Opinion of the Court. established, with power to entertain appeals and writs of error, the act of March 3, 1891, cannot be regarded as applicable in such cases. Where a statute provides for a writ of error to a specified court of appeals it must be regarded as a repeal of any previous statute which provides for a writ of error to another and different court. The decisions of the Court of Appeals of the United States in the Indian Territory are final except so far as they are made subject to review by some express provision of law. In the eleventh section of the act of March 1, 1895, it is provided that "appeals and writs of error from the final decision of said appellate court shall be allowed, and may be taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Judicial Circuit in the same manner and under the same regulations as appeals are taken from the Circuit Courts of the United States:" but it is not claimed by the counsel for the plaintiff in error that this provision applies to capital cases; and see the case of Folsom v. United States, 160 U. S. 121. It has been held by this court that the court established in the Indian Territory, though a court of the United States, is not a District or Circuit Court of the United States. In re Mills, 135 U. S. 263, 268. We accept the contention of the Solicitor General on behalf of the Government, that the Court of Appeals in the Indian Territory, being a court of the United States, is analogous to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, and bears the same relation to the trial court in the Indian Territory as the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia bore to the trial court in the District. And it was held in Ex parte Bigelow, 113 U. S. 328, 329, that no appeal could be taken or writ of error sued out to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia in a capital case, the court saying: "No appeal or writ of error in such case as that lies to this court. The act of Congress has made the judgment of that court conclusive, as it had a right to do, and the defendant, having one review of his trial and judgment, has no special reason to complain." In re Heath, 144 U. S. 92; Cross v. Burke, 146 U. S. 82, 84. Statement of the Case. Our conclusion is that we have no appellate jurisdiction of capital cases from the United States court for the Northern District of the Indian Territory, and that such appellate jurisdiction is vested exclusively in the United States Court of Appeals in the Indian Territory. The motion is allowed and the writs of error in these cases are NAEGLIN v. DE CORDOBA. Dismissed. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF NEW MEXICO. An order signed in vacation by the several members of the Supreme Court of the Territory of New Mexico cannot be considered an order of the court. The statutes of New Mexico provide that, in the absence of legitimate children, illegitimate children inherit. A natural guardian has no power to release the claim of a ward to an inheritance without the sanction of some tribunal. ON March 29, 1886, the appellees, Doloritas Martin de Cordoba et al., filed their bill in the district court of the county of Mora, fourth judicial district, Territory of New Mexico, to establish their rights as the children and heirs of one Frederick Metzger. After answer the case was referred to a master, who reported findings of fact and conclusions of law in favor of the plaintiffs. Upon a hearing in the district court a decree was entered adversely to the conclusions of the master and for the defendants. On appeal to the Supreme Court of the Territory that decree was on August 24, 1895, reversed, and one entered remanding the case to the district court, with instructions to enter a decree in conformity with the findings and conclusions of the master. Thereupon the defendants appealed to this court. At the time of entering the decree, and also of overruling Statement of the Case. a petition for rehearing, no statement of facts was prepared by the Supreme Court, and no other determination of the facts than such as appears from the direction to enter a decree in conformity with the findings and recommendations of the master. But after the Supreme Court had adjourned, an application was made to have the findings of fact made by the master incorporated into the record as a statement and finding of facts by that court, for the purpose of an appeal, and upon that application the following order was entered: "And now the foregoing statement and finding as to the facts proven and established by the evidence in each of said causes are ordered to be incorporated in the record of said Supreme Court as part thereof as fully as we may be thereunto empowered, the July term of the Supreme Court having been adjourned on the 26th day of September, A.D. 1896, and this order made and signed by each of the judges while in his district respectively. THOMAS SMITH, Chief Justice. Associate Justice, Supreme Court of New Mexico. "Signed at Silver City, in the third judicial district. GIDEON D. BANTZ, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of New Signed at Santa Fé, N. M., in the first judicial district. Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and It appears from the bill, answer and findings that Frederick Metzger, though an unmarried man, was the father of several children by different women, and this suit is one between these several illegitimate children to determine their respective rights to share in his estate. The counsel for appellants says in his brief: "The bill of complaint and the testimony present for determination of the court two questions: First, what estate Opinion of the Court. and property did Metzger own at the time of his death? and, second, who is entitled to that estate?" Mr. Harvey Spalding for appellants. No appearance for appellees. MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the court. No question is made in this record as to the admission or exclusion of testimony. There being no jury the case comes here on appeal, and the only question we can consider is whether the findings of fact sustain the decree. Act of April 7, 1874, c. 80, 18 Stat. 27; Stringfellow v. Cain, 99 U. S. 610; Cannon v. Pratt, 99 U. S. 619; Neslin v. Wells, 104 U. S. 428; Ilecht v. Boughton, 105 U. S. 235, 236; Gray v. Howe, 108 U. S. 12; Eilers v. Boatman, 111 U. S. 356; Zeckendorf v. Johnson, 123 U. S. 617; Sturr v. Beck, 133 U. S. 541; Mammoth Min. Co. v. Salt Lake Foundry & Machine Co., 151 U. S. 447. The order signed in vacation by the several members of the Supreme Court cannot be considered an order of the court. Assuming, however, for the purposes of this case, that, in view of the general language in the opinion of the court, we may take the findings of the master as its statement of facts, we observe that no doubtful question of law is presented for our determination. The master finds that Metzger was the father of the appellees, and that he owned certain property. These are questions of fact, resting upon testimony, concluded, so far as this court is concerned, by the findings, and into which it is not our privilege to enter. While under the common law illegitimate children did not inherit from their father, the statutes of New Mexico introduced a new rule of inheritance (Comp. Laws, New Mexico, 1884, tit. 20, c. 4, sec. 1435, p. 680): "Natural children, in the absence of legitimate, are heirs to their father's estate, in preference to the ascendants, and are direct heirs to the mother if she die intestate." In other words, under this stat Counsel for Parties. ute, there being no legitimate children, illegitimate children inherit. It appears that on March 19, 1875, and while Metzger was living, the mother of these plaintiffs, then minors, in her own right and for the minors, receipted and relinquished all claims against him. Without stopping to consider what was meant by that release, and giving to it all the scope which its language may suggest, we remark that a natural guardian has no power to release the claim of a ward to an inheritance without the sanction of some tribunal. Woerner's American Law of Guardianship, p. 185, and following. The decree is PIERCE v. SOMERSET RAILWAY. Affirmed. ERROR TO THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF THE STATE OF MAINE. No. 12. Argued October 11, 12, 1898. - Decided October 31, 1898. Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U. S. 361, affirmed and followed to the points: (1) That to give this court jurisdiction of a writ of error to a state court, it must appear affirmatively, not only that a Federal question was presented for decision by the state court, but that its decision was necessary to the determination of the cause, and that it was decided adversely to the party claiming a right under the Federal laws or Constitution, or that the judgment, as rendered, could not have been given without deciding it; (2) That where the record discloses that, if a question has been raised and decided adversely to a party claiming the benefit of a provision of the Constitution or laws of the United States, another question, not Federal, has been also raised and decided against such party, and the decision of the latter question is sufficient, notwithstanding the Federal question, to sustain the judgment, this court will not review the judgment. THE case is stated in the opinion. Mr. D. D. Stewart for plaintiffs in error. Mr. H. B. Cleaves was with him on the brief. Mr. Edmund F. Webb and Mr. Josiah H. Drummond for VOL. CLXXI-41 |