SCALIA, J., dissenting execution of this deportation squarely on the Attorney General, where Congress has put it." Id., at 271. III Given the insubstantiality of the due process and Article III arguments against barring judicial review of respondent's claim (the Court does not even bother to mention them, and the Court of Appeals barely acknowledges them), I will address them only briefly. The Due Process Clause does not "[r]equir[e] [j]udicial [d]etermination [o]f" respondent's claim, Brief for Petitioners in Calcano-Martinez v. INS, O. T. 2000, No. 00-1011, p. 34. Respondent has no legal entitlement to suspension of deportation, no matter how appealing his case. "[T]he Attorney General's suspension of deportation [is] "an act of grace" which is accorded pursuant to her 'unfettered discretion,' Jay v. Boyd, 351 U. S. 345, 354 (1956)..., and [can be likened, as Judge Learned Hand observed,] to "a judge's power to suspend the execution of a sentence, or the President's to pardon a convict," 351 U. S., at 354, n. 16. . . ." INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U. S. 26, 30 (1996). The furthest our cases have gone in imposing due process requirements upon analogous exercises of Executive discretion is the following. (1) We have required "minimal procedural safeguards" for death-penalty clemency proceedings, to prevent them from becoming so capricious as to involve "a state official flipp[ing] a coin to determine whether to grant clemency," Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U. S. 272, 289 (1998) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Even assuming that this holding is not part of our "death-is-different" jurisprudence, Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 55 (2001) (SCALIA, J., dissenting) (citation omitted), respondent here is not complaining about the absence of procedural safeguards; he disagrees with the Attorney General's judgment on a point of law. (2) We have recognized the existence of a due process liberty interest when SCALIA, J., dissenting a State's statutory parole procedures prescribe that a prisoner “shall” be paroled if certain conditions are satisfied, see Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U. S. 369, 370–371, 381 (1987); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U. S. 1, 12 (1979). There is no such statutory entitlement to suspension of deportation, no matter what the facts. Moreover, in neither Woodard, nor Allen, nor Greenholtz did we intimate that the Due Process Clause conferred jurisdiction of its own force, without benefit of statutory authorization. All three cases were brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Article III, § 1's investment of the "judicial Power of the United States" in the federal courts does not prevent Congress from committing the adjudication of respondent's legal claim wholly to "non-Article III federal adjudicative bodies," Brief for Petitioners in Calcano-Martinez v. INS, O. T. 2000, No. 00-1011, at 38. The notion that Article III requires every Executive determination, on a question of law or of fact, to be subject to judicial review has no support in our jurisprudence. Were it correct, the doctrine of sovereign immunity would not exist, and the APA's general permission of suits challenging administrative action, see 5 U. S. C. § 702, would have been superfluous. Of its own force, Article III does no more than commit to the courts matters that are "the stuff of the traditional actions at common law tried by the courts at Westminster in 1789," Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U. S. 50, 90 (1982) (REHNQUIST, J., concurring in judgment)—which (as I have discussed earlier) did not include supervision of discretionary Executive action. The Court has created a version of IIRIRA that is not only unrecognizable to its framers (or to anyone who can read) but gives the statutory scheme precisely the opposite of its intended effect, affording criminal aliens more opportu SCALIA, J., dissenting nities for delay-inducing judicial review than others have, or even than criminal aliens had prior to the enactment of this legislation. Because §2241's exclusion of judicial review is unmistakably clear, and unquestionably constitutional, both this Court and the courts below were without power to entertain respondent's claims. I would set aside the judgment of the court below and remand with instructions to have the District Court dismiss for want of jurisdiction. I respectfully dissent from the judgment of the Court. Syllabus CALCANO-MARTINEZ ET AL. v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT No. 00-1011. Argued April 24, 2001-Decided June 25, 2001 Petitioners are lawful permanent United States residents subject to administratively final removal orders because they were convicted of aggravated felonies. Each filed a petition for review in the Second Circuit pursuant to 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(1) and a habeas corpus petition in the District Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2241 in order to challenge the Board of Immigration Appeals' determination that, as a matter of law, they were ineligible to apply for a discretionary waiver of deportation under former §212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Second Circuit dismissed their petitions for lack of jurisdiction, holding that they could nevertheless pursue their claims in a §2241 action in district court. Held: The Second Circuit lacked jurisdiction to hear the petitions for direct review, but petitioners can proceed with their habeas petitions if they wish to obtain relief. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 expressly precludes courts of appeals from exercising jurisdiction to review a final removal order against an alien removable by reason of a conviction for, inter alia, an aggravated felony. 8 U.S. C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). This plain language explicitly strips the courts of appeals of the ability to hear petitioners' claims on direct review. However, because Congress has not spoken with sufficient clarity to strip the district courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions raising identical claims, see INS v. St. Cyr, ante, at 314, petitioners may pursue their claims in a § 2241 action. Pp. 350-352. 232 F.3d 328, affirmed. STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 352. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and THOMAS, J., joined, post, p. 352. With Lucas Guttentag argued the cause for petitioners. him on the briefs were Lee Gelernt, Steven R. Shapiro, Jayashri Srikantiah, Kerry W. Bretz, Jules E. Coven, Alan Michael Strauss, and Paul A. Engelmayer. Opinion of the Court Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Underwood, Acting Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, Paul R. Q. Wolfson, Donald E. Keener, William J. Howard, Ernesto H. Molina, and James A. O'Brien III.* JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. Deboris Calcano-Martinez, Sergio Madrid, and Fazila Khan are all lawful permanent residents of the United States subject to administratively final orders of removal. They conceded that they are deportable based upon their past criminal convictions, but each filed both a petition for review in the Second Circuit pursuant to 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(1) (1994 ed., Supp. V) and a habeas corpus petition in the District Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2241 in order to challenge the Board of Immigration Appeals' determination that, as a matter of law, petitioners were ineligible to apply for a discretionary waiver of deportation under former § 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 182, 8 U. S. C. § 1182(c) (1994 ed.). Their petitions for review were consolidated in the Court of Appeals, which subsequently dismissed the petitions for lack of jurisdiction, holding that petitioners could nevertheless pursue their constitutional and statutory claims in a district court habeas action brought pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §2241. 232 F. 3d 328 (CA2 2000). We granted certiorari in this case, 531 U. S. 1108 (2001), and in INS v. St. Cyr, 531 U. S. 1107 (2001), in order to comprehensively consider whether aliens in the petitioners' position may seek relief in the Court of Appeals (pursuant to 8 U.S. C. § 1252(a)(1)); in the district court (pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §2241); or not at all. For the reasons stated below and in our opinion in INS v. St. Cyr, ante, p. 289, we agree with the Court of Appeals that it lacks jurisdiction to hear *Martha W. Barnett, Jeffrey L. Bleich, Gerald Neuman, and Kelly M. Klaus filed a brief for the American Bar Association as amicus curiae. |