commit? The prisoner is proved to have been perfectly well aware of what he had done immediately afterwards, and in the interview which he had had since, with one of the medical gentlemen, he admitted that he knew perfectly well what he had done, and ascribed his conduct to some momentary uncontrollable impulse. The law does not acknowledge such an impulse, if the person was aware that it was a wrong act he was about to commit; and he is answerable for the consequences. A man might say he picked a pocket from some uncontrollable impulse, and in that case the law would have an uncontrolled impulse to punish him for it."

After reading the whole evidence, Baron Alderson proceeded: "That the prisoner is an object of commiseration is quite clear, and that he should also have been taken care of is equally true; but the question you have here to decide is: Are you satisfied that, at the time, he was suffering from disease of the mind which rendered him incapable of judging whether the act he committed towards the Queen was a right or a wrong act for him to do? If you are not satisfied of this fact, you must say that he is guilty; but if you think he was not aware what he was about, or not capable of distinguishing between right and wrong, you will then say he is not guilty, on the ground of insanity.”

In the case of a boy, aged twelve years, who had deliberately and cunningly poisoned his aged grandfather, some witnesses called for the defense, had described the accused as acting under uncontrollable impulse.

Baron Rolfe said "such evidence ought to be scanned with very great jealousy and suspicion, because it may tend to the perfect justification of every crime that may be committed. What is the meaning of not being able to resist moral influence? Every crime is committed under an influence of such a description, and the object of the law is to compel persons to control those influences. If it be made an excuse for a person who has been goaded to it by some impulse which medical men may choose to say he could not control, I must declare that such a doctrine is fraught with very great danger to society."

This opinion of the judge prevailed, and the criminal was committed.

American Cases-General summary of Decisions in American Court-Insane Persons-1. In General.-Setting aside cases of dementia, or loss of mind and intellect, the true test of insanity is

mental delusion. If a person persistently, and against all evidence and probability, believes supposed facts, which have no real existance except in his perverted imagination, and conducts himself, however logically, upon the assumption of their existence, he is, so far as they are concerned, under a morbid delusion; and delusion in that sense is insanity.

Such a person is essentially mad or insane on those subjects, though on the other subjects he may reason, act and speak like a sensible man.'

2. On questions of testamentary capacity, the courts shall be careful not to confound perverse opinions and unreasonable prejudices with mental alienation. These qualities of mind may exist, even in a high degree; and yet, so far as regards the view which the law takes of the case, the subject may be sane and competent to perform a legal act, and be held responsible for crime, if what constitutes insanity be sufficient to relieve the prisoner from responsibility for the criminal act, as, for example, homicide.†

The Commission.-It is the duty of the solicitor for the petitioner to name a solicitor or counsellor as one of the commissioners; and in cases of importance the commission ought not to act without his presence.‡

The Jurors.-The jurors to try the question of the capacity of a habitual drunkard shonld be selected by the sheriff. If the commissioners dictate to him in the matter, the proceedings may be set aside. The jury should inspect and examine the lunatic in every case of doubt when possible.

The Finding.-Where the inquisition found that he was of unsound mind, and mentally incapable of managing his affairs, a committee of his estate was appointed. If the jury are not able to go thus far, the committee cannot be appointed.

The finding that the party is incapable of governing himself or managing his affairs in consequence of mental imbecility and weakness, is inconclusive and insufficient. The commission will be discharged when the decision on a feigned issue is in favor of the mental capacity of the alleged lunatic.

Erroneous Finding.—In a clear case of mistake or undue prejudice of the jury, the court may discharge an inquisition of lunacy upon the mere examination of the supposed lunatic in connection

* Abbot's Digest, Append., 1875, p. 361.

Willis vs. The People, 22 New York, p. 715.
Abbott, page 401-402.

with the evidence before the jury, but it is improper to do so upon separate affidavits contradicting the finding, where no excuse is given for not having produced the deponents before the jury as witnesses.

Second Inquisition.The court has power, in the exercise of a sound discretion, to direct the issuing of a new commission, where, from the evidence or otherwise, there is no doubt that the jury must have erred in finding that the party proceeded against was not of unsound mind.

Every person is presumed to be sane till the contrary appears. The acts of a lunatic before he is found to be insane are not void. A lunatic is not absolutely disqualified from making a contract. In order to avoid a deed, entire loss of understanding must be shown. Proof of weak or impaired mind is not enough.

Weak Mind. The jurisdiction of the court is not restricted to cases of lunacy. When a person from old age, sickness, or other causes, becomes so weak of mind as to be unable to manage his affairs, a commission of the nature of a writ de lunatico inquirendo may be awarded.

Where the particular subject of monomania connects itself with the disposition or management of property of the person who is thus afflicted, he is a proper subject of a commission of lunacy. Incapacity. It is enough to vest the court with jurisdiction when the jury find that the party is mentally incapable of governing himself or managing his affairs.

The cases from which these notes are collected would only, if given in full, illustrate a few of the many dark problems which have tested the powers of American jurists and physicians. When we seek for general principles we easily find them, and justice, though blind, seems able to hold the scales with an impartial hand. But in the details of individual cases, innumerable perplexities have bewildered the wisest experts.

The court may be impartial and unprejudiced, but lawyers seldom appear to be so; and the medical witness is placed between two fires, neither of which is calculated to aid him in reaching a clear diagnosis of a myterious case. The whole matter of the law relating to the employment of medical experts, as it has grown up in Europe and America since the middle ages, is unsatisfactory; and reforms are needed which few men feel qualified to propose.

Professor Washburn, of the law school of Harvard University, has suggested to the American Academy of Arts and Science, the

submission of the subject to a committee. This committee has been formed of distinguished men, from whom important innovations are hoped for.

We cannot pursue the subject further here. We may follow the courts of New York through the search after truth in a single

case.

Mental Capacity in Relation to Devising Property.—The right of an individual to dispose of the real and personal property he has acquired during a life of industrious effort, is scarcely disputed in our day; but his mental capacity, whatever it may be, is liable to be called in question under one or more of the following circumstances:

I. Is, or was, the person who made the will, by which valuable property is disposed of, mentally qualified to do it wisely and justly?

II. Is the person charged with crime of sound mind and capable of distinguishing right from wrong, and was he, in a legal sense, sane at the time of committing the alleged offense?

III. Is the person who is possessed of valuable effects, capable of so far taking care of and making a right use of the same as to do justice to himself and to those dependent upon him?

IV. Is the person, hitherto innocent of crime, capable of taking due and proper care of himself; and has he sufficient intelligence and common sense to justify his friends in permitting him to go at large, without his being likely, through weak, perverted or anywise diseased intellect, to do injury to himself or endanger the safety or happiness of others?

Under each of these headings, many questions are perpetually arising in the courts, and on all of them, as well as the various sub-questions which come up under them, the opinions of medical men will continue to be demanded. The intricate nature of the questions which occur in actual practice, will continue to surprise physicians who have not devoted much time to the study of psychology, as a deep and extensive science. In scarcely any position will they ever be required to know so much, and find themselves compelled to attempt to render their knowledge useful under such disadvantageous circumstances. I refer now to a case of general interest which may illustrate some of the principles involved in the more common cases of medico-legal practice.

I. The Parish Will Case.-Mr. Henry Parish, of New York city, at the age of forty-two, married, October 1829, Miss Susan

Delafield, then aged 24. He resided for some years in Barclay street. In 1848 he built a mansion in Union square, at the cost of $112,000. There he resided the remainder of his life.

In 1838, Mr. Parish retired from active commercial pursuits. He soon began to suffer from disease of the eyes; about 1840, he complained of occasional attacks of vertigo, described as apoplectic in character. After two or three of these attacks, when about to sail for Europe, on the 20th of September, 1842, he, with the approval of his attorney, Mr. C. G. Havens, made a will, disposing of his estate, then valued at $700,000.

To his wife he gave real and personal property, including the dwelling house on Barclay street, a store on Pine street, furniture, wines, silver, etc., valued at $331,000.

To his nephew, Henry Parish, he gave real estate valued at $35,000, to a cousin and namesake, real estate valued at $20,000; the son of a former partner, real estate, valued at $5,000; to his two sisters, Miss Ann Parish, an elderly maiden lady, and Mrs. Allen M. Sherman, each $20,000; to an aunt of his wife an annuity valued at $5,000; to each of his five executors, as a personal gift, $10,000. If his estate should be found sufficient, he willed $10,000 to each of his brother's sons, a cousin, to his brothers-inlaw, one sister and three sisters-in-law of his wife; these last named bequests amounting to $210,000. He had now disposed of $696,000. Whatever might remain he gave to his two brothers, James and Daniel, who, with his widow and sisters above mentioned, constituted his only heirs-at-law up to the date of his death.

During Mr. Parish's absence in Europe, one or two more of the apoplectic attacks occurred. Dr. Delafield said he had at least heard of one there, which came on in the street when he was about preparing to return home. There was partial insensibility, making it necessary for him to sit down, and perhaps requiring aid to get him to his temporary home. The attack was of the nature of an apoplectic seizure. At one time, when in a bath at Baden Baden, he was suddenly stricken down in the usual apoplectic manner, and was unconscious for a short time. At this time it detained him eight days, during which he wrote home to his brother, dated August 28, 1843.

It was said the baths were too hot, as well as the sun. Mr. Kernochan, a former partner, says this tendency to apoplexy was a family complaint, Mr. Parish's father had died in old age of