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Butch Vidac, and Michael Hearst, alias Mick-, render their testimony incompetent, as we ey Hearst, were indicted by the grand jury have often held, but where the principal evifor the crime of burglary and larceny. Be- dence is that of accomplices, unless it is so fore the trial of plaintiffs in error began, corroborated by other testimony or circumCampbell and Wade pleaded guilty. Achter- stances as to prove guilt beyond a reasonable berg and Gordon Burton were granted sep- doubt it is subject to suspicion and should arate trials. Hearst was never apprehended. | be acted upon with great caution. People v. Lewis, Vidac, Talbot, and Lee Burton entered Rosenberg, 267 Ill. 202, 108 N. E. 54; Hoyt pleas of not guilty, were tried, and a verdict | v. People, 140 Ill. 588, 30 N. E. 315, 16 L. R. of guilty returned. A motion for new trial was overruled, and the four defendants were sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary, and they have sued out this writ of

error.

[1-3] No one except Campbell and Wade testified positively to plaintiffs in error being at Crandall and assisting in the commission of the crime. None of the train crew identified plaintiffs in error except Lee Burton, and as to him the identification was not definite and satisfactory. They said they could not be positive. Each of plaintiffs in error de nied on the witness stand that he was at Crandall when the crime was committed and denied any connection with it. One witness testified he met Vidac in the Saragota pool room, in Peoria, about 7:30 or 8 o'clock the evening of April 11 and the two of them played pool two hours. Two night policemen in Pekin testified they saw and talked with Vidac in a restaurant in Pekin about 11:30 or 12 o'clock the night they heard the train was held up. Four witnesses testified Talbot was in McKenzie's confectionery and soft drink parlor from about 7 o'clock till 10:30, or later. Four witnesses testified to the whereabouts of Lee Burton the night of April 11, and if their testimony was true he could not have been at Crandall when the crime was committed; and the same is true of the testimony of three witnesses as to Lewis' whereabouts the evening of April 11, if what they testified to is worthy of belief. The testimony of these witnesses for plaintiffs in error and the testimony of Campbell and Wade cannot be reconciled. That of one or the other of the two sets of witnesses was false. The rule of law is that the jury are the judges of the weight to be given to the testimony of the witnesses, and a reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the jury where no prejudicial error has been committed and the verdict does not appear to be the result of passion and prejudice. Without the testimony of Campbell and Wade the evidence would not have been sufficient to warrant a verdict of guilty. Those two witnesses admitted they helped commit the crime, pleaded guilty, applied for probation, and, as we understand, were at liberty under bail at the time of the trial. Independent of any hope they had that by pleading guilty to the crime of burglary, only, they might be leniently dealt with by the state (of which there is some evidence), they admitted they were accomplices of plaintiffs in error in the crime. That fact did not

A. 239; Campbell v. People, 159 Ill. 9, 42 N. E. 123, 50 Am. St. Rep. 134; People v. Feinberg, 237 Ill. 348, 86 N. E. 584; People v. McKinney, 267 Ill. 454, 108 N. E. 652. We do not say whether, in the absence of the conduct of the trial hereafter referred to, the jury would or would not have been warranted in finding a verdict of guilty; but we have concluded that for reasons given hereafter there should be a new trial of this case.

All four of plaintiffs in error testified at the trial and denied having had anything to do with the crime. Each of them claimed he was not present at the place and time of its commission and introduced witnesses to prove his presence elsewhere at the time. Lewis testified that he had known Frank Weber, of Peoria, about ten years; that Weber owned a pool room where he sold soft drinks. The state, on cross-examination, asked Lewis if Weber did not sell some other kinds of drinks and if his place had not been raided by prohibition officers three times within the last year, to which questions the court sustained objections. The state then asked Lewis if he meant to be understood as saying he had known Weber ten years and did not know he operated a soft drink parlor and gambling room in Peoria. The court overruled an objection to the question. Lewis was asked by the state why he had been discharged by the P. & P. U., meaning, as we understand, the Peoria & Pekin Union Terminal Railroad Company. An objection was sustained to the question, and the state then asked if it was not a fact that witness was discharged at the time a number of cars had been burglarized, but the court sustained an objection to the question. Counsel for the state asked the witness where his wife was, to which the court sustained an objection, and then counsel inquired if it was not a fact his wife had been divorced from him and been given the custody of their child, to which objection was sustained.

Vidac testified he went to Peoria about 6:30 o'clock the evening of April 11 and visited the Saragota pool room and played pool till about 10:30 and then returned to Pekin, where he operated a soft drink parlor. He was then asked if his place had not been raided twice by federal officers. An objection to the question was overruled, and Vidac answered it had. He was then asked if he was then under indictment in the federal court for the unlawful sale of alcohol, and answered he was. He was also asked if he was not under bond in the circuit court of

(145 N.E.)

Tazewell county for the unlawful sale of examination he was asked if he was present liquor, and answered he was. After he had in the Peoria county circuit court three answered, his counsel objected and moved to weeks before, at the trial of McKenzie's son. have the answers stricken, and the court or- On objection made, the court stated he could not see the point of it, and sustained the dered the same stricken. Thereupon counsel for the state objection. asked the witness if it was not true he was an alibi witness for McKenzie's son when he was tried for robbing a Standard Oil station in Peoria, and the court again sustained an objection.

On cross-examination Lee Burton was asked who was on his bond, to which the court sustained an objection. Burton testified he had for one year prior to March 1, 1923, been employed by the P. & P. U. as a special agent. He was asked on cross-examination if he had not been discharged because of robberies in the East Peoria yards, and answered he had not. He was then asked if he was not discharged, and said no; he was laid off. Counsel for the state inquired if that was not a gentlemanly way of discharging him, whereupon counsel for the defense objected "to the comments of counsel," and the court sustained the objection. Burton in his testimony spoke of having seen Talbot in Ike McKenzie's place of business. Witness said McKenzie's business was confectionery; he sold candy; witness could not say whether he sold soft drinks; said there was a bar there. He was asked if it was not the same kind of a bar they had in the old saloon, and if the place was not a saloon before the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment, and if the furniture was not the same as it was then, to all of which the court sustained objections.

[4, 5] In no case we can recall have we ever sustained a conviction which depended principally on the testimony of accomplices where the record shows such improper conduct during the progress of the trial. It does not follow that because a witness was an accomplice his testimony should not be given any weight, but when the principal evidence is the testimony of accomplices, which we have always held should be received with caution, the record should be fairly free from prejudicial error, and especially so from palpable efforts of the state to prejudice the defendants with the jury by attempting to drag into the case matters wholly foreign and irMany questions asked plaintiffs in relevant. error and their witnesses on cross-examination had no tendency to prove their guilt of the crime charged, but the only tendency was to prejudice plaintiffs in error with the jury and influence them to return a verdict of On cross-examination of Talbot the state guilty on general principles. The state must asked him if he was the same Louis Talbot have known it was not competent to ask who was indicted in Peoria county in 1921 plaintiffs in error or witnesses if they had for robbing a Standard Oil Company station, not been indicted for other crimes, or the He many other questions, some of which we have to which an objection was sustained. was also asked if he was not the Lewis Tal- set out, which had no tendency to prove the bot at whose place three barrels of alcohol issue being tried. The only effect of such an were found that had been stolen from the examination would be to cause the jury to Rock Island depot. An objection was over- believe plaintiffs in error were bad men and ruled, and witness answered there were likely to commit such a crime as the indictthree barrels taken from his place-not from ment charged. Men on trial for a particular the Rock Island Railroad Company; they crime are not required to defend themselves He against every possible insinuation which may were taken by Tazewell county officers. was then asked if he was the same Louis Tal- be made against them, nor are witnesses to bot in whose possession a washing machine be subjected to every insinuation and asperwas found that had been stolen from an Illi- sion in no way connected with the issue being nois concern, and answered, 'No.' Asked if he tried. It was held in People v. Newman, 261 had a washing machine he said he had, and Ill. 11, 103 N. E. 589, that the law does not he was then asked if the numbers on it had provide one method for trying innocent pernot been so disfigured that it could not be sons and another for trying guilty persons. identified. Counsel for the defense then in- In that case the court said: terposed an objection, and it was sustained. Joseph Day, a witness for Talbot, testified he saw Talbot in Ike McKenzie's place in Peoria the night of April 11. The state then asked the witness, repeating substantially the same question three times in succession, whether he had not, two or three weeks before, been an alibi witness in the Peoria county circuit court for McKenzie's son, to all of which questions the court sustained objections.

Joe Stafford testified for the defense that he saw Talbot in McKenzie's place the night of April 11 from 8 till 11 o'clock. On cross

"The plaintiff in error had a right to a trial by jury on competent evidence and to have his witness appear without any illegal disparagement of his credibility. The question is not what, with the aspersions against the witness wrongfully appearing in the record, we may think of the guilt or innocence of the plaintiff in error, but what would the jury have done if the case had been submitted to them without those aspersions. The rule that a judgment will not be reversed where the evidence clearly establishes the defendant's guilt does not justify the total disregard of the rights of a prisoner upon his trial for an alleged crime. still has a right to be tried by the law of the

He

land, and a conviction secured by a trial in to-, 2. Schools and school districts 42(2)—Distal disregard of that law cannot be sustained."

The subject has received the consideration of this court in several cases, some of which are People v. Green, 292 Ill. 351, 127 N. E. 50; People v. Decker, 310 Ill. 234, 141 N. E. 710; People v. Brocamp, 307 Ill. 448, 138 N. E. 728; People v. King, 276 Ill. 138, 114 N. E. 601; People v. Reed, 287 Ill. 606, 122 N. E. 806; and People v. Newman, supra.

[6] It is true, the court sustained objections to most of the improper examination of plaintiffs in error and their witnesses, but the improper examinations occurred too often during the trial and questions were so frequently repeated after objections had been sustained that the only remedy for such conduct, and the only fair treatment of the record, is a reversal of the judgment so that a fair and orderly trial may be had under the law. People v. Green, supra. This court is reluctant to reverse a judgment of conviction in any case, but it should be understood that men charged with a crime are entitled to a fair trial according to law. Where that has been denied them, guilt must be so conclusively proved that no other verdict than one of guilty could reasonably have been returned by the jury to warrant a reviewing court in sustaining the conviction. It is not to be

understood that we intend to hold the proof

in this case, in the absence of serious prejudicial error, would not warrant a verdict of guilty. What we hold is that under the state of the record to which we have called

attention it is our duty to award plaintiffs in error a new trial, at which they may present their defense to the jury and have its merits, if any, determined free from the influence of improper attempts to go into other matters than the guilt of the accused of the crime charged in the indictment. That was the issue proper to be tried, and the testimony should have been reasonably confined to that issue.

trict held not invalid as not compact and contiguous.

Normal community high school district No. 348, in McLean county, held not invalid, as not compact and contiguous, because of its size, remoteness of children from schoolhouse, or lack of facilities for traveling to it, though small number of children therein will encounter some difficulties, and possibly interruptions, in attending school because of road conditions. 3. Schools and school districts 42(2)-District held not invalid as invading other high school centers.

Territory belonging to other high school centers held not invaded, by creation of Normal community high school district No. 348, in McLean county, to such degree as to render it in

valid.

Appeal from Circuit Court, McLean County; Edward Barry, Judge.

Quo warranto by the People, on the relation of Guy Garrison and others, against T. H. Keys and others, as Board of Education of Normal Community High School District No. 348, in McLean County. From judgment of ouster, defendants appeal. Reversed.

R. F. Dunn and W. W. Whitmore, both of Bloomington, for appellants.

Lester H. Martin, State's Atty., Joseph W.

Fifer, Bohrer & Riley and Morrissey, Sullivan & Rust, all of Bloomington, for appel

lees.

county granted leave to the people, on relaHEARD, J. The circuit court of McLean tion of Guy Garrison and others, to file an information in quo warranto against the board of education of Normal community high school district No. 348, in McLean county. The petition alleged that the district braced territory belonging to other commuwas not compact and contiguous and emnity centers. After much pleading a judgment was entered in the circuit court upon

The judgment is reversed, and the cause the pleadings, ousting appellants from the

remanded for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

(313 Ill. 234)

office of members of the board of education of such district and assessing a fine of one dollar and costs on each of the appellants, from which judgment an appeal was taken to this court, and the judgment of ouster was

PEOPLE ex rel. GARRISON et al. v. KEYS reversed for erroneous rulings of the court

et al. (No. 16120.)

(Supreme Court of Illinois. Oct. 28, 1924.) 1. Schools and school districts 42(2)-District not unlawful because student may occasionally miss school on account of road conditions.

That student may occasionally miss school because of road conditions does not render district unlawful, though creation of district which will not permit children to travel to school from their homes in reasonable time with reasonable comfort, because of its size or road conditions, is not authorized.

upon the pleadings. People v. Keys, 310 Ill. 198, 141 N. E. 722. The case having been redocketed in the circuit court, and the pleadings settled in accordance with the mandate of this court, it was heard before the court, a jury having been waived, and the court again found the issues for relators, against the validity of the district, and entered judgment of ouster, with fine and costs, against appellants, from which judgment this appeal is prosecuted.

The district as organized embraces 44 sections, almost rectangular in shape, and is

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

(145 N.E.)

81⁄2 miles long by 6 miles wide. The district would afford the same conveniences to all the has operated a 4-year accredited high school children to attend the school, and it cannot continuously since the fall of 1920 in a rent- be said that, because a student may occaed school building located in the town of sionally miss school on account of road conNormal, which has a population of 5,143. ditions, a school district does not, therefore, This school building is distant 7 miles from comply with the law. People v. Rote, 312 the northeast and northwest corners of the Ill. 99, 143 N. E. 492. As said in People v. district, 41⁄2 miles from the north line, 5 Farran, 311 Ill. 87, 142 N. E. 468, no doubt miles from the southeast corner and 3% a small number of the children in the dismiles from the southwest corner. The en-trict here under consideration will encounter tire district outside of the city of Normal is some difficulties, and possibly interruptions, composed of level or slightly rolling agricul- in attending the school, but neither the size tural lands. There are no steep hills, lakes, of the district, the remoteness of any of the timber tracts, impassable morasses or un- children from the school house, nor their bridged or overflowing water courses within facilities for traveling to it are of such a the district. At the time of the trial two character as would justify holding that it is completed paved roads traversed the dis- not compact and contiguous, or that it viotrict, and a third was under construction, lates the constitutional limitation on the which according to schedule was to be com- power to create school districts. pleted in July, 1924. No part of the district as organized is more than 24 miles distant from a paved road. In addition to these paved roads there are about 87 miles of dirt road, about 18 miles of which are oiled, laid out largely on the section and half-section lines. Six rural mail carriers delivering mail throughout this district were called as wit-northeast corner for % of a mile the district nesses upon the trial, one of whom had not missed a day's delivery in 1923, one of whom had missed 12 days in 20 years, and the others missed not to exceed 5 days in any one year on account of bad roads. The dirt roads are the average Illinois dirt roads, which get muddy when it rains, and are very soft in the spring when the snow melts, and the frost comes out of the ground, but the evidence does not show that at any season of the year are they impassable for travel on horseback or with horse and buggy. In People v. Standley (No. 15016), 144 N. nected that there is no visible line of demarE. 355, this court said:

[3] It is contended that portions of the district in question are embraced within other community centers. The district in question was constructed wholly out of nonhighschool communities. At only two points does the district touch other school districts in which high schools are conducted. At the

adjoins the Towanda common school district, which maintains a 4-year high school as a part of its district school course, although not organized into a high school district under any statute. The evidence does not show that Towanda is the community center, for school purposes, of any of the territory embraced within the district. On the south the district for about 21⁄2 miles is adjacent to the city of Bloomington, a city of about 28,000 inhabitants, and the evidence shows that the cities of Bloomington and Normal are so con

cation between the two cities. The evidence "Every reasonable presumption will be in- also shows that, while some of the inhabidulged in favor of the validity of a school dis- tants of the town of Normal go to Bloomingtrict established by authority of the legislative ton for business, religious, and social purdepartment of the government, and the courts poses, Normal is their community center for will not hold the district invalid, unless it school purposes, as they for years have been clearly appears from the evidence that chil-in Normal school district No. 144, within the dren of school age residing in the district cannot reasonably avail themselves of the privileges of the school."

limits of which the present community high school is conducted. The evidence in this case does not show that, in establishing the [1, 2] While it is not a lawful exercise of district in question, territory naturally bethe constitutional power to create a district | longing to other high school centers has been which on account of its size or road condi- invaded to that degree which renders the tions will not permit the children to attend school district invalid. school by traveling from their homes to the school in a reasonable length of time and with a reasonable degree of comfort (People v. Young, 301 Ill. 67, 133 N. E. 693), it is impossible to create a district of any size which

The judgment entered by the circuit court finding this district invalid and ousting appellants from their offices is not warranted by the evidence, and it is therefore reversed. Judgment reversed.

(313 111. 321)
PEOPLE ex rel. TAYLOR et al. v. CAMARGO
COMMUNITY CONSOL. SCHOOL
DIST. NO. 158. (No. 16004.)

(Supreme Court of Illinois. Oct. 28, 1924.)
1. Schools and school districts 22-Act en-
abling original districts to detach themselves
from consolidated district held not void as
taking property without due process.

School Law (Laws 1919, p. 904), as amended on June 30, 1923 (Laws 1923, p. 587), enabling original school districts in community consolidated school district to detach themselves from latter district in manner provided in sections 84g, subd. 4, and section 84i, held not violative of Const. art. 2, § 2, as taking territory from consolidated district without due process.

2. Statutes 79(2), 96(1) — Constitutional prohibition against local or special laws as to management of schools, or granting special privileges, construed.

Const. art. 4, § 22, prohibiting local or special laws for management of common schools, or granting any special or exclusive privilege, immunity, or franchise, does not apply to all school laws and agencies adopted in providing a system of free schools, but relates merely to management of common schools in imparting instruction.

3. Statutes 79(2)—Act permitting detachment of certain territory from consolidated school district held not void, because denying privilege to other territory.

School Law (Laws 1919, p. 904), as amended on June 30, 1923 (Laws 1923, p. 587), which by section 84g, subd. 4, and section 84i, enables inhabitants of territory once forming common school district to be detached from community consolidated school district, held not void because denying such privilege to inhabitants of territory not previously constituting entire common school district; classification not being unreasonable.

4. Schools and school districts 22-Statute enabling certain territory to detach itself from consolidated district held not void, as failing to provide efficient system of common schools.

School Law (Laws 1919, p. 904), as amended on June 30, 1923 (Laws 1923, p. 587), which in section 84g, subd. 4, and section 84i, enables territory which once formed common school district to detach itself from community consolidated school district, does not, as a matter of law, violate Const. art. 8, § 1, relative to maintenance of efficient system of

common schools.

5. Constitutional law 50-Act enabling territory to detach itself from consolidated school district held not void, as conferring legislative, judicial, and executive powers on voters of territory.

School Law (Laws 1919, p. 904), as amend ed on June 30, 1923 (Laws 1923, p. 587), which in section 84g, subd. 4, and section 841, permits certain territory to detach itself from community consolidated school district, is not violative of Const. art 3, as conferring legisla

tive, judicial, and executive power on voters of detaching district.

6. Schools and school districts 33-School Law held not to authorize detachment of territory from consolidated district, so as to leave remaining territory not contiguous.

School Law (Laws 1919, p. 904), as amended on June 30, 1923 (Laws 1923, p. 587), §§ 84a, 84b, 84c, 84d, 84g, and particularly latter section, construed as whole, does not permit detachment of a former school district from a community consolidated district in such manner as to leave remaining territory of consolidated district in separate bodies or not contiguous, within section 84a. 7. Schools and school districts 22-School Law, authorizing former school district to vote on detachment from consolidated district, held not void in failing to give detailed directions for election.

School Law (Laws 1919, p. 904), as amended on June 30, 1923 (Laws 1923, p. 587), § 84g, subd. 4, which permits former common school district to detach itself from community consolidated school district by voting on that question at an election called by county superintendent, is not void as containing no specific directions for holding such election.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Douglas County; Franklin H. Boggs, Judge.

Information in nature of quo warranto by the People, on the relation of Charles C. Taylor and others, against the Camargo Community Consolidated School District No. 158. From a decree sustaining a demurrer and dismissing information, relators appeal. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Robert F. Cotton, State's Atty., of Tuscola (Green & Palmer, Henry I. Green, and Oris Barth, all of Urbana, of counsel), for appel

lants.

John H. Chadwick, of Tuscola, for appel

lee.

DUNN, J. The Camargo Community Consolidated School District No. 158, in the county of Douglas, was organized, consisting of school districts Nos. 21, 53, and 54 and other territory. On August 18 1923, separate elections were held in each of the three original districts, Nos. 21, 53, and 54, pursuant to the fourth paragraph of section 84g of the School Law as amended on June 30, 1923 (Laws 1923, p. 587), on the question of detaching those districts, respectively from

the consolidated district. The vote in each district was in favor of detachment. On January 14 1924, pursuant to leave granted, the state s attorney of Douglas county filed in the circui court an information in the the directors of the three original districts nature of quo warranto. on the relation of and of two taxpayers and landowners within each district, alleging in separate counts the detachment of each one of the original districts, and charging that the community

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