against the estate, when the contest is between the heirs or next of kin of the testator the rule is otherwise. Scott v. Harris, 113 Ill. 447; Glover v. Patten, 165 U. S. 394; I Wharton on Evidence, sec. 591; Doherty v. O'Callaghan, 17 L. R. A. (Mass.) 188, and note.

It is further insisted that portions of the evidence of this witness as to conversations with testator were inadmissible on the ground that they were hearsay, especially the statement of the testator that plaintiff in error's husband had written a letter in which he had directed the doctor not to communicate with the daughter in any way, the letter further stating that the testator had never treated his daughter right, and that when she wanted his assistance he was spending his money on whisky and fast women. The letter was also introduced in evidence. The rule is well established in this State that the declarations of the testator are competent, in a contest involving the validity of his will, to show the state of his mind but not to prove the facts stated. (Reynolds v. Adams, 90 Ill. 134; Hill v. Bahrns, 158 id. 314; Taylor v. Pegram, 151 id. 106; Kaenders v. Montague, 180 id. 300; Baker v. Baker, supra.) Whatever is material to prove the state of a person's mind or what is passing in it, and what were his intentions, may be shown by his declarations and statements. The truth or falsity of such statements is of no consequence. They are to be used only as showing the condition of his mind. Declarations, prior to the execution of the will, that certain of the testator's children were wanting in natural affection are properly considered as showing his state of mind. (Waterman v. Whitney, 11 N. Y. App. 157; Shailer v. Bumstead, 99 Mass. 112; Stephenson v. Stephenson, 62 Iowa, 163; Thompson v. Updegraff, 3 W. Va. 629; Zibble v. Zibble, 131 Mich. 655; 3 Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 1734, and cases cited.) The testimony as to the doctor's feeling towards his daughter, and the causes for it, was properly admitted to show the condition of his mind at the time the

will was executed. This evidence, taken in connection with the fact that he had several years before drawn two other wills, one giving his daughter $50 and the other $5, and also in connection with other declarations that he had given his divorced wife (the plaintiff in error's mother) quite an amount of property which she could give to plaintiff in error, was properly admitted as tending to show his reasons for disposing of his property as he did, under the will here in question.

It is further contended that the court erred in refusing to allow one Isaac Smith to testify because he was surety on the bond for costs in this case. The record shows that the objection to the testimony of this witness was withdrawn while he was still in the court room, and there is nothing here to show that his testimony could not have been thereafter introduced. Even if his testimony were competent,— which we do not decide,-if injury resulted to plaintiff in error for want of such evidence it was self-imposed and she cannot now complain. Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Railway Co. v. McDougall, 126 Ill. III.

The further contention is made that the instructions were erroneous because all of them, save one, neglected to refer to the fact that testator committed suicide within a very short time after the execution of the will. The act of self-destruction cannot judicially be regarded as proof, per se, of insanity. It is but a fact to be considered, with all the other facts in the case, in determining the testamentary capacity of the testator. (McElwee v. Ferguson, 43 Md. 479; In re Bey, 46 La. Ann. 773; I Jarman on Wills, Rand. & Tal. 5th Am. ed.-p. 112, note a, and cases cited.) Plaintiff in error did not ask an instruction presenting her view of the law on this subject. A party can not assign error on a failure of the court to give a proper instruction when he has failed to request such an instruction. (Drury v. Connell, 177 Ill. 43.) We do not think the jury were misled by the instructions as to this question.

It was not necessary for each instruction to refer to the suicide of testator.

The further contention is made that under the ruling of this court in the recent case of Huffman v. Graves, 245 Ill. 440, one of the instructions was erroneous in stating that if the jury believed, from the evidence, that the testator was of sound mind and memory then they should find he had testamentary capacity, even though they thought the disposition made by him of his property was unfair to plaintiff in error. The instruction in this case is clearly distinguishable in its wording from the one criticised in Huffman v. Graves, supra. While the instruction was not as clearly worded as it might be, instructions worded substantially the same as this one were upheld in Taylor v. Pegram, supra, and Hollenbeck v. Cook, 180 Ill. 65. Furthermore, an instruction which stated the law as contended for by plaintiff in error immediately followed the instruction here criticised. All the instructions should be construed together as a series. (Crowell v. People, 190 Ill. 508; Peterson v. Pusey, 237 id. 204; Helbig v. Citizens' Ins. Co. 234 id. 251; Lourance v. Goodwin, 170 id. 390.) Considering all the circumstances, the jury were not misled by this instruction.

It is further contended that the certified transcript of the evidence of the subscribing witnesses in the probate court was improperly admitted on the trial of the case. It is sufficient answer to this contention to state that no exception was preserved in the record as to the admission of this testimony. It may be added, however, that the certified transcript of this evidence appears to be similar, in every respect, to that held by this court in Baker v. Baker, supra, as competent to be introduced in a will contest. After this transcript was admitted it was attempted to be shown that the statement therein contained that the evidence of the subscribing witnesses was heard in open court before Hon. Charles S. Cutting, probate judge, was not true and that the evidence was not, in fact, heard before

him, but the trial court, on objection, refused to allow parol testimony to contradict the transcript. Plaintiff in error was represented by counsel on the taking of this testimony in the probate court. If it was not taken in open court, as she now contends the law requires, it was her duty then to object. In this collateral proceeding the record of the probate court showing that the evidence was taken in the presence of the judge cannot be contradicted. King v. Justices, 1 M. & S. 442; Penny v. State, 7 Scott, (C. P. & E. C.) 285.

We find no reversible error in the record. The decree of the superior court will therefore be affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

RALPH N. BAKER et al. Appellees, vs. CYRUS L. SHINKLE,

Appellant.

Opinion filed February 25, 1911.

1. STATUTES-effect of amendment of statute by subsequent act. An amendment of a statute by a subsequent act operates precisely as if the subject matter in the amendment had been incorporated in the prior act at the time of its adoption.

2. SAME-doctrine of ejusdem generis is applied only as an aid in ascertaining the legislative intent. The doctrine of ejusdem generis can only be used as an aid in determining the legislative intent, and it will not control or confine the meaning of the statute to narrower limits than the legislature intended.

3. ELECTIONS-sections 97 and 98 of the Election law should be construed together. In ascertaining the jurisdiction of the county court in election contest cases, section 97 of the Election law, as amended in 1895, and section 98, must be read and given effect together, and the words used should be given their ordinary meaning.

4. SAME-county court has jurisdiction to hear contest of election of park district trustees. Under the language "all other officers for the contesting of whose election no provision is made," used in section 98 of the Election law, the county court has jurisdiction to hear a contest of an election for trustees of a pleasure driveway and park district.

5. SAME-trustees of park district do not have power of village board of trustees over contested elections. The power of a village board of trustees to determine contests of election of its own members exists by reason of the provisions of the Cities and Villages act that the city council shall be judge of the election of its own members and that village boards shall have the powers of city councils in cities not exceeding a certain population, but there is no ground for extending such power to the trustees of a pleasure driveway and park district under the language of section 12 of the Park act of 1893, providing for the establishment of such districts.

6. SAME-Section 98 of the Election law applies to officers of municipal or quasi municipal corporation. The provision of section 98 of the Election law providing that the county court shall have jurisdiction of a contest of the election of certain officers "and all other officers for the contest of whose election no provision is made," must be read "all other like officers," etc., and extends to the officers of any public corporation, municipal or quasi municipal, for the contest of whose election no provision is made.

APPEAL from the County Court of Sangamon county; the Hon. GEORGE W. Murray, Judge, presiding.

ALBERT SALZENSTEIN, C. F. MORTIMER, C. A. JONES, and MASTERS & MASTERS, for appellant.

A. D. STEVENS, and HAMILTON & CATRON, for appellees.

Mr. JUSTICE CARTER delivered the opinion of the court: Ralph N. Baker, John E. George and John Hartmann, appellees herein, on June 4, 1910, instituted proceedings in the county court of Sangamon county by which they sought to contest the election of Harry L. Ide, John H. McCreery and appellant, Cyrus L. Shinkle, to the offices of trustees of the Pleasure Driveway and Park District of Springfield. Appellant interposed a demurrer challenging the jurisdiction of the county court to hear the petition. That court, after a hearing, overruled the demurrer. Subsequently a stipulation was entered into between appellant and appellees, in which it was provided that appellant was to abide by his demurrer, and that appellees, in support of their petition,