Three types: first test-with continuous flow positive at 30 seconds, negative at 1 minute, with intermittent flow positive at 15 seconds, negative at 20 seconds; second test with continuous flow positive at 3 minutes, negative at 4 minutes, with intermittent flow positive at 5 minutes, negative at 10 minutes.

Two toper (nozzle slanted slightly): first test-with continuous flow positive at 5 seconds, negative at 10 seconds, with intermittent flow positive at 15 seconds, negative at 20 seconds; second test - with continuous flow positive at 3 minutes, negative at 4 minutes, with intermittent flow positive at 4 minutes, negative at 5 minutes.

Two types: first test - with continuous flow positive at 2 minutes, negative at 3 minutes, with intermittent flow positive at 20 seconds, negative at 30 seconds; second test -with continuous flow positive at 3 minutes, negative at 4 minutes, with intermittent flow positive at 4 minutes, negative at 5 minutes.

There were only three fountains in Group IV. The first had a metal ring containing a number of holes, and projected a stream of water towards a common center. On the first test this showed positive results at 20 seconds, negative at 30 seconds with continuous flow, and with intermittent flow it showed positive results immediately after use, and negative at 2 seconds. On the second test, with continuous flow the results were positive at 2 minutes and negative at 3 minutes; while intermittent flow gave a positive 4-minute test and a negative 5 minute test. The second fountain had four holes in a device which projected water towards a common center. This gave the same results on the first test as had the first fountain; on the second test it showed positive results with continuous flow at 4 minutes and negative at 5 minutes, and with intermittent flow organisms were present thru 5 minutes. The third fountain of this group had three holes in a device projecting water towards a common center. It showed positive results with continuous flow at 15 seconds and negative at 20 seconds, and with intermittent flow positive upon immediate test and negative at 2 seconds. On the second test this fountain gave positive results thru 5 minutes with both continuous and intermittent flow, and negative at 10 minutes.

Conclusions from the Tests

In considering the results obtained in the above tests, many surprises and dis

appointments were experienced. Some of the devices were so crude that we could not expect them to be sanitary; others in which the mechanical principles seemed perfect and the operation beyond criticism, proved after repeated tests to be nearly as bad as the worst.

Further tests made with a view to determining just why the organisms remained so long in the stream yielded some interesting data. It was obvious why this should take place in fountains of the type of Group I, as the organisms falling down in the waste water were continually being carried upward by the stream of water passing thru it. The time required to free a fountain of this type from contaminating organisms was indeterminate and depended entirely on the question of dilution. With the stream running continuously, we found our test organisms at the end of twenty-four hours in the first set, and at the end of one hour in the other two sets. When instead of the straight culture, we poured on the bubble a mixture of the culture and sputum, which more closely resembled the washings from the mouth of a drinker, we found that we could recover the organisms at still longer periods. With the stream running intermittently, the cultures were present at the end of forty-eight hours. How much longer they would have lasted was not determined, as it was considered a waste of valuable time. From an esthetic standpoint alone, the fact that drinkers are being served with one another's sputum is repulsive.

With the fountains of Groups II, III, and IV, it at first puzzled us not a little to determine the cause for the presence of the test organisms in the stream for such a length of time, particularly when the cultures were poured directly on the bubble. That this is due to some extent to organisms "dancing" on the crest of the bubble was clearly demonstrated. Of far greater importance, however, is the fact that, evidently owing to some differences in the velocity of the water in the center and at the periphery of the stream, some of the organisms were carried down toward the nozzle in an eddy. This was true particularly in the case of mouth washings from drinkers always containing more or less viscous sputum, which when carried down to the nozzle became attached to it in threads, and as this substance is insoluble in water,

Zoning is an exercise, not of the power of eminent domain, but of the police power. When property is taken under the power of eminent domain, compensation must be paid the owner if damage can be shown. No compensation is paid for property taken, or for limitations imposed upon the use of property, under the police power.

The two questions of fundamental interest to property owners in a municipality adopting a comprehensive plan controlling building development are:

1. Whether such regulations come within the purview of the police power; and

2. Whether the particular regulations adopted can be sustained as a competent exercise of that power.

Do Regulations Come Within the Police Power?

In answering the first question, it may be stated that it is no longer open to doubt that cities in this country can apply different building regulations to different districts. The decisions of various state courts as well as of the United States Supreme Court are conclusive upon this point. In Welch v. Swasey, 79 N. E. 145 (1907), for instance, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts sustained the validity of the act limiting the height of buildings differently in different districts in Boston. In Cochran v. Preston, 108 Md. 220 (1908), the Court of Appeals in Maryland sustained a somewhat similar act limiting the height of buildings in Baltimore. The decision of the Massachusetts Court was confirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Welch v. Swasey, 214 U. S. 91 (1908).

Zoning limitations on the use of buildings have also been sustained as being within the scope of the police power. Such regulations have been sustained by the courts in half a dozen states (Arkansas, California, Illinois, New York, Texas and Washington) as well as by the United

regulations, which have weeded out undesirable business establishments from certain districts, have been approved by the highest courts in Arkansas and California, and on appeal, by the United States Supreme Court.

How broad a scope has the police power? The answer to this question is of the greatest interest to those who have the future planning of a city at heart, for city improvement depends so much upon what may or what may not be done under the police power.

The police power, of course, extends to the public health, morals and safety. But the power of the state by appropriate legislation to provide for the public convenience stands upon the same ground precisely as its power by appropriate legislation to protect public health, the public morals, or the public safety [Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Ry. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285, (1899)]. In Bacon v. Walker, 204 U. S. 311 (1907) the United States Supreme Court held that the police power of a state embraces regulations designed to promote the public convenience or the general prosperity, as well as those to promote public health, morals or safety; it is not confined to the suppression of what is offensive, disorderly or unsanitary, but extends to what is for the greatest welfare of the state. The same view was expressed in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway Co. v. Drainage Commissioners, 200 U. S. 561 (1906); and in Eubank v. Richmond, 33 Sup. Ct. 76 (1912). A still more extensive scope was given to the police power in Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 31 Sup. Ct. 186 (1911). In this case the Court stated:

"It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public needs. It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the

The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution does not curtail the police power of the states when properly exercised. The United States Supreme Court stated in Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27 (1885), that it was not designed to interfere with the police power of the state "to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources, and add to its wealth and prosperity."

Zoning is designed to promote not only the public health, morals and safety, but also the public convenience and general prosperity of the community. If the police powers extended only to the public health, morals and safety, it might be difficult in certain instances to show conclusively that every detail of a zoning scheme came within a competent exercise of the police power. But with the scope of the police power so extended as to include the promotion of the public comfort and convenience, the addition of wealth and prosperity to the state, the increase of its industry, and the development of its resources, it is hoped that even the minor features of it can be shown to be a legitimate exercise of the police power.

Altho the United States Supreme Court refrains from any attempt to define with exact precision the limits of the police power, its disposition is, nevertheless, to favor the validity of laws relating to matters completely within the territory of the state enacting them. It will interfere with local legislative authority, especially when its action is approved by the highest court of the state whose people are directly concerned, only when it is plain and palpable that it has no real or substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare. Cusack vs. City of Chicago, 37 Sup. Ct. 192 (1917).

The Constitutionality of Zoning
Regulations

The answer to the second question, it seems, will depend upon, first, whether the height, use and area classification can be shown to be reasonable; and, second, whether their application to specific districts can be shown to be reasonable. If the reasonableness of both the classification and the application of the several regulations can be demonstrated, then the victory will be complete. The attitude of the

United States Supreme Court toward such regulations as have come before it furnishes strong ground for the hope that zoning will be upheld in full.

Zoning is not designed to operate oppressively upon any owner or upon any group of owners. Each scheme is framed with the greatest consideration for property rights commensurate with the public welfare, But despite this fact certain owners will no doubt feel themselves aggrieved. This, however, does not make the law any less valid so long as its provisions are not arbitrary. It is believed that the regulations adopted in any city may meet all the tests of constitutionality laid down by the United States Supreme Court. In Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27 (1885), the Supreme Court discussed the question as follows:

"Regulations for these purposes may press with more or less weight upon one than upon another, but they are designed, not to impose unequal or unnecessary restrictions upon any one, but to promote, with as little individual inconvenience as possible, the general good. Tho in many respects necessarily special in their character, they do not furnish just ground of complaint if they operate alike upon all persons and property under the same circumstances and conditions. Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others, is prohibited; but legislation which, in carrying out a public purpose, is limited in its application, if within the sphere of its operation it affects alike all persons similarly situated, is not within the [14th] amendment."

The attitude of the United States Supreme Court toward zoning was discussed in concise and clear ordinance in Little Rock, Ark., Reinman v. Little Rock, 35 Sup. Ct. 511 (1914). "So long as the regulation in question," said the Court, "is not shown to be clearly unreasonable and arbitrary, and operates uniformly upon all persons similarly situated in the particular district, the district itself not appearing to have been arbitrarily selected, it cannot be judicially declared that there is a deprivation of property without due process of law, or denial of the equal protection of the law, within the meaning of the 14th amendment."

In Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 36 Sup. Ct. 143 (1915), the United States Supreme Court gave frank expression to the view that a city's expansion and growth are superior to the whims of a few capricious landowners who might wish to thwart the greater welfare of the community: