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tioning to identify any documents disseminated outside Congress, it does prohibit inquiry regarding the preparation of any Congressional documents, including questions about the basis for conclusions reached in the documents, the evidence relied upon or otherwise used to prepare the documents, or the sources who provided evidence relied upon or otherwise used in the documents. (11) The Clause bars testimony about the structure of various Congressional committee staffs and the subject matter of any committee or staff investigations. United States v. Accardo (Not Reported) (S.D. Fla. 1982)

A subpoena seeking the testimony of a U.S. Senate employee regarding knowledge he gained while conducting an investigation of a judicial nominee for the Senate Judiciary Committee will be quashed even though the testimony is sought by a defendant for use in a criminal trial. United States v. Eilberg, 536 F. Supp. 514 (E.D. Pa. 1982)

A Member of Congress may not refuse to be deposed on Speech or Debate Clause grounds if the subject matter of the intended deposition ostensibly involves information not protected by the Clause. However, at the deposition the Member may challenge any individual question which he believes contravenes the Clause. United States v. Eilberg, 507 F. Supp. 267 (E.D. Pa. 1980)

(1) Even though no statutory cause of action exists, the Government has an implied Federal common law civil remedy for a Federal official's alleged fraud involving receipt of fees in violation of a criminal statute. (2) The Executive and Judicial branches can determine whether a Member's phone calls have been properly charged to the House of Representatives, since calls which are not strictly official are incidental to the exercise of central legislative functions and therefore are not legislative acts protected by the Speech or Debate Clause of the U.S. Constitution. (This case is pending in U.S. District Court.] United States v. The House of Representatives of the United States,

556 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1983) Under the Congressional contempt statute (2 U.S.C. $$ 192, 194), constitutional claims and other objections to Congressional investigatory procedures may be raised as defenses in a criminal prosecution, and it would be an improper exercise of a court's descretion under the Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. $ 2201) to determine such claims by an Executive branch official in a separate civil proceeding. [This case is pending in U.S. District Court, the time for filing an appeal not having expired.) United States v. Jenrette (criminal) (D.D.C.)

Issues raised.—(1) May Government undercover agents approach a Member of Congress for the purpose of enticing him into criminal activity despite the fact that the Government had no reason to believe that the Member was engaged in criminal activity in the past? (2) Under what circumstances may it be said that Government agents, in planning and implementing an undercover investi

gation designed to gather evidence of criminal activity, became so involved in the criminal activity they were investigating that any prosecution based on evidence gathered during the investigation would be barred as a matter of law. [This case is pending in U.S. District Court.] United States v. Jenrette (civil) (D.D.C.)

Issue raised.- Does the public policy that prohibits the enforce ment of unlawful contracts necessitate the dismissal of a complaint that alleges that the defendant Congressman entered into an agreement with Government undercover agents to accept a bribe? (This case is pending in U.S. District Court.] United States v. Kelly, 539 F. Supp. 363 (D.D.C. 1982)

An indictment against a Member of Congress, which charges the Member with bribery under 18 U.S.C. $ 201, will be dismissed as violative of due process if during the investigation which led to the indictment undercover officers disregarded the Member's initial refusal to accept the bribe and continued to entice him into accepting it. [This case is on appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.] United States v. Kelly [Not Reported] (D.D.C. 1980)

(1) An indictment against a Member of Congress will not be dismissed as violative of the Speech or Debate Clause of the U.S. Constitution if the indicted Member fails to show either: (a) that documents and materials protected by the Clause were reviewed by the grand jury and were a substantial factor underlying its decision to indict; or (b) that the grand jury lacked sufficient competent evidence to establish probable cause to indict. (2) That portion of the bribery statute (18 U.S.C. $ 201(c), which prohibits a public official from soliciting anything of value in return for his promise to perform an “official act” does not require the Government to prove that the official act was capable of being performed. (3) The Punishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which provides that each house of Congress may punish its Members for disorderly behavior, does not deprive the judiciary of jurisdiction to try a Member of Congress on charges that he used his official position for illegal purposes. United States v. Lederer (criminal), 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982)

(1) Members of Congress enjoy no special constitutional rule that requires prior suspicion of criminal activity before they may be confronted with a governmentally created opportunity to commit a crime. (2) The Due Process Clause does not prohibit the Government from employing deceitful or dishonest informants. (3) Courts cannot use their supervisory power over the administration of criminal justice to fashion limitations on the conduct of law enforcement officers if such limitations are not required by the Constitution. (4) Since information concerning a Member's income from sources other than the United States is unrelated to the deliberative or communicative processes of Congress, the Speech or Debate Clause does not prevent the Government from introducing into evidence a Financial Disclosure Statement filed by a Member with the

Clerk of the House. [The U.S. Supreme Court has been asked to review this case.) United States v. Lederer (criminal), 527 F. Supp. 1206 (E.D.N.Y.

1981), affirmed, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982) (1) Whenever the issue of entrapment is raised by a defendant, the ultimate issue is whether the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime; the question of guilt or innocense does not depend on whether a Government agent provided the impetus for the crime. (2) The Constitution does not require that the Government have reasonable suspicion that a Member of Congress will accept a bribe before offering that Member a bribe. (3) A Member of Congress cannot defend his acceptance of a bribe on the ground that the amount of bribe money offered was so exorbitant that it constituted unfair temptation. (4) The use of “sting” operations to uncover corruption in public office is not improper. (5) The fact that Government agents may have violated statutes, rules, or guidelines during the course of an investigation does not require dismissal of an indictment unless the defendant shows that the violation was of a constitutional nature and that it resulted in some adverse effect or prejudice to him. (6) Payments to informants, which are contingent upon the successful prosecution of those with whom they deal, are not improper and do not require dismissal of an indictment. (7) The amount of money paid to a Government informant is not a proper subject of judicial review. (8) The conduct of Government agents during the course of an undercover investigation will not be considered so outrageous as to bar prosecution under the Due Process Clause if the individual under investigation was given the opportunity to say “No” to the agents' criminal proposal, or the extent of Government involvement was equal to or less than that in Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976). [The U.S. Supreme Court has been asked to review this case.) United States v. Lederer (criminal) [Not Reported) (E.D.N.Y. 1980)

(1) The fact that Government officials, in disclosing information regarding an ongoing criminal investigation to the press, may have acted improperly or even illegally does not necessarily constitute grounds for dismissal of an indictment resulting from the investigation. (2) The dismissal of an indictment on the ground of prejudicial pre-indictment publicity will not be granted unless the defendant shows that he suffered actual prejudice as a result of the publicity. United States v. Lederer (civil) (D.D.C.)

Issue raised.--Does the public policy that prohibits the enforcement of unlawful contracts necessitate the dismissal of a complaint that alleges that the defendant Congressman entered into an agreement with Government undercover agents to accept a bribe? (This case is pending in U.S. District Court.] United States v. Murphy and United States v. Thompson (criminal)

692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982) (1) Members of Congress enjoy no special constitutional rule that requires prior suspicion of criminal activity before they may be confronted with a governmentally created opportunity to commit a crime. (2) The Due Process Clause does not prohibit the Government from employing deceitful or dishonest informants. (3) Courts cannot use their supervisory power over the administration of criminal justice to fashion limitations on the conduct of law enforcement officers if such limitations are not required by the Constitution. (4) That portion of the bribery statute (18 U.S.C. § 201(c)) which prohibits a public official from soliciting anything of value in return for his promise to perform an "official act” does not require the Government to prove that the official act was capable of being performed. (5) The Speech or Debate Clause does not prohibit the introduction of evidence concerning a Member's conversation with another Member on the House floor so long as the conversation does not involve legislative or Congressional matters. [The U.S. Supreme Court has been asked to review this case.) United States v. Murphy and United States v. Thompson (criminal),

527 F. Supp. 1206 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) affirmed, 692 F.2d 823 (2d

Cir. 1982) (1) Whenever the issue of entrapment is raised by a defendant, the ultimate issue is whether the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime; the question of guilt or innocence does not depend on whether a Government agent provided the impetus from the crime. (2) The Constitution does not require that the Government have reasonable suspicion that a Member of Congress will accept a bribe before offering that Member a bribe. (3) A Member of Congress cannot defend his acceptance of a bribe on the ground that the amount of the bribe money offered was so exorbitant that it constituted unfair temptation. (4) The use of "sting” operations to uncover corruption in public office is not improper. (5) The fact that Government agents may have violated statutes, rules, or guidelines during the course of an investigation does not require dismissal of an indictment unless the defendant shows that the violation was of a constitutional nature and that it resulted in some adverse effect or prejudice to him. (6) Payments to informants, which are contingent upon the successful prosecution of those with whom they deal, are not improper and do not require dismissal of an indictment. (7) The amount of money paid to a Government informant is not a proper subject of judicial review. (8) The conduct of Government agents during the course of an undercover investigation will not be considered so outrageous as to bar prosecution under the Due Process Clause if the individual under investigation was given the opportunity to say “No” to the agents' criminal proposal, or the extent of Government involvement was equal to or less than that in Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976). [The U.S. Supreme Court has been asked to review this case.) United States v. Murphy and United States v. Thompson (criminal)

[Not reported) (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (1) The fact that government officials, in disclosing information regarding an ongoing criminal investigation to the press, may have acted improperly or even illegally does not necessarily constitute a ground for dismissal of an indictment resulting from the investigation. (2) The dismissal of an indictment on the ground of prejudicial pre-indictment publicity will not be granted unless the defendant shows that he suffered actual prejudice as a result of the publicity. United States v. Murphy and United States v. Thompson (criminal),

642 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1980) A Member of Congress who challenges an indictment against him on the ground that the grand jury which returned the indictment improperly considered evidence protected by the Speech or Debate Clause will not succeed if he fails to show that the grand jury did not hear significant and sufficient evidence not protected by the Clause. United States v. Myers (criminal), 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982)

(1) A Member of Congress cannot defend his acceptance of a bribe by arguing that he never intended to fulfill the promise in return for which the bribe was made. (2) Members of Congress enjoy no special constitutional rule that requires prior suspicion of criminal activity before they may be confronted with a governmentally created opportunity to commit a crime. (3) The Due Process Clause does not prohibit the Government from employing deceitful or dishonest informants. (4) Courts cannot use their supervisory power over the administration of criminal justice to fashion limitations on the conduct of law enforcement officers if such limitations are not required by the Constitution. [The U.S. Supreme Court has been asked to review this case.] United States v. Myers (criminal), 527 F. Supp. 1206 (E.D.N.Y.

1981), affirmed, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982) (1) Whenever the issue of entrapment is raised by a defendant, the ultimate issue is whether the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime; the question of guilt or innocence does not depend on whether a Government agent provided the impetus for the crime. (2) The Constitution does not require that the Government have reasonable suspicion that a Member of Congress will accept a bribe before offering that Member a bribe. (3) A Member of Congress cannot defend his acceptance of a bribe on the ground that the amount of bribe money offered was so exorbitant that it constituted an unfair temptation. (4) The use of "sting” operations to uncover corruption in public office is not improper. (5) The fact that Government agents may have violated statutes, rules, or guidelines during the course of an investigation does not require dismissal of an indictment unless the defendant shows that the violation was of a constitutional nature and that it resulted in some adverse effect or prejudice to him. (6) Payments to informants, which are contingent upon the successful prosecution of those with whom they deal, are not improper and do not require dismissal of an indictment. (7) The amount of money paid to a Government informant is not a proper subject of judicial review. (8) The conduct of Government agents during the course of an undercover investigation will not be considered so outrageous as to bar prosecution under the Due Process Clause if the individual under investigation was given the opportunity to say “No” to the agents' criminal proposal, or the extent of Government involvement was equal to or

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