« ForrigeFortsett »
urged here, and that case followed People v. Cairo, Vincennes and Chicago Railway Co. 237 Ill. 312, where it was held that a levy of $100 for “incidentals” by the town was not void because not sufficiently specific. No objection having been made to these taxes upon the ground that the amounts levied for contingent expenses were excessive, that question is not before us. While the amount annually required for contingent expenses varies in the different towns of the State, it is ordinarily but a small sum which is needed for that purpose.
As these taxes were objected to only, upon the ground that the purposes for which they were levied were not specifically stated, the objections were properly overruled.
Appellant relies upon People v. Illinois and Indiana Railroad Co. 231 Ill. 377, and People v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Co. 231 id. 209, in support of its contention that the purpose for which these taxes were levied was not sufficiently designated in the respective levies. The holdings in those cases in relation to the town tax of the town of Robinson were, in effect, overruled in People v. Cairo, Vincennes and Chicago Railway Co. 237 Ill. 312, and People v. Cairo, Vincennes and Chicago Railway Co. 247 id. 360.
Another item of the tax levy of the town of Ross was $4250.75 for the payment of outstanding indebtedness for the building of a town hall located at Rossville. This item was also objected to for the reason that, being a levy to pay existing outstanding indebtedness, it could only be made pursuant to the action of the board of town auditors after the claim had been examined and audited by the board and could not be levied by the voters at the annual town meeting. The evidence discloses that this item was levied by the voters at the annual town meeting to pay the balance due on the erection of a town hall and that the claim was not examined or passed upon by the board of town auditors. It was disclosed that in 1907 the town duly authorized the erection of a town hall, and under the contract the same was to be paid for in three yearly installments. Whether this indebtedness was evidenced by anything except the contract is not shown by this record. At the town meeting in 1907 the electors authorized and directed the levy of an annual tax of twelve cents on each $100 assessed valuation for three years to pay for the building of the town hall. The tax objected to was levied at the annual town meeting in 1909 for the purpose of paying the last installment on this contract, which would become due some time during the early part of the year 1910. Appellee insists that inasmuch as this amount was not due at the time the tax was levied but would become due about the time the taxes then levied would be collected, the board of town auditors had no authority to examine and audit this claim and the electors at the annual town meeting had authority to make the levy to provide for the payment of this indebtedness when it became due the following year. The electors of the town of Ross, at their town meeting, had the right, the statute in regard to petition and notice having been complied with, to provide for the building of a town hall, and they also had the right to provide for the payment of the cost thereof in installments and to direct the levy of an annual tax for a specified term of years to meet the indebtedness. Having done that, the electors of the town exhausted their powers. By their action in providing for the building of a town hall and for the payment of the indebtedness incurred, in installments, a claim or charge was created against the town, and it became the duty of the board of town auditors each year to audit an installment of the claim. The certificate of the board to the town clerk, and the certificate of the town clerk to the county clerk, form the only proper basis for a tax levy to meet such indebtedness. The statute requires the board of town auditors to examine and audit all charges and claims against their town, and, where the same are allowed, to make a certificate, to be signed by a majority of the board, specifying the nature of the claim or demand and to whom the amount is allowed, and to cause such certificate to bę delivered to the town clerk of the town, to be by him kept on file for the inspection of any of the inhabitants of the. town, and the aggregate amount of the claims so audited and allowed are to be certified to the county clerk by the town clerk at the same time and in the same manner as other amounts required to be raised for town purposes. The statute does not authorize the electors at a town meeting to levy taxes to pay outstanding charges and claims against the town, and as the electors derive their only power to levy and collect taxes from the provisions of the statute, any tax levied by them for a purpose not authorized will be void. “Neither in express terms nor by inference is any power given to the town meeting to audit and allow or reject claims and charges against the town, but that power is expressly given to the board of auditors. By ordinary rules of construction the statute committing that power and duty to the board of auditors excludes their exercise by the town meeting, and that view is re-enforced by the fact that the power to levy taxes for the same purpose by two different bodies would result in double taxation." (People v. Chicago and Alton Railroad Co. 193 III. 364.) The objection to the tax levy of the town of Ross for the payment of outstanding indebtedness should have been sustained.
The judgment of the county court is reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to the county court to sustain the objection to that portion of the tax levy in the town of Ross for the payment of outstanding indebtedness. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.
Reversed in part and remanded, with directions.
HOMER K. GAI,PIN vs. City or ChicaGO, Appellant.
(JOHN J. HEALY et al. Appellees.)—Same Appellant vs. BOARD OF PHARMACY et al. Appellees.—Same Appellant vs. BOARD OF DENTAL EXAMINERS et al. Appellees.--Same Appellant vs. ANTI-CRUELTY SOCIETY et al. Appellees.
Opinion filed April 19, 1911.
1. Statutes-law does not favor repeal by implication. The law does not favor repeal by implication, and unless the earlier and later statutes are so repugnant that they cannot operate together both should be treated as being in force.
2. FINES AND PENALTIES-effect of section 57 of the Municipal Court act, concerning the disposition of fines and penalties. Section 57 of the Municipal Court act, requiring moneys collected upon judgments of the municipal court in criminal and quasi criminal cases to be applied to the payment of uncollected costs, did not repeal the various general State laws concerning the disposition of fines and penalties nor does it suspend their operation as to cases brought in the municipal court, but such provision applies only to that part of the fines, penalties and forfeitures which remains after paying the amounts provided for in the various laws.
3. SAME-section 57 of the Municipal Court act does not affect State's attorney's lien for fees. Section 57 of the Municipal Court act, requiring moneys collected upon judgments of the municipal court in criminal or quasi criminal cases to be applied to the payment of uncollected costs, did not affect section 8 of the Fees act, giving State's attorneys a lien for their fees upon money received by them in the prosecution of cases as State's attorneys, nor create an exception to such section as respects criminal and quasi criminal cases in the municipal court.
4. Costs-judgments for costs must rest upon the statute. The taxing of costs in any case is not authorized by the common law but depends upon the statute, and unless the legislature has authorized costs they should not be awarded.
5. Same-statute does not authorise costs in criminal cases to be taxed against State. The authority for taxing costs in criminal cases is found in section 13 of division 14 of the Criminal Code, which does not warrant the taxing of costs against the State where prosecutions of persons for violation of law are unsuccessful.
6. Same-what is meant by “uncollected costs," as that term is used in Municipal Court act. The term "uncollected costs,” as
used in the Municipal Court act with reference to the application of moneys collected upon judgments of the municipal court in criminal and quasi criminal cases, means costs for which judgment has been rendered but which the proper officer has been unable to collect, and does not include costs which have accrued in unsuccessful prosecutions.
7. SAME-rule as to costs of preliminary examination in the municipal court. Whether the costs attending the preliminary examination in the municipal court of persons bound over to the criminal court can rightfully be included within the term "uncollected costs," as used in the Municipal Court act, depends upon whether such person is convicted in the criminal court, as there can be no judgment for costs if he is discharged or acquitted.
APPEAL from the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Lockwood Honore, Judge, presiding
EDWARD J. BRUNDAGE, Corporation Counsel, (EDWIN HI. CASSELS, of counsel,) for appellant.
GUSTAVUS J. Targe, County Attorney, and WILLIAM F. STRUCKMANN, for appellee Healy; E. I. FRANKHAUSER, for Board of Pharmacy; V. A. WRIGHT, for Board of Dental Examiners; LUTHER JOHNS, and CHARLES H. Wood, (BOWEN W. SCHUMACHER, of counsel,) for AntiCruelty Society; CHARLES A. CHURAN, for Commissioners of Lincoln Park; TOLMAN, REDFIELD & Sexton, for South Park Commissioners.
Per Curiam: This is an appeal by the city of Chicago from the judgment of the Appellate Court for the First District reversing the decree of the circuit court of Cook county in four cases instituted by Homer K. Galpin, as clerk of the municipal court of Chicago. A certificate of importance was granted by the Appellate Court in each of these cases and the four were consolidated as one case in this court.