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on Bilbao.

...

DETAILED REPORTS REQUIRED.

If you had put your headquarters at Valmaseda, and camped with your three divisions so as to act according to circumstances, you would already have made eight to ten thousand prisoners."

The army now in the emperor's hand stood thus: Sébastiani and Villatte at Bilbao and Valmaseda, under Lefebvre; Victor with Ruffin and Lapisse between Valmaseda and Orduna; Bessières with Bonnet, Merle and Mouton, out towards Burgos; Desolles and Ney with Bisson at Logroño; Marchand at Tolosa; Moncey at Tafalla and Lodosa; the Guard at Vittoria; the cavalry at various places along the line. There were over one hundred thousand foot and twenty thousand horse, and to sustain his attack on the centre Napoleon still intended to call in Victor as soon as the French right was clear. Meanwhile he never ceased to issue instructions for the protection of the communications. He gave orders to fortify Miranda, Pancorbo, Burgos when taken, and other places, and to intrench strong positions along the roads of communications. He could never get enough information, and on November 15 Berthier issued a general circular on the subject, requiring the chiefs of staff of the corps and of detached bodies, and all commandants of strong places and others in authority, to render full and detailed reports every day, and especially with regard to the breadstuffs in their respective localities.

Bessières had been thrown forward on Burgos, and on November 8 found Belvider in force in the wood of Gamonal, whereupon instead of vigorously attacking, he assumed the defensive, thus arresting the advance when he might have given the Spaniards a lesson. "It seems to the emperor, Berthier wrote, "that you missed a fine occasion of having a success and getting us news.

By this time Napoleon had got a fair grasp of the situation. Matters on the right could be corrected. The few movements

on the left would serve only to keep the enemy's attention away from the centre, which quite fitted into his plan. He overrated the enemy in front of Burgos, but his own army had nearly all arrived in Spain. Soult was placed in command of Bessières' corps, and the latter given charge of the cavalry of the army, a position he much preferred, although the action may have been taken on account of Bessières' slowness.

On the 9th the emperor heard that Lefebvre had beaten Blake at Guenes, and sent word to both Victor and him to push the enemy hard. While he wished to forge ahead, his forces were too much dispersed on the right and left to permit him to sustain Soult strongly. Not until the 12th could he count on troops enough in the centre, say forty-five thousand men; and before he ordered any movement, he received word from Soult that Burgos had been taken. He at once sent for Joseph to come up and make a triumphal entry into the town. "As much as I think it desirable to make little ceremony for me, so much I think it necessary to make it for you," he said. But while upholding Joseph's dignity as king, he would none of him as a soldier.

Soult had won a victory cheaply. He had in front of him no very great force, and this was at once dispersed by a bayonet charge of Mouton in close column without firing a shot. Belvider had had no chance against the French; he had boldly marched out to Gamonal and had driven back Bessières' cavalry; but when it came to meeting a substantial body of foot, his rout was quick and dire. The French lost two hundred men, the Spaniards nearly thirty-five hundred, it is said. Mouton's tactics had a strong moral effect, and was probably so intended by Soult, and did well against poor troops; but we shall see later," says Balagny, "against troops solid and masters of their fire like the English troops, this contemptuous method of treating the enemy, and this brilliant manner of

66

THE VICTORY AT ESPINOSA.

71

deciding in a few moments the issue of a combat, brought on for our troops the most disastrous results, and caused them considerable losses without giving them the victory."

Lefebvre had again moved forward on Valmaseda, which he took November 8, and pushed on after the enemy to Nava. Victor, on November 7, had reached Orduna, and likewise moved on Nava. The enemy retired towards Villarcayo, and Victor, having taken over Villatte's corps without authority, moved away from Lefebvre, as if wanting to do the fighting himself. At Espinosa, on the 10th, he met Blake, who, joined by La Romana, had taken up a strong position on the road from Burgos to the sea, hoping to protect the Spanish stores amassed at Reynosa and Santander. The position was excellent for defense, but bad for a defeat. Victor had been able to bring on no guns across the hills, although Lefebvre had a number, and Blake had a few from Santander. Each side. had somewhat over twenty thousand men. Victor attacked at once, but oncoming darkness stopped the fighting. During the night Blake drew up his forces for another trial. Renewing his attack at daylight, November 11, Victor broke down the Spanish defense, and Blake's army fled on Reynosa and Santander, with the loss of five thousand men. What was kept together reached Reynosa the 12th. Victor had no cavalry, and could neither pursue nor reconnoitre; and as he had exhausted his ammunition, he had to beg a supply from Lefebvre. Had the two marshals worked together, a decisive gain might have been obtained. On hearing of this victory early November 14, Napoleon gave orders for pursuit, and dispatched Soult from Burgos direct towards Reynosa, hoping yet to be able to cut off the Spanish column, an operation which, had Blake been slower, would have resulted in a marked success. Indeed, at one moment the emperor thought of joining this column in person. But Blake was too much

72

SOULT'S MOVEMENTS.

alive to the danger: on the approach of Soult's cavalry van, on November 13, he marched hurriedly towards Asturias, in which province La Romana assembled the remnant — barely fifteen thousand men of the Spanish armies, and took over the command November 24. The Army of Galicia was for some time out of service. After the victory at Espinosa, Victor remained there until the 14th, and then advanced to Reynosa, where Soult relieved him. Three days later Soult moved up to Santander, from which port the emperor wished to exclude the English. The Spaniards had left. Later Soult took Lefebvre's place at Carrion, with La Romana in his front, leaving at Santander Bonnet, faced by Ballesteros.

La Romana was the ablest of the partisan soldiers in Spain, and destined, it was thought, to the chief command of the Spanish armies. But the Junta was afraid of him; finally so much so, that he sought out Wellington, and worked with him three years.

The emperor had reached Burgos November 11. By the evening of the 15th he was ready to push his cavalry forward, cross the Douro into the mountains, and at the same time move against the left of Castaños; and for this purpose he intended to draw in Victor and Lefebvre, as soon as Soult should get the Santander country in hand. The Spanish centre and left had been practically disabled for the season: and the emperor dispatched Ney's foot towards Aranda to seize this important crossing; while Milhaud rode towards Palencia and Valladolid, to gather news of any approaching force, and keep up connection with Bessières moving on Madrid. Certain rumors of the English in the Leon and Salamanca regions were disquieting, and these forces might not be allowed to move towards Burgos; but as nothing immediately threatening was found, the emperor saw that he might safely turn on Castaños. Victor was ordered in to Burgos, where were