The civil disturbance information in CRIS was stored on four magnetic tapes and discs. They were all destroyed on April 12, 1970, by degaussing, i.e., the information was removed from the discs and tapes by passing them through a magnetic field. No other discs or tapes contained the information which was in the Fort Monroe program. Supporting files consisted of boxes of IBM cards, existing printouts, and the user manuals. These related files were destroyed on April 22, 1970.

You have asked whether a civilian approved the initiation of the Fort Monroe program. The requirement for the approval of such computer data banks was not imposed until April 1, 1970, and, hence, there was no requirement for such approval at the time the system was initiated. The Office of the Army General Counsel did become aware of the system on or about March 1, 1970. I would stress that there was no effort to hide the system in question; it was discussed and explained at various briefings to high military officials and was viewed as a normal adjunct to the Army's civil disturbance program.

The Fort Hood system, the second system referred to in your letter, did not reach the same stage of development as CRIS. In fact, it did not become fully · operational before its destruction on August 15, 1970. By way of background, a feasibility study was begun in July 1969 at Fort Hood on a computer program which could provide III Corps with the ability to retrieve civil disturbance information rapidly and assist it in predicting disturbances within its geographical area of responsibility. Under the Army Civil Disturbance Plan (Garden Plot), Fort Hood was required to provide three civil disturbance task force headquarters and six civil disturbance brigades for possible deployment in a civil disturbance situation. The computerization of the data contained at Fort Hood was intended to supply the intelligence required to respond efficiently and rapidly to a civil disturbance situation.

The program was run on a computer which was used primarily in the areas of supply, finance, accounting, and maintenance with the secondary purpose of providing support for various systems development such as the Division Logistic Systems Tests and currently the Combat Service Support System. In fact, only 0.008 of 1 percent of computer time was used in the formulation of the civil disturbance program. A request for program approval was not submitted under the provisions of paragraph 2-1, AR 18-2, described above. However, since AR 18-2 relates only to the feasibility of the system, the question of the propriety of implementing such a system would not have been reviewed under AR 18-2. Of course, new policy letters and directives now impose a requirement that such a computer data bank be approved by civilian officials.

The information for the data banks was received from the FBI, USAINTC, and from liaison contacts with local authorities. The data bank itself listed in alphabetical order various civilian organizations which were deemed to have some relation to the III Corps responsibility under Garden Plot. Under the listed organizations, the names of certain members of the organization were also included. Since this system did not reach full operational status, only two copies of a printout were produced for distribution outside of Fort Hood. The Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence, 4th U.S. Army, received one copy which was subsequently destroyed in August 1970. One was also forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, DA.

The computer program at Fort Hood was not known at DA, Headquarters until the latter part of April 1970 when an exception was sought from the provisions of the April 1, 1970 letter requiring the destruction of computerized data banks on civilians not affiliated with the Department of Defense. To review the propriety of the exception, ACSI, DA, requested a copy of the printout from the Fort Hood computer. This copy (referred to above) was forwarded, and after review of the document, the exception was denied and the data bank was ordered destroyed on August 5, 1970. The data bank and computer program on magnetic tape (there were no discs) were then destroyed on August 15, 1970.

As indicated above, the printout, from the Fort Hood system sent to the 4th U.S. Army was previously destroyed. It was thought that the printout provided to ACSI, DA, the only other printout, had also been destroyed. Although there had never been any written record of destruction to confirm this, several prior searches had failed to discover the document in question. However, on May 11, 1971, the last remaining printout from Fort Hood was discovered by accident among some files in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for

Intelligence, Department of the Army. On May 21, 1971, the Acting General Counsel of the Army wrote to the Department of Justice requesting its advice on the proper disposition of this item in view of the Tatum v. Laird litigation. The Justice Department has advised the Department that it should be retained for litigation purposes.

You asked about the existence of a set of records called the "Van Deman" files. Major General Ralph Van Deman, who formerly headed Army Intelligence, compiled intelligence files during the period of 1929–1952. There is no indication, however, that he collected these files prior to his retirement in 1929.

The files, for the most part, consisted of four general categories: (1) collection of various newspapers from the West Coast alleged to be communist or communist-affiliated; (2) literature and reference material on or produced by alleged communists; (3) a photo album of assorted individuals: and (4) files on individuals and organizations based upon information acquired from various agencies and private sources. The information in the latter category largely dealt with communist activities.

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Sixth Army, assumed custody of at least some of General Van Deman's files on January 22, 1952. It is believed that certain portions of the files were removed by associates of General Van Deman before the Sixth Army acquired these files, but this cannot be verified. The reasons for assuming custody is not entirely clear. It is quite possible that there was some informal arrangement between the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Sixth Army, and General Van Deman for the transfer of these items at General Van Deman's death.

The files in the possession of the Sixth Army were shipped in 1958 to what is now designated as the United States Army Investigation Records Repository (USAIRR). Following this transfer, the index cards prepared by General Van Deman for use with his material were replaced by punch cards and integrated into the USAIRR index. His own index cards were then destroyed. In 1968, the punch cards prepared from the earlier index cards were also destroyed, and all reference to these materials in the Defense Central Index of Investigations was thereby deleted. The Van Deman files were then segregated within the USAIRR. After 1968, these files were not referenced by the DCII.

These files remained in the USAIRR, although segregated, until March 2, 1971 when they were transferred to the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee pursuant to a written request by the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee. We have found no record of an inquiry to Mr. Froehlke or to the Department of Defense related directly or indirectly to the Van Deman files prior to your letter of March 30.

In regard to your last series of questions on page 3 of your letter, the Army implemented a policy in February 1971 of reviewing each file at the USAIRR prior to its release to an authorized official for the purpose of removing material which cannot be retained under our present directives. Mr. Froehlke explicitly informed you of this policy in his appearance.

"There are dossiers within the Army Investigative Records Repository which contain FBI reports and other material which do not meet current Army criteria for retention. A mass screening of the 8 million dossiers would be a long and very expensive undertaking. To comply with the spirit of the new DA policy, however, all dossiers are reviewed for unauthorized material-which is removed and destroyed-before being released to the requester. (Report of Proceedings held before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary Mar. 2, 1971, Vol. 4, p. 600.)"

Files have been and will continue to be screened in accordance with this policy for the purpose of removing and destroying material not authorized for retention under current policy. Generally speaking, there has been no special effort to segregate files to be screened. However, upon discovering that files on certain prominent individuals contained information which is no longer authorized to be retained, the Army has specifically screened out this material. I trust that this information will assist you in your inquiry. Sincerely.

J. FRED BUZHARDT.

Are you planning any similar procedure at the Justice Department?

Mr. MARONEY. No, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. Do you think there should be such a procedure? I do not know whether anyone at the Justice Department has had a chance to think about this problem. Perhaps you could write us a note about what you are doing, or about what you will do, or about why you will not do it if that is what you decide. Or are you prepared to say something about that right now?

Mr. MARONEY. I think as I indicated, if we were to follow that procedure, we would have a substantial legal problem on the question of taint in a future criminal case. The only way we can demonstrate in such a case that none of the evidence being used in the case has been tainted is to turn over the logs, have a hearing, and then demonstrate that none of the evidence being used at the trial resulted from the electronic surveillance.

Senator KENNEDY. Where is the material now that came from the illegal taps? Is it in one place, or is it still at different agencies? Have you collected it from the other agencies? Have you issued any regulations, for example, that none of this material will be available to anyone unless there is a specific order from the Attorney General and that then it will only be for the purposes of protecting a defendant's rights? Has anything been done about that?

Mr. MARONEY. No, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, should there not be? Suppose there is some of that material in other departments. For example, how will they know over at the Defense Department what you are saying up here? Has the Attorney General done anything about that? Should he do something about it? Are you not concerned that something should be done to try to achieve what you have outlined here— that is that this information not be generally available?

Mr. MARONEY. None of this information is generally available, Senator.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, not generally available to the public,

but

Mr. MARONEY. All of it is handled as confidential investigative material. It has a limited dissemination. I do not think there is any danger of any improper use of this information.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, of course, even though there may be some procedures about dissemination of investigative information, it is still in the files. I am not so sure that it should be left in those same investigative files and available even to the people who are entitled to obtain investigative files. Why can't it just be assembled and put into a separate place, under a specific restriction-only for protecting defendants' rights.

Mr. MARONEY. Well, of course, the logs themselves are maintained by the FBI. They are not disseminated in any place. As a matter of fact, the only time there is an examination of those logs by anybody other than the people in the FBI is in connection with a pending court procedure in which a question arises as to turning logs over to a dependant or the court for in camera inspection.

Senator KENNEDY. Of course the original purpose of getting the information was to use it.

Mr. MARONEY. And some of the investigative information would be in investigative files, some pieces of the information.

Senator KENNEDY. How do you get it out of those files?

Mr. MARONEY. How do you get it out?

Senator KENNEDY. Yes, how do you get it out so that it just is not available in the files for anyone even those with access-to review it? Mr. MARONEY. Well, it would be a difficult job to go back andSenator KENNEDY. Well, the Army did it.

Mr. MARONEY. Well, the Army essentially just destroyed all of its files in that area.

Senator KENNEDY. But you are not even able to

Mr. MARONEY. It did not just destroy 10 percent or 1 percent of the information in those files.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, we do not really know how difficult it would be because no one has tried to do it.

Mr. MARONEY. Well, no one has tried to do it and I have no doubt that it would be an extremely difficult job.

Senator KENNEDY. Is that because there is so much of it?

Mr. MARONEY. No, I think because you would have to cull maybe, you know, one-thousandth of a percent out of a number of files. Senator KENNEDY. Could you tell us how many devices were turned off as a result of the Keith opinion?

Mr. MARONEY. There were six removed as a result of the Keith decision, leaving a total of 27.

Senator KENNEDY. Six devices, or organizations, or what?

Mr. MARONEY. Telephone wire taps and microphone installations. Senator KENNEDY. And the decisions to turn those off were all made by the Attorney General in consultation with you?

Mr. MARONEY. Yes, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. Were those surveillances of organizations or individuals? Can you tell us?

Mr. MARONEY. Some of each.

Senator KENNEDY. If you had a number of devices on one organization, would that be counted as one device, or several?

Mr. MARONEY. Each installation, each device is counted as one installation.

Senator KENNEDY. Can you give us any idea of how long those devices had been in operation?

Mr. MARONEY. I do not have any figures on that, Mr. Chairman. Senator KENNEDY. Could you provide it for use if you have time? Mr. MARONEY. I will try to provide it; yes, sir.

[Subsequent to the hearing, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Maroney submitted a letter to the subcommittee dated August 2, 1972, containing the following answer to Senator Kennedy's question:]

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On page 29 of the reporter's transcript of the hearing on that date, you made a request for information on the length of operation of the six electronic surveillances in the national security field which were discontinued by the FBI as a result of the United States Supreme Court decision of June 19, 1972, in the Keith case. One of these electronic surveillances was operated for 21 months; two for 18 months; one for 42 months; one for 3 months; and one for 2 weeks.

Of course, in accordance with established practice, those of the aforementioned surveillances which were in operation more than 3 months were reviewed and reauthorized every 3 months by the Attorney General.

(The full text of the above letter is reprinted at page 47.)

Senator KENNEDY. There was a report in the June 24 edition of the Cape Cod Standard-Times quoting Mr. Kleindienst as saying that the Department "had canceled some 10 wiretaps"

Mr. MARONEY. I think he said less than 10. He was not giving precise figures.

Senator KENNEDY. I am not trying to catch you.

Mr. MARONEY. But these figures are the precise figures.

Senator KENNEDY. Can you tell us how many national security taps or bugs are still being operated?

Mr. MARONEY. Twenty-seven.

Senator KENNEDY. Again, are those different groups or targets or are those the total number of devices? Do you know what I am driving at? If there is an organization on which you have more than one device is that counted as one or is that several?

Mr. MARONEY. If there were two devices

Senator Kennedy. If you have one organization and it is tapped five times, is that considered one or five?

Mr. MARONEY. Five.

[Subsequent to the hearings, the subcommittee received a letter from Deputy Assistant Attorney General Maroney, dated August 2, 1972, containing the following clarification:]

On pages 29 and 30 of the reporter's transcript there was a brief colloquy as to the method of computation of electronic surveillances, that is, when we say there are 27 electronic surveillances in effect on a given date does that represent "targets" or the number of devices. I am advised by the FBI that the number of surveillances indicated represent premises of organizations or individuals without regard to the number of instruments which may be involved in effectuating the surveillances.

[The full text of the above letter is reprinted at page 47:]

Senator KENNEDY. Could you give us a breakdown by the five statutory categories, such as clear and present danger, threat of overthrow, and foreign intelligence information?

Mr. MARONEY. Well, I have not had time to break that out. Mostpractically all of those would be foreign intelligence, strictly foreign intelligence.

Senator KENNEDY. If most are for foreign intelligence, what are the remaining ones for?

Mr. MARONEY. Well, what we have been doing in the past 6 months to a year is when the Attorney General authorizes one of these installations, he makes precise findings in terms of the five criteria set forth in 2511(3). I have not had a chance this week to make that breakdown; I think we could do that for you and I think it would go back where we would have that capability for 6 months to a year. Senator KENNEDY. Could you do that for us?

Mr. MARONEY. Yes, sir.

Senator Kennedy. That would be helpful.

[Subsequently to the hearing, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Maroney submitted a letter to the subcommittee, dated August 2, 1972, containing the following information:]