less than that in Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976). [The U.S. Supreme Court has been asked to review this case.] United States v. Myers (criminal) [Not Reported] (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (1) The fact that Government officials, in disclosing information regarding an ongoing criminal investigation to the press, may have acted improperly or even illegally does not necessarily constitute a ground for dismissal of an indictment resulting from the investigation. (2) The dismissal of an indictment on the ground of prejudicial pre-indictment publicity will not be granted unless the defendant shows that he suffered actual predjudice as a result of the publicity.

United States v. Myers (criminal), 635 F.2d 932 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980)

(1) The fact that a grand jury improperly considered evidence protected by the Speech or Debate Clause of the U.S. Constitution is not, of itself, sufficient to warrant dismissal of an indictment. However, it is an open question whether dismissal would be warranted in a case where such privileged evidence constituted such a large proportion of the evidence before the grand jury as to raise a substantial question of whether the grand jury had sufficient competent evidence to establish probable cause. (2) A Member of Congress whose pretrial motion to dismiss an indictment against him on separation of powers grounds was denied by a trial court has a right to appeal the trial court's ruling before his trial begins. (3) That portion of the bribery statute (18 U.S.C. § 201(c)) which prohibits a public official from soliciting anything of value in return for his promise to perform an "official act" does not require the Government to prove that the official act was capable of being performed. (4) The enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c), creating the offense of bribery, including bribery of a Member of Congress, violates neither the Speech or Debate Clause nor the separation of powers doctrine. (5) The Punishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which provides that each House of Congress may punish its Members for disorderly behavior, does not deprive the judiciary of jurisdiction to try a Member of Congress on charges that he used his official position for illegal purposes. (6) Although the Speech or Debate Clause prevents the Government from questioning a Member about his legislative acts, it does not prevent a Member from offering evidence of such acts in his own defense at trial, although he thereby subjects himself to cross-examination regarding those legislative acts. (7) Congress has the power to redefine the offense of bribery so as to make non-criminal, in the case of Members of Congress, the acceptance of bribes offered by undercover agents of the Government.

United States v. Myers (civil)

Issue raised.-Does the public policy that prohibits the enforcement of unlawful contracts necessitate the dismissal of a complaint that alleges that the defendant Congressman entered into an agreement with Government undercover officials to accept a bribe? [This case is pending in U.S. District Court.

United States v. Richmond, 550 F. Supp. 605 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)

That portion of a voluntarily negotiated guilty plea agreement which provides that a defendant Member of Congress will resign from the House of Representatives and withdraw as a candidate for re-election represents an unconstitutional interference by the Executive branch with the Legislative branch of Government and with the fundamental right of the defendant's constituents to elect their representative, and also violates the separation of powers doctrine.

United States v. Roth [Not Reported] (Sup. Ct. D.C. 1981)

(1) An information charging individuals with disrupting a subcommittee hearing will not be dismissed on grounds of selective prosecution, regardless of the political views or motives of the subcommittee chairman holding the hearing, without a prima facie showing that others similarly situated have not been prosecuted for similar conduct. (2) For purposes of the relevant statute governing disruption of Congressional proceedings (D.C. Code 1973, §9123(b)(4)) it is irrelevant whether the disruption is of proceedings on the floor or at a committee or subcommittee hearing. [This case is pending in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.]

United States v. Thompson and United States v. Murphy (civil) (D.D.C.)

Issues raised.-As a follow-up to the criminal prosecutions and convictions of Reps. Frank Thompson, Jr. of New Jersey and John M. Murphy of New York, the Government filed a seven count civil complaint against them. Because the only pleading filed as of March 1, 1983 has been the complaint, the issues in this case have yet to be determined. [This case is pending in U.S. District Court.] United States v. Williams, 644 F.2d 950 (2d Cir. 1981)

A Member of Congress who challenges an indictment against him on the ground that the grand jury which returned the indictment improperly considered evidence protected by the Speech or Debate Clause will not succeed if he fails to show that the protected evidence constituted a substantial portion of the evidence considered by the grand jury.

United States v. Williams [Not Reported] (E.D.N.Y. 1980)

(1) A Member of Congress who challenges an indictment against him on the ground that the grand jury which returned the indictment improperly considered evidence protected by the Speech or Debate Clause will not succeed if he fails to show that the protected evidence constituted a substantial portion of the evidence considered by the grand jury. (2) The fact that Government officials, in disclosing information regarding an ongoing criminal investigation to the press, may have acted improperly or even illegally does not necessarily constitute a ground for dismissal of an indictment resulting from the investigation. (3) The dismissal of an indictment on the ground of prejudical pre-indictment publicity will not be granted unless the defendant shows that he suffered actual preju

dice as a result of the publicity. [This case is pending in U.S. District Court.]

Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1983)

(1) Republican Members of the House of Representatives have standing to bring an action against the House Democratic leadership alleging that the assignment of Republican Members to House committees in a ratio which does not exactly reflect the ratio of Republican to Democratic Members in the entire House violates Article I and the First and Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. (2) A court is not deprived of jurisdiction over such an action under the Article I provision conferring on the House the power to make its own rules since the judiciary has a responsibility to say what rules Congress may not adopt because of constitutional infirmity. (3) Such an action will nonetheless be dismissed under a court's remedial discretion to withhold relief where prudential and separation of powers concerns are sufficient to warrant not adjudicating the controversy. (4) The Speech or Debate Clause of the U.S. Constitution does not necessarily protect legislative activities like those at issue in such an action. [The case is pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.]

Walker v. Jones, 557 F. Supp. 366 (D.D.C. 1983)

A suit against the Chairman, Members and staff of the Subcommittee on Services of the Committee on House Administration alleging sex discrimination and wrongful discharge of the General Manager of the House Restaurant System is barred by the Speech or Debate Clause of the U.S. Constitution because actions relating to the internal administration of Congress are within the legitimate legislative sphere protected by the Clause. [This case is pending in U.S. District Court, the time for filing an appeal not having expired.]

Webster v. Sun Company, Inc. (D.D.C.)

Issues raised.-(1) Is the communication of allegedly defamatory documents by a private party to an employee of the Congressional Research Service absolutely privileged under the common law and/ or the First Amendment right to petition the government and the Speech or Debate Clause of the U.S. Constitution? (2) Does such a privilege apply to "informal" communications not made during, or preliminary to, a formal legislative proceeding such as a hearing? [This case is pending in U.S. District Court.]

CASES