OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA NAPOLEON. XXXVIII. MEDINA AND BAYLEN, OCTOBER, 1807, TO JULY, 1808. SPAIN was under the influence of Godoy, Prince of the Peace, while Charles IV. and his son Ferdinand were at odds. To maintain his Continental System, Napoleon seized the Roman States, and agreed to occupy Portugal and cede it to Spain for the territory north of the Ebro; an army under Junot was dispatched to Lisbon; and to open roads to Portugal, troops were advanced into Spain. The people rose against the monarchy, Murat occupied Madrid, and the king and Ferdinand, appealing to Napoleon as arbiter, were wheedled into resigning their rights to the throne, to which a fabricated Junta elected Joseph. The people rose in arms. Spain was an awkward land in which to campaign, the roads running across the rivers and mountains instead of along them, and provision being scant. The army amounted to little, but victories over the insurgents never brought results, and the authorities of every town occupied fled as well as the people. The Spanish infantry was poor, the artillery somewhat better and the cavalry inefficient. The men were better than the officers. The French troops first sent to Spain were new, but far superior to the Spanish. At the opening of the Napoleonic wars the English army status was low, but the Duke of York began to raise it, and Wellington brought it up to the highest pitch. Napoleon did not believe Spain would be a difficult problem. In May, 1808, Junot was in Lisbon, Murat in Madrid, Bessières on the Ebro and Dupont on the Tagus, and scattered forces were in Aragon, Catalonia and Valencia,- all opposed by Spanish armies. England sent munitions. A Spanish army under Blake and Cuesta advanced on Astorga, and this Bessières beat at Medina del Rio Seco, July 14, thus "placing Joseph on the throne." Dupont moved down to Seville and Cordova, but, opposed by Castanos and Reding, in a weak battle was compelled to surrender. After seven days in Madrid, Joseph was obliged to leave. On hearing this news Napoleon determined to go to Spain in person. WE left Napoleon after the Treaty of Tilsit at the height of his power, and yet with work before him which it seemed 2 THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM. beyond the capacity of man to accomplish. How, after his astounding rise to power, he failed to continue his victories, it will be the purpose of these volumes to narrate; and in so doing the interesting question of the emperor's gradual loss of strength, physical and moral, will be dwelt upon. In consequence of the Tilsit peace, the Grand Army had been gradually withdrawn towards the Confederation of the Rhine, and a treaty had been made with Prussia, somewhat relaxing the grievous pressure succeeding Jena; but Napoleon's hand still lay sore upon the land, and the presence of French troops all over the Continent was a never-ceasing menace. Napoleon had upheld his Continental System with the aid of Austria and Russia; but in order to carry it forward to the point of isolating England and reducing her to accept peace, it had become essential for him to control the several minor navies of the Continent, and thereby match her victorious fleet; and as a further block to British commerce, to possess Italy, Sicily and Spain, with their extensive coastline and numerous seaports. The next step, then, in the emperor's political and military career was interference with the status of these countries. Charles IV., of Spain, was under the influence of his wife and of her favorite, Manuel Godoy, who, by virtue of good looks backed by mediocre talents, had risen from plain bodyguard through various grades to a dukedom and the ministry of foreign affairs. Although, after the execution of Louis XVI., Spain formally declared war, yet believing that quiet was better for the country and himself, in 1795 Godoy signed the Treaty of Basle, by which he earned the name of Prince of the Peace. But he went too far, entering next year into an onerous treaty with France that embroiled Spain with England, and led to the loss of her navy at Cape St. Vincent in 1797. On more than one occasion Godoy attempted to play a fast and loose game with Bonaparte, and when the First Consul prepared to use Spain for ulterior purposes against Portugal, he wrote, December 1, 1801, to Gouvion St. Cyr, who represented him in Madrid: "I desire that you should make Their Majesties understand my extreme discontent with the unjust and inconsequential conduct of the Prince of the Peace. . . . If he continues on this system, say plainly to the Queen and to the Prince of the Peace that all this will finish by a clap of thunder." The thunder-cloud was long in gathering, but it burst in 1808. Up to this date, Spain had made little but losses out of France, had practically been her vassal, and with her had been beaten at Trafalgar without glory or gain; while her cousin Bourbons had been driven out of Naples, and Joseph Bonaparte made king. Everything tended to chill the French alliance. After Austerlitz Godoy made hasty advances towards the victor, and Napoleon was not slow to recognize him as a useful tool, keeping touch with Spain by occasional correspondence with king and minister. In answer to a New Year's greeting, he wrote Charles from Warsaw January 20, 1807: "One and the same cause unites us. I have always regarded our interests as inseparable, and in this view I have striven to render useful to Your Majesty the success which Providence has accorded to my armies.' He ends with assurances of inviolable amity. And next day he wrote to "His Cousin the Prince of the Peace," to keep the English away from the Continent: "to strike their commerce there is to attack the base of their power. It is there we must aim before all." Thus alternately cajoled and threatened, Spain had fairly well adhered to her treaties. Still the ancient Spanish monarchy was allied to the new French empire by fear rather than interest; and as her defection, which in 1807 Napoleon |