(B) The term of office of the Director shall be 4 years. The Director shall be responsible for the discharge of the functions and duties of the Office. He shall be appointed and compensated at a rate not in excess of the maximum rate prescribed for GS-18 of the General Schedule under section 5332 of title 5 of the United States Code. (3) The Director may appoint, and assign the duties of, employees of such Office, and with the concurrence of the Commission he may fix the compensation of such employees and procure temporary and intermittent services to the same extent as is authorized under section 3109 of title 5, United States Code. (b)(1) The Director shall coordinate assistance to the public with respect to authorities exercised by the Commission. The Director shall also coordinate assistance available to persons intervening or participating or proposing to intervene or participate in proceedings before the Commission. (2) The Commission may, under rules promulgated by it, provide compensation for reasonable attorney's fees, expert witness fees, and other costs of intervening or participating in any proceeding before the Commission to any person whose intervention, or participation substantially contributed to the approval, in whole or in part, of a position advocated by such person. Such compensation may be paid only if the Commission has determined that (A) the proceeding is significant, and (B) such person's intervention or participation in such proceeding without receipt of compensation constitutes a significant financial hardship to him. (3) Nothing in this subsection affects or restricts any rights of any intervenor or participant under any other applicable law or rule of law. (4) There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of Energy to be used by the Office for purposes of compensation of persons under the provisions of this subsection not to exceed $500,000 for the fiscal year 1978, not to exceed $2,000,000 for the fiscal year 1979, not to exceed $2,200,000 for the fiscal year 1980, and not to exceed $2,400,000 for the fiscal year 1981. SEPARABILITY OF PROVISIONS SEC. 320. If any provision of this Act, or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance, shall be held invalid, the remainder of the Act, and the application of such provision to persons or circumstances other than those as to which it is held invalid, shall not be affected thereby. [16 U.S.C. 825r] SHORT TITLE SEC. 321. This Act may be cited as the "Federal Power Act." [16 U.S.C. 791a] PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY ACT OF 19351 [Public-No. 333-74th Congress] AN ACT To provide for control and regulation of public-utility holding companies, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Public Utility Act of 1935." TITLE I-CONTROL OF PUBLIC-UTILITY HOLDING COMPANIES NECESSITY FOR CONTROL OF HOLDING COMPANIES SEC. 1. (a) Public-utility holding companies and their subsidiary companies are affected with a national public interest in that, among other things, (1) their securities are widely marketed and distributed by means of the mails and instrumentalities of interstate commerce and are sold to a large number of investors in different States; (2) their service, sales, construction, and other contracts and arrangements are often made and performed by means of the mails and instrumentalities of interstate commerce; (3) their subsidiary public-utility companies often sell and transport gas and electric energy by the use of means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce; (4) their practices in respect of and control over subsidiary companies often materially affect the interstate commerce in which those companies engage; (5) their activities extending over many States are not susceptible of effective control by any State and make difficult, if not impossible, effective State regulation of public-utility companies. Upon the basis of facts disclosed by the reports of the Federal Trade Commission made pursuant to S. Res. 83 (Seventieth Congress, first session), the reports of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, made pursuant to H. Res. 59 (Seventy-second Congress, first session) and H. J. Res. 572 (Seventy-second Congress, second session) and otherwise disclosed and ascertained, it is hereby declared that the national public interest, the interest of investors in the securities of holding companies and their subsidiary companies and affiliates, and the interest of consumers of electric energy and natural and manufactured gas, are or may be adversely affected (1) when such investors cannot obtain the information necessary to appraise the financial position or earning power of the issuers, because of the absence of uniform standard accounts; when such securities are issued without the approval or consent of the States having jurisdiction over subsidiary publicutility companies; when such securities are issued upon the 'This Act appears in the United States Code at 15 U.S.C. 79-79Z-6. basis of fictitious or unsound asset values having no fair relation to the sums invested in or the earning capacity of the properties and upon the basis of paper profits from intercompany transactions, or in anticipation of excessive revenues from subsidiary public-utility companies; when such securities are issued by a subsidiary public-utility company under circumstances which subject such company to the burden of supporting an overcapitalized structure and tend to prevent voluntary rate reductions; (2) when subsidiary public-utility companies are subjected to excessive charges for services, construction work, equipment, and materials, or enter into transactions in which evils result from an absence of arm's-length bargaining or from restraint of free and independent competition; when service, management, construction, and other contracts involve the allocation of charges among subsidiary public-utility companies in different States so as to present problems of regulation which cannot be dealt with effectively by the States; (3) when control of subsidiary public-utility companies affects the accounting practices and rate, dividend, and other policies of such companies so as to complicate and obstruct State regulation of such companies, or when control of such companies is exerted through disproportionately small investment; (4) when the growth and extension of holding companies bears no relation to economy of management and operation or the integration and coordination of related operating properties; or (5) when in any other respect there is lack of economy of management and operation of public-utility companies or lack of efficiency and adequacy of service rendered by such companies, or lack of effective public regulation, or lack of economies in the raising of capital. (c) When abuses of the character above enumerated become persistent and wide-spread the holding company becomes an agency which, unless regulated, is injurious to investors, consumers, and the general public; and it is hereby declared to be the policy of this title, in accordance with which policy all the provisions of this title shall be interpreted, to meet the problems and eliminate the evils as enumerated in this section, connected with public-utility holding companies which are engaged in interstate commerce or in activities which directly affect or burden interstate commerce; and for the purpose of effectuating such policy to compel the simplification of public utility holding company systems and the elimination therefrom of properties detrimental to the proper functioning of such systems, and to provide as soon as practicable for the elimination of public-utility holding companies except as otherwise expressly provided in this title. DEFINITIONS SEC. 2. (a) When used in this title, unless the context otherwise requires (1) "Person" means an individual or company. (2) "Company" means a corporation, a partnership, an association, a joint-stock company, a business trust, or an organized |