permitted which will weaken said rule founded upon the principles of
public policy. Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Central Transportation
Co., 138.
2. Acting upon those settled principles the court decides: (1) That the
Central Company is entitled to recover from the Pullman Company the
value of the property transferred by it to that company when the lease
took effect, with interest, as that property has substantially disap-
peared, and cannot now be returned; (2) That the value of that prop-
erty is not to be ascertained from the market value of the shares of the
Central Company's stock at that time, but by the value of the property
transferred; (3) That the value of the contracts with railroad compa-
nies transferred by the Central Company forms no part of the sum which
it is entitled to recover; (4) That the same principle applies to the
patents transferred which had all expired; (5) That it is not entitled
to recover anything for the breaking up of its business by reason of the
contracts being adjudged illegal. Ib.
1. An indictment under Rev. Stat. § 3296, for the concealment of distilled
spirits on which the tax has not been paid, removed to a place other
than the distillery warehouse provided by law, which charges the per-
formance of that act at a particular time and place, and in the lan-
guage of the statute, is sufficiently certain. Pounds v. United States, 35.
2. When there is nothing in the record to show that the jury in a criminal
case separated before the verdict was returned into court, and the
record shows that a sealed verdict was returned by the jury by agree-
ment of counsel for both parties in open court, and in the presence of
the defendant, the verdict was rightly received and recorded. Ib.
1. In order to authorize a denial of a plaintiff's motion to discontinue a
suit in equity, there must be some plain legal prejudice to the
defendant, other than the mere prospect of future litigation, rendered
possible by the discontinuance. Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Central
Transportation Co., 138.
2. Unless there be an obvious violation of a fundamental rule of a court
of equity, or an abuse of the discretion of the court, the decision of
a motion for leave to discontinue will not be reviewed here. lb.
3. The decision of the Circuit Court in denying the motion of the Pullman
Company to discontinue its suit was right, as was also its decision
permitting the Central Company to file a cross bill. Ib.
The commissioners of the District of Columbia have no power to agree to
a common law submission of a claim against the District. District of
Columbia v. Bailey, 161.
The court of claims made the following findings of fact in this case.
I. During the years 1889, 1890 and 1891 the claimant was a corpora-
tion existing under the laws of New Jersey, organized in 1888, and
having a factory for carrying on its business at Bayonne, in that
State. II. In 1889 and 1890 the claimant imported from Canada box
shooks, and from Europe steel rods, upon which importation duties
amounting in the aggregate to $39,636.20 were paid to the United
States, of which sum $837.68 was paid on the importation of the steel
rods. III. The box shooks imported as set forth in finding II were
manufactured in Canada from boards, first being planed and then
cut into required lengths and widths, intended to be substantially
correct for making into boxes without further labor than nailing the
shooks together. They were then tied up in bundles of sides, of ends,
of bottoms, and of tops of from fifteen to twenty-five in a bundle for
convenience in handling and shipping. IV. The shooks so manu-
factured in Canada and imported into the United States as aforesaid
were, at the claimant's factory in Bayonne, New Jersey, constructed
into the boxes or cases set forth in Exhibit E to the petition herein,
by nailing the same together with nails manufactured in the United
States out of the steel rods imported as aforesaid, and by trimming
when defective in length or width to make the boxes or cases without
projecting parts, i.e.: the shooks were imported in bundles of ends, of
sides, of tops and of bottoms, each part coming in bundles separated
from the bundles of other parts. From one of these bundles of ends
the ends of a box are selected, to which the sides taken indiscrimi-
nately from any bundle of sides are nailed by nailing machines; then
the sides are trimmed off even with the ends by saws; then by bottom-
ing machines bottoms taken from any bundle of bottoms are nailed
on; then the bottoms are trimmed even with the sides by saws; then,
after being filled with cans, the tops are nailed on; and then the
boxes or cases are ready for exportation. The cost of the labor
expended in the United States in the necessary handling and in the
nailing and trimming of the boxes as aforesaid was equal to about
one tenth of the value of the boxes. The principal part of the labor
performed in trimming the boxes was occasioned by the Canadian
manufacturer not cutting the shooks into the required lengths and
widths for use in making the boxes, and for which the claimants
sometimes charged the cost of such trimming to the Canadian manu-
facturer. Held, that the company, when exporting these manufactured
boxes, was not entitled to be allowed a drawback under Rev. Stat.
§ 3019. Tide Water Oil Co. v. United States, 210.
1. As neither the plaintiff nor those under whom he claims title availed
themselves of the remedy provided by the statutes of West Virginia
for removing the forfeiture arising from the fact that, during the
years 1881, 1885, 1886, 1887 and 1888, the lands in question were not
charged on the proper land books with the state taxes thereon for
that period or any part thereof, the forfeiture of such lands to the
State was not displaced or discharged, and the Circuit Court properly
directed the jury to find a verdict for the defendants. The plaintiff
was entitled to recover only on the strength of his own title. Whether
the defendants had a good title or not the plaintiff had no such inter-
est in or claim to the lands as enabled him to maintain this action of
ejectment. King v. Mullins, 404.
2. Reusens v. Lawson, 91 Virginia, 226, approved and followed to the point
that "In an action of ejectment the plaintiff must recover on the
strength of his own title, and if it appear that the legal title is in
another, whether that other be the defendant, the Commonwealth,
or some third person, it is sufficient to defeat the plaintiff. If it
appears that the title has been forfeited to the Commonwealth for the
non-payment of taxes, or other cause, and there is no evidence that
it has been redeemed by the owner, or resold, or regranted by the
Commonwealth, the presumption is that the title is still outstanding
in the Commonwealth."
1. Under the circumstances disclosed in the statement of the case and in
the opinion of the court in this case, the Union Trust Company can-
not be allowed to set up its alleged title to the stock and bonds in
controversy, as against third parties taking in good faith and without
notice, and the same principle is applicable to its assignee, and to
creditors seeking to enforce rights in his name; and, so far as this
case is concerned, there is nothing to the contrary in the statute of
Iowa regulating assignments for the benefit of creditors, as expounded
by the Supreme Court of that State. Hubbard v. Tod, 474.
2. This court concurs in the conclusion reached by the Circuit Court and
the Circuit Court of Appeals on the fact that the respondents' right
to the securities was superior to that asserted by the petitioner. Ib.
EQUITY JURISDICTION.
See REMOVAL OF PUBLIC OFFICERS.
EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.
GUARDIAN AND WARD.
See CONFEDERATE STATE LEGISLATION, 5.
NEW MEXICO, LAWS OF, 3.
1. When the committing court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter and
of the person, and power to make the order for disobedience to which
a judgment in contempt is rendered, and to render that judgment,
then the appellate court cannot do otherwise than discharge a writ
of habeas corpus brought to review that judgment, and secure the
prisoner's discharge, as that writ cannot be availed of as a writ of
error or appeal. Tinsley v. Anderson, 101.
2. It was competent for the District Court to compel the surrender of the
minute book and notes in Tinsley's possession, and he could not be
discharged on habeas corpus until he had performed, or offered to per-
form so much of the order as it was within the power of the District
Court to impose, even though it may have been in some part in-
valid. Ib.
INHERITANCE, LAWS OF.
See NEW MEXICO, Laws Of, 2.
1. Thirty-one railroad companies, engaged in transportation between
Chicago and the Atlantic coast, formed themselves into an associa-
tion known as the Joint Traffic Association, by which they agreed
that the association should have jurisdiction over competitive traffic,
except as noted, passing through the western termini of the trunk
lines and such other points as might be thereafter designated, and to
fix the rates, fares and charges therefor, and from time to time change
the same. No party to the agreement was to be permitted to deviate
from or change those rates, fares or charges, and its action in that re-
spect was not to affect rates disapproved, except to the extent of its
interest therein over its own road. It was further agreed that the
powers so conferred upon the managers should be so construed and
exercised as not to permit violation of the Interstate Commerce Act,
and that the managers should coöperate with the Interstate Commerce
Commission to secure stability and uniformity in rates, fares, charges,
etc. The managers were given power to decide and enforce the course
which should be pursued with connecting companies, not parties to the
agreement, which declined or failed to observe the established rates.
Assessments were authorized in order to pay expenses, and the agree-
ment was to take effect January 1, 1896, and to continue in existence
for five years. The bill, filed on behalf of the United States, sought
a judgment declaring that agreement void. Held, (1) That upon
comparing this agreement with the one set forth in United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U. S. 290, the similarity between
them suggests that a similar result should be reached in the two cases,
as the point now taken was urged in that case, and was then inten-
tionally and necessarily decided; (2) That so far as the establishment
of rates and fares is concerned there is no substantial difference be-
tween this agreement and the one set forth in the Trans-Missouri case;
(3) That Congress, with regard to interstate commerce, and in the
course of regulating it in the case of railroad corporations, has the
power to say that no contract or combination shall be legal, which
shall restrain trade and commerce, by shutting out the operation
of the general law of competition. United States v. Joint Traffic
Association, 505.
2. The Kansas City Live Stock Exchange was an unincorporated volunteer
association of men, doing business at its stock yards, situated partly
in Kansas City, Missouri, and partly across the line separating Kansas
City, Missouri, from Kansas City, Kansas. The business of its mem-
bers was to receive individually consignments of cattle, hogs, and other
live stock from owners of the same, not only in the States of Missouri
and Kansas, but also in other States and Territories, and to feed such
stock, and to prepare it for the market, to dispose of the same, to re-
ceive the proceeds thereof from the purchasers, and to pay the owners
their proportion of such proceeds, after deducting charges, expenses
and advances. The members were individually in the habit of solicit-
ing consignments from the owners of such stock, and of making them
advances thereon. The rules of the association forbade members from
buying live stock from a commission merchant in Kansas City, not a
member of the exchange. They also fixed the commission for selling
such live stock, prohibited the employment of agents to solicit con-
signments except upon a stipulated salary, and forbade the sending of
prepaid telegrams or telephone messages, with information as to the
condition of the markets. It was also provided that no member should
transact business with any person violating the rules and regulations,
or with an expelled or suspended member after notice of such viola-
tion. Held, that the situation of the yards, partly in Kansas and partly
in Missouri, was a fact without any weight; that such business or occu-
pation of the several members of the association was not interstate
commerce, within the meaning of the act of July 2, 1890, c. 647, "to
protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopo-
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