(145 N.E.) consolidated district, after the detachment, | Their powers may be enlarged, diminished, had usurped the rights, title, authority, pow-modified, or revoked, their acts set aside or ers, privileges, jurisdiction, and franchises of confirmed, at the pleasure of the Legislature. a community consolidated school district The state may, with or without the consent over the territory of the respective original school districts, and calling upon the consolidated district to show by what authority it claimed to exercise such rights, title, authority, powers, privileges, jurisdiction, and franchises. The consolidated district appeared and demurred to the information, on the ground that the amendment of 1923, which authorized the detachment of territory from the consolidated district, was unconstitutional. The court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the information, and the relators appealed. The parts of the statute which the appellee claims to be unconstitutional are as follows: "Sec. 84g. 4th. If one-half of the legal voters of a former common school district shall file with the county superintendent of schools a petition asking that a vote be taken in such district on the question of detaching from a community consolidated school district, then the county superintendent of schools shall within (30) thirty days from the date of filing of said petition call an election in said former school district and if three-fourths of the legal voters of such district shall vote in favor of detachment then the county superintendent of schools shall thereupon detach said territory and organize the same into a common school district." "Sec. 84i. * When the former common school districts have been re-established in consequence of the discontinuance of a community consolidated school district or the territory of a former common school district has been detached and re-established, their reorganization shall be completed by an election ordered by the county superintendent in each of said districts for the purpose of selecting a board of directors or a board of education as the case may require." [1] The first objection to the act is that it violates section 2 of article 2 of the Constitution, which provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, in that it permits the taking of territory from the appellee without due process of law. The appellee is a public municipal corporation created by legislative authority for the purpose of exercising such part of the governmental powers of the state as the law has confided to it. It is a part of the machinery of government. Its functions are wholly public, and it is merely a local agency of the state for the exercise of those functions. The character of the functions of such municipal corporations, the extent and duration of their powers and the territory in which they shall be exercised rest entirely in the legislative discretion. The governmental powers which they may exercise and the property which they may hold and use for governmental purposes are equally within the power of the Legislature. of the inhabitants or against their protest, and with or without notice or hearing, take their property without compensation and vest it in other agencies, or hold it itself, expand or contract the territorial area, divide it, unite the whole or part of it with another municipality, apportion the common property and the common burdens in accordance with the legislative will, and it may abolish the municipality altogether. The property of such corporations is public property in the hands of state agents for certain purposes and is subject to the will of the Legislature. It has been held so in many cases. Bush v. Shipman, 4 Scam. 186; Trustees of Schools v. Tatman, 13 Ill. 27; People v. Trustees of Schools, 86 Ill. 613; People v. Bartlett, 304 Ill. 283, 136 N. E. 654;, Dennis v. Maynard, 15 Ill. 477; Pike County v. People, 11 Ill. 202; County of Richland v. County of Lawrence, 12 Ill. 1; People v. Power, 25 Ill. 187; Sangamon County v. City of Springfield, 63 Ill. 66; Logan County v. City of Lincoln, 81 Ill. 156; Marion County v. Lear, 108 Ill. 343; Wilson v. Board of Trustees, 133 Ill. 443, 27 N. E. 203; Laramie v. Albany, 92 U. S. 307, 23 L. Ed. 552; Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U. S. 514, 25 L. Ed. 699; Attorney General v. Lowrey, 199 U. S. 233, 26 S. Ct. 27, 50 L. Ed. 167; Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U. S. 161, 28 S. Ct. 40, 52 L. Ed. 151. Some of these cases involved the property of school districts and others that of counties or towns, but, whatever the character of the municipal corporation involved, it was held that political subdivisions, whether counties, towns, or school districts, were subject to the supervision and control of the state and that their property and revenue are subject to the control of the Legislature. [2,3] It is argued that the law violates section 22 of article 4 of the Constitution, which prohibits the General Assembly from passing local or special laws providing for the management of common schools, or granting to any corporation, association, or individual any special or exclusive privilege, immunity, or franchise whatever. The prohibition of this section applies, not to all school laws, and not to the agencies which the state shall adopt in providing a system of free schools, but relates merely to the management of common schools in imparting instruction. Fuller v. Heath, 89 Ill. 296. The act does not grant to any corporation, association, or individual any special or exclusive privilege. The special privilege which the appellee complains of is the right of the inhabitants of territory which once formed a common school district to be detached from the community consolidated school district, while the same privilege is not granted to the inhabitants of territory which has not previously consti tuted an entire common school district. It, cation, but that the people whose children is said that there is no distinction which are to be provided for may, in establishing constitutes a reasonable basis for granting districts, establish such as will not accomthe right in the one case and withholding it plish the purpose of furnishing a good comin the other, and that the classification made mon school education. The amendment of by the act is therefore unconstitutional. In the School Law, so as to authorize the dePeople v Exton, 298 Ill 119, 131 N. E. 275, tachment of territory from a community conand People v Moyer, 298 Ill. 143, 131 N E. solidated school district and organize such 280, it was held that the classification made territory into a common school district, does by the act providing for the formation of not destroy the system of free schools heretocommunity consolidated school districts out fore existing, and the detachment of territory of territory composed of entire common does not destroy any school which had preschool districts was based upon a rational viously existed. The argument of the appeldifference of situation or condition and was lee is directed rather against the policy or valid. The consolidated district can only be wisdom of the act than its constitutionality. formed of territory bounded by school dis- With that question we have nothing to do. trict lines. This was regarded as a reason. It may be unwise, but it was said in People able basis of classification in the organiza- v. Graham, 301 Ill. 446, 134 N. E. 57. tion of districts. It is then not unreasonable that the same classification should be preserved in reference to the detaching of territory, for the consolidated district could not continue to be composed of territory bounded by school district lines, if part of its territory not so bounded could be delature to act in its stead, have, as a matter of tached. If the district has been constituted of a number of original school districts and two-thirds of the people in one or more of those districts find by experience that the conduct of the schools in the consolidated district is unsatisfactory, it is not an unreasonable classification which gives them the right to withdraw, and organize into a common school district as they had been originally organized. [4] The act is also said to violate section 1 of article 8 of the Constitution because it does not make any attempt to provide a thorough and efficient system of common schools. The argument is that the act for the establishment of community consolidated school districts was constitutional, that it required the territory of the district to be compact and contiguous, and that under the amendment (section 84g) the detached territory may not constitute such a district as will furnish a thorough and efficient means for giving the children residing therein a good common school education, or that the portion of the community consolidated school district which shall be left after such detachment will not constitute such a district as to provide a thorough and efficient means by which the children of the district may receive a good common school education, or may not be compact and contiguous. This argument is directed not so much at the system which the Legislature has provided for furnishing the children of the state a good common school education as at the unreasonable action which the people of a particular district may take in seeking to avail of the benefits of such system. The objection made is not that the system does not make provision for the formation of districts and the establishment of schools by which the children may receive a good common school edu "It is not for the courts to say that the Legislature has acted unwisely in selecting the agencies or methods which it deems best to carry out the mandate of the Constitution, and the courts cannot interfere unless the Legislature, or the officers authorized by the Legis fact, created a system of free schools which all reasonable men must agree is not an efficient and thorough system, as those terms are commonly and generally understood." tends to affect adversely or favorably the Whether the amendment complained of thoroughness and efficiency of the system of free schools is a legislative question, which is not for our determination, and this amendment cannot be held, as a matter of law, to violate section 1 of article 8 of the Constitution. [5] It is contended that the act violates article 3 of the Constitution, in that it permits territory to be detached from the community consolidated school district by the county superintendent and the legal voters of the district, and thereby confers legislative, judicial, and executive powers upon the voters of the district. Ever since there has been a school law in this state the fundamental principle for the establishment of school districts has been that they should be such as the convenience and wishes of a majority of the inhabitants required. The law has provided for the ascertainment of such wishes and convenience either by petition signed by a majority or more of the legal voters or by elections held for the purpose, and districts have been created, changed, added to, diminished, consolidated, and divided upon petitions of the voters to the school authorities and elections. It is not the exercise of either legislative, executive, or judicial power for the inhabitants of any territory to avail themselves of the privilege of organizing a school district in accordance with the authority conferred by a statute which specifies with particularity the rules and conditions under which the organization may be made. [6] It is contended that the act, and particularly section 84g, is so vague and uncer (145 N.E.) distance of more than three miles. To avoid this absurd result, in view of the situation of the territory to be effected, the court, giv the letter of the act must yield to the evident intention of the Legislature, and the detached territory held to belong to Jefferson county in accordance with that intention. The rule of interpretation was followed that statutes must be interpreted according to the intent and meaning, and not always according to the letter; that a thing within the intention is within the statute, though not within the letter, and a thing within the letter is not within the statute, unless within the intention; and that it is sufficient authority to depart from the words of a statute when to follow them would lead to an absurd consequence. A sound construction of the act here in question does not permit the detachment of a former school district, which would leave the remaining territory of the district in separate bodies or not contiguous. tain that it cannot be enforced, and the appellee argues that the amendment to section 84g, by authorizing the detachment of any original school district, makes a community | ing consideration to the whole act, held that consolidated school district possible, not composed of contiguous territory, as required by section 84a. The organization of community consolidated school districts was authorized by a statute passed in 1919, which required the territory to be contiguous and compact. Laws 1919, p. 904. Section 84g provided for the annexation of additional territory by means of an election to be held as provided in sections 84b, 84c, and 84d of the act and made no provision for detaching territory. The amendment of 1923 eliminated the word "compact" from section 84a, but left the requirement that the territory of the consolidated district should be contiguous. Provisions for the detachment of territory were added to section 84g and the reference to the manner of calling and holding the election was omitted. Construing all the provisions of the act together, it is clear that the Legislature did not intend that consolidated districts might exist with parts of their territory entirely separated from the rest of the district. The statute as amended required by its first section (84a) that the territory should be contiguous. This requirement was not changed, and since a consolidated district could not be organized out of districts which were not contiguous, it was clearly not the intention of the Legislature that such an organization could be accomplished indirectly by a change of boundaries. [7] The further objection is made that subsection 4 of section 84g, under which the territory in question was detached, contains no direction whatever in regard to the holding of elections, but simply directs the county superintendent to call an election. This subsection does not state how the election shall be called or conducted, but the act provides for an election on the question of the establishment of a community consolidated school district to be called by posting notices at least 10 days in 10 public places throughout the territory, for the establishment of voting precincts, the designation of polling places, the appointment of judges and clerks, and the furnishing of ballots, ballot boxes, tally sheets, poll books, and blanks, all by the county superintendent of schools, the returns to be made to him within five days. In Wild v. People, 227 Ill. 556, 81 N. E. 707, it was held that a city could not be organized out of tracts of land connected only by narrow strips, though there was actual contact of all the strips by that means. So in a case where the authority of a city to annex territory was limited to such territory | The election of a board of education is to be as was contiguous to the city, and no incorporated city, town, or village could be annexed to another unless they adjoined each other, it was held that, since a city could not be so organized originally, having unorganized or unincorporated territory within its boundaries and entirely surrounded by it, the same result could not be accomplished indirectly by annexing to the city a village whose boundaries connected with the city's only at the north and south ends of the village, while between the north and south ends there was no common boundary line, but for a considerable distance there was an area of 200 acres of unincorporated territory. Village of Morgan Park v. City of Chicago, 255 Ill. 190, 99 N. E. 388. In Perry County v. Jefferson County, 94 Ill. 214, by a literal following of the language of the act there under consideration, a portion of the northeast part of Perry county was detached from it and attached to Franklin county, though actually separated from the territory of the latter county by a called by the superintendent by posting notices at least 10 days in 10 public places. While section 84g does not prescribe the number of notices or the time they shall be posted or the manner in which the election shall be held in other respects, it does require the superintendent to call the election, and does contemplate the action of the superintendent based upon the election. It originally contained the provision that the election should be called and held in accordance with the provisions of sections 84b, 84c, and 84d of the act, so far as they were applicable. It was not necessary that the act should repeat every detail of the requirements of the election. It does direct the manner of calling and conducting the election upon the question of establishing the district and directs the same method as to the election of the board of education. It was not necessary to repeat these details, but whenever an election is ordered and an election held in accordance with the requirements of the act for the organization of the district, that J. L. Gallimore and Hosea V. Ferrell, both of Marion, for appellant. H. E. Skinner and E. M. Spiller, both of Marion, for appellees. would be a sufficient basis for the superin-, Finis G. Crain and others against the same tendent's action in accordance with the act, district. From adverse judgments, defendand it was no doubt in that view that the ant appeals. Reversed. provisions of 84g in the original act in regard to the manner of calling and holding the election were omitted in the amendment of 1923. In section 84i it is provided that, when the territory of a former school district has been detached and re-established, THOMPSON, J. the reorganization shall be completed by an These appeals present election ordered by the county superintend- for decision the constitutionality of the Coment in the district for the purpose of select-munity High School District Act approved ing a board of directors or a board of educa- June 27, 1923. Section 89a provides that a tion, as the case may require, and this au- community high school district may be esthorizes an election in the same manner as tablished in any territory (1) which is coman election on the question of the establish- pact and contiguous; (2) which comprises ment of the district. or includes a community center; (3) the limits of which do not extend more than onehalf the distance between the community center of the proposed district and another community center; (4) where there will be a probable attendance of 75 pupils; and (5) which does not include territory at the time maintaining a high school. Section 89b gives to the circuit court in term time, or the judge of such court in vacation, upon the presentation of a proper petition, power to call or refuse to call, at his discretion, an election to determine whether such a district shall be established. Section 89g provides: The act is not subject to the objections which are made to it, and the demurrer should have been overruled. The decree is reversed, and the cause will be remanded, with directions to the circuit court to overrule the demurrer. Reversed and remanded, with directions. (313 Ill. 422) NORTH et al. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION CRAIN et al. v. SAME. (Nos. 16112, 16113.) (Supreme Court of Illinois. Oct. 28, 1924.) "Whenever a majority of the legal voters residing within any contiguous portion of the territory embraced in any community high school district desire to be detached therefrom and added to a non-high-school district, or to another high school district they may present a petition therefor to the judge of the circuit court in vacation, or to the circuit court in term time of the county in which said district * ** If the or the major part thereof lies. board of education appears to contest the same, it shall file a written answer thereto and the judge or court shall hear the evidence both for 2. Statutes 2-Law must be complete when and against the granting of said petition. it leaves Legislature. 1. Constitutional law 61 Schools and school districts 22-Laying out districts and altering boundaries legislative function. Laying out school districts and altering boundaries of established districts is legislative function, and hence School Law, § 89g, is unconstitutional under Const. art. 3. * * * If in his or its opinion, the said ter Law to be valid must be complete when it ritory, or any part thereof, sought to be deleaves Legislature. All presumptions are in favor of validity of statute, and in all doubtful cases doubt is resolved in favor of law; but, where it is clear that Constitution has been disregarded, it is plain duty of court to so declare, no matter how beneficial attempted legislation may be. Appeal from Circuit Court, Williamson County; D. T. Hartwell, Judge. Proceedings by John T. North and others against the Board of Education of Community High School District No. 203, and by tached is not properly a part of said community high school district under the provisions set forth in sections 89a and 89b for the organization of community high school districts, or if said territory, or any part thereof, is not an essential portion of said community high school district for the performance of its corporate functions, the said judge or court shall enter an order detaching said territory, or any part thereof, from said community high school district and adding the same to a non-highschool district or to another high school district as prayed in the petition; otherwise, said judge or court shall enter an order denying the petition." Laws of 1923, pp. 592-595. Pursuant to the provisions of section 89g, two petitions were filed in the circuit court of Williamson county to detach two separate blocks of territory from community high school district No. 203. After a hearing on both petitions the court entered an order detaching the territory described in each pe For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes (145 N.E.) tition and annexing said territory in both, judge might entertain still a third view. instances to the adjacent non-high-school dis- Judges of the different circuits would no trict. An appeal was prosecuted in each in- doubt entertain divergent views on the substance, and the appeals have been consoli-ject. We find, therefore, that under the dated in this court. Arti piece of legislation before us no one will [1-4] It is difficult to conceive of an act know what the law is until a particular judge more clearly unconstitutional than said sec- acts. Instead of being a uniform law applition 89g. This court has held in a long line cable alike to all similar areas of territory of decisions that the laying out of school throughout the state, it is subject to the varydistricts and the altering of the boundaries ing opinions of the judges in the several cirof established school districts is a legislative cuits of the state, and of the different judges, function. People v. Graham, 301 Ill. 446, 134 or their successors, in the same circuit. It is N. E. 57; People v. Opie, 301 Ill. 11, 133 N. the province of the Legislature to declare E. 689; Jackson v. Blair, 298 Ill. 605, 132 the method by which school districts shall be N. E. 221; Kenyon v. Moore, 287 Ill. 233, | organized and to fix the limitations which 122 N. E. 548. These decisions are support- it considers necessary for the establishment ed in principle by the holding in Funkhouser of a thorough and efficient system of free v. Randolph, 287 Ill. 94, 122 N. E. 144, and schools, and it is the province of the courts City of Galesburg v. Hawkinson, 75 Ill. 152. to decide whether a particular school district The same power cannot be either legislative has been organized in accordance with the or judicial, as the Legislature may deter-authority granted by the Legislature. mine to retain it or surrender it to the judiciary. If, as all the authorities hold, the boundaries of municipal corporations can be altered and changed by the Legislature in its discretion, then it is impossible that the courts can be invested with the same power. City of Galesburg v. Hawkinson, supra. Courts may determine what are the corporate limits already established, and they may inquire whether a municipal corporation has been created in accordance with the authority granted by the Legislature. The power of the courts to perform these functions implies an existing law applicable to the particular subject, and the inquiry is: What is the law and has it been violated or obeyed? The inquiry in the instant case, however, is: What territory shall be included within the corporate limits of a municipal corporation? We are unable to perceive how any one can contend that this is a judicial function, to be performed by a court. The court is not only given power to detach from one municipal corporation some of its territory, and thereby change its boundaries, but it is given power to attach this same territory to another existing municipal corporation, thereby changing its boundaries. The wishes of the municipal corporations are not consulted. They have territory torn from them or thrust upon them as a judge or a court may decree. One of the circuit judges might consider that a district four miles square was too large to form a constituent part of a thorough and efficient system of free schools; another of the judges might consider a district eight miles square sufficiently compact to conform to the constitutional limitation; while the third cle 3 of our Constitution declares that the The statute under which the court acted being void and the court being without power to alter the boundaries of this school district, the judgments entered detaching the territory described in the two petitions before us are reversed. Judgments reversed. |