496

ASSEMBLING FOR A PASSAGE.

below Drissa, Murat and Ney moving on Dissna, with Nansouty and Montbrun in their front; and Grouchy was at Bobr reconnoitring out towards Orsha on the Dnieper. The advance went on. Eugene was ordered towards Kameni on the road to Vitebsk, and the left wing to be drawn in up the Dvina; Davout to reach out from Mohilev towards Eugene, and to bring up in reserve Jerome's wing. The Grand Army was assembling for a passage at the excellent Dvina crossing near Bechenkovichi, and though aware that Barclay had already moved up river beyond Polotsk, the emperor expected to anticipate him at Vitebsk and force battle.

Like all the rest, Davout came in for his share of faultfinding. The emperor felt that he had not been as energetic as usual in his work against Bagration; and though he had taken part of his divisions from him, and given him a big task with the rest, he expressed his discontent.

On July 20 he told Berthier to write him: "That I cannot be satisfied with his conduct towards Jerome. That I only gave him the command in the case where the assembly had been made, and the two armies being on the battlefield, one commander became necessary; instead of which he published this order before the assembly was made, and when he was scarcely in communication by a few posts. That having done this, and after having learned that Jerome had retired, he was to keep the direction and send orders to Poniatowski. That I do not know to-day how my right is getting ou; that I had given him a proof of the greatest confidence that I have in him, and that it seems to me that he has not done himself justice."

Yet Davout took it all in good part, and seems to have been alive as to what it was necessary to do. From Igumen, July 15, he wrote Pajol:

"It is essential to have prompt news of Bagration. Jerome day before yesterday was at Niesvish, and announced that he was pursuing the enemy with his sword in his ribs. It is therefore probable that he is marching to-day on Slutsk. The distances are too great for us to take part in any

SITUATION ON JULY 24.

497 affair which might occur there, but we must give the utmost disquiet to the enemy, and be ready to act against Bagration according to what he may do. If Bagration wishes to pass by way of Bobruisk, I can, I think, on his march by the flank do him much harm. If he wishes to pass the Beresina lower down, it is important for me to anticipate him on the Dnieper."

On the same day Berthier was instructed to put Poniatowski in command of Jerome's force, the latter declining to serve under Davout. Some one had to be wrong, and it was never Napoleon. From now on, the old reliance upon Davout's capacity and good-will seems to lessen, much to the emperor's eventual loss. Davout wrote Poniatowski, July 24:

:

"I see that His Majesty has given you command of the right wing. I know that this command is in very good hands, and the esteem that we bear each other, as well as our devotion to the service of the emperor, is a sure guarantee of our good understanding in our operations. I will lay bare to you my ideas and will let you know my situation, so that you may take action according to your own information or mine." Where upon follow full details of the status.

In consequence of the fresh manœuvres, the situation on July 24 was this: From Glubokoi via Ushach Napoleon had reached Kameni; Murat, with Nansouty and Montbrun in the van, and Ney close behind him, marching via Dissna and Ulla, and Eugene via Kameni, followed by the Guard, had all come on to Bechenkovichi; St. Cyr was at Ushach, and Oudinot at Dissna watching Wittgenstein, who had reached Drissa, and was ready to cross the Dvina and attack anything in his front, as a diversion. Macdonald had reached Jakobstadt July 21, and at Bauske thrown back on Riga a Russian detachment. Poniatowski was coming along to reinforce Davout, who had just crossed swords with Bagration. Reynier was back at Chomsk, Tormasov at Pinsk, Schwartzenberg at Slonim.

Fearing that the French would anticipate him at Vitebsk, or on the road to Smolensk, Barclay had made speed, and by

VOL. III.

BATTLE OF MOHILEV.

499

July 23 had in part reached Vitebsk. He would have marched to Orsha; but the French were so close at hand that he had to send Ostermann to Ostrovno to retard them and enable him to draw in his rearguard under Doctorov. The French mass was now concentrated at Bechenkovichi, ready either to cross and give battle, or to march on Vitebsk; and Napoleon wrote Eugene, July 24, that it was important to secure this latter town to rest the troops, but that the safe crossing was the main point.

Davout had reached Mohilev July 20, with Grouchy at Kochanovo, keeping touch with Napoleon. He had a difficult task, as he knew little of the enemy, and had to keep communications open on the left to Orsha and on the right to Beresino. Tried by what the rest of the army had accomplished or failed in, he was doing well. Bagration, who had reached Bobruisk two days before, was marching in two divisions on Mohilev. He could either force his way north through Mohilev, or file off towards Mstislavl; but as his orders named Orsha as objective, he determined on the former plan, and on the 23d, with his first column under Raevski, he attacked Davout. The French position was astride the Bobruisk road, on a high bank in rear of a marshy brook, with the left on the Dnieper and the right on a wood where stood a strong detachment. It could have been turned, but Bagration feared that Davout would cut him from his second column, and made only a frontal attack. The contest was sharp both commanders were fighters of the first water. At one moment it looked as if the French line would be broken; but by putting in his reserves, Davout held his own, and Bagration, exaggerating his forces, and finding the road thus closed, left Platov with his Cossacks to delay pursuit, and marched back to Stari Bichov, crossed the Dnieper, and marched via Mstislav on Smolensk. Davout would have exceeded his orders in cross

500

DAVOUT TO PONIATOWSKI.

ing the Dnieper to again head him off. In this battle of Mohilev each side had some twenty thousand men, and the loss has been stated as high as three thousand killed and wounded on each side, although Napoleon put it at one hundred French

and one thousand Russians. Davout wrote Poniatowski, July 26: "I see that the battle of the 23d put great confusion into their projects, but they will follow them in part, and my first manœuvre is not to let myself be separated from the emperor, who to-day must be in Vitebsk. Raevski's two divisions must be looked on as hors de combat."

Davout had crossed the Vistula with seventy-two thousand