tain this action in her own name, without, cannot be made to respond in damages. joining her husband.

In the case of Flandermeyer v. Cooper, 85 Ohio St. 327, 98 N. E. 102, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 360, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 983, this court decided that a wife might maintain an action against a person who furnishes morphine to her husband, he being addicted to the morphine habit, and as a result of drugs being so furnished the husband becomes impaired in mind, rendering it necessary to confine him in an insane asylum. The recovery was placed upon the ground of loss of consortium, and the first paragraph of the syllabus is as follows:

"Husband and wife are entitled to the affection, society, co-operation and aid of each other in every conjugal relation, and either may maintain an action for damages against any one who wrongfully and maliciously interferes with the marital relationship, and thereby deprives one of the society, affection, and consortium of the other."

Much is found in the opinion of Judge Donahue in that case to show that these rights are not mere personal rights, and the mere fact that a recovery is permitted sufficiently shows that they are recognized as property rights.

The cases are quite numerous in Ohio and elsewhere which recognize an action for damages for alienation of the husband's affections. Surely no further argument is needed to show that an action for damages lies in the instant case, and it is not claimed that the small judgment for damages is errone

ous.

These principles have been enforced uniformly in labor strikes, and many cases decided in recent years by the Supreme Court of the United States were quoted by this court with approval in the case of La France Electrical Construction & Supply Co. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 108 Ohio St. 61, 140 N. E. 899.

The leading case on that subject is Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 36 Sup. Ct. 7, 60 L. Ed. 131, L. R. A. 1916D, 545, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 283, and more recent authorities are American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184, 42 Sup. Ct. 72, 66 L. Ed. 189, 27 A. L. R. 360; Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 38 Sup. Ct. 65, 62 L. Ed. 260, L. R. A. 1918C, 497, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 461; Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172, 65 L. Ed. 349, 16 A. L. R. 196.

Surely the rights of an employer to the fruits of his contract with his employés are no more sacred than the rights of a wife to the consortium and support of her lawful

husband.

An unbroken line of authorities establish

the proposition that equity has jurisdiction in a proper case to restrain trespass. Jurisdiction in this class of cases is ordinarily confined to those cases where, from the nature of the property affected, or because of the frequent repetition of the trespass, the injury sustained is not susceptible of remedial damages. This principle has peculiar analogy to the instant case.

Much was said in argument by counsel for Miss Snedaker to the effect that this is a mere personal right belonging to the wife. Even so, many cases have been decided to the effect that a mere personal right is within the protection of a court of equity by injunction, and I can see no reason why the courts might not properly give relief in a case involving a breach of the marriage contract, even though it should be placed solely upon the personal right.

It is, of course, conceded that it is not every case where an action for damages will lie which may be made the subject-matter of injunction. It is only those cases where damages are an inadequate remedy. It is true that, excepting one or two cases, the courts have not dealt with this identical proposition, and it is therefore a novel proposition which is presented to this court for determination. On the other hand, I am of the opinion that the principle involved in Before entering upon a discussion of the this case is exactly identical with that nu- jurisdiction of equity over the infringement merous class of cases where equity has not of personal rights, it should be stated that hesitated to exercise its jurisdiction to pro- there is a clear legal right and a property tect a contract right against undue influence right, which, by reason of the insolvency of by persons not parties thereto. A contract the defendant in this case, renders a suit right has uniformly been held to be a prop- for damages wholly inadequate as a remedy. erty right, and it has been further held that We have reached the point in Ohio where inducing a breach of such a contract is an there is one divorce for every five marriages, actionable tort. While injunction does not and it cannot longer be claimed that the statlie in all such cases, it is very generally held utes relating to marriage and divorce furthat an injunction will lie to restrain third nish that "ample and adequate" remedy persons from inducing the breach of a law- which the majority opinion of the court in ful contract by one of the parties thereto, this case claims. If, as seems to be feared when it will result in irreparable injury. by the majority, the trial court will have This has been held, regardless and irrespec- some difficulty in enforcing the order entered tive of whether the defendant is insolvent, in this case, that difficulty need give this but the cases are quite uniform in holding court no immediate concern. I anticipate, that injunction will lie when the defendant | however, that the defendant would not light

(145 N.E.)

ly disobey the injunction, if it is permitted | has in this case mistaken her remedy. The to stand. The commercial interests of the failure of Miss Snedaker to procure a bill state of Ohio should not be the only concern of exceptions and to reverse the adjudication of the courts of the state. All property of fact, and her attempt only to have this rights and interests, even though growing out court declare a technical rule of law that the of the marriage relation, are entitled to the finding of fact does not support the judgment care and consideration of our courts quite of law which has been entered, affords no as much as those other interests growing out relief to her character. It cannot be lightly of commercialism. assumed that she seeks only vindication at the hands of this court. It seems quite conclusive, on the contrary, that her real purpose is to be relieved from the inhibition of associating with plaintiff's husband.

(145 N.E.)

When damages may be recovered at law, right in the services of his minor daughter, for the invasions of this right, we see no rea- but that he had a further right to have and son why equity may not enjoin, when the to keep her within his home, and not to be legal remedy fails, and we must accept as interfered with by others who might prevent conceded in this case that the money action him from reforming his minor daughter and for damages is inadequate, owing to the recovering her good name, and leading her financial irresponsibility of the defendant be into the paths of rectitude. Ex parte Warlow. field is cited with approval in this case.

The jurisdiction of a court of equity to protect marital rights by injunction has heretofore been recognized. In Ex parte Warfield, 40 Tex. Cr. R. 413, 50 S. W. 933, 76 Am. St. Rep. 724, the right was recognized in an action denying habeas corpus to one who was imprisoned in jail upon a contempt charge for violating an order restraining the defendant from writing to, speaking to, or talking with, the plaintiff's wife, whose affections he had already partially alienated from her husband.

It is true that the case arose on habeas corpus, and hence should not be regarded as controlling, but the principle of the power of equity to enjoin those who interfere with the marriage relation is clearly recognized.

In discussing this case, Dean Pound, in 29 Harvard Law Review, p. 674, says:

"If the order had been appealed from, there might have been a serious question as to the expediency of exercising the jurisdiction. The chancellor would have to consider whether he could reasonably expect to accomplish anything by such an injunction; to consider whether a situation where the defendant was in jail because he persisted in seeing her would not be likely to fan the wife's erring affection for defendant, and to consider that he could not keep the wife away from the defendant, even if he could keep the defendant away from the wife. But these considerations are not relevant to the question of jurisdiction.

*

Counsel for plaintiff cite the case of Hodecker v. Stricker (Sup.) 39 N. Y. Supp. 515. The same does not, however, apply, for the reason that in that case the plaintiff was not then being deprived of any support or consortium, and the purely personal right of some other woman using her name and thus scandalizing and injuring the plaintiff was not deemed sufficient for the jurisdiction of the court of equity; "there being no allegation that plaintiff still lives with him, or that her cohabitation with him was discontinued for any cause attributable to defendant," which fact sufficiently distinguishes Hodecker v. Stricker, supra, from the case at bar.

Hall v. Smith, 80 Misc. Rep. 85, 140 N. Y. Supp. 796, was an action brought by the plaintiff, the wife, against the defendant, a woman, who was charged with having enticed away, or alienated from the plaintiff, the love and affection of her husband, whereby the plaintiff had been deprived of the society of her husband ever since the time when he first met the defendant. Finding that it is the settled law that the wife may maintain a suit for alienation of the affections of her husband and consequent loss of consortium, the court says, at page 87 (140 N. Y. Supp. 798):

"The motion which has been made in this action requires the determination of the question whether in such an action an injunction or"Two circumstances, however, detract some- der may and should be made to restrain the what from the weight of Ex parte Warfield as defendant pendente lite from the continuance an authority. There was a statute in Texas of those acts which lie at the foundation of the which the courts of that state construe as giv- cause of action. While the question is most uning a wider power of granting injunctions than usual, in respect of the power of the court to that possessed by courts under the general equi-grant such relief, I have no doubt whatever that ty doctrine. Also, it might be urged that at common law the husband has a legal right to the services of the wife, which is to be regarded as a property right, and hence that equitable relief may be invoked to secure that right, and may be employed incidentally to secure the more significant interests of a purely personal nature. Thus the case could be brought within the analogy of Gee v. Pritchard [2 Swanst. 402]. But it is significant that the property not more full, as we are denied anything save We regret that the record in this case is right of the husband in the wife's services.

in a proper case the right to grant such an injunction resides in the court of equity, and that it is not unduly extending the jurisdiction or cognizance of the court to restrain the impending, threatened, or continued commission of such acts as are violative of the rights of a plaintiff in a suit of this character."

now thoroughly moribund for all substantial the amended petition, the answer, which is purposes, should acquire a temporary vitality a general denial, and the journal entry, to enable the courts to secure interests of per- | which finds that “the allegations of the petisonality which they hesitate to protect avowedly tion and each of them are true," and that. as such." the plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for.

In Stark v. Hamilton, 149 Ga. 227, 99 S. The averments of the amended petition are E. 861, 5 A. L. R. 1041, a father secured an very broad, charging the defendant below for injunction against those who were keeping a period of over five years of wickedly, purhis minor daughter in prostitution; the in- posely, and maliciously intending to win junction being grounded, not only upon the from plaintiff the affections of her husband, grounds that the father had the property his companionship, support, love, and to ap

propriate the same to herself, and that the defendant, unless restrained by an order of court, in order to prevent the plaintiff from regaining the love, esteem, affection, co-operation, aid, and support, and conjugal relation of her husband, the defendant will wickedly, maliciously, and purposely continue to do and perform each and all of the matters and things complained of, by reason of which the plaintiff will be prevented from regaining the love, esteem, affection, support, and conjugal relation of her said husband. There is an averment of the insolvency of the defendant and the inadequacy of any legal remedy. While these averments of the amended petition are denied by answer, there is no testimony in the record, and we are informed by counsel, that no trial was in fact had, but that a waiver of any damages over the sum of $5 was made by the plaintiff, and the defendant below was enjoined as heretofore set forth.

We are therefore denied any opportunity to know what a full hearing would have de veloped, but must reach our conclusion simply upon the single question presented, to wit: Has a court of equity jurisdiction to enjoin such an invasion of the personal and prop erty rights of the plaintiff below when no adequate remedy at law exists?

While the marriage relation should be kept out of court, rather than to be allowed to go into court to adjust its wrongs and grievances, fancied or otherwise, yet I cannot say that, when all other means have failed, a court of equity has no power in the premises. A good statement of equitable principles applicable to the present situation is found in 4 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, section 1338:

"In determining whether an injunction will be issued to protect any right of property, to enforce any obligation, or to prevent any wrong, there is one fundamental principle of the utmost importance, which furnishes the answer to any questions-the solution to any difboth affirmative and negative, and the affirmaficulties which may arise. This principle is tive aspect of it should never be lost sight of, any more than the negative side. The general principle may be stated as follows: Wherever a right exists or is created by contract, by the ownership of property or otherwise, cognizable by law, a violation of that right will be prohibited, unless there are other considerations of policy or expediency which forbid a resort of this prohibitive remedy. The restraining power of equity extends, therefore, through the whole range of rights and duties which are recognized by the law, and would be applied to every case of intended violation, were it not for certain reasons of cxpediency and policy which conI think, technically, the jurisdiction ex- trol and limit its exercise. This jurisdiction of ists, but that the expediency of granting such equity to prevent the commission of wrong is, relief and its enforcement are serious questions of expediency and of convenience, which however, modified and restricted by considerations for the trial judge, sitting as a chancel- confine its application to those cases in which lor, to determine in the first instance. We the legal remedy is not full and adequate. simply sit as a reviewing court to determine Equity will not interfere to restrain the breach the power of a court of equity in the prem- of a contract, or the commission of a tort, or ises. the violation of any right, when the legal remedy of compensatory damages would be complete and adequate. The incompleteness and inadequacy of the legal remedy is the criterion the right to the equitable remedy of injuncwhich, under the settled doctrine, determines tion."

It is unfortunately true that the law cannot produce nor make happy marriages by

its order and decree, and the ability of a court of equity to compel obedience by the husband of his marital duties toward his wife, by restraining his paramour from seducing him from his wife, is extending such power a great ways; the law already giving some remedy, even though the same may not always be fully adequate.

For reasons of expediency and public policy, the chancellor might well refuse the assistance of a court of equity, as the consortium, affection, and support of a husband that must be vouchsafed to the wife by an injunction restraining other women from enticing him from his wife is of such doubtful value and character that the action of a court of equity would avail very little to benefit the wronged spouse.

If divorce, alimony, damages for alienation of affection, or arrest for nonsupport of minor children are all of no avail, surely the decrees of a court of equity may not bring back the love, affection, esteem, and consortium of which so worthless a husband deprives his wife. But these are matters for the consideration of the trial judge, and not for a reviewing court.

Applying this doctrine to the present instance, we are confronted with the absolute finding of the courts below that the plaintiff in error is financially irresponsible; hence the inadequacy of the legal remedy.

I am of opinion that the injunction granted in the present instance was far broader than necessary, and that, as far as the injunction should go, would be to enjoin the plaintiff in error from visiting or associating with defendant in error's husband, and from doing any act preventing or tending to prevent the husband from giving to his wife the love, affection, companionship, or conjugal relation to which she is entitled, and that the plaintiff in error should not interfere with the defendant in error in her efforts to regain the love, esteem, affection, support and conjugal relation. If the injunction were modified in this form, and, considering the matter as a pure question of equitable principles, concerning personal and property rights growing out of the marriage relation, I am, in the