A HEROIC GAME.

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in ignoring Napoleon's proposals. They were a real confession of weakness, as the czar's had not been in his Vilna letter.

With regard to the missive intrusted to Lauriston, there was much suspicion among some of the Russian officers that Kutusov favored peace and intended to meet Lauriston secretly. Sir Robert Wilson was consulted, and after an interview Kutusov received Lauriston publicly, and agreed to convey Napoleon's letter (of which no copy exists) to the czar. No notice was taken of the letter, and the czar reprimanded Kutusov for receiving Lauriston, his orders forbidding any treating whatsoever with the enemy.

From the outpost reports the emperor was convinced that Kutusov had left the Kolomna for the Kaluga road; and as Chichagov, released by the peace from the lower Danube, had marched up to join in the campaign now centring in Moscow, he had new and awkward conditions to face. Although Kutusov had asked for Chichagov's army as a reinforcement, this had left Bucharest July 31, and by September 20 had joined Tormasov in the Ostrog-Lutsk country, making over sixty thousand men. Napoleon's idea that Kutusov's retreat was towards reinforcements was not the fact; the Russians were playing a heroic game, and were preparing at the proper moment to deal him some lusty blows. The emperor must have regretted his error in not making Prussia a loyal ally, so as now to draw on her for reserves on which to fall back.

At one moment Napoleon proposed himself to turn in force on Kutusov; but finally he detailed Murat, and upon his advance, Kutusov retired September 26, Murat having by Napoleon's orders striven to turn his right flank; and on October 4 he was behind the Nara, in a previously intrenched position, holding the Tarutino crossing; here Murat kept touch with him at Viankovo, Bessières in support at the Pachra. The main army was in quarters all around Moscow,

SITUATION ON OCTOBER 4.

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Davout in the southern part of the city, Eugene in the north, with van out at Dmitrov, Ney at Bogorodsk.

Because Napoleon had miscalculated in his Russian campaign, we must not imagine that he had ceased to weigh the evidence. He was fast being persuaded that the Russians would not make peace, and that he would soon have to retreat; and on gauging the situation October 4, this was what he found. On the extreme left, Macdonald, at Dünaburg, with the Prussian auxiliaries, had been blockading Riga ; on September 22 Steinheil arrived at Riga from Finland with ten thousand men, and the Russians undertook the offensive; but as the Prussians forced them back into the city, Steinheil led his men off to join Wittgenstein. St. Cyr had been reduced by sickness and poor victual to seventeen thousand men, while Wittgenstein, at this date, had forty thousand. On the extreme right, Chichagov and Tormasov, over sixty thousand strong, had advanced on Schwartzenberg, who with his thirty-four thousand men was gradually forced back to Brest Litovsk. Between the two French wings, Victor had been in Smolensk since September 27, with his own troops and those left behind by Napoleon, in all some thirty-seven thousand effective. Thus, of the triangle of Riga-MoscowBrest Litovsk, the left side was over five hundred miles long, the right side over six hundred miles, and the base three hundred and fifty miles long; while from Moscow back to the Niemen at Kovno was five hundred and thirty miles. To defend this vast theatre Napoleon had --

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PERFECT ORGANIZATION.

As Wartenburg points out, Napoleon had taught the world a new system of strategy, but he had not followed this up by as excellent an organization; and the Grand Army was not equal to so severe a test of his strategy. The modern world has been taught by Prussia what perfect organization and logistics can do. This perfection depends on: universal service; preparations for mobilization; preparations for feeding. and moving armies, making use of all modern scientific and material advance; a general staff made up on the modern plan. In Napoleon's military economy these essentials are indicated, not perfected. He had opened his campaign with four hundred and fifty thousand men, and in three and one half months his army had dwindled to little over two hundred thousand all told. As compared with this, in 1870, the Prussians opened the campaign with three hundred and seventy thousand men, and in three and one half months they had placed on a theatre of about one third the extent of that in Russia four hundred and twenty-five thousand men, with nearly as many troops in the rear from which to draw. In other words, the perfection of the Prussian organization and mobilization enabled them to keep on increasing their power; Napoleon's kept on decreasing; and as a result, the Prussians could remain in Paris until they forced a peace on France, while Napoleon was compelled to leave Moscow because he had not force enough to hold himself. These are not parallel the conditions were quite different; but the one illustrates the other.

cases

On the uprising of the people in the French Revolution Napoleon had built up his wonderful system of war; but of itself this required many improvements to uphold and maintain it, and these Napoleon did not add. "In peace prepare for war," is no idle phrase. You cannot get ready to mobilize a large army without many years of preparation.

THE CZAR'S PURPOSE.

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Napoleon prepared in a marvelous manner, considering his short years of peace. But he retained in his own hand all power, all knowledge, all mechanism of the Grand Army; he was his own general staff; and, with such large armies as he eventually commanded, it is not possible for one man to do this, even if he be a Napoleon; for military work on a large scale must be divided and specialized, as all other modern work is done. Napoleon's step forward was from mercenary armies controlled by the central political authorities to a people's war of masses; but he never worked out the idea to its legitimate conclusion and subdivision. Had he lived and wrought longer, he would no doubt have done so.

The first news of Borodino which reached St. Petersburg had been that of a Russian victory. Kutusov's later report described the battle as drawn, but this was not generally published, and as people could not see why, if they had won a victory, Moscow had been abandoned and burned, there was much discouragement. Some of the imperial family were in favor of peace, some anticipated a march on St. Petersburg, and made ready to evacuate the city. Alexander would not yield to further French dictation. Count Lieven, sent to London as ambassador, testifies that the czar had said:

"I have chosen just this moment to send you to London, so as better to enforce by so doing my firm intention not to make peace until I shall have thrust the enemy out of our frontiers, even should I, before I succeed in this, have to retire beyond Cazan. So long as I shall have to defend the Russian territory, I shall ask from London only munition and When, with the aid of Providence, I shall have driven the enemy beyond our frontiers, I will not stop there, and it will be only then that I shall have an understanding with England on the more efficacious assistance that I shall then claim of her, so as to arrive at delivering Europe from the French yoke."

arms.

He had notified other countries of his purpose in similar fashion, and with such a spirit in the monarch, Napoleon

VOL. III.