The Clerk argues that anything Congress investigates, like King Midas' golden touch, becomes an integral part of Congress' deliberative and communicative process. The FBI investigatory records, created before the Committee's existence, do not reflect the "deliberative and communicative processes" of the Committee. Parts of the 6,000 pages of documents reflecting FBI communications within or without the agency pertaining to the Committee may be barred from disclosure by the Speech or Debate Clause, but it would be erroneous to withhold those records in their entirety on this basis. In addition, dissemination of these records to the public or throughout the Executive Branch may have eliminated such protection. See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 317 (1973). The Court agrees with the Clerk that communications sent from the Committee to the FBI in pursuit of a lawful congressional investigation are an integral part of the "deliberative and communicative process" of Congress. Accordingly, the Speech or Debate Clause bars their disclosure. See United States v. People's Temple of the Disciples of Christ, 515 F.Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1981); Tavoulareas v. Piro, 527 F.Supp. 676 (D.D.C. 1981). In People's Temple, this Court quashed a subpoena which sought unpublished documents from a House committee investigation. In Tavoulareas, this Court prohibited questioning Congressional staff regarding their "active acquisition of information." Id. at 680. Barring production of the documents originated by the Committee, whether they are in the possession of Congress or an agency, is consistent with Congress' exclusion of itself from the Freedom of Information Act. IV. Matters that are "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party" may be withheld pursuant to exemption five of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). This exemption protects the predecisional deliberative process within agencies "in which opinions are expressed and policies formulated and recommended." Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Its application depends upon the individual document and the role it plays in the administrative process. Playboy Enterprises v. Department of Justice, No. 81-1605, Slip op. at 7-8 (D.C. Cir. May 11, 1982). The Executive Branch defendants argue that the 300,000 pages of documents requested by plaintiff disclose the deliberative process of the Committee, its efforts to obtain the FBI's cooperation, and the Committee's interaction with the FBI during its investigation. Disclosure of records to Congress, they contend, did not eliminate the deliberative process privilege because of the public policy which encourages broad congressional access to government information. The exemption five claim is premature. First, defendants have failed to comply with Local Rule 1-9(h) of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. They did not provide any information regarding this claim in their statement of material facts to which there is no genuine issue. See Gardels v. Central Intelligence Agency, 637 F.2d 770, 773 (D.C. Cir. 1980). More important, they made no pmpt to apply this claim to the six categories of records or any individual documents. See Playboy Enterprises v. Department of Justice, supra. FBI investigatory records provided to the Committee do not reflect any deliberative process by the Committee or the FBI's interaction with the Committee. The application of exemption five to the remaining categories of records must await a more particularized presentation of the documents. An appropriate order accompanies this opinion. November 24, 1982. JUNE L. GREEN, United States District Judge. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA MARK A. ALLEN, PLAINTIFF V. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ET AL., DEFENDANTS Civil Action No. 81-1206 November 24, 1982 ORDER Upon consideration of the motions for summary judgment by defendant-intervenor Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Executive Branch defendants, plaintiff's oppositions, thereto, plaintiff's motion to strike parts of intervenor's answer and motion for summary judgment raising defense of speech or debate clause, and the entire record in this action, for the reasons stated in the accompanying memorandum opinion, it is by the Court this 24th day of November 1982, ORDERED that the Clerk's motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to communications sent from the Committee to the FBI and is otherwise denied; it is further ORDERED that the Executive Branch defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied without prejudice to a renewal on sufficient showing of exemption; and it is further ORDERED that the Executive Branch defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied without prejudice to a renewal on sufficient showing of exemption; and it is further ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to strike is denied. JUNE L. GREEN, United States District Judge. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, ET AL. PLAINTIFFS V. SAMUEL R. PIERCE, DEFENDANT Civil Action No. 82-3111 November 15, 1982 MEMORANDUM OPINION This action is before the Court on plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction, defendant's opposition thereto and motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs also are seeking declaratory and mandamus relief. At the oral hearing on November 10, 1982, the parties agreed to consolidate this case on the merits. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants injunctive and declaratory relief to the plaintiffs and such relief is to remain in effect through December 31, 1982. On September 29, 1982, two hundred seventeen employees at the Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") received RIF notices and were to be separated or reassigned as of close of business on October 31, 1982. See Declaration of Judith L. Tardy at 3. Plaintiffs American Federation of Government Employees ("AFGE") and the HUD employees filed a class action on October 29, 1982 and were joined by Congressman Martin O. Sabo, in his capacity as a member of the United States House of Representatives and a member of the House Appropriations Committee. Plaintiffs contend that the RIF is actually a reorganization and violates the Appropriations Act. On October 29, 1982, this Court issued a temporary restraining order, prohibiting defendant Samuel Pierce, Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, from implementing a reorganization in the Department via Department via a reduction-in-force ("RIF"), in violation of the Department of Housing and Urban Development-Independent Agencies Appropriations Act of 1983, 97 P.L. 272 ("Appropriations Act" or "Act"). I. At the outset, the Court confers standing on Congressman Sabo to challenge HUD's attempted reorganization. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F. 2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F. 2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In Kennedy v. Sampson, supra, a United States Senator sought a declaratory judgment that a bill became law without the signature of the President. The D.C. Circuit stated that Senator Edward Kennedy had standing to maintain a suit seeking a declaration that the Family Practice of Medicine Act, S. 3418, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. (1970), became law on December 25, 1970. Id. at 432-33. Congress passed this legislation in the fall of 1970. On December 24, 1970, the President announced that he would withhold his signature from S. 3418 but took no further action. Id. at 432. Appellants, Administrator of the General Services Administration and the Chief of White House Records, maintained that the President had effected a "pocket veto" of the bill under article I, section 7 of the United States Constitution. The Senator contended that the bill became law without the President's signature at the end of the ten-day period following its presentation to him. Id. The court conferred standing on Senator Kennedy "to maintain this suit in his capacity as an individual United States Senator who voted in favor of S. 3418." Id. at 433. The court found a "logical nexus" between the Senator's status and "the claims sought to be adjudicated." Id. According to the court, "an individual legislator has standing to protect the effectiveness of his vote with or without the concurrence of other members of the majority." Id. at 435. As in Kennedy v. Sampson, supra, the instant case involves legislative power and threatened "diminution of congressional influence in the legislative process." Id. Unlike the situation in Harrington v. Bush, 553 F. 2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977), the injury to Congressman Sabo is not speculative or remote. Id. at 212. See Part II infra. In Harrington, a member of the House of Representatives sought a declaration that certain activities of the Central Intelligence Agency were illegal and an injunction prohibiting the Agency from using the funding and reporting provisions of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. § 403a et seq. in connection with the alleged illegal activities. Id. 193. The D.C. Circuit found that Congressman Harrington lacked standing in his capacity as a Congressman to bring this action. In so ruling, the court distinguished Kennedy: In Kennedy [the "concrete adverseness" which is the con- Id. at 212 (footnotes omitted). Moreover, Harrington can be distinguished from the instant case. In Harrington, the court stated: The assumed illegal Agency activities and the misuse of the funding and reporting provisions do not affect the legal status of the appropriations bills for which appellant has voted. The abuse of delegated authority does not invade the lawmaking power of Congress or appellant.... Appellant's votes have not been nullified or diminished in force because of the post-enactment illegality. Id. at 213. In the instant case, however, Secretary Pierce has invaded the lawmaking power by utilizing funds for a reorganization, albeit disguised as a RIF, in direct violation of the Appropriations Act. As a result, Congressman Sabo has standing to enjoin this action and seek declaratory relief from this Court. Because the Court confers standing on Congressman Sabo, the Court will not address the issue of whether AFGE or the HUD employees have standing in this case. II. The Appropriations Act states in pertinent part: [N]one of the funds made available in this paragraph The House Report accompanying the Appropriations Bill provides guidance as to Congress' intent in including a specific proviso in the Appropriations Act. H.R. Report No. 97-720 states in pertinent part: The Committee is concerned with personnel actions The Department is proposing reduction-in-force (RIF) ac- House Report 97-720 to Accompany H.R. 6956 of the House Committee on Appropriations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (August 10, 1982). The Court also finds Secretary Pierce's statement in his letter of September 15, 1982 to David Stockman, Director, Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") instructive. The letter provides the budget and program estimates of HUD for fiscal year 1984, including re-estimates for fiscal year 1983. See Plaintiff's Attachment H. Secretary Pierce states that "The reduction in 1983 is principally related to the proposed field reorganization, but also includes reductions at Headquarters based upon some organizational restructuring and management and procedural improvements, as well as the performance of selection functions by contractors in lieu of inhouse staff." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 3. Finally, the Court notes the definition of reorganization found in 5 C.F.R. 351.203(F) which states as follows: "Reorganization" means the planned elimination, addi tions, or redistribution of functions or duties in an organi- Based on the House Report accompanying the Appropriations Act, Secretary Pierce's letter to OMB, and the definition of "reorganization," this Court finds that Secretary Pierce was attempting to effectuate a reorganization through the RIF of HUD employees in violation of the Appropriations Act. By taking this action, the Secretary has circumvented the statutory requirement that the Committees on Appropriations approve any reorganization which is to occur prior to January 1, 1983 and has deprived Congressman Sabo of an opportunity to vote on this matter. Accordingly, the Court de |