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BRANDEIS and HOLMES, JJ., dissenting.

held that since the enactment had been given the force of law in Virginia, it was as much the action of that State as if it had been originally passed by an authorized legislative body. In being so adopted by Virginia the enactment clearly did not lose the quality which it had had from its inception, namely, that of being a "statute." It was in this connection that Mr. Justice Field said: "Any enactment, from whatever source originating, to which a State gives the force of law is a statute of the State, within the meaning of the clause cited relating to the jurisdiction of this court." This language was used with reference to the acts of an irregular legislative body whose enactments would be commonly described as "statutes." It had no reference to the acts of a regular legislative body whose enactments would never be characterized as statutes, in ordinary speech. That Mr. Justice Field would not so have applied it, is clear. For in the term of Court preceding that in which Williams v. Bruffy was decided, he had participated in the decision in Home Insurance Co. v. City Council of Augusta, 93 U. S. 116, 121, in which the Court had plainly indicated that a municipal ordinance was not a statute of any State."

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The dicta concerning our jurisdiction in Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Goldsboro, and in Reinman v. Little

be maintained that a statute of, or authority exercised under, the hostile de facto Government of Virginia was the statute of or authority of a State, in the sense of the law which is this Court's commission to take cognizance of appeals from the state tribunals? (5. How., Scott vs. Jones)." The case cited by Mr. Maury, 5 How. 343, 376, held that the statutes of an unorganized political body were not statutes "of a State" within the meaning of § 25 of the Judiciary Act, although that body later became a State. In Miners Bank v. Iowa, 12 How. 1, a territorial statute was held not to be a statute "of a State" within § 25, though the Territory had since become a State. The language in Ford v. Surget, 97 U. S. 594, 603, 604, and Stevens v. Griffith, 111 Û. S. 48, 50, also makes clear the exact point of the decision in Williams v. Bruffy.

BRANDEIS and HOLMES, JJ., dissenting.

277 U.S.

Rock, have never been repeated in any later case dealing with municipal ordinances, even where the decisions in the two cases have been relied upon. Some care seems to have been taken not to repeat the expression that a municipal ordinance was a statute of a State. See Thomas Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 242 U. S. 526, 529; Zucht v. King, 260 U. S. 174, 176. To construe the phrase "statute of any State" as applying to a municipal ordinance disregards the common and appropriate use of the words; ignores decisions which for nearly a century have governed our jurisdiction to review judgments of state courts sustaining the validity of such ordinances; and tends to defeat the general purpose of the Act of 1925 "to relieve this Court by limiting further the absolute right to a review by it." Moore v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 272 U. S. 317, 321; Smith v. Wilson, 273 U. S. 388, 390.20 It completely frustrates the particular purpose which Congress must have had in striking from § 237 the clause" or an authority exercised under any state." "1 The trival character of the substan

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20 Much weight was given to this purpose in construing earlier acts reducing our jurisdiction. Compare McLish v. Roff, 141 U. S. 661, 666; Robinson v. Caldwell, 165 U. S. 359, 362; American Sugar Refining Co. v. New Orleans, 181 U. S. 277, 281, all construing the Circuit Court of Appeals Act, March 3, 1891, c. 517, 26 Stat. 826; American Security & Trust Co. v. District of Columbia, 224 U. S. 491, 495, construing § 250 of the Judicial Code; Inter-Island Steam Navigation Co., Ltd., v. Ward, 242 U. S. 1, construing § 246 of the Judicial Code, as amended by the Act of January 28, 1915, c. 22, 38 Stat. 803.

21 Since the effective date of the Act of 1925, judgments of state courts sustaining the validity of municipal ordinances have been reviewed on writ of error in a number of cases. Beery v. Houghton, 273 U. S. 671 (Per Curiam); Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392; Angelo. v. Winston-Salem, 274 U. S. 725 (Per Curiam); Bloecher & Schaaf v. Baltimore, 275 U. S. 490 (Per Curiam); Kresge Co. v. Dayton, 275 U. S. 505 (Per Curiam). Compare Natchez v. McNeely, 275 U. S. 502 (Per Curiam). But in none of them did

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tive question presented by this case-in which a writ of certiorari, if applied for, would plainly not have been granted-illustrates the wisdom of Congress in limiting our jurisdiction on writ of error.

SULTAN RAILWAY & TIMBER COMPANY v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON ET AL.

ECLIPSE MILL COMPANY v. SAME.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON.

Nos. 274 and 275. Argued March 5, 1928. Decided May 14, 1928. 1. An order of a state bureau requiring a manufacturer to report the number and wages of employees, and to pay premiums or assessments into the state workmen's compensation fund out of which injured employees are compensated, is a "statute" of the State within the meaning of Jud. Code, § 237 (a). King Mfg. Co. v. Augusta, ante, p. 100. P. 136.

2. Employment on a navigable river in assembling saw logs there in booms for towage elsewhere for sale, and the breaking up of booms which have been towed on such a river to a saw mill and the guiding of the logs to a conveyor extending into the river by which they are drawn into the mill for sawing, is employment of a local character having only an incidental relation to navigation and commerce, and the rights and obligations of the employees and their employers arising from injuries suffered by the former may be regulated by the local compensation law. P. 137. 141 Wash. 172, affirmed.

counsel question the jurisdiction of this Court, or call to our attention the significance of the amendment of § 237 made by the Act of 1925. It is well settled that the exercise of jurisdiction under such circumstances is not to be deemed a precedent when the question is finally brought before us for determination. United States v. More, 3 Cranch, 159, 172; Snow v. United States, 118 U. S. 346, 354; Cross v. Burke, 146 U: S. 82, 86; Louisville Trust Co. v. Knott, 191 U. S. 225, 236; Arant v. Lane, 245 U. S. 166, 169.

Opinion of the Court.

277 U.S.

ERROR to judgments of the Supreme Court of Washington, affirming judgments which upheld an order of the respondent, requiring the petitioners to make reports and deposits under the State Workmen's Compensation Law.

Mr. Frederic E. Fuller, with whom Messrs. James W. McBurney and John H. O'Brien were on the brief, submitted for plaintiffs in error.

Mr. Mark H. Wight, with whom Mr. John H. Dunbar was on the brief, for defendants in error.

MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.

These suits present the same questions, were heard together and may be disposed of in one opinion, as they were below.

They were brought to restrain the enforcement of an order, legislative in character, made by a state bureauthe objection to the order being that it is repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States in that it impinges on the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States. The order was upheld by the trial court and by the Supreme Court of the State, 141 Washington 172. The cases are here on writs of error sued out under § 237(a) of the Judicial Code.

The order is a statute of the State within the meaning of that section, and therefore our jurisdiction is invoked in the right mode. John P. King Manufacturing Co. v. Augusta, ante, p. 100, and cases there cited.

The order requires each of the plaintiffs from time to time to report the number of men employed by it in the work about to be described; together with the wages paid to them, and to pay into the State's workmen's compensation fund, out of which injured employees are compensated, premiums or assessments based on such wages.

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135

BRANDEIS and HOLMES, JJ., dissenting.

The plaintiff in one suit is conducting logging operations, a part of which consists in putting sawlogs into booms, after they have been thrown into a navigable river, so that they conveniently may be towed elsewhere for sale. The men are employed in the booming work. The plaintiff in the other suit conducts a saw mill on the bank of a navigable river. Logs are towed in booms to a point adjacent to the mill and then anchored. The booms afterwards are taken apart and the logs are guided to a conveyor extending into the river and then drawn into the mill for sawing. The men are employed in taking apart the booms and guiding the logs to the conveyor. In both instances the place of work is on navigable waterin one it is done before actual transportation begins and in the other after the transportation is completed.

It is settled by our decisions that where the employment, although maritime in character, pertains to local matters, having only an incidental relation to navigation and commerce, the rights, obligations and liabilities of the parties, as between themselves, may be regulated by local rules which do not work material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law or interfere with its uniformity. Grant Smith-Porter Co. v. Rohde, 257 U. S. 469; Millers' Indemnity Underwriters v. Braud, 270 U. S. 59; Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Accident Commission, 276 U. S. 467.

We think the order in question as applied to the situations disclosed comes within that rule.

Judgments affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS.

For reasons stated in John P. King Manufacturing Co. v. City Council of Augusta, ante, p. 100, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES and I think that the writs of error in these cases also should be dismissed. Treating these writs of error as

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