barah, therefore, he made all things of nothing; yet it cannot possibly be taken in any other sense here than to signify the producing of something, yea, of all things, out of nothing. For, suppose the word in itself should import no more than that he made all things, yet here it necessarily implies, that he made them of nothing: because it is here expressed, that it was in the beginning that he made all things; and, therefore, before which there was nothing that he could make any thing of: for if there had been any thing he could make any thing of; before he is here said. to create heaven and earth, he could not have been said to have created them in the beginning, there being something begun, and so a beginning before that. Secondly; as from these words it may rationally be deduced, that he made all things of nothing; so, also, that of nothing he made all things: I mean, there is nothing in the world but what is comprehended under one of these two words, heaven and earth. And it is usual in the Hebrew tongue, ,עם יושבי חדל من السكان جها There are but two Hebrew words that offer at it, and they are n and an; both which, I must confess, mostly, if not always, are translated "world :" but properly, they denote not the universal, but only the habitable world, even so much of the universe as is inhabited. As for the first,, it is made use of by the Holy Ghost but only once in all the Bible; and that is, Isaiah, xxxviii. 11. I shall not behold man more,' 'with the inhabitants of the world,' as we render it; but the Targum, xy, the inhabitants of the earth;' the Arabic, Li L, any of them that dwell in it,' viz, in the earth, spoken of before. Whence we may see, that the most ancient translators took and as synonymous terms. And truly, from this place it cannot (nor so from any place) be proved that this word signifies any more than the habitable world, the inhabitants of it being here spoken of. But the more usual word that is rendered world, is ban; made use of, I confess, very frequently, but never to signify any more than 7, even the habitable world; and, therefore, always rendered by the seventy, oinovμév. The Chaldee, Psalm ix. 9. renders it, y¬¬ y, the people of the earth;' where the Arabic also renders it by tmall 'habitata, habitabilis;' the habitable part of the world. So, also, Psalm xviii. 16; xcviii. 7. and elsewhere. The Syr. always retains the Hebrew word JL. The Rabbins contracted the signification of it still narrower than the habitable world, making it to signify no more than " the land of Israel;" ,היא ארץ ישראל שהיא מתיבלת במצוות הרבה,saith ,תבל whence R. Sal. speaking of illa est terra Israelis, quæ condita est præceptis multis,' Isaiah, xxiv. 4. and these two words coming short, there is no word in the Hebrew having no one word to express it by as other languages have, to join these two words, heaven and earth, together, and under them to comprehend the whole circumference of all created beings; which we call the world, or universe. And there is no place of Scripture where they come together, but they are to be taken in that comprehensive sense. And in this, God himself seems to be his own interpreter, who in one place saith," In six days he made heaven and earth," Exod. xxxi. 17. in another place, that "In six days, [he] made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is," Exod. xx. 11. And St. Paul most excellently not only explains the phrase, but confirms the truth, saying, that "by him were all things created that are in heaven, and that are in the earth, visible and invisible; whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers, all things were created by him, and for him," Col. i. 16. Which place being itself so clear, plain, and full a proof of it, I need not produce any more to prove that God is the Maker of all things, visible and invisible. even now, Neither do the Scriptures testify his creation only, but his preservation also, of all things in the world. For we did not only at the first receive our beings from him, but, "in him we live, and move, and have our being," Acts, xvii. 28. And not only we, but all things in the world, are as well preserved by him, as at first they received their beings from him: what David saith of some, "these wait all upon we may apply to all creatures; thee, that thou mayest give them their meat in due season. That thou givest them, they gather: thou openest thine so comprehensive as to signify the whole world. Neither, indeed, had the Grecians any such word until Pythagoras's time; who, seeing the wonderful order of all things, called the compages of all creatures, Kórμos. So Plutarch, Πυθαγόρας πρῶτος ὠνόμασε τὴν τῶν ὅλων περιοχὴν, Κόσμον, ἐκ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ τάξεως. De Placit. Philos. lib. ii. cap. 1. Franc. 1620. and from thence did the Latins call it mundus.' * Εν αὐτῷ γὰρ ζωμὲν καὶ κινούμεθα καὶ ἐσμέν· ὥσπερ ἐν σωματικῷ ὑποδείγματι, ὡς αδύνατον ἀγνοῆσαι τον αέρα πανταχοῦ κεχυμένον, καὶ οὐ μακρὰν ἀφ' ἑνὸς ἑκάστου ἡμῶν ὑπάρχοντα, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν ὄντα, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τον τῶν ὅλων δημιουργὸν Θεόν. παρ ̓ αὐτοῦ γὰς ἐστιν τὸ εἶναι, τὸ ἐνεργεῖν, τὸ μὴ ἀπολέσθαι. — Ecumen. in Act. xvii. 28. tom. i. p. 138. B. Par. 1631. And Theophylact. in eund. loc. τὴν πρόνοιαν αὐτοῦ λέγει καὶ την συγκρότησιν τὸ εἶναι παρ ̓ αὐτοῦ, τὸ ἐνεργεῖν, τὸ μὴ ἀπολέσθαι. hand, they are filled with good. Thou hidest thy face, they are troubled; thou takest away their breath, they die, and return to their dust. Thou sendest forth thy spirit, they are created, and thou renewest the face of the earth," Psalm civ. 27-30; cxlv. 15. It is he "who covereth the heavens with clouds, who prepareth rain for the earth, who maketh grass to grow upon the mountains. He giveth to the beast his food, and to the young ravens which cry," Psalm cxlvii. 8, 9. It is he "who giveth us richly all things to enjoy," 1 Tim. vi. 17. It is he "that stretcheth out the north over the empty place, and hangeth the earth upon nothing. He bindeth up the waters in his thick clouds, and the cloud is not rent under them," Job, xxvi. 7, 8, &c. It is "he [that] maketh his sun to rise upon the evil, and upon the good, and sendeth rain on the just, and on the unjust," Matt. v. 45. Without whom, not so much as a sparrow shall fall on the ground." By whom" the very hairs of your heads are all numbered," Matt. x. 29, 30. In a word, it is he that upholdeth all things by the word of his power," Heb. i. 3. without whom, therefore, nothing in the world could stand; but all things would immediately fall down into their first nothing. So well may he be called, "the Maker and Preserver of all things visible and invisible." 2. Confirmation from REASON.-And though some of the ancient naturalists have been thought to assert the eternity of the world, as Aristotle; and others do deny an universal * Nomen Filii Dei magnum et immensum est, et totus ab eo sustentatur orbis.-Herma Past. lib. iii. Similitudo, 9. sec. 14. p. 75. Par. 1672. a And truly Aristotle may well be thought to have asserted the eternity of the world, when he states the question in the 10th chapter of his first book de Colo; Λέγωμὲν μετὰ ταῦτα πότερον ἀγέννητος ἡ γεννητὸς, καὶ ἄφθαρτος pagróc; dicamus deinceps utrum ingenitus sit an genitus, et incorruptibilis an corruptibilis? And then, having handled the question in that, he concludes in the beginning of the second book,Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτε γέγονεν ὁ πᾶς οὐρανὸς, οὔτε ἐνδέχεται φθαρῆναι, καθάπερ φασί τινες αὐτὸν, ἀλλ ̓ ἔστιν εἷς καὶ ἀἴδιος, ἀρχὴν μὲν καὶ τελευτην οὐκ ἔχων τοῦ παντὸς αἰῶνος, ἔχων δὲ καὶ περιέχων ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸν ἄπειρον χρόνον, ἔκ τε τῶν εἰρημένων ἔξεστι λαβεῖν τὴν πίστιν, καὶ διὰ τῆς δόξης τῆς παρὰ τῶν ἄλλως λεγόντων καὶ γεννώντων αὐτόν· i. e. Quòd itaque nec totum cœlum factum est, nec potest corrumpi, ut quidam dicunt, sed est unum, et æternum, neque initium nec finem habens totius durationis, habens autem et continens in se infinitam durationem, probatur, cùm ex præcedentibus tum ex opinione eorum qui aliter dicunt, eumque genitum Providence (either holding all things to fall out by chance, as the Epicureans, or else from a fatal necessity, without the concurrent providence of a Deity, as the Stoics); yet we cannot thence conclude it beyond the reach of reason to find the contrary to be true. Nay, certainly, if we pass our judgment upon creation and providence from the certain conclusions of unbiassed reason, without having any respect to the Scriptures at all, it can be no other than that God is as really the Maker and Preserver of all things, as he is God. For, first, unless he made all things, how can he be termed the first cause, or, by consequence, God? Unless he be the cause of all causes, how can he be called the first cause? And unless he be the cause of all things, how can he be the cause of all causes? And, therefore, if there be any thing he is not the cause of, or which he did not make, how is he the cause of all things? No, certainly, to say he made not all things, is as much as to say, he is not the first cause, as really as to say, he is not the first cause, is censent. And this Aristotle's opinion concerning the eternity of the world, is both cited and confuted by Lactantius. Aristoteles autem, saith he, labore se et molestiâ liberavit, dicens, semper mundum fuisse: itaque et humanum genus, et cætera, quæ in eo sunt, initium non habere, sed fuisse semper, ac semper fore. Sed cùm videamus singula quæque animalia, quæ antè non fuerant, incipere esse, et esse desinere: necesse est totum genus aliquando esse cœpisse, et aliquando desiturum esse, quia cœperit. Omnia enim tribus temporibus contineri necesse est, præterito, præsenti, futuro. Præteriti est origo, præsentis substantia, futuri dissolutio. Quæ omnia in singulis hominibus apparent. Et incipimus enim, cùm nascimur; et sumus, cùm vivimus; et desinimus, cùm interimus. Unde etiam tres Parcas esse voluerunt: unam, quæ vitam hominibus ordiatur; alteram, quæ contexat; tertiam, quæ rumpat ac finiat. In toto autem genere hominum quia solum præsens tempus apparet; ex eo tamen præteritum, id est, origo. colligitur; et futurum, id est, dissolutio, &c.-Lactant. de Orig. Error. lib. ii. p. 176. Oxon. 1684. And this opinion of the eternity of the world is, by Lucretius himself, elegantly refuted.--Lib. v. line 325. Præterea, si nulla fuit genitalis origo Terraï et cæli, semperque æterna fuere: Cur supera bellum Thebanum, et funera Troja, Non alias alii quoque res cecinere poëtæ ? Quo tot facta virûm toties cecidere? Nec usquan Æternis famæ monumentis insita florent? Verùm, ut opinor, habet novitatem summa, recensque as much as to say, he is not God. Again, unless God made all things, there is something in the world that was either made by itself, by some other person besides God, or else it was never made at all. To say any thing was made. by itself, is a contradiction; for then it would be and not be at the same time: it would not be, because not made; it would be, because it could make itself; it being impossible for any thing to act which doth not exist. If it was made by any other person besides God, either there must be two infinites (which I have proved impossible), or else a finite power must be able to make any thing of nothing, which is impossible also; for upon that very account, because it can make any thing of nothing, it is infinite for that which can make any thing of nothing, can do any thing at all, there being nothing harder to be done than that, because there cannot be a greater distance betwixt any two things, than there is betwixt any thing and nothing, the one being immediately contradictory of the other. And he that can do the hardest thing that is possible to be done, cannot have any bounds or limits of his power, and, therefore, must needs be infinite. Thus there can be nothing in the world made of itself, or by any other person, besides God: it remains, therefore, that it was either never made at all, or else made by God. That there should be any thing in the world besides God never made at all, is impossible; for then God would not be the cause of all things besides himself, and so not God. Again, if there be any thing in the world besides God that was never made, it must needs be eternal, as God himself: for if it was never made, it had no beginning; if it had no beginning, it must needs be eternal. Now, it is impossible any thing should be eternal as God, and not be God; for absolute eternity is a perfection, and, therefore, cannot but be acknowledged an essential property in God, and so the very essence of God; which, therefore, no person can have, but he that hath the essence of God, which to say any but God can have, is a contradiction. This, also, would quite destroy that old axiom, that every thing that is, or hath any being, is either the Creator or This distinction of all things into created or uncreated, be sure, is as old as Justin Martyr, if not far older; who expressly saith, Kai ngãtóv ye |