Frederick's success was owing to good luck. He violated Maxim 21 in the most dangerous manner in separating his army into two parts, and exposing the weaker part under Ziethen (one third of the whole) to be beaten, while he with the other part effected a very circuitous and uncertain march round to the enemy's rear:-thus the only way in which these separated portions could communicate was actually through the Austrian position—as really happened. Such a victory should have been impossible.

It is evident that he violated Principles 1. and 3. and Maxim 23. in bringing fractions of his troops into collision voluntarily with the mass of the enemy; in giving the Austrians the advantage of very interior lines; and by persisting in attacking with successive fractions of his force when by a short delay he might have united them.

Ziethen won the battle; his resolution to unite with Frederick by forcing a passage through the enemy is a fine instance of the value of boldness in war, when based on self-confidence. Of this battle Napoleon says it is of all his battles that in which Frederick committed most faults, and the only one in which he displayed no talent.

Had Frederick carried his whole army round to the enemy's rear, he would then have acted in accordance with the rules of war, as that movement would have placed his army in direct communication

with his own territories, besides that the enemy's position was not so strong on that side.

BATTLE OF NORDLINGEN, 1645.

On the 4th of August, 1645, Condé and Turenne led a French army of 17,000 to attack the Count de Merci who commanded a Bavarian force of 14,000, posted in a strong position between Nordlingen and Donauwerth.

Bavarian Position.

The right occupied the heights of Weinberg, and rested on the Warnitz river; about 200 yards in front of the centre was the village of Allerheim which was occupied, and whose church and cemetery were converted into a sort of citadel by loop-holing, barricading, &c.; the left, commanded by Jean de Vert, occupied the hill and the castle of Allerheim, and rested on a stream called the Eger.

Merci according to his custom began to entrench his position immediately on its occupation.

French Disposition.

Condé ranged his army in order of battle. The left resting on the Warnitz, composed of 16 squadrons and 6 battalions, was commanded by Turenne. The centre, commanded by the Count de Marsin, was opposite the village of Allerheim, and

consisted of 6 battalions. The right, resting on the Eger, was composed of 4 battalions and 10 squadrons, and was commanded by Marshal de Grammont. In

a second line in rear of the right was a reserve of 4 battalions and 6 squadrons under M. de Chabot.

The two armies were about equal in infantry and artillery. The French were superior in cavalry.

At three o'clock in the afternoon Condé ordered Marsin to attack the village of Allerheim. The Bavarian infantry posted in the village defended it with so much obstinacy, that although the whole of the French infantry of the centre and right were successively engaged and headed by Condé in person, they were always repulsed, and at length retired from the contest broken and dispirited. On the Bavarian side the commander, Merci, was killed.

Jean de Vert, who commanded the Bavarian left, charged the French cavalry of the wing opposed to him which had been denuded of infantry to feed the attack on Allerheim; he overthrew both lines and pursued them in disorder to a considerable distance from the field of battle. The battle seemed hopelessly lost. Condé's left alone stood firm, his right and centre had disappeared. He repaired to the left where Turenne commanded to consult with that marshal. They resolved to make a desperate attack on the enemy's right. They did so, over

threw the troops opposed to them, took prisoner the general who commanded the Bavarian right wing, and captured the battery of Weinberg. Turenne thus succeeded in placing himself on the flank of the Bavarian general position. The greater part of the Bavarian infantry were in the village of Allerheim. Turenne countermarched his troops, and led them (left in front) in rear of the Bavarian line, so as when halted and fronted to face the village of Allerheim, thus occupying nearly the same ground as that originally held by the Bavarian centre. Meanwhile Jean de Vert, informed of what had occurred, stopped his pursuit and returned to attack Turenne. It was growing dark. De Vert, in place of marching against Turenne by the most direct line, resumed his first position on the left of the Bavarian line, then countermarched, and led his troops left in front to attack Turenne. But these pedantic movements had lost valuable time, and with it the battle. It had become dark. The Bavarian infantry in Allerheim discouraged by the death of their general, believing themselves to be isolated from succour and to be surrounded by Turenne, and ignorant of Jean de Vert's approach, capitulated. De Vert perceiving that his right and centre no longer existed, retreated, followed by Turenne, to Donauwerth, where he passed the Danube, abandoning all his guns except four.

Observations

The position of Merci was very good.

His flanks were secured. His centre was protected by the village 200 yards in front of his general line. Allerheim was evidently the decisive point, but the Bavarian right was a decisive point, as its possession by Turenne enabled him to effect that movement without which the infantry in Allerheim would not have surrendered, and without which the fortune of the day would certainly have been reversed.

Without a superiority in infantry and artillery Condé was not justified in attacking so strong a position. Allerheim was too strong to be successfully attacked by infantry alone; a powerful artillery fire was required to reduce it.

Condé weakened his right by withdrawing the whole of the infantry, which caused De Vert's attack to succeed. The defeat of the French right and centre should have been decisive; but De Vert pursued too far like Rupert at Naseby, and like him also he found the battle lost before he could attempt to restore it.

But it might still have been retrieved but for the exterior lines on which De Vert moved to attack Turenne, in place of marching diagonally across the plain straight to Allerheim as he should have done.