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him the recent attempts to awaken party animosities, have not, I am convinced, originated; because I can discover no motive which he could have for furbishing up the old story of Lord Holland and unaccounted millions other than that of dividing the public attention, of diverting, for a moment, a portion of that attention from the conduct of Lord Melville and Mr. Pitt; and, at the same time, to throw some degree of odium on the name, at least, of Mr. Fox, that Mr. Fox, whom he so recently and so highly praised, and at not seeing whom in the cabinet he expressed his regret; a motive which it would be monstrous to impute to him. No: the insinuations in the 3d paragraph of the . libel and in the body of the petition procee ed, I am fully persuaded, neither from the pen nor the mind of Mr. Stuart; but from those of some envious and venernous upstart, who, perhaps, in his haste to attain the summit of that power, of which his foot never ought to have touched the first step, would, had he capacity equal to his will, sting where be cannot betray, and degrade where he cannot destroy, every one whom he regards as an obstacle to the accomplishment of his pre"Curst sumptuous and insolent desires.

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66 cows, however, according to the old saying, "have short horns;" and thus it has appeared in the present case, where the attempt to wound has injured nobody but the assailant and his friends. Miserable is the man, or the party, driven to accept of the support of an upstart, and happy all those who are the objects of his malice; for, of such creatures,

"It is the slaver kills, and not the bite." Read the history of the those princes and ministers, whose career has terminated in disgrace, and say how few of them have not owed their downfall to some political being of their own creation; to some upstart, whom, in the luxury of their power, in a refinement in their contempt for the habits, opinions, and feelings of mankind, they have invested with authority, which, in such hands, has finally become insupportable to any but the basest of minds. Of all de

symptoms of political decline the prominence of upstarts is the surest. It is not till the crown of the oak is blasted, till his heart is rotten, till his roots are loosened, till he rocks with every wind, till he trembles even at the zephyr, that the fungus shoots up from his stem.

Having thus stated the reasons, which induce me to believe, that Mr. Stuart ought not to be regarded as the author of the publications in question, I shall now, Sir, procced to describe the three points, which, in the present letter, it is any intention to dis

cuss. 1. The case of the late LORD HOLLAND, as compared with that of LORD MELVILLE.-2. The nature and tendency of the libel published in the Oracle of the 26th ultimo, compared with publications in general, touching upon the proceedings in Parliament.- -3. The injudiciousness of the writer, in selecting your name, under which to publish a threat against the editors of public papers, and that of Sir Henry Mildmay, under which to make a sort of protest against an alleged attempt to abridge the liberty of the press as to parliamentary proceedings; which point will naturally extend to an inquiry into the example af forded us by that weekly newspaper of which you were the principal conductor, and also to the relation of an occurrence which will tend to show whether the writer in the Oracle has truly represented the real disposi tion of Sir Henry Mildmay, and which occurrence, though quite of a public nature, is known to very few persons except that gentleman and myself.

FIRST; let us suppose, for a moment, that the case of Lord Holland, the father of Mr. Fox, had borne an exact resemblance, in all its parts, to the case of Lord Melville, instead, as will be found to be the case, of resembling it in no one particular. Let us suppose this; what has Mr. Fox to do with the matter? Ought he to be reproached with his father's misconduct? Ought he, supposing his father to have been guilty of a gross violation of the law and a high breach of duty, to be reviled because he is endea vouring to cause a similar offence to be punished in another man? Whither, Sir, would such a principle lead us? Most assuredly to the exclusion from public authority of every one whose ancestors (for there is no knowing when to stop) have been guilty of such offences against the public; for, if a person so descended has no right, if it be unjustor indecorous in him, to use his utmost endeavours to bring peculators to punishment, he certainly ought never to be placed in any post of public trust. The upstart writer has, therefore, only to persuade us to adopt this principle and the way will soon be cleared before him; for scarcely a man will be found eligible to power, except he has sprung from ancestors who had the good fortune never to be known, even perhaps, to their own children. This sweeping principle, however we shall not, at the modest suggestion of this upstart, adopt. In giving us a picture of injustice calculated to make a deep impression of abhorrence on our minds, the moralist has represented a ferocious beast, resolved to devour his neighbour but having

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no good ground of complaint against him, and receiving from him an assurance of his innocence, exclaiming, " that's nothing to "me: if it was not you, it was your father." But, Sir, where is the man amongst us, however low and obscure his origin, who would be willing to be made answerable for the faults of his ancestors? I should not, for those of mine. Would you, Sir, for the faults of yours? And, if we, whose ancestors had the good fortune to live in "a snug privacy," as Bobadil calls it; if we should think it hard to be called to account for their faults, what, if this retrospective censorship were established, would be the lot of those, the deeds of whose progeni tors, for centuries past, have been carefully recorded? What, for instance, if, upon reading the petition of Mr. Stuart, boasting of his joint labours with Lord Melville in the cause of loyalty; what, if upon reading tnis petition, and seeing the writer state, that it was presented by Sir Henry Mildmay, some one were to exclaim, what! Sir Henry Mildmay the friend of loyalty! Sir Henry Mildmay, the descendant of a family having in it the most infamous of all the English regicides! He a friend to loyalty, who bears the names, of the man, of whom Clarendon says, that "he "had been loaded with so great favours and "bounties by King James and by his Majesty (King Charles I.) that he was raised by them to great estate, that no man was more obsequious to the court than he "whilst it flourished, being a great flatterer "of all persons in authority, and a spie in all

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places for them, and yet who, from the beginning of the parliament, concurred "with those most violent against the court,

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that the party of miscreants, their fellow "Commissioners, locked upon no two men "in the kingdom with such scorn and de"testation as they did upon D'Anvers and Mildmay!" If, any one, upon reading in the Oracle, that Sir Henry Mildmay presented and eulogized die petition of Mr. St-]

art, boasting of his loyalty, had, in the above manner burst forth with regard to the family of the worthy Baronet, what would have been the feelings of the public? Would they not have been the feelings of astonishment and scorn at a mode of attack so novel, so foul, and so audibly expressive of the badness of. the cause, as well as of the meanness and malignity of the assailant? And, if, in such case, these would have been their feelings, who shall express the contempt, which they now do, and which they ought to, entertain towards all those, who have resorted to simi-. lar means of assailing Mr. Fox?—Thus far, Sir, I have proceeded upon the supposition of a perfect similarity in the case of Lord Holland and that of Lord Melville; and, if, under that view of the matter, we can find no. justification for those who have now revived the case of the former for the evident and, avowed purpose of thwarting and checking his son in his laudable endeavours to bring Lord Melville to justice; if, even under that view of the matter, we are, upon every principle of honour and justice, called on to condemn the conduct of those persons, what will they merit at our hands, when it shall appear, as, from what is about to be stated, I am satisfied it will, that there is no similarity in the cases, and that, in the case of Lord Holland, the fault was not in the man, but altogether in the office, while, in the case of Lord Melville, we well know, that the fault was not in the office, but altogether in the man? But, Sir, before we enter on this statement, in which I shall be compelled to be very brief, it is not unnecessary to observe, that that part of Mr. Stuart's publication, which relates to Lord Holland and to Mr. Fox, I mean the 3d and last paragraph, was not included in the subject of Mr. Grey's complaint. Mr. Fox appears to have been willing to leave it to the contempt of the public; and, I must request you to recollect, that, according to a statement in the Oracle of the 20th, this 3d paragraph never would have been read to the Flouse had not the reading of it been moved for, as the ORACLE tells us, by Mr. Robert Ward, ab under Secretary of State. Mr. Fox, after the para-graph had been read, very pertinently asked, whether the gentlemen on the opposite side regarded this attack upon him personally, as a palliation of the foregoing attack upon the House.

Mr. Ward, one would think, could hardly have viewed it in that light; Mr. Ward, who, though in a pamphlet the mat ter of which was stole aid diluted while s manner was excessively dull, had spoken i terms the most contemptuous of Mr. Af dington's ministry, comprizing elmat di

that cabinet to which Mr. Fox is now opposed; Mr. Ward, who, in the same pamphlet, had treated with indignation the assertion of the Addington writers, that Mr. Fox was fit to be a French prefect of a Britan"nic Republic, and not the minister of a "British King;" Mr. Ward, who, in recommending an union of the great public character and talents of the country, thus expressed his regret at not seeing it likely immediately to take place: "We are game"sters of a most dangerous, a most dreadful "order: our play is for neither more nor "less than the existence of Britain, and the

66

King's crown. "should be an end of party. All the opposing "benches in the House of Commons pre"sent abilities that might yet save the na"nation. Can any one refuse to say, that "Mr. Fox's mind is of the very first class? "It is dreadful to think, that the whole of "this ability is excluded from the cabinet !” I think, Sir, it will be allowed, that the malice of the writer in the Oracle got the better of his prudence, when he represented this same Mr. Ward as anxious to feast his ears with the repetition, in open Parliament, of a paragraph evidently intended, though quite uselessly employed, to wound the feelings and to degrade the character of Mr. Fox.--Coming now to a comparison between the case of the late Lord Holland and that of Lord Melville, we must first observe, that Lord Holland was Paymaster of the Forces at a time when the regulations, and the very constitution of that office, not only permitted large balances of the public money to be kept in the hands of the Paymaster, but rendered it almost impossible that he should not hold such balances. The money, issued from the Exchequer for the service of the army, was issued directly to the Paymaster, who, therefore, was, in that respect, a great banker of government, keeping the money in his hands, compelled, indeed, to keep it in his hands, till it was called for in payment of the army services. It has been thought by some, that while it remained in hishands, he ought not to have made use of it; hat others have thought, and still think, that he had a legal right to make use of it; and, indeed, the legality of the practice seems to have been recognized by Parliament, when they, at the recommendation of the Commissioners of Accounts, granted an addition to the fixed salary of the Paymaster, in teu of all other perquisites, emoluments and profits whatever, amongst which was expressly included the emolument arising in the use theretofore made of the balances of the public money in his hands. It will be remembered, that the Paymaster's

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Office and that of the Treasurer of the Navy, were, at the time I am speaking of, and, indeed, till the year 1782, upon nearly the same footing. Upon looking back into the. reports and accounts, laid, at different times, within these last twenty years before Parlia ment, we find that the practice of using the public money, while in the hands of the Paymaster of the Army and the Treasurer of the Navy, was universal, as well as the practice of keeping, for many years, an account open with each Paymaster and Treasurer, after he had quitted his office. He or (in case of his death) his representative, was obliged to settle all the accounts he had opened; and, to those who take but a moment to reflect on the multiplicity of the accounts he was obliged to open; on the difficulty of settling with the accountants in the colonies, and with the executors or representatives of others; to such persons it will not appear surprizing, that every Paymas ter as well as Treasurer left his public accounts to be settled by the succeeding generation. To hear the venomous writer in the ORACLE, Sir, one would imagine, that the accounts of no other Paymaster then Lord Hollaud ever were in a situation similar to his; but, if we look into the financial statements laid beore Parliament, we find, that the executors of Mr. Rigby are still paying in part of his balance as Ex-Paymaster of the Forces; that the Executor of Lady Greenwich, Executrix of the Rt. Hon. Charles Townsend, is paying in part of that gentleman's balance as Ex-Paymaster of the Forces; and, in the returns of no older a date than 1798, we find the representatives of the Rt. Hon. George Grenville (the father, I believe, of the Marquis of Buckingham, &c., &c.) paying in money on his account as ExTreasurer of the Navy. The fault was, as I said before, in the office, and not in the man. The office was constituted at a time when the expenditure was a mere trifle, compared to what it had grown to during the official period of Lord Holland. Bank paper, and all the operations connected therewith had increased tenfold before he quitted the office; and, the many discussions and inquiries relative to the subject only tended to demonstrate, that, to have avoided the embarrassments and defalcations, in which he was inveved, would have required powers of prevention more than have ever yet fallen to the let of any human being. At last, the evil could be endured no longer; it was found upon repeated trials, that no degree of vigiLince and punctuality in the officer could prevent its continuation as long as the vices of the office continued. These vices were, therefore, renoved: the constitution of the

the person assessed the opportunity of obtaining redress, and making the assessors accountable for their conduct, a vast deal of existing oppression would be put an end to. It is necessary, before, I quit the subject of the receipt of the revenue, to notice the propriety of each department being superintend

offices of the Paymaster of the Forces and of the Treasurer of the Navy was abrogated: another was formed for each: that for the Army Pay-Office was formed in 1782 by Mr. Burke, then Paymaster, and that of the Navy Pay-Office in 1785, by Mr. Dundas, then Treasurer of the Navy. In the former, the new constitution was rendered effi-ed by commissioners. This principle appears, cient by the integrity of the officer; in the latter, it was rendered completely inefficient by that gross violation of the law and high breach of duty, of which Mr. Dundas was guilty for sixteen years, and for which he has now been censured and disgraced.- -Office, the Hawkers' and Pedlars' Office,

What similarity, therefore, Sir; what similarity in any one point, is there in the case of Lord Holland and that of Lord Melville? And, what, then, are we to think, where are we to look for words adequate to express our contempt, of the conduct of those, who have now been, not only propagating the notion of such a similarity, but urging it as a ground whereon to charge the son of the former with injustice, because he has demanded, in the name of his injured constituents, punishment upon the head of the latter?

The length, to which this letter has unexpectedly extended, prevents me from entering, at present, on the other proposed points, which, therefore, must be postponed till my next.- In the mean time, I am, Sir, yours, &c. &c. WM. COBBETT. May 7th, 1805.

REFORM OF FINANCIAL ABUSES..
LETTER III.

SIR,I have pointed out, in my twe former letters, the necessity and the practicability of keeping and stating the public accounts in the same manner that is adopted by all persons in trade. I have briefly set forth, that the whole business of receiving the national income should be comprised in the assessment, collection, receipt and payment of it into the Exchequer. The reasons upon which the preparatory measure of assessment in every instance appears requisite, I mentioned in my last letter; but, since writing it, a further reason has occurred, viz. the opportunity it affords the subject of appeal, in case of unjust conduct on the part of the assessor. The tyranny of taxation is certainly the greatest evil that attends it. It is no great sacrifice for a person, who can contemplate the blessings of the British constitution, to contribute even very largely to its defence; but, to be exposed to the vexatious domineering of a tax-gatherer, where he oversteps the bounds of his duty, is to become subject to the worst evils of a state of slavery. making the first step of collecting taxes, the assessment of what is to be paid, and giving

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upon looking into the practice of the reve
nue, to have been in some instances carried
too far, and in one to have been entirely ne--
glected. Commissioners have been appoint-
ed for each distinct department of the Salt

and the Hackney Coach Office, when one
would have been sufficient; and while the
whole revenue of the Post Office has been
committed to the charge of two Postmasters
General. In both cases the recommendation
of the Committee of Finance have been ne-
glected. They recommend the Salt Duties
to be placed under the management of the
Excise Office, (9th Rep. p. 5) and the busi-
ness of the Hawkers and Pedlars Office, and
the granting of Licences for Hackney Coach-
es to be transacted by the Stamp Office. (10
Rep. p. 4, and 11 Rep. p. 4.) They also say,
in regard to the Post Office. "It may be
worthy of consideration, whether a Board of
Commissioners upon the plan on which other
revenue departments are conducted, would
not secure the most effectual attention to the
rapid and complicated business of this office."
(7. Rep. p. 31.) These are circumstances at
this period, particularly deserving of the at-
tention of Parliament, as it must be presumed,
that the Committee did not adopt these sen-
timents, without having found in the course
of their investigations, very sufficient reasons
for forming them. But the circumstance of
all others the most to be attended to, and that
which I wish most particularly to impress
upon your readers, is the total abandonment
of the present practice of reducing every offi-
cer employed in the receipt of the revenue, at
the same time a paymaster of it. If respon
şibility attaches to the duty of receiving, it
attaches in a tenfold proportion to the duty of
paying; and, therefore, this latter duty
should be placed in other distinct hands, and
the control be proportionably greater.
the one instance, the person who pays,
checks the conduct of the officer that re-
ceives, because he will always be a ready wit-
ness to declare the truth; in the other, the
person paid being a participator in the fraud,
whenever any is committed, will leave the
public officer at liberty to commit it, so far
as his evidence, inay be calculated upon as
likely to appear against him. But, further,
it is impossible, so long as collectors and re-
ceivers are paymasters, that they can be pre-

In

"ing money from York to London, and "from London to York, to pay the march"ing guineas of a regiment of militia from

" method of having the payment made by "the recciver general of the district? How "inconvenient, all this innovation will be; "and how impolitic in times like these to. "add new burthens on the people, by em

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vented from keeping large balances in their hands; some balances are actually necessary to enable them to pay for whatever they are liable to be called upon; and this necessity". York, instead of adhering to the present will always be pleaded as an excuse for keeping very large balances to be applied to their private emolument, whilst the public, are deprived of the benefit of their own money. Besides these reasons, it must be very obxious to every person the least acquainted with the receipt and expenditure of large sums of money, that whenever a receiver is empowered to make payments for expenses incurred by himself, expenses similar to the incidental expenses in the revenue, that he will be very profuse, and his disbursements be very great. Take even the account of a valet de chambre. If this gentleman is left to himself and experiences no difficulty in passing his accounts, even on the supposition that they are perfectly correct, and that every thing purchased is forthcoming; the money expended will amount to a much greater sum, than that which would have been sufficient to purchase all the necessaries of his master, had his master taken the trouble upon himself of transacting his own busi

ness.

The natural inclination of every one to expend money, when they have it in their possession, is continually operating to stimulate the invective powers of the holder of it to find new objects of purchase; and, besides this pleasure of buying, there is the further gratification, which operates upon petty public officers of incurring the obligations of those they employ by giving them the benefit of the employment. It therefore happens, even where public officers are perfectly honest, that the optionary power of expending the public money in the incidents belonging to their department, induces a much greater expense to the public, than is necessary to be incurred, or than would be incurred if the expenditure and payment

were under the direction of a distinct officer.
Many objections will, no doubt, be started
against this plan of enforcing the payment cf
ALL the public income into the Exchequer,
previous to the expenditure of one farthing
of it upon any object whatsoever. It, how
ever, appears to me, that every species of. ob-
jection may be reducible under two heads,
first the inconvenience; and, secondly, the
additional expense that would be incurred by
a lopting this plan. It will be said, "What,
"will you prevent the officer who collects
"the tax from deducting from the amount
"of his receipt, the salary that is due to
"him for his trouble; or, of the expenses
"which are unavoidable in executing the
"duties of his office? Will you adopt the
* circuitous and expensive method of sends ¦

ploying new officers for the duties of pay"ing the public money!" To the objection to the plan as being inconvenient, a sufficient answer may be given in a few words; namely, that individual convenience must always give way to the convenience and good of the public; and, whether it should in this instance give way, will be determinable by the. result of the consideration of the plan, as one calculated to promote the public good. This consideration involves the objection of addi-, tional expense; and, therefore, the inferences that may be drawn from it will fully decide the merits of both objections.--In the first, to proceed regularly with the discussion of these objections, it is proper to state those which exist against the method now in use. These are an immense optionary expenditure of the public money, by. the public officers in the collection and receiving of it, not subject to an efficient control; the necessity of large balances being permitted to remain in their hands, and great confusion, and consequently, the opportunity of committing great fraud, in the revenue accounts. If then, these evils could be prevented by enforcing the payment of all the public income into the Exchequer, would or would not the public be a gainer by the transaction, even if the new system of making payments was attended with some additior al expense? The answer is perfectly obvious. This expense would be attended with a profit to the public beyond calculation, For, who can estimate what the public now loses by the uncontroled profusion of its ofliçers; the immense sum of balances; and the extent of fraud which may he presumed to exist in every department? Without, therefore, any reference to particular facts, or any laboured argument, it may with safety be inferred, that the public good would be vastly advanced by the adoption of the division of the duties of receiving and paying the publicmoney; and that the objections of incenvenience and additional expense are by no means tenable.-Before I conclude, I beg to cffer a few additional observations upon the receipt of the revenue. As this portion of the public business has engaged the particu lar attention of the Committee of finance, it has arrived at a degree of perfection not to be found in any other branch. The institution

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