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state that names or places of residence were unknown and could not have been ascertained on diligent inquiry under paragraph j.

7. Records 9(6)-Known claimant could not be made party to proceedings to register title by joining "all whom it may concern."

Person claiming estate in land, whose name and address is known or can be ascertained on diligent inquiry, cannot be made party to application to register title, under Land Titles Act, §§ 11, 13, by adding as parties "all whom it may concern" under section 11, par. j.

8. Records 9(12)-Objection that dismissal should have been without prejudice held not available for first time on appeal.

Objection that application to register title should have been dismissed without prejudice, because it did not pass upon merits of applicants' title, held not available for first time on appeal, in absence of record showing that petitioners asked lower court that dismissal be without prejudice.

or expectancy, and if any, set forth the name and post office address of every such person and the nature of his estate or claim. *

"(j) When the place of residence of any person whose residence is required to be given is unknown, it may be so stated if the applicant will also state that upon diligent inquiry he has been unable to ascertain the same. All persons named in the application shall be considered as defendants thereto, and all other persons shall be included and considered as defendants by the term 'all whom it may concern.'"

tition stated:
In compliance with paragraph f, the pe-

"Liens and incumbrances on the lands are a trust deed from Henry Ambos and Martha Ambos to Henry L. Koch, dated June 1, 1918, and recorded August 2, 1918, securing payment of one note for $2,200, due five years after its date (June 1, 1918), with interest at 6 per cent. per annum, payable semiannually. Said trustee, Henry L. Koch, is deceased. William

Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; C. Koch is the successor in trust in said trust George Fred Rush, Judge.

Application for registration of title by Henry Ambos and wife against Emma J. Glos and others. Decree dismissing application, and petitioners appeal. Affirmed.

Enoch J. Price, of Chicago, for appellants. John R. O'Connor and Alben F. Bates, both of Chicago, and Walter A. Glos, of Chicago, for appellees.

deed. Name of owner or holder thereof, Lydia W. Johnson. Post office address, 3818 North Robey street, Chicago, Ill. Amount of claim, $2,200. Recorded as document No. 6369454."

The allegations of the petition in an attempt to comply with paragraph g were as follows:

"Other person, firm or corporation having or claiming any estate, interest or claim, in law J. Scott Matthews, of Chicago, for Joseph or expectancy in said land, are: (1) Emma J. or equity, in possession, remainder (reversion) F. Haas, Registrar of Titles.

Glos, address Elmhurst, Du Page county, Ill. (2) Clara G. Bates, address Elmhurst, Du Page county, Ill. (3) Albert H. Glos, address Elmhurst, Du Page county, Ill. (4) Walter A. Glos, personally and as trustee, address ElmGlos, address Elmhurst, Du Page county, Ill (5) Mabelle L. (6) August A. Timke, trustee, address Elmhurst, Du Page county, Ill. (7) Charles E. Wilson, successor in trust, address 3166 Lincoln avenue, Chicago, Ill. (8) A. Engelbracht, address 1011 North Lawlor avenue, Chicago, Ill. (9) Henry Schmelzle, address 4741 Linder avenue, Chicago, Ill. (10) Henry M. Cohen, suecessor in trust, address unknown.

DUNN, J. Henry Ambos and Martha Ambos, his wife, made application to the circuit court of Cook county for the initial reg-hurst, Du Page county, Ill. istration of title to lot 301 in a certain subdivision of real estate in that county, claiming that they were the owners of the lot in fee simple as joint tenants, occupying it as their homestead. The petition was answered by some of the defendants, others were defaulted, and the cause was referred to an examiner of titles, who made his report recommending that the application be dismissed. The exceptions of the appellants to the report were overruled, and a decree was entered dismissing the application at the petitioners' costs, from which they appealed.

The petition was in the form prescribed by sections 11 and 13 of the Land Titles Act (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1923, c. 30, §§ 55, 57). Paragraphs f, g, and j of section 11 provide that the petition shall set forth substantially as follows:

"(f) Whether the land is subject to any lien

or incumbrance, and, if any, give the nature and amount of the same, and, if recorded, the book and page of record; also give the name and post office address of each holder thereof.

"The interests of said Emma J. Glos, Clara G. Bates, Albert H. Glos, Walter A. Glos, Mabelle L. Glos and August A. Timke, trustees, are under tax deed and are all void and invalid. Said defendants, Charles E. Wilson, successor in trust, Henry M. Cohen, successor in trust, liens on said premises which have been paid A. Engelbracht and Henry Schmelzle, claim and the record of which should be canceled and set aside."

The allegations which relate to the require

ments of paragraph j were as follows:

"That Henry M. Cohen, successor in trust, and all whom it may concern, on due inquiry cannot be found, so that process cannot be served upon him, and upon diligent inquiry his place of residence cannot be ascertained; that his last known place of residence was Chicago,

"(g) Whether any other person has any estate or claims any interest in the land, in law or equity, in possession, remainder, reversion Ill.

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

(145 N.E.)

"(7) Other facts connected with said land are that there are other persons not named as defendants herein above who do or may claim some interest in said premises. All such persons are hereby made defendants to this proceeding by the name and style of 'all whom it may concern.'"

The examiner found that the land in question was subject, among other liens and incumbrances, to three trust deeds: One from Charles Hepp and wife to Henry Beisner, dated September 11, 1899, securing the payment of one note for $900 due three years after date, with interest at 62 per cent. per annum, payable semiannually; another from Jacob Glos to August A. Timke, dated November 7, 1917, securing a note for $50,000 payable on or before ten years after date, with interest, which affected the tax interest of the grantor at the date of the trust deed; another from Jacob Glos to Walter A. Glos, dated May 31, 1919, securing a note for $10,000 payable on or before five years after date, with interest at 5 per cent. per annum, affecting the tax interest of Jacob Glos at the date of the trust deed. The recommendation of the examiner that the application be dismissed was based upon his report that these three trust deeds recorded in the recorder's office of Cook county were not specifically mentioned in the application, though they were introduced in evidence, and that the holders or owners of the notes secured by such trust deeds were not made parties to the application, and that on account of the failure to make such necessary parties he had refused to receive and consider any evidence tending to show a cancellation of the indebtedness secured by such trust deeds as against such holders and owners who had not been brought within the jurisdiction of the court. The trust deed to Henry L. Koch was not questioned in any way, but was admitted in the application to be a lien on the lot.

[1] In partial compliance with the require ments of paragraph g of section 11, the application set forth the names and post office addresses of certain persons alleged to have or claim some estate, interest, or claim in the land, but it omitted to state the nature of such interests or claims. The allegation that the interests of some of the persons named were under tax deeds conveyed no information as to the nature of their claims, whether as grantees in the tax deeds or remote grantees of the persons receiving the tax deeds, or as incumbrancers by way of mortgage, trust deed, or otherwise. The statement that Charles E. Wilson, successor in trust, Henry M. Cohen, successor in trust, A. Engelbracht and Henry Schmelzle claimed liens on said premises which have been paid and the record of which should be canceled and set aside gave no information as to the character of the liens-whether mechanics' 145 N.E.--41

liens, judgment liens, mortgage liens, or liens of another character. The application' gave no information as to the nature of the trusts which the respective trustees held, whether the trust deeds were in the nature of mortgages to secure the payment of money or whether they were made for the use of the beneficiaries of the trust in some other form. The statute, in requiring the nature of the claim to be stated, demanded something more than the mere statement, as it is sometimes made, for instance, in bills for the foreclosure of mortgages, where subsequent incumbrancers or purchasers are made parties defendant by the simple allegation that they have or claim some interest, the exact naturė or extent of which is unknown to the complainant. In this proceeding the statute required that the nature of the claim should be stated as fully as was in the power of the applicant, though it was not necessary to state that the claim was void, or any reason for its validity, or to pray for any specific relief in regard to it.

[2-5] All persons having or claiming any estate or interest in land are required to be made parties to an application for the registration of the title, and the general rule is that in all suits respecting trust property, whether brought by or against a trustee, the beneficiaries are necessary parties and the objection on account of their not being made parties may be taken on appeal. Wilson v. Central Trust Co., 285 Ill. 427, 120 N. E. 739; Dubs v. Egli, 167 Ill. 514, 47 N. E. 766. The trustee is a necessary party because he holds the legal interest. The beneficiary is a necessary party because he has the equitable and ultimate interest to be affected by the decree. The beneficiaries of the trusts upon which Wilson, Cohen, and Timke held, were parties equally as necessary as Wilson, Cohen, and Timke, the trustees, and the nature of their estates or claims was required to be stated. In the case of the admitted lien of the trust deed to Henry L. Koch, the application did set forth the name of the holder of the note as well as the name of the trustee and successor in trust.

[6] While paragraph g required the name and post office address of every person having any estate or claiming any interest in the land to be stated, paragraph j provided that when the place of residence of any per son whose residence is required to be given is unknown, it may be so stated if the applicant will also state that upon diligent inquiry he has been unable to ascertain the same. No effort was made to comply with this requirement. There is nothing to indicate that either the names or the places of residence of the beneficiaries in the trust deeds were unknown, or, if they were unknown, that upon diligent inquiry they could not have been ascertained. They should all have been stated. For aught that appears,

the names and addresses of all the beneficia- [ 3. Countles 191-Taxes levied by viva voce ries in all these trust deeds were well known vote held vold. to the petitioners and they may all have been residents of this state, so that they could have been served personally with pro

cess.

[7] The further provision of paragraph ♬ that all persons named in the application should be considered as defendants thereto and all other persons shall be included and considered as defendants. by the term "all whom it may concern," does not justify the making of persons whose names and addresses should be given parties defendant by

the term "all whom it may concern." The name as well as the place of residence of every person which the applicant by diligent inquiry may ascertain is required to be stated, and no such person can be made a party to the proceeding by the name of "all whom it may concern," and the expression "all whom it may concern" was not intended and cannot be extended to include parties so required to be named. "All whom it may concern," in proceedings for the initial registration of title, includes only persons not known to have or claim any estate or interest in the land, or persons having some estate, interest, or claim whose names are unknown and cannot upon diligent inquiry be ascertained.

[8] The appellants say that the decree should have dismissed the application without prejudice because it did not pass upon the merits of the applicants' title in fee, which the examiner found was vested in the appellants. The appellants are not permitted to make this objection for the first time in this court. There is nothing in the record to show that they asked in the circuit court that the dismissal should be without prejudice, and it was properly dismissed for want of necessary parties.

The decree is affirmed.
Decree affirmed.

(314 I11. 386)

Taxes levied by board of commissioners of a county under township organization by in relation to counties, as amended by Laws viva voce vote held void, under section 54 of act 1921, p. 388, requiring vote to be taken by ayes and nays, and entered on record.

Appeal from Piatt County Court; M. R. Davidson, Judge.

of William Piatt Smith as County Collector Application by the People, on the relation of Piatt County, for judgment against the property of the Wabash Railway Company for delinquent taxes. From judgment for applicant, railway company appeals. Reversed.

N. S. Brown and L. H. Strasser, both of St. Louis, Mo., and F. M. Shonkwiler, of Monticello, for appellant.

Edie & Edie, of Monticello, for appellee.

DE YOUNG, J. The county collector of Piatt county applied to the county court of that county at its June term, 1924, for judgment against real estate upon which taxes were delinquent. The Wabash Railway Company filed objections to certain county taxes. The objections were overruled, and judgment was rendered against its property for $4,682.74. The railway company prosecutes this appeal from the judgment of the county court.

The supervisors' record shows that at the September, 1923, meeting of the county board of supervisors, on motion, a resolution was adopted that there be levied upon all taxable property of the county the sum of $74,660, which consisted of various items. The county clerk testified, over the objection of the appellant. that all the members of the board were present at the meeting; that when the resolution was offered the chairman said, "All in favor of the motion say 'yea'"; that they all voted yea, and that the chairman declared the motion carried.

[1, 2] The county of Piatt is under township organization. Section 54 of the act in relation to counties, as amended in 1921. ap

PEOPLE ex rel. SMITH, County Collector, V. plicable to counties under township organiza

WABASH RY. CO. (No. 16313.)

(Supreme Court of Illinois. Dec. 16, 1924.) 1. Counties190(1)-County can levy taxes only in conformity with power granted.

A county in levying taxes exercises a power granted by the General Assembly, and it can act only in conformity with the power so granted.

2. Counties1532-County's power to appropriate money is definitely limited by law. A county's power to appropriate money is definitely limited as to the time when, the purposes for which, and the manner in which, it shall be exercised.

tion, requires that the vote on all propositions to appropriate money from the county treasury shall be taken by ayes and nays, and entered on the record of the meeting. Laws of 1921, p. 388. Section 45 of the same act, also amended in 1921 (Laws of 1921, p 387), which is applicable to boards of county commissioners in counties not under township organization, contains that identical provision In People v Wabash Railway Co., 308 Ill. 604, 140 N. E. 10, it was held that the levy of a county highway tax is an appropriation of money; that section 45, as amended in 1921, requires that such an appropriation be made by a vote by ayes and nays, and

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

(145 N.E.)

for review before the Commission, which affirmed the award. The employer afterward filed petition for review of award because disability had ended. Judgment for claim

entered on the record of the meeting of the county board, and that the failure to take such vote and to make such record was fatal to the tax. The county in levying taxes exercises a power granted by the General As-ant, and the employer brings error. Affirmed. sembly, and it can act only in conformity with the power so granted. Its power to ap propriate money is definitely limited as to the time when, the purposes for which, and the manner in which, it shall be exercised.

[3] The county board cannot act in disregard of the statutory limitations, which are imposed for the benefit of the taxpayer. The resolution in the instant case was adopted by a viva voce vote. There was no roll call, but all the supervisors voted collectively. No attempt was made to comply with the requirements of the statute that there shall be an aye and nay vote and that such vote shall be entered on the record of the meeting. People v. Wabash Railway Co., supra, is decisive of this case, and the appellants' objections to the tax should have been sustained. The judgment of the county court will be reversed.

Judgment reversed.

(314 III. 509)

in error.
T. W. Quinlan, of Springfield, for plaintiff

A. W. Kerr of Chicago, and George R.
Stone, of Marion, for defendant in error.

STONE, J. [1, 2] Defendant in error, Jess

Norman, while in the employ of plaintiff in error as a loader, received an injury by reason of a powder explosion, causing burns about his arms, face, and body. An award was entered for temporary total disability and disfigurement, and the further sum of $4.95 per week for a period of 384 weeks for partial disability. The decision of the arbitrator was entered on July 27, 1919. A petition for review before the commission was filed, and a hearing was had thereon on January 30, 1920, and on February 11, 1920, the commission affirmed the award.

On July 2, 1921, a petition was filed by the plaintiff in error under paragraph (h) of section 19 of the Compensation Act (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1923, c. 48, § 156), setting up that the defendant in error's disability had, since the entry of the original award, decreased and ended. A hearing was had on this petition on October 31, 1921. The only testimony offered on behalf of plaintiff in error on this petition related to the earnings of the defendant in error at the time the petition was filed. Defendant in error was examined, and testified that he was at that time receiving $6.86 per day for top work; that he was unUnder partial disability clause of Work-able to load coal, which had been his regular men's Compensation Act, § 8, par. (d) on petition to end award under section 19, par. (h),

RIDGE COAL MIN. CO. v. INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION et al. (No. 16193.)
(Supreme Court of Illinois.
Dec. 16, 1924.)
1. Master and servant 419-Showing neces-
sary, on petition to review award of com-
pensation because of changed conditions,

stated.

where there has been change in scale of wages, to show comparison of earning power before and after injury showing should be made as to increased scale of wages in his employment since accident, and also increase of wages for · services rendered by him prior to accident.

2. Master and servant 419-Evidence only concerning wages of injured workman held not sufficient to justify holding disability had ended.

On petition filed by employer under Workmen's Compensation Act, § 19, par. (h). to end compensation for partial disability under section 8, par (d), testimony only concerning wages of injured workman and not his condition, was not sufficient to justify holding that disability had ended.

Error to Circuit Court, Williamson County; D. T Hartwell, Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Jess Norman, claimant, opposed by the Ridge Coal Mining Company, employer. After an award by the Industrial Commission, the employer brought a petition

occupation at the time of the injury; that he could do the top work, such as trimming cars, because it was not so heavy; that his left arm was a little better; that his back was worse, and that his kidneys were in bad shape; that he had been unable to return to the work of loading coal since the injury.

On the hearing on the original claim it was stipulated that at the time of his injury his average weekly wage was $27.51. The testimony on the hearing on this petition showed that when he went to work at top work he earned $4.36 per day, and that thereafter different increases in wages were granted, until by August 16, 1920, he was earning $6.86 per day.

Plaintiff in error contends that the wage of defendant in error at the time this petition was filed amounted to $31.36 per week as against $27.51 before the injury; that this evidence of itself is sufficient to show that the disability has ended. Counsel for plaintiff in error also states in his brief that it is stipulated that the increase in wages for loading coal amounted to 14 per cent., and that with such increase added to the wage receiv

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ed by the defendant in error before the in-1 before the commission in January, 1920, it jury it would still be less than he is receiv- does not show what increase, if any, had tak ing. The record shows, however, that the en place in the scale of wages for such emstipulation as to an increase of 14 per cent. ployment up to the time of the hearing on for loaders was entered into at the time of this petition in October 1921. the hearing on review of the original petition for compensation before the commission on January 30, 1920. The record does not contain any evidence as to the increase in the wages of loaders up to the time of the hearing on this petition on October 31, 1921. There is not therefore in the record sufficient evidence on which to base a comparison of in

creases.

Since the plaintiff in error has contented itself with presenting testimony only concerning the wages of the defendant in error, and has offered no evidence concerning the condition of the defendant in error, its evidence is not sufficient to justify a holding that the disability of the defendant in error has ended, and the circuit court was right in so holding

The judgment of the circuit court will therefore be affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

(314 Ill. 392)

PEOPLE ex rel. HALL v. PEARSON. (No. 16244.)

It is not essential, to comply with Const. art. 4, § 13, requiring title of act to express the one subject embraced in act, that the title shall be a synopsis of provisions of act or an index to contents of each section.

2. Statutes 109—Provisions in act effecting purpose of act as expressed in title are within title.

Title of an act contemplated by Const. art. 4, § 13, is intended to indicate the general subject of legislation contained in act, and whatever provisions may be regarded as tending to effect the purpose of the act are within the

The "partial disability clause" of the statute, as it is called, is paragraph (d) of section 8 of the Compensation Act (section 145), which provides that if the employee, as a result of his injury, becomes partially incapacitated from pursuing his usual and customary line of employment, he is entitled to compensation "equal to fifty per centum of the difference between the average amount which he earned before the accident, and the average amount which he is earning or is able to (Supreme Court of Illinois. Dec. 16, 1924.) earn in some suitable employment or business. Statutes 109-Title to act need not be after the accident." Paragraph (h) of section synopsis of its provisions or index to con19 permits a review of the award within 18 tents of each section. months "on the ground that the disability of the employee has subsequently recurred, increased diminished or ended." The disability referred to in paragraph (h) of section 19 is the disability found to exist, and for which 'compensation is allowed under paragraph (d) of section 8 of the act. It is therefore important, though not necessarily controlling, on a petition under paragraph (h) of section 19, to determine what the employee is earning as compared with what he earned prior to his injury Where there has been a change in the scale of wages, a comparison of earning power before and after the injury cannot be fairly made without a showing not only as to the increase in the scale of wages received by the employee since the accident, but also the increase in the scale of wages paid for the character of services rendered by him prior to the accident. The purpose of the act is to as nearly as possible give the injured employee 50 per cent. of the difference between what his earnings would have been had he not been injured and what he is earning or is able to earn subsequent to the injury. In order to do this, where the scale of wages of his subsequent employment has increased since the injury, it is necessary to show whether or not there has been an increase or decrease in the scale of wages paid for employment of the character the employee was engaged in before the injury, and how much. While the record in this case shows that the increase in the scale of wages paid for employment of the character followed by the defendant in error before his injury, amounted to 14 per cent. up to the time of the hearing on the original petition

title.

3. Statutes 121(1)-Section of Revenue Act of 1898 held not void as going beyond subject of act as expressed in title of act.

Revenue Act of 1898, section 24 thereof which provides that term of office of assessor. of township, which, under Township Organization Act, art. 7, § 1, had previously begun imtion, should begin on 1st day of January followmediately following his election and qualificaing election, held not void under Const. art. 4, § 13, as going beyond subject of act as expressed in its title-the assessment of property and providing the means therefor.

4. Statutes 159-Scope of repeal by impli

cation stated.

A repeal by implication extends only to such provisions of the prior act as are so irreconcilably repugnant to the latter act that both cannot be given effect.

5. Towns 58-Statute changing duration of term of assessor's office held not to repeal section of Revenue Act relative to beginning of term.

Laws 1909, p. 470, changing term of assessor's office from one to two years, held to

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