THE PROPER OBJECTIVE. 83 march on Madrid and from the Spanish capital impress his success on Europe, or to turn on the most dangerous force now in the field, the English army under Moore, of which he had heard indefinite rumors. After the Convention of Cintra at the end of August and the departure of Wellesley, Moore, succeeding to the command of the troops, had marched from Lisbon toward Spain, and his van had by mid-November reached Salamanca; while another body of ten thousand men under Baird, recently landed at Corunna, had by November 26 reached Astorga. In ignorance of these facts, Napoleon could do nothing but march on Madrid. He expected an advance of the Anglo-Portuguese from Lisbon up the Tagus on the Spanish capital; he had no idea that Moore would attempt an operation towards his communications; and to take possession of the centre of government was not only more in accordance with his method of utilizing the moral forces, but in view of the limited numbers of the English, it was the wiser course; for had the French moved on him in superior force, Moore would have fallen back, and delayed their entry into the capital for a mere thrust in the air. Moreover, the Guadarama passes were held by ten thousand Spanish troops to protect the assembling of the army in Madrid, and everything seemed to point to the capital as the proper objective. Arranging for Moncey to undertake the siege of Saragossa, for Lefebvre to march from Carrion via Palencia and Valladolid on Segovia to protect his right flank, and for Ney to move via Guadalajara to protect his left flank, Napoleon marched on Madrid. Owing to Lannes' disablement by a fall from his horse, Moncey, after the late battle, had sent Maurice Mathieu towards Borja, where he struck the rear of the fleeing Spaniards, and another column on Saragossa. Both Ney and 84 LOSS IN EFFICIENCY. Moncey were aiming at Saragossa, but Lannes ordered the latter on Calatayud, where with Mathieu he arrived the 28th. Lannes also advised Ney to turn on Castaños, but Ney deemed Moncey strong enough, and thought he himself might seize Saragossa out of hand. Moncey also shortly returned, leaving pursuit to Mathieu, and although the latter won a handsome success at Bubierca, November 29, Castaños was able to keep his troops together. Only on December 2 did the emperor get Ney's and Moncey's reports of November 27, whereupon he sent Moncey orders to open the siege of Saragossa, while Ney was coming on to Madrid, to help swell the troops needed there. Here is again an instance of how the emperor's method began to lose in efficiency by his not being personally at the point of the most important operations. Ney had marched to Alagon, November 28; and Moncey was moving towards Calatayud in pursuit of Castaños. Thus Ney was near Saragossa and Moncey much nearer Guadalajara; but the emperor, arguing upon not what they had done but what he expected they would do, gave them instructions which added seriously to the distance each had to march. To compare the emperor's present manner with his omnipresence in former campaigns exhibits a decrease of the activity we have so much admired; yet we must not forget that the theatre was more extended, the forces much greater, and the difficulties. of movement far more pronounced than in 1796 or 1800. But the comparison of 1808 with 1805 or 1806 stands good. Ney was just sitting down before Saragossa, December 1, when he received the emperor's orders of November 28 to pursue Castaños so he should not reach Madrid; but being so far out of the way, he could accomplish little. Mathieu had, as ordered by Moncey, gone not more than a day beyond Calatayud. Upon Ney's leaving, Moncey with Morlot, Grandjean, THE PASS AT SOMO-SIERRA. 85 and Musnier, twenty-two thousand men, sat down before Saragossa, and Ney, taking Lagrange, Marchand and Desolles, marched to Calatayud. As, after Tudela, Palafox had withdrawn into Saragossa with his thirty thousand Aragonese, Moncey merely observed the town, not having men enough to besiege it, until Mortier joined him. Ney reached Guadalajara December 7. From here he sent his cavalry to Madrid and cantoned his troops. The central Junta ordered Castaños to Aranjuez ostensibly to undertake the general management, and La Peña and Cartaojal, left in command, essayed sundry raids on the capital. From Aranda Napoleon broke up, November 28, to march on Madrid, which was ill-prepared to resist him; the same day Savary had attacked the enemy in the foothills of the mountains, but they had checked him, and Victor was sent forward with Ruffin and Villatte to take Sepulveda. On the 30th at early dawn, with Victor, Ruffin in the lead, — the cavalry and the Guard, the emperor pushed up towards the pass at Somo-Sierra, which he found held by San Juan and a force of ten thousand men, with sixteen guns trained down the mountain road. The road was full of curves, so that guns could not be pointed to advantage, and as the pass could be defended only by holding the road and the slopes on either hand, the Spanish troops had occupied them both. It was foggy until noon. French skirmishers were sent along the adjoining slopes to outflank the batteries, and soon met the Spanish on the hills. The road was broken in places, and the repairs consumed time; the progress was slow. The emperor rode up to the defile as far as his own advance batteries, and under fire examined the ground. His escort was as usual a squadron of each of the cavalry regiments of the Guard, and as the tirailleurs on right and left were not advancing fast enough to suit him, 86 CHARGE OF POLISH SQUADRON. he ordered the Polish squadron forward to charge up the road, and take the Spanish battery. Montbrun was that day in command of the vanguard cavalry and started with the squadron; but before pushing it out on its desperate task, he hid it behind a roll in the ground, and sent back word to the emperor that the charge was simply impossible. The emperor replied that he knew no such word, and sent Major Ségur with the renewed order to the Polish squadron. The chief of squadron, Kozietulski, received the order, Ségur accompanied him, Montbrun remained behind, the squadron galloped up the road by fours, and though having grape and canister in front, and musketry fire from the heights on either side, bravely carried the three Spanish batteries stationed at the curves and firing down the road. The loss of this squadron was heavy; all the officers fell, Kozietulski's horse being killed at the beginning. Ségur had three wounds, fifty-seven men had been killed or wounded, many had remained behind because their horses had been shot. Thus the first squadron was checked; but the squadrons in rear that charged soon after, leaping over dead men and horses and shouting their national battle-cry, pushed in on the battery, the defenders of which were already shaken by the flanking foot, and, imposing on the Spanish defenders by sheer audacity, rode over the guns, sabred the gunners and captured every piece. The loss of the second squadron was small. The Spaniards decamped and the emperor's aim was accomplished. As a noteworthy instance of gallantry, the charge of the first squadron earned a name for the Polish horse throughout every corps of the Grand Army. The distance covered was about a mile and a half, and consumed seven or eight minutes. It was of course assisted by the advance made by the French skirmishers on right and left, but this does not detract from its exceptional gallantry. To the moral effect produced by the charge was A MARK OF ESTEEM. 87 mostly due its success. "The Poles merited fully," says Balagny, "the flattering mark of esteem which the emperor gave them on the morrow Polish Lancer. routed corps dispersed in every direction, and Napoleon bivouacked that night at Buitrago. Somo-Sierra was ordered to be fortified, as the Spaniards ought long before to have done. The cavalry pursued the enemy along the Madrid road; and hearing that Spanish troops were arriving from Escorial and Guadalajara, bodies of horse were sent out to check them. The emperor expected to find no further resistance unless Castaños or the English had got to Madrid; but curiously, while he was moving on Madrid, Hope was leading his English column towards Avila in the reverse direction. The road to Madrid was now clear, and Ruffin and Villatte, with the Guard, marched thither, Bessières' cavalry reaching the heights of Chamartin, overlooking the city, in a dense fog during the forenoon of December 2. The emperor had at |