That there was a mutual mistake made in the description of the property in the deed is not questioned by appellants. They seek a reversal of the decree upon the grounds, first, that the conveyance was voluntary; second, that there is no proof of the execution or delivery of the deed; third, that the appellee's right to relief is barred by laches; and fourth, that the court erred in decreeing that they should pay one-half the costs.

At the time the deed was executed the family of appellee consisted of himself, his wife and the five minor children of Mrs. Schroeder. The proof shows that at the time the deed was executed Mrs. Schroeder was seriously ill. She executed this deed to her husband upon the consideration that he would furnish her five minor children with a home, board, clothing, schooling, and care during sickness and health, until they should each arrive at the age of fourteen years, and that he would pay her four daughters each the sum of $400 and her son the sum of $1000 when they, respectively, became of age. At that time the children ranged in age from five to thirteen years. On the same day, July 24, 1884, appellee executed and delivered four promissory notes for $400 each, payable, respectively, to the four daughters of Mrs. Schroeder, and one for $1000 payable to the son, and also executed a trust deed to the eightyeight acres that day conveyed to him, to secure the payment of said notes and to secure his performance of the agreement to provide for the children until they had each arrived at the age of fourteen years. Mrs. Schroeder died August 27, 1884. Appellee performed his agreement to care for and educate the children and paid each of said promissory notes as it fell due. This constituted a sufficient consideration to entitle him to maintain his bill.

Appellee was in possession of the deed executed by Mrs. Schroeder. He produced it at the hearing and offered it in evidence. The deed bore a certificate of acknowledgment by a notary public, regular in form, as of the date of

execution, and was recorded September 3, 1884. The execution of the deed was sufficiently proved by the certificate of acknowledgment of the notary public, (Hurd's Stat. 1909, chap. 30, sec. 35; McConnel v. Johnson, 2 Scam. 522;) and the recording of the deed is prima facie evidence of delivery. (Valter v. Blavka, 195 Ill. 610.) Appellants made no effort to rebut the prima facie case made by appellee by showing that the deed never was, in fact, executed or delivered. As the deed was in the possession of appellee and was produced by him there is a strong implication that it had been delivered, and only clear and convincing evidence could overcome the presumption. Inman v. Swearingen, 198 Ill. 437.

Appellee's right to relief was not barred by laches. He had been in the peaceable possession of the premises in question from the time of the execution of the deed until he filed this bill. Laches is not to be imputed to one who is in the peaceable possession of land, for delay in resorting to a court of equity to correct a mistake in the description of the premises in the conveyance to him. His possession is notice to all of his equitable rights, and he need not assert them until occasion arises for him to do so. Mills v. Lockwood, 42 Ill. 111; Wilson v. Byers, 77 id. 76; Henderson v. Harness, 184 id. 520; Bradley v. Lightcap, 201 id. 511.

It is insisted that the court erred in adjudging one-half of the costs against appellants. The awarding of costs in a court of chancery is a matter of discretion with the court, and that discretion will not be reviewed except for abuse. Appellants presented no substantial or well-founded defense to the bill, and we cannot say that it was an abuse of discretion to require them to pay one-half the costs. The decree of the circuit court is affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

THE LAND COMMISSIONERS OF THE COMMONS OF KASKASKIA et al. Plaintiffs in Error, vs. THE PRESIDENT AND "TRUSTEES OF THE COMMONS OF KASKASKIA et al. Defendants in Error.

Opinion filed April 19, 1911.

1. COMMONS OF KASKASKIA—power to authorize sale of lands is in the State, only. The title to the commons of Kaskaskia is in the inhabitants of the Parish of the Immaculate Conception of Kaskaskia, in trust for the use of the inhabitants, but the power to authorize a sale of the lands rests in the State. (Stead v. Commons of Kaskaskia, 243 Ill. 239, followed.)

2. SAME management of the common property is determined by the majority. All authoritative acts in the management of the commons of Kaskaskia must be sanctioned by the will of the majority, but it is immaterial whether such will be manifested by ballot or petition, as both methods are appropriate and one is as effective as the other.

3. SAME-petition of the majority is binding upon the minority. A petition by the majority of the inhabitants of the island of Kaskaskia, addressed to the legislature and asking for the enactment of a certain law relating to the management of the common property, is an assent binding upon all other inhabitants, whether the policy of the law requested is wise or unwise.

4. SAME-interest of inhabitant depends upon his being a member of the community. Each inhabitant of the island of Kaskaskia has the right to enjoy, in common with the other inhabitants, the common property so long as he remains a member of the community, but he cannot sell his right nor does it descend to his heirs, and if he removes from the community his right is lost.

5. SAME-effect of act of 1909, authorizing sale of commons of Kaskaskia. The only effect of the act of 1909, (Laws of 1909, p. 425,) authorizing the sale of the commons of Kaskaskia, so far as the common property is concerned, is to provide for the conversion of land into securities, leaving unaffected the right of each inhabitant to the benefit of the income of the securities for the support of the schools, to the same extent it was enjoyed before the act was passed.

6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-act of 1909, authorizing sale of commons of Kaskaskia, is valid. The act of 1909, (Laws of 1909, p. 425,) authorizing the Governor to appoint commissioners to sell the commons of Kaskaskia for the purpose of raising a fund, the

income of which is to be used for the support of the schools of the island, is not invalid upon the ground that it deprives the inhabitants of their property without due process of law.

7. SAME-constitution does not prohibit all special legislation concerning schools. The provision of section 22 of article 4 of the constitution, that no special or local law shall be passed providing for the management of schools, is expressly restricted to the subject of the management of common schools and has no reference to a law passed for the support or establishment of schools.

8. SAME the act of 1909, authorizing sale of the commons of Kaskaskia, is not invalid as prohibited special legislation. The act of 1909, (Laws of 1909, p. 425,) authorizing the sale of the commons of Kaskaskia and the investment of the proceeds in interestbearing securities, the income of which is to be used for the schools of the island of Kaskaskia, is not invalid as a special law providing for the management of schools, within the meaning of section 22 of article 4 of the constitution.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Randolph county; the Hon. GEORGE A. CROW, Judge, presiding.

W. H. STEAD, Attorney General, (EMERY ANDREWS, of counsel,) for plaintiffs in error.

JAMES H. MARTIN, A. E. CRISLER, and H. C. HORNER, for defendants in error.

Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE VICKERS delivered the opinion of the court:

Certain of the lessees of the commons of Kaskaskia filed a bill in equity against the trustees of said commons for the purpose of enjoining said trustees from collecting the rents for the year 1909. In June, 1909, the legislature passed an act entitled "An act to provide for the sale of the Kaskaskia commons upon the island of Kaskaskia, in the county of Randolph, and to create a permanent school fund for the inhabitants of said island out of the proceeds of said sale, and to punish any person failing to comply with the provisions thereof." Said act authorized the Gov

ernor to appoint three commissioners, to be known as the "Land Commissioners of the Commons of Kaskaskia,” and defined the powers of said commissioners in respect to the sale and final disposition of the commons of Kaskaskia. Under that act the Governor afterwards appointed W. R. Hunter, C. A. Davidson and H. H. Kohn as such commissioners. After their appointment the commissioners came in and upon their motion they were made parties complainant in the bill then pending against the president and trustees of the commons. The bill was thereafter amended, and the defendants filed both a general and special demurrer thereto. The circuit court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the bill for want of equity. The complainants below have sued out a writ of error from this court to obtain a review of the decree sustaining the demurrer and dismissing their bill. The only question involved is the constitutionality of the act of 1909.

A brief statement of the situation in relation to the Kaskaskia commons at the time of the passage of the act of 1909, and prior thereto, is necessary to a correct understanding of the several provisions of the act. A very complete and exhaustive statement of the history of the Kaskaskia commons will be found in the cases of Trustees of Commons v. McClure, 167 Ill. 23, and Stead v. Commons of Kaskaskia, 243 id. 239. Only so much of the history will be recapitulated here as seems to be necessary to a proper understanding of the questions presented by the record in this case.

The title of these commons was originally in the king of France. On September 14, 1722, Louis XIV, king of France, made a grant of Kaskaskia commons to the inhabitants of the Parish of the Immaculate Conception of Kaskaskia, in the territory of Illinois. No written evidence of the original grant has been found, but the existence of the grant is well authenticated by the order of confirmation issued by the Governor and Commissary Orderer