VIII. 1546. that he now took arms, not in a religious, but in a civil BOOK quarrel; not to oppress any who continued to behave as quiet and dutiful subjects, but, to humble the arrogance of such as had thrown off all sense of that subordination in which they were placed under him as head of the Germanic body. Gross as this deception was, and manifest as it might have appeared to all who considered the emperor's conduct with attention, it became necessary for him to make trial of its effect; and such was the confidence and dexterity with which he employed it, that he derived the most solid advantages from this artifice. If he had avowed at once an intention of overturning the Protestant church, and of reducing all Germany under its former state of subjection to the papal see, none of the cities or princes who had embraced the new opinions could have remained neutral after such a declaration, far less could they have ventured to assist the emperor in such an enterprise; whereas, by concealing, and even disclaiming, any intention of that kind, he not only saved himself from the danger of being overwhelmed by a general confederacy of all the Protestant states, but he furnished the timid with an excuse for continuing inactive, and the designing or interested with a pretext for joining him, without exposing themselves to the infamy of abandoning their own principles, or taking part openly in suppressing them. At the same time the emperor well knew, that if, by their assistance, he were enabled to break the power of the elector of Saxony and the landgrave, he might afterwards prescribe what terms he pleased to the feeble remains of a party without union and destitute of leaders, who would then regret too late their mistaken confidence in him, and their inconsiderate desertion of their associates. The pope, by a sudden and unforeseen display of his The pope zeal, had well nigh disconcerted this plan which the em- disconcerts his plan. peror had formed with so much care and art. Proud of having been the author of such a formidable league against the Lutheran heresy, and happy in thinking that the glory of extirpating it was reserved for his pontificate, he pub VOL. VI. CC VIII. 1546. BOOK lished the articles of his treaty with the emperor, in order to demonstrate the pious intention of their confederacy, as well as to display his own zeal, which prompted him to make such extraordinary efforts for maintaining the faith in its purity. Not satisfied with this, he soon after issued a bull, containing most liberal promises of indulgence to all who should engage in this holy enterprise, together with warm exhortations to such as could not bear a part in it themselves, to increase the fervour of their prayers and the severity of their mortifications, that they might draw down the blessing of Heaven upon those who undertook it'. Nor was it zeal alone which pushed the pope to make declarations so inconsistent with the account which the emperor himself gave of his motives for taking arms. He was much scandalized at Charles's dissimulation in such a cause; at his seeming to be ashamed of owning his zeal for the church'; and at his endeavours to make that pass for a political contest which he ought to have gloried in as a war that had no other object than the defence of religion. With as much solicitude, therefore, as the emperor laboured to disguise the purpose of the confederacy, did the pope endeavour to publish their real plan, in order that they might come at once to an open rupture with the Protestants, that all hope of reconcilement might be cut off, and that Charles might be under fewer temptations, and have it less in his power than at present, to betray the interests of the church by any accommodation beneficial to himself". The emperor, though not a little offended at the pope's indiscretion or malice in making this discovery, continued boldly to pursue his own plan, and to assert his intentions to be no other than what he had originally avowed. Several of the Protestant states, whom he had previously gained, thought themselves justified in some measure by his declarations for abandoning their associates, and even for giving assistance to him. 1 Du Mont Corps Diplom. F. Paul, 188. Thuan. Hist. i, 61. VIII. 1546. The prepa testants for defence. But these artifices did not impose on the greater and BOOK sounder part of the Protestant confederates. They clearly perceived it to be against the reformed religion that the. emperor had taken arms, and that not only the suppres-ration of sion of it, but the extinction of the German liberties, would the probe the certain consequence of his obtaining such an entire their own superiority as would enable him to execute his schemes in their full extent. They determined, therefore, to prepare for their own defence, and neither to renounce those religious truths, to the knowledge of which they had attained by means so wonderful, nor to abandon those civil rights which had been transmitted to them by their ancestors. In order to give the necessary directions for this purpose, their deputies met at Ulm, soon after their abrupt departure from Ratisbon. Their deliberations were now conducted with such vigour and unanimity as the imminent danger which threatened them required. The contingent of troops which each of the confederates was to furnish having been fixed by the original treaty of union, orders were given for bringing them immediately into the field. Being sensible, at last, that through the narrow prejudices of some of their members, and the imprudent security of others, they had neglected too long to strengthen themselves by foreign alliances, they now applied with great earnestness to the Venetians and Swiss. of the Ve To the Venetians they represented the emperor's inten-They solition of overturning the present system of Germany, and cit the aid of raising himself to absolute power in that country by netians. means of foreign force furnished by the pope; they warned them how fatal this event would prove to the liberties of Italy, and that by suffering Charles to acquire unlimited authority in the one country, they would soon feel his dominion to be no less despotic in the other; they besought them, therefore, not to grant a passage through their territories to those troops which ought to be treated as common enemies, because by subduing Germany they prepared chains for the rest of Europe. These reflections had not escaped the sagacity of those wise republicans. VIII. 1546. BOOK They had communicated their sentiments to the pope, and had endeavoured to divert him from an alliance which tended to render irresistible the power of a potentate whose ambition he already knew to be boundless. But they had found Paul so eager in the prosecution of his own plan, that he disregarded all their remonstrances". This attempt to alarm the pope having proved unsuccessful, they declined doing any thing more towards preventing the dangers which they foresaw; and in return to the application from the confederates of Smalkalde, they informed them, that they could not obstruct the march of the pope's troops through an open country, but by levying an army strong enough to face them in the field; and that this would draw upon themselves the whole weight of his, as well as of the emperor's, indignation. For the same reason they declined lending a sum of money, which the elector of Saxony and landgrave proposed to borrow of them, towards carrying on the war. Of the The demands of the confederates upon the Swiss were not confined to the obstructing of the entrance of foreigners into Germany; they required of them, as the nearest neighbours and closest allies of the empire, to interpose, with their wonted vigour, for the preservation of its liberties, and not to stand as inactive spectators, while their brethren were oppressed and enslaved. But with whatever zeal some of the cantons might have been disposed to act when the cause of the reformation was in danger, the Helvetic body was so divided with regard to religion, as to render it unsafe for the protestants to take any step without consulting their Catholic associates; and among them the emissaries of the pope and emperor had such influence, that a resolution of maintaining an exaét neutrality between the contending parties, was the utmost which could be procured P. » Adriani Istoria di suoi Tempi, liv. v. p. 332. Sleid. 381. Paruta Istor. Venet. tom. iv, 180. Lambertus Horten sius de Bello Germanico, apud Scardium, vol. ii, p. 547. Sleid. 392, VIII. 1546. VIII. Being disappointed in both these applications, the pro- BOOK testants, not long after, had recourse to the kings of France. and England; the approach of danger either overcoming of Fran the elector of Saxony's scruples, or obliging him to yield cis 1. and to the importunities of his associates. The situation of Henry the two monarchs flattered them with hopes of success. Though hostilities between them had continued for some time after the peace of Crespy, they became weary at last of a war attended with no glory or advantage to either, and had lately terminated all their differences by a peace concluded at Campe near Ardres. Francis having, with great difficulty, procured his allies, the Scots, to be includ-ed in the treaty, in return for that concession he engaged to pay a great sum, which Henry demanded as due to him on several accounts, and he left Boulogne in the hands of the English as a pledge for his faithful performance of that article. But, though the re-establishment of peace seemed to leave the two monarchs at liberty to turn their attention towards Germany, so unfortunate were the Protestants, that they derived no immediate advantage from this circumstance. Henry appeared unwilling to enter into any alliance with them, but on such conditions as would render him not only the head, but the supreme director of their league; a pre-eminence which, as the bonds of union or interest between them were but feeble, and as he differed from them so widely in his religious sentiments, they had no inclination to admit. Francis, more powerfully inclined by political considerations to afford them assistance, found his kingdom so much exhausted by a long war, and was so much afraid of irritating the pope, by ens tering into close union with excommunicated heretics, that he durst not undertake the protection of the Smalkaldic league. By this ill-timed caution, or by a superstitious deference to scruples, to which, at other times, he was not much addicted, he lost the most promising opportunity of mortifying and distressing his rival which presented itself during his whole reign, Rymer, xv. 93. Herbert, 258. |