U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit after the Senate repealed the limit on outside earned income which formed the basis of the rule.]

League of Women Voters of California v. Federal Communications Commission, 547 F. Supp. 379 (C.D. Cal. 1982)

That portion of 47 U.S.C. § 399 which provides that no non-commercial educational broadcasting station which receives government funding may engage in editorializing is unconstitutional as violative of the First Amendment. [This case is pending in the U.S. Supreme Court.]

League of Women Voters of California v. Federal Communications Commission, 489 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1980)

(1) A challenge to a statute which forbids noncommercial broadcast licensees to editorialize, or endorse, or oppose candidates for public office is not ripe for adjudication if there is a distinct likelihood that the Federal Communications Commission will not seek to penalize a broadcaster for violating its terms. (2) When no attempt is made by the defendant Executive branch agency, in this case the FCC, to defend the challenged statute, no genuine adversariness of interests exists and therefore there is no case or controversy under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. [These holdings were vacated after the new administration directed the FCC to defend the challenged statute.]

Lewis v. Sawyer, 698 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1983)

(1) The Public Printer does not have authority to furlough employees of the Government Printing Office in the face of a resolution adopted by the Joint Committee on Printing barring such personnel actions. (2) In the absence of a Joint Committee resolution prohibiting furloughs, the Public Printer would have the power to order such personnel actions.

McSurely v. McClellan (formerly McAdams), 697 F.2d 309 (D.C. Cir. 1982)

Absolute immunity for a Government prosecutor is limited to his quasi-judicial actions (i.e., where he is acting as an advocate), and a prosecutor engaged in essentially investigative or administrative functions is entitled to only the lesser protection of qualified immunity.

McSurely v. McAdams (formerly McClellan), 535 F.2d 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 438 U.S. 189 (1978)

(1) A Member of Congress and his aides are not immune under the Speech or Debate Clause of the U.S. Constitution from liability in a private suit for damages in which the plaintiff alleges that private papers and documents illegally taken from the plaintiff's home by state officials and transported to Washington by a Senate investigator were disseminated outside of Congress. (2) Even though material comes to a Congressional committee by means that are unlawful or otherwise subject to judicial inquiry, the subsequent use of that material by the committee in the course of official business is privileged legislative activity.

Moore v. United States House of Representatives and Paul v. United States, 553 F. Supp. 267 (D.D.C. 1982)

(1) Members of Congress lack standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibiltiy Act of 1982, on the ground that its enactment violated the Origination Clause of the U.S. Constitution when Congress specifically considered and-despite the plaintiff Members' votes in opposition-rejected the suggestion of any constitutional infirmities in the act. (2) Even if the individual Representatives' claim of injury to their rights as Members of Congress to originate bills for raising revenue could be deemed constitutionally sufficient to confer standing, the doctrine of equitable discretion would mandate dismissal of the case, and the plaintiffs would be relegated to their legislative remedies no matter how remote their chances for success in the future. [This case is on appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.]

Municipal Electric Utilities Association of New York State v. Reagan (D.D.C.)

Issue raised.-Does ex parte correspondence from Members of Congress to the President and the chairman of an Executive branch agency concerning the merits of an administrative action pending before that agency constitute unlawful political interference in an adjudicatory proceeding? [This case is pending in U.S. District Court.]

Murray v. Buchanan (formerly Morton), 505 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1981)

Taxpayer plaintiffs who allege no other interest, apart from their views with respect to religion, to distinguish themselves from any other taxpayers have no standing to challenge the authorization and payment of salaries and expenses for the Chaplains of the House and Senate, particularly in view of the constitutional authority of Congress to choose its officers and make its internal rules. [Although this district court holding was reversed by a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the panel's decision was subsequently vacated by the en banc court. The case remains pending in the appeals court.]

Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 534 F. Supp. 1139 (D.C.C. 1982)

It is improper for a Member of Congress to convey to agency officials of the Executive branch his views as to how a particular case, then pending before the agency and involving the adjudication of the rights of a private party, should be resolved. [This case is on appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.]

Smith v. McDonald (M.D.N.C)

Issues raised.-(1) Does the Petition Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Cosntitution absolutely bar liability for allegedly defamatory communications sent by private parties to Federal officials (including Members of Congress) concerning prospective nomi

U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit after the Senate repealed the limit on outside earned income which formed the basis of the rule.]

League of Women Voters of California v. Federal Communications Commission, 547 F. Supp. 379 (C.D. Cal. 1982)

That portion of 47 U.S.C. § 399 which provides that no non-commercial educational broadcasting station which receives government funding may engage in editorializing is unconstitutional as violative of the First Amendment. [This case is pending in the U.S. Supreme Court.]

League of Women Voters of California v. Federal Communications Commission, 489 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1980)

(1) A challenge to a statute which forbids noncommercial broadcast licensees to editorialize, or endorse, or oppose candidates for public office is not ripe for adjudication if there is a distinct likelihood that the Federal Communications Commission will not seek to penalize a broadcaster for violating its terms. (2) When no attempt is made by the defendant Executive branch agency, in this case the FCC, to defend the challenged statute, no genuine adversariness of interests exists and therefore there is no case or controversy under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. [These holdings were vacated after the new administration directed the FCC to defend the challenged statute.]

Lewis v. Sawyer, 698 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1983)

(1) The Public Printer does not have authority to furlough employees of the Government Printing Office in the face of a resolution adopted by the Joint Committee on Printing barring such personnel actions. (2) In the absence of a Joint Committee resolution prohibiting furloughs, the Public Printer would have the power to order such personnel actions.

McSurely v. McClellan (formerly McAdams), 697 F.2d 309 (D.C. Cir. 1982)

Absolute immunity for a Government prosecutor is limited to his quasi-judicial actions (i.e., where he is acting as an advocate), and a prosecutor engaged in essentially investigative or administrative functions is entitled to only the lesser protection of qualified immunity.

McSurely v. McAdams (formerly McClellan), 535 F.2d 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 438 U.S. 189 (1978)

(1) A Member of Congress and his aides are not immune under the Speech or Debate Clause of the U.S. Constitution from liability in a private suit for damages in which the plaintiff alleges that private papers and documents illegally taken from the plaintiff's home by state officials and transported to Washington by a Senate investigator were disseminated outside of Congress. (2) Even though material comes to a Congressional committee by means that are unlawful or otherwise subject to judicial inquiry, the subsequent use of that material by the committee in the course of official business is privileged legislative activity.

Moore v. United States House of Representatives and Paul v. United States, 553 F. Supp. 267 (D.D.C. 1982)

(1) Members of Congress lack standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibiltiy Act of 1982, on the ground that its enactment violated the Origination Clause of the U.S. Constitution when Congress specifically considered and-despite the plaintiff Members' votes in opposition-rejected the suggestion of any constitutional infirmities in the act. (2) Even if the individual Representatives' claim of injury to their rights as Members of Congress to originate bills for raising revenue could be deemed constitutionally sufficient to confer standing, the doctrine of equitable discretion would mandate dismissal of the case, and the plaintiffs would be relegated to their legislative remedies no matter how remote their chances for success in the future. [This case is on appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.]

Municipal Electric Utilities Association of New York State v. Reagan (D.D.C.)

Issue raised.-Does ex parte correspondence from Members of Congress to the President and the chairman of an Executive branch agency concerning the merits of an administrative action pending before that agency constitute unlawful political interference in an adjudicatory proceeding? [This case is pending in U.S. District Court.]

Murray v. Buchanan (formerly Morton), 505 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1981)

Taxpayer plaintiffs who allege no other interest, apart from their views with respect to religion, to distinguish themselves from any other taxpayers have no standing to challenge the authorization and payment of salaries and expenses for the Chaplains of the House and Senate, particularly in view of the constitutional authority of Congress to choose its officers and make its internal rules. [Although this district court holding was reversed by a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the panel's decision was subsequently vacated by the en banc court. The case remains pending in the appeals court.]

Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 534 F. Supp. 1139 (D.C.C. 1982)

It is improper for a Member of Congress to convey to agency officials of the Executive branch his views as to how a particular case, then pending before the agency and involving the adjudication of the rights of a private party, should be resolved. [This case is on appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.]

Smith v. McDonald (M.D.N.C)

Issues raised.-(1) Does the Petition Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Cosntitution absolutely bar liability for allegedly defamatory communications sent by private parties to Federal officials (including Members of Congress) concerning prospective nomi

nees for Federal office, even if the communications are sent out of ill-will or spite and even when the statements at issue are knowingly false or made in reckless disregard of their truth or falsity? (2) Does the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution bar liability for allegedly defamatory communications sent to relevant Federal officials regarding the qualifications of candidates for of fices requiring nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate, since without such protection the President and Senate might not obtain complete information on prospective nominees and therefore could not adequately fulfill their constitutional responsibilities on appointment? (3) Does the common law legislative privilege and/or Speech or Debate Clause of the U.S. Constitution bar liability for allegedly defamatory communications made preliminary to legislative proceedings? [This case is pending in U.S. District Court.]

Tavoulareas v. Washington Post, 93 F.R.D. 11 (D.D.C. 1981) and 527 F. Supp. 767 (D.D.C. 1981)

(1) The Speech or Debate Clause of the U.S. Constitution confers on legislators immunity from judicial process requiring them to answer questions relating to the performance of their legislative duties, and the privilege applies to Congressional staff as well as to Members of Congress. (2) The Clause does not bar testimony relating to the dissemination of information outside Congress since such dissemination is beyond the legitimate legislative sphere. (3) The Clause does bar inquiry into the motives of Congressional staff members in conducting an investigation, although inquiry into the apparent motivation of reporters in bringing the matter to the staff's attention would not be similarly precluded. (4) The Clause prohibits inquiry about investigative information gathering efforts by Congressional staff, whether the investigation is characterized as "formal" or "informal". (5) The Clause prohibits the use of judicial process to inquire of a third party noncongressional witness about the legislative acts of a legislator or his aides. (6) Insofar as newspaper reporters or other individuals are voluntary, unsolicited sources of information for Congressional staff members regarding matters in dispute in a libel action, the Clause does not bar questioning of the staff members concerning the nature and content of those voluntary communications or the purpose or intent behind them. (7) While the active acquisition of information by Congressional staff is protected by the Clause, the privilege extends only to the point at which the staff ceases to be an active catalyst that induces the provision of particular information to Congress and becomes, instead, the passive recipient of information provided by an outside source at the source's own election. (8) The Clause prohibits questioning concerning information provided to staff members in response to a Congressional telephone call or letter, an interview prearranged by a staff member, a Congressional promise of confidentiality, or a Congressional subpoena. (9) Although the Clause does not bar testimony regarding the dissemination of information outside of Congress, or about the arrangements made to disseminate information, it does prohibit questioning about the interchange of documents or information among various Congressional committees or staffs. (10) Although the Clause does not bar ques