No proceedings for compensation under the decisions of this court, that the demand for act shall be maintained, unless claim for compensation by the proper claimant is jucompensation has been made within 6 months risdictional, and that, if not made within the after the accident, or, in the event that pay-time required by the Compensation act, the ments have been made under the provisions claim for compensation is barred. Haiselden of the act, unless written claim for compensation has been made within 6 months after such payments have ceased, and a receipt therefor, or a statement of the amount of compensation paid, shall have been filed with the commission. v. Industrial Board, 275 Ill. 114, 113 N. E. 877; Central Car Works v. Industrial Com., 290 Ill. 436, 125 N. E. 369. In the case of In re Gorski's Case, 227 Mass. 456, 116 N. E. 811, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that neither ignorance of the law nor absence from the country constitutes reasonable cause for failure to make demand for compensation within the time required by the act. We think this is good law, and we are compelled to hold in this case, that the administrator's claim for compensation is barred for want of demand as required by the statute. In this case Mrs. Korys was a mere volunteer. She was in no way related to the parties entitled to compensation, and was not authorized to make demand in this case. The judgment of the superior court is reversed. Judgment reversed. (314 Ill. 58) GENERAL CONST. CO. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (No. 16055.) (Supreme Court of Illinois. Oct. 28, 1924.) I. Master and servant 416-Compensation Act recognizes right to file pleading which should be consistent with commission's findings. While this section of the act does not in specific terms state that the claim for compensation must be made by the injured party or the person entitled to compensation, we think the statute, if given a reasonable construction, must be interpreted as providing that the claim for compensation must be made by the party entitled to the compensation in person, or by or through some person who is authorized, as the agent or attorney of such party, to make such demand, and that a demand made by one who is purely a volunteer, and without authority of the injured party or the person entitled to compensation, is nót such a demand as can be recognized as legal and binding upon the employer who is to pay the compensation. The last proviso of this section, when considered, strengthens or adds weight to this conclusion. This proviso is, that no employee who, after the accident, returns to the employment of the employer in whose services he was injured shall be barred for failure to make such claim, if an application for adjustment of such claim is filed with the Industrial Commission within 18 months after he returns to such employment. This proviso clearly indicates, when considered with the rest of the section, that the employee is to make the claim or demand for compensation previously mentioned in the section. It was decided in the case of West-2. Master and servant 414—Stipulation as to facts and questions in compensation case ern Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident authorized. Com., 35 Cal. App. 104, 169 P. 261, that even where suit is brought by an attorney in behalf of the party entitled to compensation living in a foreign country, there must be some proof of the authority to act, and that an unauthenticated letter is not sufficient proof of the authority of the attorney. If courts did not hold that a demand made by a volunteer, simply, was not a sufficient demand, they would by their action authorize any intermeddler having no interest in the world in the case, or right to compensation, to act for the rightful party interested, and thereby bind the employer, which would, in effect, render the provision of the statute for demand nugatory. It would establish the principle or rule that a demand for compensation is a demand by any one, whether he has a right to make a demand or otherwise. It has been thoroughly established by the While Compensation Act does not prescribe character of pleading, it recognizes right of becomes part of record and should be consistent party to file document in nature thereof, which with findings of commission in making award. In proceedings under Compensation Act, parties by stipulation may waive conflicts between them or necessity for evidence, and agree that certain questions only shall be determined. 3. Master and servant 366-Test of application of Child Labor Law, stated. Test of application of Child Labor Law is chinery, but whether actual work is connected not whether place of employment contains mawith operation of machinery or is otherwise dangerous. 4. Master and servant 366-Stipulation that parties were under Compensation Act held to preclude question whether minor's employment violated Child Labor Law. Where parties stipulated that they were minor arose out of and in course of his employunder Compensation Act, and that injury to ment, employer's contention that it was not liable because minor was employed in violation of Child Labor Law was not available. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes (145 N.E.) 5. Master and servant 405 (5)-Award to fa- | week from the date last mentioned. The Inther of compensation for partial dependency dustrial Commission affirmed the arbitraheld supported under evidence. Where minor son contributed part of his earnings to his father, and money was applied toward their living expenses, within Compensation Act, § 7, par. (c), held, that an award to father on ground of partial dependency was supported by evidence. tor's award. On review the circuit court quashed the writ of certiorari and sustained the award of the Industrial Commission. The case has been brought to this court by writ of error. The decedent, Virgil Smith, at the time of the accident, was 15 years and 11 months He gave Error to Circuit Court, St. Clair County; of age and lived with his father. George A. Crow, Judge. Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Charles Smith, claimant, for death of Virgil Smith, his son, opposed by the General Construction Company, employ er. Award of Industrial Commission was affirmed, and the employer brings error. Affirmed. his wages-to the extent, at least, of meeting the cost of his board and lodging-to his father to apply on the expense of maintaining the home. Prior to the employment in after his injury he was taken to a hospital, question he had attended school. Shortly where an operation was performed, but he died in a few hours. At the time of the son's death the father was engaged in the truck John W Freels, of East St. Louis, for ing business, but when the hearing occurred plaintiff in error W. J. MacDonald, of Chicago, for defendant in error. DE YOUNG, J. Charles Smith made an application to the Industrial Commission for compensation by the General Construction Company, the plaintiff in error, for an accident which resulted in the death of his son, Virgil Smith. It was stipulated before the arbitrator that on August 11, 1922, Virgil Smith was in the employ of plaintiff in error; that both parties were under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1923, c. 48, §§ 138-172); that on that day Virgil sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, of which injury notice was given within 30 days, and on account of which a demand for compensation 'was made within the time required by the statute; that the wages of Virgil for the year preceding the accident were $1,050, or $20.18 weekly; and that the only questions to be determined were whether the applicant was entitled to compensation for medical and surgical services rendered, and whether Virgil left surviving him any person or persons entitled to compensation, and the amount of such compensation. The arbitrator found that the decedent left his father, Charles Smith, the only person dependent upon his earnings for support; that such dependency was one-fifth of total dependency; that because the injuries were fatal the father was entitled to $10.09 weekly for 1632 weeks, as provided in paragraph (c) of section 7 of the act; that the applicant was then entitled to $86.48, the compensation accrued from August 12 to October 10, 1922, and to $418 for first aid, medical, surgical, and hospital services, as provided in paragraph (a) of section 8; and that the remainder of the compensation should be paid in weekly installments, beginning one he worked in a coal mine. It is not clear that Virgil Smith had obtained the statutory certificate permitting the employment of a minor under 16 years. The father testified that he believed his son had asked for a permit a day or two before school closed, but he did not remember When this whether one had been issued. fact was adduced on review before the Industrial Commission, the plaintiff in error moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the boy was engaged in an illegal employment, as defined in the Child Labor and Workmen's Compensation Acts. The motion was continued, and the decision of the commission later was, in effect, a denial of the motion. The plaintiff in error contends (1) that Virgil Smith was employed in an extrahazardous occupation; (2) that he had not yet attained the minimum age to be so employed; (3) that in consequence the Industrial Commission had no authority or jurisdiction to hear and determine the claim for compensation, (4) that despite the stipulation it may question the illegality of the employment and want of jurisdiction; and (5) that in any event the finding of the dependency of the father was not supported by the evidence. [1] Supporting its contention that Virgil Smith was engaged in an extrahazardous occupation, the plaintiff in error cites the following statement in the application for adjustment of claim: "Nature of work upon which injured was engaged at time of accident, and how caused: Swinging derrick by engine, derrick fell over and part of the derrick called stiff-leg hit boy, causing his death." The employment of Virgil at the time he was injured is not more definitely shown. The Compensation Act does not prescribe the character of pleading, but it recognizes the right of a party to file a document in the nature of a pleading, which becomes a part For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes of the record and should be consistent with, Compensation Act, and the contention of the the findings of the commission in making its plaintiff in error to the contrary is not open award. Garden City Foundry Co. v. Indus- to consideration. Indian Hill Club v. Intrial Com., 307 Ill. 76, 138 N. E. 122. dustrial Com., supra. The motion to dismiss the application was properly denied. [2] Regardless of what the application and evidence may show, the parties by stipulation may waive conflicts between them, or even the necessity for evidence, and agree that certain questions only shall be determined. Indian Hill Club v. Industrial Com., 309 Ill. 271, 140 N. E. 871. [5] On the question of dependency, the father testified that his average wages were $3.50 per day, or slightly in excess of $20 per week. His rent was $10 per month. He had neither property nor any additional source of income. At the time of the acci[3] The evidence shows that Virgil Smith dent, the father and son were the only memat the time of his injury and death was un-bers of the family. The boy gave part of der 16 years of age. The Child Labor Law his earnings to his father, and the money (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1923, c. 48, § 9 et seq.) was applied towards their living expenses. does not exclude a boy of his age from every kind of employment, but chiefly from such as require the operation of machinery or such as the department of labor finds to be dangerous to life or limb. The use of machinery by the plaintiff in error may have brought the parties within the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Ascher Bros. v. Industrial Com., 311 Ill. 258, 142 N. E. 488), but the test of the application of the Child Labor Law is not whether the place of employment contains machinery, but wheth-ardson Sand Co. v. Industrial Com., 296 Ill. er the actual work is connected with the operation of machinery, or is otherwise dangerous. Messmer V Industrial Board, 282 Ill. 562, 118 N. E. 993; Roszek v. Bauerle & Stark Co., 282 Ill. 557, 118 N. E. 991, L. R. A. 1918F, 207. [4] The plaintiff in error would not be liable to pay compensation under the act for injuries suffered by a minor illegally employed, for in that event the employee would not be embraced within its provisions (Roszek v. Bauerle & Stark Co., supra), but it was expressly stipulated that both parties were under the Compensation Act and that the injury arose out of and in the course of Virgil Smith's employment. Plaintiff in error is in the anomalous position of questioning the legality of Virgil's employment, after having stipulated facts which gave the Industrial Commission jurisdiction, and reserving only the questions of dependency and compensation for medical and surgical services. The stipulation obviated the necessity of showing that the employee's work was legal under the Workmen's Compensation and Child Labor Laws. The Industrial Commission has jurisdiction of this class of cases. Pocahontas Mining Co. v. Industrial Com., 301 Ill. 462, 134 N. E. 160. This court acts upon the record before it. The parties agreed that they were under the Workmen's The parent's income, their mode of living, and the application of the boy's earnings, at least partially, to the maintenance of the home, were of such a character as to justify an award on the ground of partial dependency. Partial dependency may exist, even though the claimant could have subsisted without the decedent's contributions. The test is whether the contributions were relied on by the dependent for his means of living as determined by his position in life. Rich 335, 129 N. E. 751; Rockford Cabinet Co. v. Industrial Com., 295 Ill. 332, 129 N. E. 142. In Chicago, Wilmington & Franklin Coal Co. v. Industrial Com., 303 Ill. 540, 543, 135 N. E. 784, 786, we said: "A child contributes to the support of its parents, within the meaning of the Compensation Act, when it contributes a substantial sum to the support of the family, although this sum is less than the actual cost of its support and maintenance, where the child is a minor or is in a condition to demand legal support from its parent." Dependency and its extent are questions of fact, and this court will not interfere with the finding of the commission on those questions, if there is evidence to sustain its finding. Richardson Sand Co. v. Industrial Com., supra. The minimum compensation under paragraph (c) of section 7 of the act (Smith's Stat. 1923, p. 980) was allowed. The award is supported by the evidence. The impropriety of allowing compensation for medical and surgical services was urged on the hearing before the arbitrator, but the point is not raised here; hence it need not be considered. We find no error in the record. The judgment of the circuit court will be affirmed. Judgment affirmed. (313 III. 346) PEOPLE v. HUBBARD. (Supreme Court of Illinois. (145 N.E.) (No. 16092.) 1. Attorney and client II-Defendant held guilty of "holding himself out as attorney" without license to practice. City attorney, consulted at his office regarding legal matters by persons whom he told he was a lawyer with authority to represent them before state courts, and appearing before justice of peace as attorney at law representing clients for hire, held guilty of holding himself out as attorney, and, not being regularly licensed, violated Act May 16, 1905 (Laws 1905, p. 190). 2. Attorney and client -Act prohibiting practice of law without license held not void as repugnant to later act. Act May 16, 1905 (Laws 1905, p. 190), declaring one holding himself out as attorney at law without being licensed to practice guilty of misdemeanor, held, not so repugnant to act revising law concerning attorneys and counselors, as amended in 1917 (Laws 1917, p. 205), as to render either void; latter prohibiting practice of law without license, by giving legal advice or representing client in court of record or before justice of peace. Error to Appellate Court, Fourth District, on Appeal from Franklin County Court; Sidney M. Ward, Judge. him if he was a lawyer, and that he replied that he was; that she told him that her husband was a drunkard and treated her cruelly, and asked him if he could get her a divorce; that he told her he could, and that it would cost her $45; that she paid him $20 at that time, and that $25 was paid two days later; that she went with her father, and that Hubbard gave her father a receipt for the money; that about the middle of February Hubbard told her that J. E. Carr, a lawyer at West Frankfort, would look after her case when it came up in the circuit court at Benton; that Carr tried her case and secured the divorce for her; that she did not pay Carr any money. In December, 1921, Minnie Mabon employed Hubbard to represent her in some litigation she was having with her husband. She testified that Hubbard told her he was a lawyer and could secure a divorce for her; that she paid him $15; that he took her to Carr, at West Frankfort, and told her that Carr was his partner; that later she received a notice to appear in court as a defendant in a suit filed by her husband; that she did not appear in court, and she understood her husband procured a divorce from her. In February, 1923, Jacob Gabor called to see Hubbard regarding a case pending in the county court of Franklin county on appeal from a justice of the peace. He testified that he asked Hubbard if he could handle the case, and that Hubbard said he was a licens William C. Hubbard was convicted of holding himself out as attorney at law, without license to practice. Judgment affirmed by Appellate Court, and he brings error. Af-ed attorney and could handle the case at firmed. J. E. Carr, of West Frankfort, and George Sawyer, of Marion, for plaintiff in error. Edward J. Brundage, Atty. Gen., Roy C. Martin, State's Atty., of Benton, and James B. Searcy, of Springfield (Thurlow G. Lewis and Nealy I. Glenn, both of Benton, of counsel), for the People. Benton the same as he had handled it before the justice of the peace; that Gabor paid him $15; that Hubbard came to his house some time later and threw the $15 down on a table; that he looked angry, said nothing, and walked out of the house. Hubbard testified that he had never held himself out as a licensed attorney, and had always refused to practice in courts of record; that Psepiorkoski came to him about securing a divorce for his daughter; that he told Psepiorkoski that he was only city at THOMPSON, J. William C. Hubbard was convicted in the county court of Franklin county of the offense of holding himself out as an attorney at law, without being regular-torney, and could not practice in the circuit ly licensed to practice as such. The judgment entered on the verdict was affirmed by the Appellate Court, and he prosecutes this writ of error for a further review. Hubbard located at Zeigler on August 27, 1921, and was appointed city attorney on March 18, 1922. Prior to coming to Zeigler he was licensed to practice law in the state of Missouri. While he was a resident of Illinois, he was admitted to practice law in the state of Indiana. January 3, 1922, 21⁄2 months before he was appointed city attorney, Hubbard accepted a fee of $45 from Antoni Psepiorkoski to secure a divorce for the latter's daughter, Helen Skucki. She testified that she went to Hubbard's office at Zeigler on the 1st day of January, and asked court; that he talked to Psepiorkoski about the case, and told him that his daughter could secure a divorce; that he retained Carr for them, and that Carr secured her divorce; that Minnie Mabon came to him and asked him to represent her before a justice of the peace in a prosecution against her husband for wife abandonment; that he did not tell her he was a lawyer, and that she asked him no questions about it; that she asked him to prosecute the case for her before the justice of the peace, and that he rendered the service and made a charge for it; that the husband was bound over to await the action of the grand jury, and was released on bond; that she returned with him to his office, and told him she wanted to secure a For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes divorce; that he told her that he could not [any action or suit in which he is not a party get a divorce for her, but that he would take concerned, in any court of record within this her to a lawyer who could; that he drove state. The meaning of this act is plain. It her in his automobile to see Carr, at West prohibits any person, not regularly licensed, Frankfort; that Jake Gabor's wife had to practice in any capacity whatever as an trouble with a young man and the latter was attorney or counselor at law, whether that arrested for disturbing the peace; that it practice consists in giving legal advice in the was a city case and that he prosecuted the office or in representing a client in court. case as city attorney; that an appeal was The act likewise prohibits any person, not a taken to the county court, and Gabor came party concerned, to commence, conduct or deto see him about the case before it was called fend, in any capacity, any action or suit in a for trial; that he told Gabor that the city court of record. While a person not licensed had employed Carr to prosecute the case in to practice law might, as the agent of anthe county court; that Gabor said he want- other, commence, conduct or defend an action ed to employ some attorney to help prosecute before a justice of the peace, he could not the case; that he told him he might pay perform this service as an attorney at law. Carr some extra money, if he cared to; that Although the Legislature might well have Gabor gave him $15 to take to Carr; that combined these two statutes, and thereby one Elkins told him that Gabor had employed avoided double legislation on the same subJudge Hart, at Benton, to prosecute the case, ject-matter, they are not so repugnant to and that he returned the $15 to Gabor. each other as to render one of them void. There being no reversible error in the record, the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. KING et al. v. WALRATH. (Supreme Court of Illinois. (313 III. 551) (No. 14958.) [1] The principal contention of plaintiff in error is that the evidence is not sufficient to justify the verdict of guilty. The fact that people called at his office and consulted him regarding legal matters and the fact that he was appointed city attorney are strong circumstances indicating that he was holding himself out as an attorney at law. Three witnesses testified positively that he told them he was a lawyer and had authority to represent them before the courts of this state. He admits that he appeared before a justice of the peace in Zeigler on different occasions, as the attorney for the city of Zeig-formance where they voluntarily abandoned ler, and as the attorney for Minnie Mabon. The act under which this prosecution is brought provides: "That any person residing in this state not being regularly licensed to practice law in the courts of this state, who shall, in any manner, hold himself out as an attorney at law, or solicitor in chancery, or represent himself either verbally or in writing, directly or indirectly, as authorized to practice law, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." When plaintiff in error appeared before a justice of the peace as an attorney at law, representing clients for hire, he was clearly violating the provisions of this statute. [2] The second contention of plaintiff in error is that the act to prevent and punish frauds in the practice of law, approved May 16, 1905 (Laws 1905, p. 190), which is the act under which this prosecution was instituted, is irreconcilable with, repugnant to, and therefore repealed by, the act to revise the law in relation to attorneys and counselors, as amended by the law of 1917 (Laws 1917, p. 205), the contention being that the latter act permits persons to represent clients be fore a justice of the peace. This act provides that no person, without having previously obtained a license for the purpose, shall be permitted to practice as an attorney or counselor at law, or to commence, conduct, or defend Oct. 28, 1924.) contract, surrendered possession, and notified Where vendees surrendered possession to vendor's assignee, and notified him that they were unable to make further payments, and assignee accepted their offer of abandonment, and asked them to further signify cancellation of contract by returning their copy with statement on it that it was canceled by mutual consent, held that there was abandonment and cancellation though vendees did not return their copy of contract. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes |