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HEADQUARTERS AT RATISBON.

fully explained to him by word of mouth. Though Napoleon still supposed the Austrians were assembling in Bohemia, from his experience with the methods of the Aulic Council, he scarcely expected them to open the campaign before April 15. In these Instructions he tells Berthier that "the Austrians have not declared war. To believe that they will attack without recalling their ambassadors does not seem probable, yet it is what they did in 1805." On the assumption, however, that they would be slower than they actually were, he favored Ratisbon as the most available point of assembly: the Bavarians would concentrate along the Isar; and hither Oudinot's grenadiers and the cavalry were to come, while Davout would assemble at Nürnberg and Massena at Augsburg ready to close up. "Thus," say the Instructions, "headquarters would be at Ratisbon in the midst of two hundred thousand men, astride a great river, guarding the right Danube bank from Ratisbon to Passau, and we would then be in a position secured from care about the enemy's movements, with the advantage of the Danube, which would bring up speedily to the army everything of which it stands in need." But this selection of Ratisbon was strictly dependent upon the enemy's remaining quiet, or advancing so slowly that concentration could without interruption be effected so far forward. In this project Napoleon was striving to rendezvous at a point as far in the advance as circumstances rendered possible, and especially where he would be in command of the Danube, the best line on which to invade Austria. Moreover, Ratisbon was the apex of the two lines of Charles' advance.

It will be noticed that Napoleon does not open the campaign by asking what the enemy will do: he does not build his plan upon that of the adversary. Looking over the geogra phical situation and the general conditions, he determines upon what he himself shall do, and then first asks how the enemy

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will respond to this. No one paid more heed to every event that had already occurred to limit his actions: beyond this he was free, always chose the initiative and followed it. A quite exceptional campaign was that of 1813. On more than

one occasion he carried the idea too far, as in once writing to Soult: "One must never want to guess what the enemy can do. My intention is always the same." As a fact, no one was more constantly striving to divine his enemy's operations: in this dictum Napoleon meant that if, before yourself taking action, you waited for the enemy to develop, you lost one of the winning cards in war- initiative.

Having, then, selected Ratisbon as the best place of assembly, provided always the enemy remained quiet, among a multitude of other things, Napoleon ordered that Augsburg with large supplies should be placed beyond danger of seizure out of hand, that the bridge-heads on the Lech should be strength

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TO CENTRALIZE the army.

ened, that Donauwörth should be well victualed, as probable headquarters of the army; and that at Ingolstadt there should be good bridge-heads, to enable the French to debouch at will on the Danube left bank. Berthier was ordered to Strasburg, on the way to the front: "As it is probable that the Austrians will make no movement, the major-general can go to Ulm... and Augsburg," but if nothing pressed, he was to stay in Strasburg, where he could be more readily reached. "My aim is to carry my headquarters to Ratisbon, and there to centralize all my army. The headquarters of Donauwörth and the line of the Lech are a position to occupy in case the enemy should forestall me; but if the Austrians do not stir, I desire that Oudinot and St. Hilaire assemble at Ratisbon." All this is unmistakable.

Thereupon Napoleon argues out what the enemy may do, providing the French cannot assemble at Ratisbon before he "attacks."

"What is it that the enemy, who is ready, could undertake to-day against our army? It would be to move from Pilsen on Ratisbon via Waldmünchen and Cham" (the two available gaps in the Böhmer Wald). "This case arriving, the Bavarian division at Sträubing would fall back on Ingolstadt, the Bavarian division at Landshut would make the same movement. The corps of Davout would move on Ingolstadt and Donauwörth," instead of on Ratisbon, “and then it would be a matter of putting headquarters at Donauwörth." But if the Austrians do not advance so soon, once the army having cantoned about Ratisbon, what will the enemy do? Will he move on Cham? That would enable us to assemble all our forces against him, to stop him at the positions we should have reconnoitred on the Regen. Will he move on Nürnberg? He would find himself cut off from Bohemia. Will he move on Bamberg? He will be equally cut off. Finally, will he choose to march on Dresden? Then we shall enter into Bohemia and pursue him into Germany. Will he act against the Tyrol, debouching at the same time from Bohemia? He will no doubt arrive at Innsbruck, but the ten or twelve regiments which he would have at Innsbruck would not be found in line of battle on the

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debouches of Bohemia, and these troops, which would be at Innsbruck, would learn the defeat of their army in Bohemia by our arrival at Salzburg. Finally, if the enemy seems to desire to take the extremities of the left and of the right to act, we must accept " (strengthen) "the centre, having for retreat the Lech, and holding Augsburg as a garrison, so be sure always to have this town at our disposition."

In these Instructions the army is again called the "Grand Army," although by an order of October 12, 1808, from Erfurt, the Grand Army had been dissolved.

One thing remains clear. Napoleon was preparing to concentrate his forces at his own chosen spot on a single line of operations, and was thus making ready to meet the enemy at whatever point he might operate: if on Franconia, to turn his left; if on Saxony, to take him in reverse; if from Bohemia on Ratisbon, to meet him by a frontal attack along the Regen; if from Bohemia and on the Tyrol, to beat the Bohemian army and turn the Tyrolese. Every step is definite, and set down in words that wonderfully exhibit the clearness of the great captain's conceptions and prevision.

Armed with the Instructions, Berthier left Paris March 31, and arrived at Strasburg early April 4, put the finishing touches to the artillery and engineers, and hurried up the troops still in the rear, inspecting every detail with his usual care, and especially seeing that the troops were well armed and provided with ammunition. Orders were also issued for repairing and guarding the roads from Strasburg to Nürnberg and to Donauwörth, and equally detailed instructions were given to Intendant-General Daru as to supplies and equipment to be collected at Strasburg and wheeled forward to the army.

In this anti-Gallic uprising, though all Germany was instinct with the same antagonism, the gallant Tyrolese were the first to give the signal. At the beginning of April the uprising broke out in its every mountain valley; the Bavarians

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AUSTRIANS IN BOHEMIA.

were massacred right and left; and Bisson, who came to the rescue with two thousand French troops, partook the same fate. The insurrection quickly spread to the Voralberg and threatened Wurtemberg; but, except the Tyrol and Austria, no country stirred. The dread of Napoleon was marked.

Early in March, the Austrians, for once on the alert under Charles' pushing, had concentrated their main army in western Bohemia, with Hiller, Kienmayer and Jellachic south of the Danube along the Traun and Enns. At Charles' suggestion, the main army was to cross the Bohemian mountains, and move on the French in one mass. It was not to swerve from its path even if the French should enter Bavaria, but to rely on its own manœuvre to force them to retire; and if Davout fell back from the Bamberg region, the line of advance was to be one between the river Main and the Black Forest. And especially it was to give battle to the enemy, wherever met, so as to detach from the French alliance and bring back to Austria the troops of Saxony, of the Confederation of the Rhine and other German states. This was a sound strategic project. At this moment, in a few marches, the whole Austrian force could debouch upon Ratisbon or Würzburg, and catch the French corps in dispersed order and illprepared for battle; for near mid-March, Davout's divisions. were cantoned about Würzburg, Bamberg, Bayreuth and Nürnberg; the Bavarians were on the Isar; Oudinot at Augsburg, Massena's divisions at Ulm, Memmingen, Günzburg and Donauwörth; and the Wurtemberg troops back of Ulm. Charles' advance would have compelled them all to hurry back towards Wurtemberg, and reassemble much farther in the rear than Napoleon had intended. But at the opportune moment the views of the Aulic Council suddenly shifted, perhaps because the presence of Oudinot and Massena at Augsburg and Ulm seemed to indicate a French concentration