(145 N.E.) testatrix had in mind when she used the words "loyal branch church." The trustee is under the fifth clause of the will to determine what churches are "loyal branches" with the assistance of the Christian Science committee on publication of Illinois, and there should be no difficulty in carrying out the plain intention of the testatrix in this regard. [4, 5] The contention of appellants that the fifth clause of the will is void, because it is in contravention of the rule against perpetuities, as it is not certain that the churches which will receive the money under the fifth clause of the will will be in existence, or, if in existence, will start building within the period prescribed by the rule, cannot be sustained. It is clear that this trust is a char: itable trust. Such trust is one for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, by bringing their hearts-under the influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies of disease, suffering, or constraint by assisting them to establish themselves for life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or works or otherwise lessening the burdens of government. Jansen v. Godair, 292 Ill. 364, 127 N. E. 97; Crerar v. Williams, 145 Ill. 625, 34 N. E. 467, 21 L. R. A. 454. Since the gift in this case is a charity, the beneficiaries are not, as contended by appellants, the Christian Science churches of Chicago which may build church edifices, but the gift is for the benefit of the people of Chicago generally, so they may have an opportunity of learning the doctrine of Christian Science. The gift is not a conditional gift, but a gift in præsenti. The language of the gift is: "I give, devise and bequeath unto Joseph E. Otis, of Chicago, Illinois, as trustee, all of my estate and property remaining, * trust for and upon the following trusts," etc. in The gift is one to charity in præsenti, and not on condition, and so does not come within the rule against perpetuities. Jansen v. Godair, supra. In the case just cited we said: "It has long been the established rule in this state that courts of equity favor gifts to charity." We also adopted the doctrine laid down in section 607 of Gray on Perpetuities, which is to the effect that, if the intention of the testator is to make an unconditional gift to charity, the gift will be regarded as immediate, and not subject to any condition precedent, and therefore not within the scope of the rule against perpetuities. [6] The final contention of appellants is that the gift is void, because it lacks a certain definite object. The gift is to charity, by furthering "the cause of Christian Science, as taught and promulgated by Mary Baker Eddy in her work 'Science and Health, with Key to the Scriptures,'" and directions are given for the distribution of the trust fund to the building funds of certain churches. We are not in accord with appellants' contention. Less definite and certain charitable gifts than this have been upheld. Hitchcock v. Board of Home Missions, 259 Ill. 288, 102 N. E. 741, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 1. The decree of the superior court is affirmed. . Decree affirmed. PEOPLE v. LOONEY et al. (Supreme Court of Illinois. (814 I11. 150) (No. 15736.) Oct. 28, 1924. Rehearing Denied Dec. 3, 1924.) 1. Attorney general 6-Appearance of Attorney General after return of indictment not basis of objection; "trial." Since Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1923, c. 14, § 4, expressly authorizes Attorney General, when in his judgment people's interest requires it, to attend trial and assist in prosecution of crime, defendant cannot object to appearance of Attorney General after return of indictment; "trial" also including all preliminary and subsequent proceedings in case. [Ed. Note.-For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Trial.] 2. Grand Jury 34—Appearance of Attorney General by assistants before grand jury not ground for quashing indictment. Appearance of Attorney General by assistants before grand jury to assist in examination of witnesses is not ground for motion to quash indictment. 3. Criminal law 633(1)-Defendant cannot question source of fund for investigating and prosecuting him. Defendant cannot call on state's attorney or Attorney General to disclose source from which funds required to pay for investigating and prosecuting him are derived. 4. Indictment and information 137(1)-In dictment not quashed because of public sentiment or excitement, or denunciation by newspapers. Indictments cannot be quashed because of public sentiment or excitement because open crime, has been committed and gone unpunished, or because newspapers or individuals have denounced crime or individuals charged therewith. 5. Grand jury 15-Not ground of challenge that grand juror has formed and expressed opinion. It is not ground of challenge of grand juror that he has formed and expressed opinion as to prisoner's guilt. 6. Indictment and information 10-Competency or sufficiency of evidence before grand jury not subject to inquiry, unless all witnesses incompetent. Court will not inquire into competency of evidence nor of witnesses before grand jury For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes nor sufficiency of evidence to justify indictment, | police protection, evidence of checks, considerunless all witnesses were incompetent. ation of which was not shown to be connected its admission error. with conspiracy charged, was incompetent, and 7. Grand jury 34—Appearance of Attorney General before, to assist state's attorney, not ground for quashing indictment. Presence of Attorney General in grand jury room, for purpose of assisting state's attorney, is not ground for quashing indictment. 8. Conspiracy 45-Evidence of occurrences after accomplishment of conspiracy held competent under indictment. In prosecution for conspiring to furnish punch boards and other gaming devices to divers persons, where three counts of indictment varied in statement of purpose of conspiracy to use powers of city officials to coerce purchase of boards, to refrain from arresting users thereof and to protect them, and its purpose to receive and accept any bribes, evidence of occurrences, after conspiracy as to punch boards had been carried out, and having no connection with placing punch boards, held competent. 9. Criminal law 899- Motion to exclude parts of certain newspaper articles from jury held not waiver of prior objection to other parts. Where, in prosecution for conspiracy, defendants made general objection to certain newspaper articles offered in evidence, they did not by afterwards moving that certain parts be not read to jury, waive their objection to other parts of exhibit. 10. Conspiracy 45 Evidence concerning firearms found in residence of one defendant held improperly admitted as irrelevant. In prosecution for conspiracy to furnish punch boards and other gambling devices under police protection, evidence of firearms found in defendant's residence which had no connection with charge, and no tendency to prove conspiracy charged or any act in relation to it, was improperly admitted. 14. Criminal law 338 (4, 5)-Admitting evidence of homicide of alleged conspirator's son, not shown to be connected with conspiracy, held error. In prosecution for conspiracy to furnish punch boards and gambling devices under police protection, it was error to admit evidence connection of defendants being shown with it. of murder of son of alleged conspirator, no 15. Conspiracy 48-Instruction held erroneous as authorizing conviction without proof of conspiracy alleged. Instruction that certain count charged conspiracy to receive bribes as an inducement to use official power for certain unlawful purposes, and as to essentials to convict under such count, held erroneous as authorizing conviction upon proof of conspiracy to use official powers of officers mentioned corruptly, and for their own gain without reference to receiving bribes. Error to Circuit Court, Rock Island County; Harry Edwards, Judge. John P. Looney, Harry M. Schriver, Thomas Cox, and Lawrence Pedigo were indicted for conspiracy. Defendants Schriver, Cox, and Pedigo were convicted, and bring error. Reversed and remanded. Kenworthy, Dietz, Shallberg, Harper & Sinnett, of Moline, W. C. Allen, of Rock Island, and P. R. Ingelson, of Moline (C. E. Dietz, of Moline, and J. J. Neiger, of Virginia, of counsel), for plaintiffs in error. Edward J. Brundage, Atty. Gen., Ben S. Bell, State's Atty., of Rock Island, and Edward C. Fitch, of Chicago (Charles W. Hadley, of Wheaton, James J. Barbour, of Chicago, and George W. Wood, of Moline, of Id. Conspiracy 45- Certain evidence held In prosecution for conspiracy to furnish punch boards and other gaming devices to saloons and houses of prostitution, and to protect such places from police interference, evidence of witnesses who followed chief of police, a defendant, and keeper of house of prostitution, was properly admitted as tending to show knowledge and intent of chief of police. 12. Criminal law 338 (4, 5) Evidence of murder whose perpetrators not identified, held incompetent. In prosecution for conspiracy to furnish punch boards and other gambling devices to saloons and houses of prostitution under police protection, evidence of killing of certain saloon keeper, there being no evidence identifying perpetrators, held incompetent. 13. Conspiracy 45-Evidence of checks not shown to be connected with conspiracy charge held incompetent. In prosecution for conspiracy to furnish punch boards and other gambling devices under DUNN, J. At the January term, 1923, of the circuit court of Rock Island county, an indictment was returned against John P. Looney, Harry M. Schriver, John K. Scott, Thomas Cox, Lawrence Pedigo, and Robert Kinner for conspiracy to furnish punch boards and other gaming devices to divers persons and divers keepers of houses of prostitution, and to protect them from arrest and keep them free from police molestation while they were engaged in the city of Rock Island in the keeping, maintenance, and operation of such gaming devices, saloons, gaming houses, and houses of prostitution. Looney was not arrested, Kinner was granted a severance, and the cause was continued as to Scott. The other defendants, Schriver, Cox, and Pedigo, were tried at the term the indictment was returned and convicted, and are presenting a writ of error to reverse the judgment. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes (145 N.E.) [3] A defendant charged with crime cannot call upon the state's attorney or Attor ney General to disclose the source from which the funds required to pay the expens es of investigating and prosecuting him in particular or crime in general are derived There is no rule which declares the private subscription of funds for the prevention, discovery, or prosecution of crime to be contrary to public policy. It needs not to be said that neither the state's attorney nor the Attorney General may receive any private funds for his own use, either as compensation or for personal expenses, and nothing of the kind is claimed to have occurred. [1] The Attorney General, by his assist- | The report of the grand jury of the previous ants, appeared before the grand jury while term, referring to crime conditions in Rock it was investigating the charges upon which Island, was introduced in evidence on the the indictment was returned, and after its hearing of the motion, as were several newsreturn represented the people as well in the paper articles on the same subject which had motions made preliminary to the trial before been circulated widely before the grand jury the jury as in that trial itself. The plain- met, and during its session. It was shown tiffs in error made a motion to quash the that a citizen's committee had raised by popindictment, and also objected to the appear- ular subscription a fund of $35,000 "to clean ance of the Attorney General and his assist- up Rock Island," to be used in paying exants, making a motion that they be required penses in connection with the investigation to show by what authority they appeared for and prosecution of crime, and it was claimed the people. The motion to quash was based that the Attorney General's assistants were chiefly on the participation of the Attorney to be paid out of this fund. These assistants General in the proceedings before the grand testified on the hearing of the motion that jury. Both motions were denied, and the de- they represented the Attorney General only, nial of them is among the errors assigned. and looked to him for their compensation. Since the act in regard to Attorney General Objections to questions asked as to the source and state's attorneys (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. of the Attorney General's funds were sus1923, c. 14, § 4), expressly authorizes the tained. Such questions were incompetent. Attorney General to advise the several Whether the assistant attorneys general state's attorneys in matters relating to the were paid or not paid was immaterial. duties of their office, and, when in his judgment the interest of the people of the state requires it, to attend the trial of any party accused of crime and assist in the prosecution, there is no basis for an objection by a defendant to the appearance of the Attorney General after the return of the indictment. The trial referred to is not merely the proceedings beginning with the impaneling of the jury and ending with the verdict, but includes all the preliminary and subsequent proceedings arising in the progress of the case. It is not only the duty of the Attorney General in the case specified in the statute to attend the trial before the jury, but to assist in the prosecution. His services are not limited to consultations and advice, but include whatever assistance may be desirable and beneficial to the prosecution. Since there are a hundred and two counties in the state, and courts are in session at the same time in many of them, the Attorney General cannot be present in person in all of them, and must necessarily be represented, at times, by his assistants. The state's attorney made no objection to the appearance of the Attorney General or any act of his in the case. was satisfied to accept his assistance. If the state's attorney, without objection, permits the Attorney General to appear in court assisting in the prosecution of one accused of crime, it certainly does not lie in the mouth of the defendant to object. The record shows the appearance of both the state's attorney and the Attorney General, and neither was under any obligation to show any authority for his appearance. [4-6] An indictment cannot be quashed because of public sentiment in the community, or of public excitement because open crime has been committed and gone unpunished. or because newspapers or individuals or associations have denounced crime or individuals charged with crime. A grand jury is an accusatory body. It does not try persoas charged with crime. It only investigates, and, if sufficient criminating evidence is presented, makes accusation, which is an He indictment. So it is not a ground of challenge of a grand juror that he has formed and expressed an opinion as to the guilt of a prisoner. Musick v. People, 40 Ill. 268. Our statute (Smith-Hurd's Rev. St. 1923, c. 38, § 715) authorizes the grand jury to make presentments upon the information of not less than two of their own number, without the necessity of their being sworn, and to find indictments upon the sworn testimony of one member, the same as in the case of other witnesses. An opinion of the guilt of the prisoner, therefore, cannot be a ground of challenge. Neither will a court inquire into the competency of evidence or of witnesses before a grand jury, or the sufficiency of the evidence to justify an indictment, unless all the witnesses were incompetent. People v. Bladek, 259 Ill. 69, 102 N. E. 243; [2] Much space is taken up in the record, and more in the briefs, with the question of the right of the Attorney General to appear before the grand jury. The statements in the motion to quash were sworn to on information and belief by one of the plaintiffs in error, and did not prove anything as to what took place in the presence of the grand jury. People v. Duncan, 261 Ill. 339, 103 N. E. cute the action in the district court. The 1043. [7] It is insisted, however, that the mere presence of the Attorney General before the grand jury is a reason for quashing the indictment. We have seen that the statute gives the Attorney General authority to assist in the prosecution. "Prosecute" and "prosecution" have been variously defined. It is said in 23 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d Ed.) p. 268: office of Attorney General was created by the Constitution, and he was required to perform such duties as might be prescribed by the Constitution or by law. By an act of the General Assembly of 1877 (Gen. Laws 1877, p. 412, art. 3) he was required to ap pear for the state, prosecute and defend all actions and proceedings, civil and criminal, in which the state should be a party or interested, when required to do so by the Gov "To prosecute is to proceed against judicial-ernor or General Assembly. When this act ly. A prosecution is the act of conducting or waging a proceeding in court; the means adopted to bring a supposed offender to justice and punish by due course of law. It is also defined as the institution or commencement and continuance of a criminal suit; the process of exhibiting formal charges against an offender before a legal tribunal and pursuing them to final judgment on behalf of the state or govern ment, as by indictment or information." Cases are cited illustrating the various meanings with which the words are used upon different states of fact. This language has been approved in State v. Bowles, 70 Kan. 821, 79 P. 726, 69 L. R. A. 176. That was an indictment which was signed by the Attorney General of the state. A motion was made to quash the indictment, on the ground that it was not signed by the prosecuting attorney of the county, or any attorney authorized by law to sign indictments in the county. The Code of Criminal Procedure required each indictment to be signed by the prosecuting attorney. This provision had been in force since 1858, but in 1861 (Laws 1861, c. 58, § 43) the office of Attorney General was created, and it was provided that the Attorney General, whenever required by the Governor or either branch of the Legislature, should appear for the state, and prosecute or defend in any court or before any official in any cause or matter, civil or criminal, in which the state might be a party or interested. It was held that the language of this statute indicated that the intention was to grant plenary power to the Attorney General, and he was invested with full authority to use all the means afforded by the law to meet the requirements of any situation and fully protect the interests of the state, and that when directed by the Governor or either branch of the Legislature to appear and prosecute criminal proceedings in any county, he became the prosecuting attorney of that county in those proceedings and had all the rights that any prosecuting official there might have, including those of appearing before the grand jury, signing indictments, and pursuing cases to final deter mination. became effective the method for prosecuting felonies was by means of an indictment, which the law required to be signed by the district attorney, who was required to appear in the courts of his district, and prosecute in behalf of the people. "Such being the state of the law," the court said, “it is clear that when the Legislature empowered the Attorney General to prosecute under certain conditions, that official, when the required conditions existed, could do each and every thing the district attorney might have done in the premises. Though the letter of the law required one official, alone, to do certain things, its spirit permitted another to do and perform the same or similar acts under certain conditions." One of the duties of the Attorney General of Montana prescribed by statute was that he should, when required by the public service or directed by the Governor, assist the county attorney of any county in the discharge of his duties. The district court having denied the Attorney General the right to appear before the grand jury, he applied to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to determine whether the order of the district court judge was valid or void. In the case in the district court the Attorney General attempted to appear before and advise the grand jury and interrogate witnesses in regard to bribery charges made by certain members of the Legislature in connection with the senatorial election by the Legislature, to which the judge of the district court had expressly directed the attention .of the grand jury. In the opinion the court said: the Attorney General is to do more than to exercise those supervisory powers contemplated by previous requirements of the law-he is to assist the county attorney in the discharge of his duties when the public service requires it, or when the Governor directs him to give such assistance. Nor is there any limit whatever to the assistance to be given; no point where it is to begin or to end, except the bound of the official duty of the county attorney. Just so long as the county attorney has a duty to discharge, and just so far as he may "Here we have a specific direction by which go in discharging it, so long is it the right and A similar conclusion was reached in Peoobligation of the Attorney General to actively ple v. Gibson, 53 Colo. 231, 125 P. 531, Ann. assist him in the discharge of such a duty, and Cas. 1914B, 138, as to the right of the At-equally far in executing the duty shall he go torney General to file an information in the when the public service requires it, or when name of the people for a felony, and prose- directed to assist by the Governor. * (145 N.E.) Circumstances sometimes demand that there shall not only be a supervisory action, but an assistance to an inferior official as well, to the end that justice may be more certainly attained. When considerations of this nature move the Attorney General, or even when they do not move him, if the Governor is moved by them, and directs him to exert his authority, he shall assist the county attorney, and must do so in the discharge of the duties which the county attorney is required by law to perform." State v. District Court, 22 Mont. 25, 55 P. 916. duty of various officers, and fixing penalties for various offenses. It then averred that Harry M. Schriver was the mayor, Thomas Cox, the chief of police, and John K. Scott, the city attorney, that certain persons (named severally) kept saloons and maintained gaming houses, and other persons (named severally) kept saloons and maintained gaming houses equipped with gambling devices, and in conjunction therewith also kept, maintained, and operated houses of prostitution, and that upwards of 150 saloons, gaming houses, and houses of prostitution were kept and operated in the city of Rock Island by divers other persons whose names were unknown to the grand jury; that the defendants conspired to sell, lease, loan, give, furnish, and provide, for a cor punch boards, slot machines, etc., to the named keepers of saloons, gaming houses. and houses of prostitution and to divers other keepers, to the number of upwards of 150, contrary to the ordinances of the city and the laws of the state, and in violation of the duties of the mayor, chief of police, and city attorney to use the powers of the offices of mayor, chief of police, and city attorney to coerce and require the keepers named, and divers other keepers of saloons, gambling houses, and houses of prostitution, to purchase, lease, use, keep, maintain, and operate gambling devices and share the prof It is unnecessary to discuss the commonlaw powers of the Attorney General. He has the statutory power to assist the state's attorney. The state's attorney in this state has always exercised the power of calling witnesses and examining them before the grand jury, and this power is not now ques-rupt consideration, gambling devices, to wit, tioned by the plaintiffs in error. Neither is it denied that his assistant has the same power; for the motion directed against the Attorney General and his assistants expressly excepted from its scope the state's attorney and his assistant. While it is essential to the secrecy of the proceedings and the freedom and independence of judgment and action of the grand jurors that no unauthorized persons shall be present during the proceedings, and no person during their deliberation and voting, the power of the state's attorney to be present and assist in the examination of witnesses has been recognized by implication, and it has been ex-its and proceeds therefrom with the defendpressly decided that the appearance of an attorney employed by private persons before the grand jury, and the examination of witnesses by him, when he is not present during their deliberation on the evidence, and does not attempt to influence their action, is not ground for quashing an indictment. People v. Hartenbower, 283 Ill. 591, 119 N. E. 605. There is a conflict in the decisions as to the effect of the appearance of private attorneys before the grand jury, influenced to some extent by varying statutory provisions, but the case last cited declares the rule in this state. In this case, however, no private attorney appeared before the grand jury, but the Attorney General of the state assisting the state's at- | give, furnish and provide divers gambling detorney pursuant to statutory authority, and his action was clearly proper. [8] There were three counts in the indictment, the first of which charged that the defendants on November 15, 1921, conspired to do illegal acts injurious to the public police; that is to say, then and there to unlawfully and knowingly offer for sale, sell, lease, loan, and deliver to divers persons and divers keepers of gaming houses, punch boards, being gambling devices used for the purpose of playing upon and winning and losing money and other articles of value. The second count set out a number of ordinances of the city, showing the distribution of official powers, the existence and 145 N.E.-24 ants and to refrain from arresting such keepers, and to protect the persons named and other keepers, and keep them free from police molestation and attack while they were keeping, maintaining, and operating said punch boards, slot machines, saloons, gambling houses and houses of prostitution, and to use the powers of their offices with corrupt partiality to the persons named and other keepers of saloons, gaming houses, and houses of prostitution. The third count contained the same recitals as the second, and charged the defendants with conspiring to accept and receive bribes by them, said Schriver, Cox, and Scott, to cause them to unlawfully and knowingly sell, lease, loan, vices, to wit, punch boards and slot machines, to keepers of gambling houses, and in their said offices to protect the keepers named in the use of such devices, and to protect divers other keepers, in violation of the ordinances and laws and in violation of their duties as mayor, chief of police, and city attorney, and for their own gain to use the powers of their offices for the same purposes mentioned in the second count. Evidence was produced by the prosecution, which tended to show that there were a large number of saloons, houses of prostitution, and gaming houses in Rock Island; that John P. Looney had conducted there for some years a scandalous weekly paper, which |