« ForrigeFortsett »
the date upon which the lien for taxes attached to the real estate. The act in force at that time provided that "all church property actually and exclusively used for public worship,
when the said buildings and the land on which said buildings are located (said land to be of reasonable size for the locatio'. of said buildings) are owned by the congregation
and not used for pecuniary profit,” shall be exempt from taxation. (Hurd's Stat. 1908, chap. 120, sec. 2, clause 2.) It is clear under the allegations of this petition that the premises therein described did not come within this exemption. The petition does not disclose whether this property was actually and exclusively used for public worship, unless we accept the allegation that the premises were used for “church purposes” as conveying that meaning. But aside from the question whether the petition was sufficient in this respect, it is clearly disclosed that the petitioner was not the owner of the premises. Under that statute a religious corporation holding a contract for a deed, merely, could not claim its property as exempt. In order to be exempt title must be in the corporation on or before April 1, the date on which the lien for taxes attaches for the ensuing year. (People v. St. Francis Academy, 233 I11. 26; People v. Ladies of Loretto, 246 id. 403.) The amendment of 1909 of said section 2 of the Revenue act could not affect the taxes for the year 1909, as that amendment was not retrospective and did not become effective until July 1 of that year, whereas the lien for the taxes attached to this realty on April 1 preceding.
The board of review of Cook county erred in granting the prayer of the petition and ordering the property exempt from taxation for the year 1909, and its order is reversed.
THE PEOPLE Ex rel. Frank E. Davis, Appellee, vs. FRED
D. NELLIS, Appellant.
Opinion filed February 25, 1911.
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-purpose of provision of constitution concerning titles of acts. The constitutional requirement that no act shall embrace more than one subject and that shall be expressed in its title was not intended to hamper the legislature or embarrass honest legislation, but was intended to prevent matters not related to the subject matter of the legislation under consideration from being incorporated into an act without being referred to in the title.
2. SAME-provisions fairly tending to effectuate object of an act as expressed in title are proper. All provisions may be legitimately incorporated in an act which fairly tend to effect the object of the act as expressed in its title, and the constitution is obeyed if the provisions of the act relate to one subject indicated in the title and are parts of, incident to or reasonably connected with such subject.
3. Same-all parts of act to suppress mob violence are within its title. All parts of the act of 1905, entitled "An act to suppress mob violence,” (Hurd's Stat. 1909, p. 802,) including the provisions of sections 4, 5 and 6 making it a felony to become a member of a mob, giving a right of action to the families of persons killed by mob violence and subjecting sheriffs to removal from office for permitting persons to be taken from their custody by mobs and lynched, are germane to each other and within the title of the act.
4. SAME—legislature may authorize Governor to remove officer elected by people. While the constitution merely empowers the Governor to remove those officers whom he may appoint, yet there is no limitation on the power of the legislature to confer upon the Governor power to remove a county officer elected by the people. (Donahue v. County of Will, 100 III. 94, followed.)
5. Same-section 6 of Mobs and Riots act is not invalid. Section 6 of the Mobs and Riots act of 1905, which authorizes the Governor to remove a sheriff who has permitted a person to be taken from his custody by a mob and lynched, is not invalid upon the alleged ground that the Governor cannot be empowered to remove officers whom he has not appointed.
6. Same-all legislation based upon classification not prohibited. The 'constitutional provision against special legislation does not prohibit legislation which is based upon a classification, provided the classification is founded upon a rational difference of situation or condition existing in the persons or objects which are the subjects of such classification.
7. SAME-section 6 of the Mobs and Riots act is not invalid as special legislation. Section 6 of the Mobs and Riots act of 1905 is not invalid as special legislation, in that it subjects sheriffs to removal under the conditions specified, whereas other peace officers, such as coroners, constables and policemen, are not expressly made subject to the same burde:1, since sheriffs are the principal peace officers of the county, and may, for the purpose of legislation affecting their duties and rights, be placed in a class apart from minor peace officers.
8. OFFICES—office of sheriff becomes vacant when Governor's removal proclamation is issued. Under section 6 of the Mobs and Riots act of 1905 the office of a sheriff who has permitted a person to be taken from his custody by a mob and lynched becomes vacant upon the day the Governor's proclamation removing him from office is issued and not upon the day when the deposed officer's application for re-instatement is denied.
9. SAME—successor of deposed sheriff must be elected if unexpired term exceeds one year. If the time between the day the Governor proclaims the office of a sheriff vacant under section 6 of the Mobs and Riots act and the end of the term of the deposed sheriff exceeds one year the vacancy in such office must be filled by an election and not by appointment.
Farmer and Cooke, JJ., dissenting.
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Alexander county; the Hon. W. W. DUNCAN, Judge, presiding.
The State's attorney of Alexander county, in the name of the People, upon the relation of Frank E. Davis, by leave of court, filed an information in the nature of a quo warranto against Fred D. Nellis, who was acting as sheriff of said county, praying that he be ousted from said office. The case involves the legality of the action of the Governor in removing from the office of sheriff of Alexander county Frank E. Davis, the relator, on the 18th of November, 1909, and the legality of the appointment of Fred D. Nellis, the respondent, by the board of supervisors of said county on December 23, 1909, to fill the vacancy caused by such removal. The information was in the usual form and charged the respondent with usurping the office of sheriff of Alexander county. The respondent justified, and by three several pleas set up his title to the office of sheriff of said county. The grounds for the removal of the relator from the office of sheriff of said county by the Governor were, that he suffered a mob to take from his custody, and to kill, two prisoners,—one a negro and the other a white man,-each of whom had been arrested and taken into custody by the relator, as sheriff of said county, upon the charge of murder. The negro, as averred in the first plea, was taken from the relator, as sheriff, by a mob on November 11, 1909, and killed. The second plea averred that a mob, on the night of November 11, 1909, broke into the county jail and took therefrom Henry Salzner, who was confined therein upon the charge of having murdered his wife, and hung and shot him to death. The third plea set out in detail the circumstances attending the taking of each of said prisoners from the relator, as sheriff, and killing them. The negro, William James, it was averred, was being taken by the relator, as sheriff, to some other place than Alexander county for safe keeping and to avoid his being captured by a mob which was threatened and feared, and while the relator was thus moving his prisoner he was overtaken by a mob, who took the prisoner from him, returned with him to the city of Cairo, in Alexander county, and there killed him. Said plea further averred that the mob, then proceeded to the jail where Henry Salzner was confined, broke into the jail, beat and broke down the cell in which he was confined, took him there from and hung and shot him to death. Each of said pleas averred that on the 18th day of November, 1909, knowledge of such hanging having come to the Governor, he issued a proclamation, pursuant to the statute in such case made and provided, on that day, declaring the office of sheriff of Alexander county vacant and directing the coroner of said county to take possession of the office and execute the duties of sheriff of said county; that the coroner of said county thereupon, in the absence of the relator, took possession of the office rooms, books, papers and records pertaining to the office of sheriff of said county; that afterwards, on the 18th day of November, 1909, said Frank E. Davis filed with the Governor a petition praying for re-instatement to said office; that he gave the notice required by statute for a hearing of said petition, and that the first day of December, 1909, was fixed by the Governor for said hearing, at which time Frank E. Davis appeared before the Governor with counsel and witnesses and the matter of the right of said Frank E. Davis to be re-instated as sheriff of said county was then and there heard and considered by the Governor, who on the 6th day of December, 1909, found the said Frank E. Davis, as sheriff of said Alexander county, did not do all in his power to protect the lives of said James and Salzner, and then and there denied the prayer of the petitioner for his re-instatement. The pleas further aver that the Governor notified the county board of Alexander county, on December 14, 1909, that the office of sheriff in said county was vacant, and said board, on the 23d day of December, 1909, appointed the respondent, Fred D. Nellis, sheriff of the said county; that said Nellis gave bond, took the oath of office, and on the 24th day of December, 1909, received a commission from the Governor as sheriff of said county, and on that day the coroner and acting sheriff turned over to him the office rooms, books, records and papers pertaining to the office of sheriff of said county, and he then and there entered upon the discharge of his duties as such sheriff and by that warrant he held and executed said office. The respondent interposed a demurrer to said pleas and each of them. The court sustained the demurrer to each of said pleas, and the respondent having elected to stand by his pleas, judgment was rendered against him, finding that he unlawfully usurped, held and executed the office of sheriff of Alexander county and entered a judgment of ouster