SORIA FIRST, CASTAÑOS SECOND.

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headquarters and the Guard; Lefebvre, on the Carrion, was to keep up outpost service for Santander and Burgos, to tie Soult to the main army, and to reconnoitre the Leon-Benavente-Valladolid region; and the French right wing and centre being secure, Napoleon strengthened his left to advance upon Castaños, whom Palafox had now joined. By November 18 he knew that the Spanish troops had fallen back south of Aranda, while Castaños was still at Calahorra; he imagined Castaños might strive to march on Madrid via Soria and Almazan, which was the shortest way, and on such a march might be cut off; and at noon of this day Ney, reinforced by Desolles, was ordered on Almazan or Soria, according to the information gleaned on the way, so as to get in the rear of the Spanish army. Should Castaños retire towards Madrid by way of Calatayud, Soria was to be occupied before marching beyond. "Thus, on the 22d," ran the orders, "the left will be at Calahorra, the centre, that you form, will be at Almazan-Soria, the right at Aranda. The emperor relies on your talents and your zeal. Thus the first aim of your movement is to cut off the retreat of Castaños' army; the second to subdue the town of Soria." Such is the order in the records of the Prince of the Moskwa; but in the minutes of the War Archives, Soria comes first, and Castaños second. Corresponding orders had already been sent to Lannes, Moncey, Ney and Bessières, when word ran in from the last that the enemy had occupied Somo Sierra, and Napoleon for a moment retarded Ney's movement on Soria, so that he might sweep clear the ground up to the mountains.

On November 20 Soult was in Santander, Lefebvre on the upper Carrion, Victor on the way to Burgos, and the status on the Ebro was unchanged. The emperor determined to move his entire force on Aranda, so as to follow up Ney's movement if desirable. He had at Burgos six thousand of the Guard, and

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ARANDA FIRMLY Held.

Victor was within a march or two with twenty thousand men. Next day Victor and the Guard were moving on Aranda, Lefebvre on the town of Carrion, and Lannes was ordered to attack Castaños the 22d. Headquarters went to Aranda the 22d, Mathieu Dumas remaining in charge at Burgos.

The emperor never forgot that the English were the most dangerous of his opponents, but he had small knowledge of their whereabouts or intentions. As they were on his right, he was cautious about moving too far away to the left, lest he should miss the chance of meeting them with proper force; but so soon as he had learned that there was no trace of the English troops in the Valladolid country, that Castaños was still on the Ebro, and Aranda was firmly held, and was thus relieved from fear for his centre and right, he felt more free to act. By November 24 Victor and the Guard occupied Aranda.

While Napoleon had a large force in Spain, not more than one hundred and twenty thousand men were immediately available, and he could not have brought together enough men to justify him in joining Ney with any additional force. According to his orders, Lannes and Ney were to be respectively at Calahorra and Soria, November 22, and if Lannes should beat Castaños, and the latter retire by way of Soria, he would be netted to the last man. That Castaños might withdraw to Tudela to fight, and then flee via Calatayud, had not been divined by Napoleon. The emperor might have put off Lannes' attack and relied upon Castaños remaining somewhat longer at Calahorra, but he was afraid that Castaños would move away if he gave him too much time. In his original orders to Ney, he reckoned on battle at Calahorra.

Lannes had already taken over Moncey's corps and Lagrange's division, and advanced down the Ebro on Castaños' front. It was unfortunate for the Spanish cause that Cas

مان

CAL FORNIA

CASTAÑOS AT TUDELA.

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taños and Palafox, both able and useful men, could not agree upon one general plan; each desired to carry out his own ideas, irrespective of the other's, or of the general scheme. Late in October they had consulted as to plans, and Palafox would listen to nothing except the defense of the Aragon, so as to turn the French left via Sanguessa in rear of Pampeluna, while Blake was doing the same opposite Bilbao: but Blake's defeat at Zornosa spoiled this plan, which indeed grew less possible as the French reinforcements arrived. Castaños then planned to fall upon the French flank as it should march on Madrid, and had also conceived a plan for attacking Moncey's left; but he fell sick, and owing to constant misunderstandings, nothing on the Spanish side got done. By November 20 Castaños learned that Lannes was at Logroño, Moncey at Lodosa, and that Ney, who had reached Almazan, was moving up the Douro Valley; and as the rumors kept on increasing, on the night of November 21-22 he withdrew to Tudela, where he went into position stretching out to Tarazona. Palafox still clung to his plan, and though Castaños expected an attack by the French at any moment, he could do nothing to meet it without his colleagues' consent. At the same time Lannes was preparing to cross the Ebro at Lodosa, and Ney was marching on Soria. The Spanish generals were not abreast of their danger, from military inexperience rather than from lack of news.

By evening of November 22 Ney's report that he had arrived at Almazan, and would march the 22d on Soria, reached the emperor. Lefebvre would be in Carrion November 24, and bring Soult's left into connection with the army. Milhaud was in his front, keeping his eye out for the English.

On the morning of November 23, Lannes, who had been advancing via Calahorra, and was disappointed at not having found the Spaniards there the day before, reached the Span

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BATTLE OF TUDELA.

ish position at Tudela, where stood the victors of Baylen and the defenders of Saragossa and Valencia-the hope of Spain. They were confident, but had assembled without a definite plan. The line was over ten miles long; and in it, owing

to the disagreements of the Spanish generals, the troops had been hastily marshaled, Palafox on the right with the Aragonese, in the centre the Castilians and Valencians, and Castaños on the left near Cassante. Lest the enemy should again retire, Lannes was afraid to wait for Ney, who was yet far off, and neither had heard from the other. Discovering how sparsely held the line was, and having much less than the Spanish force,- for his divisions came up by different roads and singly, Lannes wisely massed his blow. It was not safe to accept battle on the defensive, and perhaps Lannes, like Victor, was ambitious to keep all the glory to himself. The cavalry having almost surprised Tudela between 9 and 10 A. M., he threw Maurice Mathieu sustained by Grandjean in on the Spanish right, backed by the fire of sixty guns, hoping to destroy this before help could arrive from the left, which was at a distance and separated from Tudela by a long gap, which O'Neil was to have filled, but did not. Morlot, sustained by Musnier, operated on the Spanish centre. The fighting was hearty, and the French did not at once succeed, but by dint of steady pushing, at 3 P. M. the Spanish right wing was broken. The several sections of the enemy had not worked together. his army and rode to Saragossa, and Lefebvre Desnouettes.

Spanish Grenadiers.

Palafox left

LANNES DEFEATS CASTAÑOS.

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penetrated the gap and, taking the Aragonese in reverse, shattered the right wing and sent these troops whirling down the river. Tudela was captured. The Spanish left wing took no hand in this fighting, but at first had some success against Musnier; had it attacked with vigor, Lannes might have been compromised; but it was broken by Lagrange, who came up by 5 P. M.; and partaking of the demoralization of the right and centre, it fled towards the south. Luckily night fell and saved the relics of the Spanish army. Castaños was able to retire across the head of Ney's column, rally his demoralized troops at Calatayud, November 25, and retreat to Siguenza on the way to Madrid. In this battle of Tudela, Lannes, out of thirty thousand men, lost only one thousand; the Spanish army, out of fifty thousand, of which two thirds engaged, lost, chiefly among

French Voltigeur.

the Aragonese, three thousand killed and wounded, thirty guns and four thousand prisoners.

The honor was all Lannes'; Ney had lent no hand in winning the victory.

Napoleon wrote Lannes November 27: "Your aide. . has announced the brilliant affair of Tudela. I make you my compliment. Ney has not on this occasion carried out my purpose. Arrived at Soria the 22d at noon, he ought, according to orders he had received, to have been early the 23d at Agreda; but having allowed himself to be imposed on by the inhab