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hearing en banc be circulated to the active judges of the court. On March 25, 1981, the Ninth Circuit denied the petition for rehearing and rejected the suggestion for a rehearing en banc.

On April 8, 1981, on an unopposed motion of the House and Senate, the court stayed its mandate pending the filing of petitions for certiorari on or before June 23, 1981.

On June 22, 1981, the House and Senate each filed petitions for a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court. Nos. 80-2170 and 80-1832, respectively) In addition, the House and Senate each filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 16.1 of the U.S. Supreme Court Rules.

In their motions to dismiss, the House and Senate both argued that 28 U.S.C. $ 1252 did not permit a prevailing and non-aggrieved party, such as INS, to invoke the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. In support of this argument, the House and Senate asserted that the words "any party" in section 1252 should not be read literally, for to do so would contradict the long-established rule of Federal appellate practice that a party who received all that was sought is not aggrieved by the judgment and cannot appeal from it.

With respect to the petitions for certiorari, the issues raised by the House and Senate were not identical. In the House's view, the issues before the Court were as follows:

1. Whether, in a proceeding under Section 106(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act to review a final order of deportation, a court of appeals has jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of Section 244(c)(2) of the Act, which establishes Congressional procedures for determining whether a particular deportation proceeding should be cancelled and the alien given permanent resident status.

2. Whether a concededly deportable alien has standing, in a Section 106(a) review proceeding, to challenge the constitutionality of Section 244(c)(2), pursuant to which the House of Representatives disapproved cancelling the deportation and granting the alien permanent resident status.

3. Whether such a review proceeding constitutes a constitutional case or controversy where (a) both the deportable alien and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the only two parties to the proceeding, are in total agreement that Section 244(c)2) is unconstitutional and that the deportation order should be cancelled, and (b) the deportable alien declines to seek other available relief from deportation, including the right to apply for permanent resident status following his recent marriage to an American citizen.

4. Whether the propriety of the Section 244(c)(2) procedures for Congressional adjustment of the status of deportable aliens is a "political question."

5. Whether Section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act is severable from the remainder of Section 244, where any power the Attorney General may have to cancel deportation and adjust an alien's status is condi

tioned upon favorable Congressional action pursuant to
Section 244(c)(2).

6. Whether the Congressional procedures specified in Section 244(c)(2) constitute "necessary and proper" means of executing the plenary, sovereign power of Congress over the status and deportation of aliens, and is consistent with the letter and spirit of other provisions of the Constitution, particularly the separation of powers doctrine. (Petition of U.S. House of Representatives for Writ of Certiorari, June

22, 1981, at I-II) According to the Senate, the issues before the Court were as follows:

1. Whether the court of appeals rendered an unnecessary judgment on the constitutionality of Section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1254(c)(2), by failing to remand to the Immigration and Naturalization Service to determine the availability of alternative relief following the alien respondent's marriage to a United States citizen and the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980.

2. Whether Section 244cX2) is severable from the remainder of Section 244.

3. Whether the provision of Section 244 which cancels deportation and grants permanent residence to deportable aliens only after legislative review is a necessary and proper means of implementing the power of Congress over the admission of aliens. [The Senate also incorporated the following questions presented by the House of Representatives in its petition for certiorari:]

4. Whether, in a proceeding under Section 106(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act to review a final order of deportation, a court of appeals has jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of Section 244(0)2) of the Act, which establishes congressional procedures for determining whether a particular deportation proceeding should be cancelled and the alien given permanent residence status.

5. Whether a concededly deportable alien has standing, in a Section 106(a) review proceeding, to challenge the constitutionality of Section 244(c)(2), pursuant to which the House of Representatives disapproved granting the alien permanent residence status.

6. Whether such a review proceeding constitutes a constitutional case or controversy, where both the deportable alien and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the only two parties to the proceeding, are in total agreement that Section 244(c)2) is unconstitutional and that the deportation order should be cancelled.

7. Whether the propriety of the Section 244(c)(2) procedures for congressional adjustment of the status of deportable aliens is a “political question.” [Petition of U.S. Senate for Writ of Certiorari, June 22, 1981, at I-II]

On October 5, 1981, the petitions of the House and Senate for certiorari were granted and consolidated. [454 U.S. 812] The question of jurisdiction to hear the appeal of INS was postponed.

On November 19, 1981, the House filed its brief. In it, the House alleged that: (1) section 244(c)(2) constituted a "necessary and proper" means of executing the sovereign legislative power of Congress over the status and deportation of aliens; (2) the INS, as a prevailing party below, had no standing to appeal the Ninth Circuit's ruling; (3) the Ninth Circuit had no jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of section 244(c)(2) since section 106(a) of the INA gives circuit courts the power to review only final orders of deportation made pursuant to administrative proceedings; (4) Mr. Chadha, by conceding his deportability, lacked standing to challenge the House resolution, which “simply denied Chadha's plea for mercy” [Brief of the United States House of Representatives, November 19, 1981, at 45]; (5) the action presented no case or controversy in that both Mr. Chadha and INS had agreed that section 244(c)(2) was unconstitutional; (6) the case presented a nonjustifiable political question in that the Congressional power over aliens, together with the Necessary and Proper Clause, prevented judicial review of the section 244(c)(2) procedure; and (7) because section 244(c)(2) was not severable from the remainder of section 244, any invalidation of section 244(c)(2) would invalidate all of section 244, thus abolishing the suspension of deportation statute itself and rendering it impossible for Mr. Chadha to be granted the relief he sought.

The Senate's brief, which was also filed on November 19, made four arguments. It repeated the challenges raised by the House with respect to: (1) the nonseverability of section 244(c)(2); (2) the absence of circuit court jurisdiction under INA section 106(a); and (3) the omnipotence of Congress, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, to control the status and deportation of aliens. In addition, the Senate argued that by marrying a U.S. citizen on August 10, 1980, Mr. Chadha now had the right to have his immigration status adjusted to that of a lawful permanent resident. Because that option was available, said the Senate, it would be imprudent and unnecessary for the Court to pass upon the constitutionality of section 244(c)(2).

On December 31, 1981, Mr. Chadha filed a brief in which he responded to the arguments put forth by the House and Senate. With respect to the House's argument that section 244(c)(2) constituted a necessary and proper exercise of the Congressional power to control immigration, Mr. Chadha asserted that the section 244(c)(2) proceeding was not proper because it: (1) violated the separation of powers doctrine by usurping essential Judicial and Executive branch functions; (2) deprived the President of the right to veto Congressional actions having the effect of law; (3) violated the principle of bicameralism, which requires the concurrence of both houses on decisions affecting the public; and (4) was unconstitutional under the delegation doctrine, which prevents Congress from conferring overly broad and judicially unreviewable powers on either the Executive or Legislative branches of Government. Next, Mr. Chadha argued that even though he had conceded his deportability he had never conceded the validity of the deportation order, which was issued as a direct result of the House's decision to deny him suspension of deportation. Thus, said Mr. Chadha, the court of appeals did have jurisdiction under INA section 106(a). Turning to the question of standing, Mr. Chadha asserted that it was little more than sophistry to term the 244(c)(2) resolution a denial of a plea for mercy. The disapproval resolution, said Mr. Chadha, was clearly a veto, and it resulted in direct injury to him. Regarding adverseness, Mr. Chadha stated that it was not at all unusual for the parties to a suit to be in agreement. In such cases, said Mr. Chadha, the courts have approved the notion that the necessary adverseness could be supplied by amici. In support of this contention, Mr. Chadha cited two Supreme Court cases where amici allegedly supplied the requisite adverseness: United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), and Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1 (1955). As to the political question argument, Mr. Chadha claimed that if either the Congressional power over immigration or the Necessary and Proper Clause conferred "anywhere near as wide a discretion as is suggested, no law would ever be declared unconstitutional under either of them." [Brief of Appellee-Respondent Jagdish Rai Chadha, December 31, 1981, at 24] Regarding severability, Mr. Chadha claimed that there was “not a word in the legislative history to support the assertion that if Congress knew it could not have the veto, then it would have given the Executive no power at all to cancel the deportation and adjust the status of aliens suffering extreme hardship.” [Id. at 29] In fact, said Mr. Chadha, "the contrary is far more likely to be the case.(Id.] Finally, Mr. Chadha argued that his marriage to a U.S. citizen did not moot the action in that success in the case would result in his immediately becoming eligible for citizenship, whereas marriage to a U.S. citizen would only result in the granting of lawful permanent resident status.

On January 12, 1982, INS filed its brief. Like Mr. Chadha, INS argued that: (1) section 244(c)(2) violated the principle of bicameralism and the requirement that legislative measures be presented to the President for his approval; (2) the section violated the separation of powers doctrine; (3) the Ninth Circuit had jurisdiction under section 106(a) of the INA; (4) there was no lack of adverseness; (5) section 244(c)(2) was severable from the remainder of section 244; and (6) Mr. Chadha's marriage did not bar the instant case.

On January 8, 1982, the American Bar Association ("ABA") filed a motion for leave to file an amicus curiae brief. In its brief, the ABA stated that it had a special interest in this litigation not only because its charter demanded that it uphold and defend the Constitution, but also because “the legislative veto, particularly in its increasingly frequent application to rulemaking (under) the Administrative Procedure Act, directly affects the practice of its members before federal administrative agencies.” [Motion for Leave to File and Brief of American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae, January 8, 1982, at ii.] Terming the general use of legislative vetoes "a serious threat to effective regulatory administration and fundamental constitutional principles," the ABA brief repeated many of the arguments already made by INS and Mr. Chadha as to the unconstitutionality of section 244(c)2). The ABA, however, differed with INS as to the effect of legislative vetoes. In the ABA's view, legislative veto statutes in many instances serve to increase the power of the Executive branch. This happens when the power that is subject to the veto would not, absent the veto provision, have been given to the Executive branch at all. "In such situations," continued the ABA, “Congress and the Executive sometimes have combined to erect a structure that will deprive the people of their democratic right to have their representatives vote on major, often controversial, changes from the status quo-changes which Congress has not conditionally approved, but which it later approves by inaction, in declining to veto the Executive’s ‘proposal.” [Id. at 22] On January 18, the motion for leave to file an amicus brief was granted.

Also on January 8, several Members of the House of Representatives filed a motion for leave to file an amicus curiae brief. The Members-Phillip Burton, John Conyers, Jr., Don Edwards, James J. Florio, Robert W. Kastenmeier, Richard L. Ottinger, Benjamin S. Rosenthal, Fortney H. Stark, and Henry A. Waxman-agreed with Mr. Chadha and INS that section 244(c)(2) was unconstitutional. According to the Members, the statute violated the separation of powers doctrine, the principles of bicameralism, and the Presentment Clause. On January 18, 1982, the motion for leave to file was granted.

Reply briefs were filed on February 11 and 12, 1982 by the Senate and House respectively.

The case was argued before the Supreme Court on February 22, 1982.

On July 2, 1982, the Supreme Court decided to restore the case to the calendar for reargument. (102 S. Ct. 3507]

On December 7, 1982, the case was reargued before the Supreme Court.

Status- The case is pending in the U.S. Supreme Court.

The complete text of the December 22, 1980 opinion of the circuit court is printed in the “Decisions” section of Court Proceedings and Actions of Vital Interest to the Congress, March 1, 1981. Consumer Energy Council of America v. Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission

Nos. 80-2184 and 80-2312 (D.C. Cir.)
Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of

America No. 81-2008-AFX (U.S. Supreme Court)
Nos. 81-2008, 81-2020, 81-2151, 81-2171, 82–177, 82-209 (U.S.

Supreme Court) Title II of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (“NGPA"), 15 U.S.C. $$ 3341 et seq., directs the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC”) to develop regulations providing that a certain portion of natural gas acquisition costs incurred by an interstate pipeline be allocated to an "incremental pricing account” to be passed on to specified natural gas users. The NĞPA further pro vides that certain specified types of amendments (i.e. rules) issued by FERC pursuant to the NGPA shall not take effect if either house of Congress passes a resolution disapproving the rule. Specifically, the Congressional review provision, 15 U.S.C. 3342(c/1), states:

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