the All-American Canal and appurtenances. Previously, the construction of the All-American Canal, for the purpose, interalia, of supplying irrigable water to the Coachella Valley, was undertaken pursuant to a contract entered between the United States and the Coachella Valley County Water District on October 15, 1934, contract symbol Ilr-781. This contract was made pursuant to the act of Congress of June 17, 1902 (32 Stat. 388), and acts amendatory and supplementary thereto, commonly known and referred to as the Federal reclamation law, and particularly pursuant to the act of December 21, 1928 (45 Stat. 1057; 43 U. S. C., sec. 617), designated as the Boulder Canyon Project Act. The question whether the general excess-land provisions which are part of the Federal reclamation law apply to the Coachella Valley Water District lands depends on the construction and the interpretation of these statutes.

It is my opinion that the excess-land provisions of the Federal reclamation law apply to the Coachella Valley County Water District lands and, accordingly, these provisions should be incorporated in the contracts presently under consideration.

The Federal reclamation law is contained in the Reclamation Act of June 17, 1902 (32 Stat. 388), which, together with acts amendatory and supplementary thereto, forms a complete legislative pattern in the field. The Supreme Court describes this type of legislation succinctly in United States v. Barnes (222 U. S. 513 (1912)) at page 520:1

Much of our national legislation is embodied in codes, or systematic collections of general rules, each dealing in a comprehensive way with some general subject, such as the customs, internal revenue, public lands, Indians, and patents for inventions; and it is the settled rule of decision in this court that where there is subsequent legislation upon such a subject it carries with it an implication that the general rules are not superseded, but are to be applied in its enforcement, save as the contrary clearly appears. *** [Emphasis supplied.]

Congress has followed precisely this type of legislative policy in enacting the Federal reclamation law.

The excess-land provisions of general applicability in this law are the following:

The Reclamation Act of June 17, 1902 (32 Stat. 388, 389; 43 U. S. C., sec. 431);

Section 46 of the Omnibus Adjustment Act of May 25, 1926 (44 Stat. 636, 649; 43 U. S. C., sec. 423 (e));

The Warren Act of February 21, 1911 (36 Stat. 925, 926; 43 U. S. C., secs. 523, 524);

The act of August 9, 1912 (37 Stat. 265, 266; 43 U. S. C., secs. 543, 544);

The Reclamation Extension Act of August 13, 1914 (38 Stat. 686, 689; 43 U. S. C., sec. 418).

Since, in the opinion of the Bureau of Reclamation, "the excess land provisions of section 46 of the Omnibus Adjustment Act seem to be applicable to contracts made with the Coachella District" (see copy of undated letter attached from the Acting Commissioner to the Regional Director, Boulder City, Nev.), these provisions will be used, for illustrative purposes only, of this type of statute:

No water shall be delivered upon the completion of any new project or new division of a project until a contract or contracts in form approved by the Secretary

1 This case held that certain procedures set out in sec. 3177 of the Revised Statutes, providing for the enforcement of the internal revenue laws, applied to the collection or enforcement of the specific tax imposed on oleomargarine by the act of August 2, 1886 (ch. 840, 24 Stat. 209).

of the Interior shall have been made with an irrigation district *** organized under State law providing for payment by the district *** of the cost of constructing, operating, and maintaining the works during the time they are in control of the United States *** Such contract or contracts with irrigation districts hereinbefore referred to shall further provide that all irrigable land held in private ownership by any one owner in excess of one hundred and sixty irrigable acres shall be appraised in a manner to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior and the sale prices thereof fixed by the Secretary on the basis of its actual bona fide value at the date of appraisal without reference to the proposed construction of the irrigation works; and that no such excess lands so held shall receive water from any project or division if the owners thereof shall refuse to execute valid recordable contracts for the sale of such lands under terms and conditions satisfactory to the Secretary of the Interior and at prices not to exceed those fixed by the Secretary of the Interior; *** [Emphasis supplied.]

The language used in the other statutes listed is similar. As will be considered presently, section 5 of the Reclamation Act employs the term "sold" in connection with water rights, in contrast to the term "delivered" in the Omnibus Adjustment Act.

Generally speaking, these excess-land provisions represent a firmly established, time-honored, and sound public policy which seeks to achieve the twofold purpose of preventing speculation and of spreading the benefits of a reclamation project among the larger group of smaller landowners rather than confining those benefits to the relatively smaller group of large landowners. These excess-land provisions are of general applicability to all reclamation projects in the 17 States enumerated in section 1 of the Reclamation Act of 1902, as amended. Whenever these general excess-land provisions did not fit the special circumstances of a project, or were found not to be adequate enough to check speculation, special excess-land provisions were enacted by Congress, applicable only to specific projects. Examples of this type of legislation are:

Interior Department Appropriation Act of May 10, 1926 2 (44 Stat. 453, 465);

Columbia Basin Antispeculation Act of May 27, 19373 (50 Stat. 208), as amended by the

4

Columbia Basin Project Act of March 10, 1943 (47 Stat. 14; 16 U. S. C. A., App., sec. 835).

Furthermore, Congress has waived the excess-land provisions of the Federal reclamation law, with regard to two projects, in view of the peculiar circumstances involved which threatened to make these projects economically unsound:

Act of June 16, 1938 (52 Stat. 764; 43 U. S. C., sec. 386), with respect to the Colorado-Big Thompson project;

Act of November 29, 1940 (54 Stat. 1219), with respect to the Washoe County Water Conservation District, Truckee storage project, and the Pershing County Water Conservation District, both in Nevada.

In the act of June 16, 1938, supra, the language reads:

The excess-land provisions of the Federal reclamation laws shall not be applicable to lands which, on June 16, 1938, had an irrigation water supply from

This act contains the 160-acre limitation but provides the manner, peculiar to the statute, in which excess lands may be conveyed to the United States.

This statute contains the following proviso: "That every such contract with any district shall further require that all irrigable land held in private ownership by any one owner in excess of forty irrigable acres *** shall be designated as excess land and as such shall not be entitled to receive water from said project." [Emphasis supplied.]

The limitation here is to farm units containing not less than 10 nor more than 160 acres.

sources other than a Federal reclamation project and which will receive a supplemental supply from the Colorado-Big Thompson project.

The exclusion is equally positive in the act of November 29, 1940, supra.

The existence of the two foregoing types of statutes is of tremendous importance in the instant situation and has a direct bearing on the problem before me. Congress in enacting them has shown clearly that the excess-land provisions are the heart of the reclamation law. Where such provisions are not sufficiently drastic, Congress has enacted a special excess-land law designed to meet the particular situation, as in the Columbia Basin Antispeculation Act. But where reasons of policy militate against the application of the excessland provisions, Congress provides express exemption, as in the Colorado-Big Thompson project.

When the pertinent parts of the Boulder Canyon Project Act are analyzed, it becomes apparent that Congress incorporated therein neither special excess-land provisions nor exemption from the excessland provisions generally. Instead, it showed clearly that it intended these provisions to be applicable to irrigable lands within the project. Section 14 reads:

This Act shall be deemed a supplement to the reclamation law, which said reclamation law shall govern the construction, operation, and management of the works herein authorized, except as otherwise herein provided.

Section 12, which is definitive, reads in part:

***"Reclamation law" as used in this Act shall be understood to mean that certain Act of the Congress of the United States approved June 17, 1902, entitled "An Act appropriating the receipts from the sale and disposal of public land in certain States and Territories to the construction of irrigation works for the reclamation of arid lands," and the Acts amendatory thereof and supplemental thereto. ***

These sections will now be analyzed in the light of the general structure of the Boulder Canyon Act, its relationship to the reclamation law, its legislative history, and the few court decisions which have endeavored to interpret it.

When Congress in section 14 made the Boulder Canyon Act "a supplement to the reclamation law," it incorporated into the former statute the 160-acre limitation of the act of June 17, 1902. Webster defines the word "supplement" as "that which completes, or makes addition to, something already organized, arranged, or set apart" (Webster's New International Dictionary, first edition, 2083). Thus, the word "supplement," as used in the Boulder Canyon Act, means an addition to legislative enactments already existing.

With the exception of one unpublished decision by an inferior State court in California-which will be analyzed in detail subsequently the only case found in which the relationship between the Boulder

"The excess-land provisions of the Federal reclamation laws shall not be applicable to land in the Washoe County Water Conservation District, Nevada, irrigated from the Boca Reservoir, Truckee River storage project, Nevada, nor to the Pershing County Water Conservation District, Nevada, irrigated from the Humboldt River Reservoir, and the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to enter into a contract with said districts, amending, in accordance with this Act, the contract of December 18, 1936, between the United States and the Washoe County Water Conservation District, and the contract of October 1, 1934, between the United States and the Pershing County Water Conservation District."

A 160-acre limitation on lands for homesteads within the project is expressly stated in sec. 9 of the Boulder Canyon Act, as follows: "That all lands of the United States found by the Secretary of the Interior to be practicable of irrigation and reclamation by the irrigation works authorized herein shall be withdrawn from public entry. Thereafter, at the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, such lands shall be opened for entry, in tracts varying in size but not exceeding one hundred and sixty acres, as may be determined by the Secretary of the Interior, in accordance with the provisions of the reclamation law.****

Canyon Act and the reclamation law was considered is Six Companies, Inc. v. De Vinney (2 F. Supp. 693 (D. C. Nev. 1933)).

The legal problem in this case may be stated simply. The Six Companies, Inc., sought to enjoin a county assessor in Nevada from collecting State taxes on its personal property and from demanding the payment of poll taxes from its employees. The plaintiff's principal contention for avoiding tax liability was that all of its property and the homes of its employees were inside the Boulder Canyon project Federal reservation, to which territory the State of Nevada was alleged to have ceded jurisdiction.

In dismissing the bill, the Federal District Court for Nevada observed, in part:

The statutes referred to are the reclamation law and the Boulder Canyon Project Act. The latter act, as before pointed out, is supplementary_to_the reclamation law, except as otherwise therein provided. *** The Boulder Canyon Project Act clearly discloses that the dam and incidental works therein referred to are of a permanent character, and specifically provides that "the title to said dam, reservoir, plant and incidental works shall forever remain in the United States." ***There is no specific provision in the Boulder Canyon project authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to establish any reservation, and if such authority may be inferred it would be limited to the area covered by the expression last above quoted, including any additional area necessary for administrative purposes.

While, "except as otherwise herein provided," the Project Act is deemed a supplement to the reclamation law, a reference to the latter law * * * discloses nothing which the National Government might be said to intend the retention of control beyond the consummation of the purposes of the law-the reclamation by means of irrigation of portions of the arid domain. This law comprehends the acquisition by citizens of the United States of the land and water rights. The law generally comprehends that its purposes will be carried out under national direction, but, subject thereto, always without relinquishment of State jurisdiction.***

Only in the reclamation law is there any provision for the establishment of town sites within reclamation projects or under the authority of the Bureau of Reclamation (secs. 561-570, 43 U. S. C. A. 7). These provisions of the law clearly indicate the intention of Congress that the towns so established will be and remain subject to local State jurisdiction, and lots therein acquired by individual residents, and parks, playgrounds, community centers, and school grounds acquired by the public. [Emphasis supplied.]

In a word, then, the court, in order to find the answer to this question of tax liability, was required to revert to the reclamation law, of which the Boulder Canyon Act is a supplement. The answer clearly was not in the Boulder Canyon Act proper. Therefore, is it not logical to conclude that, if the provisions for the establishment of town sites carried over from the reclamation law to the Boulder Canyon Project Act, the excess-land limitation of 160 acres one of the most basic provisions of the reclamation law-carried over in like fashion?

While the following State court decision concerns the original Homestead Act and the Enlarged Homestead Act rather than the reclamation law and the Boulder Canyon Project Act, it is sufficiently in point to merit discussion, First State Bank of Shelby v. Bottineau County Bank (56 Mont. 363, 185 Pac. 162 (1919)). In that case, one Charles R. Wilbur, on July 25, 1913, made final proof upon 320 acres of land which he had entered under the Enlarged Homestead Act of

"How thoroughly the 160-acre limitation permeates both the homestead and the reclamation laws is emphasized in 34 Stat. 116, 43 U. S. C., sec. 561, cited by the court, as follows: "The Secretary of the Interior may withdraw from public entry any lands needed for town-site purposes in connection with irrigation projects under the reclamation law, not exceeding one hundred and sixty acres in each case, and survey and subdivide the same into town lots. [Emphasis supplied.]

February 19, 1909 (35 Stat. 639). On July 30 of the same year, the Bottineau County Bank recovered judgment against Wilbur. In January 1914, Wilbur received his patent and on April 15, 1914, he conveyed the land by warranty deed to the First State Bank of Shelby, Mont. In November 1914, the Bottineau bank attempted to levy execution on the land in satisfaction of its judgment, whereupon the First State Bank sought to restrain the sheriff from making the levv.

The question was whether the provisions of the original Homestead Act of May 20, 1862 (12 Stat. 392) [containing a 160-acre limitation], exempting the land from the past debts of the patentee, carried over to the Enlarged Homestead Act, supra [containing a 320-acre limitation]. The language in the original statute provided flatly that no land acquired thereunder could "in any event become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the issuing of the patent therefor." The "enlarged" statute was silent in the matter. If the provision of the original statute carried over to the latter act, the attempted levy of the Bottineau bank was without legal sanction. The Supreme Court of Montana so held. It reviewed in detail the history and policy of the two statutes. It then summarized the six sections of the Enlarged Homestead Act and concluded:

*** It will be seen at once that the Enlarged Homestead Act does not in terms change any of the provisions of the original act. The determination of the principal question before us, therefore, depends upon the proper construction of the Enlarged Homestead Act with reference to the original act.

Was it intended as an independent statute, or was it meant to become a part of the original homestead act as it existed at the time this new measure went into effect? Aside from any other consideration, the bare reading of the act of 1909 would seem to be sufficient to convince one that it could not have been intended as an independent act. ***

If the Enlarged Homestead Act was intended as an amendment to the prior homestead laws, then the acts are to be construed as one-as originally in the amended form. The history of this act is fairly conclusive that it was never intended to be construed otherwise than as a part of the original homestead law as it was then in force. Without quoting from the committee reports or the debates in the Congress, we think it is apparent from them that it was the intention of the lawmakers by this act to supplement the existing statutes-to improve the homestead laws and encourage the settlement of the vast areas of public lands in the semiarid regions, by increasing the amount of land subject to entry.

***

A supplementary act is one designed to improve an existing statute by adding something thereto without changing the original text. *** Supplemental statutes include every species of amendatory legislation which goes to complete a legislative scheme ***.

Our conclusion is that the Enlarged Homestead Act is merely supplementary to the original homestead law, and is to be construed as a part of it. It follows that land acquired under it becomes subject to the provisions of section 2296 of the United States Revised Statutes *** and that the land in controversy in this action could not in any event become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted by Wilbur prior to the date his patent was issued. [Emphasis supplied.]

The answer to the question in the instant case is contained in the italicized lines from the opinion of the Montana Supreme Court. If anything, our case is stronger. Section 14 of the Boulder Canyon Project Act makes that statute "a supplement to the reclamation law." There was no such express statutory connection between the original Homestead Act and the Enlarged Homestead Act. Yet the court found such a connection, even in the absence of express language, and