said that the watch was wholly manufactured within the United States. The same remark we think may be made with reference to the shooks in this case, which were practically worthless except for being put together for a box of a definite size.

The distinction here made was alluded to in the opinion of this court in Worthington v. Robbins, 139 U. S. 337, 341, in which the question arose whether "white hard enamel," used for various purposes, including watch dials, was dutiable as "watch materials," or as a simple manufacture. In delivering the opinion of the court Mr. Justice Blatchford said: "The article in question was, to all intents and purposes, raw material. If it were to be classed as watch materials,' it would follow that any metal which could ultimately be used, and was ultimately used, in the manufacture of a watch, but could be used for other purposes also, would be dutiable as 'watch materials.' In order to be 'watch materials' the article must in itself bear marks of its special adaptation for use in making watches. The fact that the article in question was used in the manufacture of watches has no relation to the condition of the article as imported, but to what afterwards the importer did with it."

It does not necessarily follow that the shooks in question were not a manufacture, and dutiable as such, or that they were dutiable as boxes, though destined to be put together as such, since in United States v. Schoverling, 146 U. S. 76, finished gunstocks with locks and mountings, unaccompanied by barrels, were held to be dutiable as manufactures of iron, and not as "guns."

Opinion of the Court.

Bearing in mind that the object of the drawback was partly, at least, to encourage domestic manufactures, and that all the substantial work done in this country was in nailing together the tops, bottoms and sides of these boxes, we think it clear that it cannot be said that the boxes so constructed were wholly manufactured in the United States. The work done in trimming or sawing off the ends of the boards was a mere incident to the nailing together, and was caused by the inadvertence, negligence or insufficient instructions given to the Canadian manufacturer, and was no proper part of the manufacture. While the amount of work done to constitute a new manufacture may not be great, Saltonstall v. Wiebusch, 156 U. S. 601, yet we think the fact that in the transfer of those boards to the completed boxes, the cost of labor expended in the United States represented only one tenth in value of the boxes is important, especially when taken in connection with the fact that the shooks when imported were usable only for a single purpose. It is quite improbable that Congress intended to allow a drawback upon the nine tenths represented by the Canadian material for the benefit of the one tenth represented by the labor put upon the boxes in this country. What was doubtless meant was to allow this drawback upon articles manufactured wholly and bona fide within the United States, either from the raw material, or from material which was the result of the last complete manufacture.

While the nails, which were used in fastening the shooks together and were made from iron rods imported from abroad, may be said to have been wholly manufactured in the United States within the principles here announced, they lost their identity as such when used in nailing the shooks together, and became so far a part of the boxes that no separate drawback could be claimed for them.

There was no error in dismissing the petition, and the judgment of the Court of Claims is therefore

Affirmed.

The grant which is the subject of controversy in this case was one which, at the time of the cession in 1853, was recognized by the government of Mexico as valid, and therefore is one which it is the duty of this Government to respect and enforce to the extent of one and three fourths sitios.

In Ainsa v. United States, 161 U. S. 208, it was decided, with reference to such grants, that while monuments control courses and distances, and courses and distances control quantity, where there is uncertainty in specific description, the quantity named may be of decisive weight, and necessarily is so if the intention to convey only so much and no more is plain and this case comes within that rule.

ON October 19, 1892, proceeding under section 8 of the act of March 3, 1891, c. 539, creating the Court of Private Land Claims, 26 Stat. 854, the United States filed in that court a petition against Santiago Ainsa, administrator of the estate of Frank Ely, deceased, and others, alleging that said administrator claimed to be the owner through mense conveyances of a large tract of land in the Territory of Arizona, known as the Rancho de San Jose de Sonoita; that he had not voluntarily come into the court to seek a consideration of his title; that the title was open to question, and was in fact invalid and void; that the other defendants claimed some interests in the land, and praying that they all might be brought into court and be ruled to answer the petition, set up their titles and have them settled and adjudicated.

In an amended answer the administrator set forth the nature and extent of his title, and prayed that it be inquired into and declared valid. Reply having been filed, the case came on for trial, which resulted in a decree on March 30, 1894, that the claim for confirmation of title be disallowed

1 The docket title of this case is Santiago Ainsa, administrator of the estate of Frank Ely, deceased, v. The United States.

Statement of the Case.

and rejected. The opinion by Associate Justice Sluss contains this general statement of the facts:

"On the 29th day of May, 1821, Leon Herreros presented his petition to the intendente of the provinces Sonora and Sinaloa, asking to obtain title to two sitios of land at the place known as Sonoita. The intendente referred the petition to the commander at Tubac, directing him to cause the tract to be surveyed, appraised and the proposed sale thereof to be advertised for thirty days.

"In obedience to this order the officer proceeded to make a survey of the tract, which was made on the 26th and 27th days of June, 1821, and on the completion of the survey he caused it to be appraised, the appraised value being one hundred and five dollars. Thereupon the proposed sale was advertised for thirty consecutive days by proclamation made by a crier appointed for that purpose, beginning on June 29 and ending on the 28th day of July, 1821. Thereupon, on the 31st day of July, 1821, the officer took the testimony of three witnesses to the effect that Herreros had property and means to occupy the tract. On October 20, 1821, the proceedings above mentioned being reduced to writing, were by the officer returned to the intendente.

"On October 25, 1821, the intendente referred the proceedings to the promoter fiscal for his examination.

"On November 7, 1821, the promoter fiscal reported to the intendente the regularity of the proceedings and recommending that the land be offered for sale at three public auctions, and thereupon the auctions were ordered to be held.

"The first auction was held on November 8, 1821, the second on November 9, and the third on November 10, 1821.

"At the conclusion of the third auction the land was struck off to Herreros at the appraised value by the board of auction, of which board the intendente was a member and the president.

"All these proceedings being concluded, on the 12th day of November, 1821, Herreros paid to the officers of the treasury the amount of the appraisement, together with the fees and charges required to be paid, and with his concurrence the