THEORY OF WAR. 66 INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. Every purpose is established by counsel; and with good THE Peace which has just been concluded may not be of long continuance.* The war has doubtless had the effect of convincing most officers of the advantage of devoting the leisure time of peace to * This was written immediately after the conclusion of the Russian war. It is easy to read by the light of the past, and to condemn the errors committed by successive ministers in the hasty and unwise reduction of many thousands of trained soldiers at the end of a great war; but when the necessity is removed the lesson always is, and always will be, forgotten. It is vain to expect it will ever be otherwise under a Representative Government, and we must take the evil with the good. Wisdom lies with the few, but the power of the purse with the many, who will never consent to tax themselves to provide against an evil which is only probable, not present. But if the Minister had resisted the reductions forced upon him at the end of the Russian war, on what high ground he would now stand, and how much increased would be his power for good for the future! acquiring that knowledge of the theory of their profession which has to be practically applied in war; without which the conduct of military operations at the outbreak of hostilities is likely to be a succession of blunders, dearly to be paid for by much valuable life and treasure. In this introductory chapter it will be sought to touch generally on the details of the Art of War, without being too minute; and to point out some of the most important objects to which the attention of a general in command of an army must be unceasingly directed in order to carry on that art with success. The science of war has been divided into the two branches of Strategy and Tactics; and though no very cogent reason exists for such separation, the objects as well as the principles of both being identical, such distinction having been made, it is better to preserve it. The arbitrary distinction which has been made by military writers is that, Strategy relates to the movements of an army on the theatre of war, when not in actual presence or eyesight of an enemy, however great or small the distance which separates them ; while Tactics relates exclusively to the movements of an army when in the actual presence or eyesight of an enemy. The following definition applies equally to both. Strategy and Tactics are the art of placing in a certain position at a certain time (meaning the right position at the right time), a body of troops in fighting order superior to that body which your enemy can there oppose to you. The terms of the definition may be modified to suit the circumstances of different armies, but the principal remains the same. For example, of two armies A and B, on the theatre of war, A numbers 20,000 men, while B numbers 40,000. Yet a may, on account of its composition and general condition as regards discipline, exercise, &c., be fully equal to B in effective force though so inferior in number. Such being the case, the problem would be solved, supposing the 20,000 men of a to fall upon 30,000 of B, after B had been diminished to that extent. In the same manner the spirit of the problem will be observed, where a general at the head of a much inferior force to that of the enemy on the theatre of war, supposing him to have received orders to cover a certain frontier or protect a district or town, throws himself in the enemy's path with every disposable man of his own army, while the enemy has brought to bear on the same point only a fraction of his force, albeit that fraction may be numerically the stronger. The most brilliant example of this in history, ancient or modern, is found in the manoeuvres by |