Adopting Ordinances—
Increasing Service Rates

An ordinance purporting to increase electric light and water rates as fixed by a municipal franchise is void where the yeas and nays were not called and recorded, as required by a state law governing the adoption of ordinances, holds the Arkansas Supreme Court in the recent case of Cooley vs. Arkansas Light & Power Co. (211 Southwestern Reporter, 664). The Court declares that the requirement for calling and recording the yeas and nays is mandatory, being intended "to make the members of the council feel the responsibility of their action when important measures are before them, and to compel each member to bear his share in the responsibility by a record of his action which should not afterwards be open to dispute."

The opinion recognizes the right of municipal authorities to increase the rates that may be charged by a public service corporation notwithstanding the fact that there exists an unexpired franchise fixing a schedule of rates. It is held that a city in granting a franchise specifying maximum rates to be charged for service during the life of the franchise acts for the private benefit of itself and its inhabitants, and that its contracts of this character are governed by the same rules that govern contracts of private individuals. That is, the contract is subject to modification by mutual consent of the parties thereto.

Invalid Municipal Proceedings

Where a special meeting of a municipal. board of trustees was void because proper written notice had not been given and the full membership was not present, action taken at that meeting toward the purchase of property was without effect, and could not be given life at a subsequent meeting by purported ratification. (California District Court of Appeal, City of Orange vs. Clement, 183 Pacific Reporter, 189.)

Lowest Bidder's Right to Award

Under the Buffalo charter the lowest responsible bidder for a municipal contract is entitled to compel award of the contract to him, unless all bids are rejected or unless there is room for the exercise of reasonable discretion on the part of the municipal authorities. But where tractors were purchased for use in connection with flusher trailers the city officers could validly award a contract to a higher bidder, under a good faith purpose to secure standardization of the city's equipment, with the advantages of interchangeability of parts, etc. On the other hand, no valid discrimination can be made between competing bidders on the ground that the favored one owns an important local industry. (New York Supreme Court, People vs. City of Buffalo, 176 New York Supplement, 642.)

EDITOR'S NOTE. It is strongly intimated in the opinion, however, that the proceedings in this instance might be invalid, on the ground that the specifications were so drawn as to virtually exclude competition. "Of course, "" says the Court, "specifications which would exclude competition are a plain violation of the statute."

Necessity for Written Contracts

Where additional grading was done under a Philadelphia paving contract without agreement there for having been reduced to writing, as required by the charter of the city, the contractor could not recover compensation, altho the Director of Public Works, in a letter to the Chief of the Bureau of Highways, had suggested a basis of compensation, which was approved by the latter, who then orally directed that the additional work be done. "Anyone dealing with the municipality is obliged to know the necessity for a contract in strict accordance with the law before there can be a legal obligation binding the municipality. It has been held that the acceptance of a proposal is not a contract, but merely part of the negotiations leading to one." (Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Union Pav

ing Co. vs. City of Philadelphia, 107 Atlantic Reporter, 370.)

Unguarded Retaining Walls

A city was grossly negligent in failing to place any guard along the retaining wall of a street extending along the side of a creek from 7 to 11 feet below. But, notwithstanding such negligence, a pedestrian cannot recover damages for falling over the wall, where, tho the night was dark, she was familiar with the street, and had three safer and better lighted routes, and did not look where she was going. (Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Haughney vs. Mahanoy City Borough, 107 Atlantic Reporter, 843.) Regulation of Laundries

In the regulation of laundries, a city ordinance defining a public laundry to be any premises, etc., used for the purpose of laundering certain washable articles "for thirty or more owners of such articles per week, and for pay," is not unreasonable nor discriminatory. The basis of classification therein employed is natural and reasonable, and the provisions of the ordinance operate uniformly upon the class therein named. When a city has the right, under its police power, to impose regulations upon a business, the validity of an ordinance cannot be attacked merely because its scope was not extended to cover the entire field of possible abuses which such ordinance seeks to prevent. An ordinance imposing on an administrative officer, as a prerequisite to the issuance of a license, the duties of ascertaining whether sanitary and drainage arrangements are sufficient to protect the public health, and whether "adequate ventilation" and "adequate plumbing and drainage facilities" are provided on the premises, does not unconstitutionally confer arbitrary confer arbitrary legislative or judicial powers upon such officer. If his conduct should prove to be arbitrary or palpably unwarranted, resort may be had to the courts. (Ohio Supreme Court, Yee Bow vs. City of Cleveland, 124 Northeastern Reporter, 132.)

Debt Limit in Georgia Cities

Where a contractor contracted with a Georgia city to construct and equip a light and water plant, to be paid for in installments covering a term of years after completion of the contract, there was the creation of a "debt" within the provisions of the constitution of the state, limiting the

power of cities to contract debts. Provision of the contract that delivery of the plant should be made to the city, "as lessee," on its completion, title to vest in the city on payment of all the installments, and the city to pay an annual "rental" of $1 until payment of all of such installments, constituted the agreement a conditional sale contract and not a lease. And since a suit brought by the contractor to recover possession of the plant or the balance due on the contract necessarily depended upon the agreement which violated the debt limit provisions of the constitution, the suit must be dismissed. (Georgia Supreme Court, J. B. McCrary Co. vs. City of Glennville, 100 Southeastern Reporter, 362.) EDITOR'S NOTE. The opinion in this case notes that contrary conclusions have been reached by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky and the appellate courts of other states in similar

cases.

Defective Sidewalks in Iowa

"The rule recognized by this state is that to charge a municipality with negligence for conditions that render a sidewalk un

safe, where the city is not responsible originally for the condition, where it is merely a defect that came into existence thru no fault of the city, the defect, if not known to the city, must have existed for such a length of time before the accident that the officers and agents of the city, charged with the duty of caring for or maintaining its sidewalks, ought in the exercise of reasonable and ordinary care to have known and remedied it before the accident." (Iowa Supreme Court, Evans vs. City of Council Bluffs, 174 Northwestern Reporter, 238.)

Discriminatory Health Regulations

An ordinance of the city of Pensacola, requiring that every house and building, "however used or occupied, shall be provided with a sanitary privy that shall be connected with a sewer as provided by existing ordinances," and requiring compliance within 15 days after the date of notice from the Commissioner of Health, "or within such further time as the Commissioner of Health may allow," is void as permitting exercise of arbitrary discrimination by the Commissioner. (Florida Supreme Court, Ellis, City Marshal, vs. Thiesen, 82 Southern Reporter, 607.)