32 BRANDEIS, J., dissenting. phone Co. v. Fuller, 229 U. S. 322, 329, it was said that in taxation there is a broader power of classification than in some other exercises of legislation. The cases dealing specifically with classification for purpose of taxation on a basis similar to that here employed, are not discussed in the opinion of the Court; and only one of them is cited. It seems desirable to call attention to some of them, as the rule which they declare is embodied in the tax systems of the Nation and of many States. long, and at 8 cents if the line was 15 miles or less in length. Dow v. Beidelman, 125 U. S. 680, 690, 691. Compare Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Conley, 230 U. S. 513, 522. A statute which permitted railroads less than 50 miles in length to heat passenger cars by stove or furnace, but denied such permission to lines of 50 miles or more. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. R. Co. v. New York, 165 U. S. 628, 633. A statute which pernitted railroads of less than 50 miles in length to be operated without a complete crew, but denied such permission to lines of 50 miles or more. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, 219 U. S. 453; St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, 240 U. S. 518, 520. An inspection law which applied to mines employing 6 or more men, but not to those employing 5 or less. St. Louis Consolidated Coal Co. v. Illinois, 185 U. S. 203, 207. A screen law which applied to mines employing 10 or more men, but not to those employing 9 or less. McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, 551. A statute requiring a washroom at mines where there was a request by 20 employees, but not at mines where by only 19. Booth v. Indiana, 237 U. S. 391, 397. Workmen's compensation laws which apply to employers of 4 or 5 men, but not to employers of less. Jeffrey Manufacturing Co. v. Blagg, 235 U. S. 571, 576; Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 249 U. S. 152, 159; Ward & Gow v. Krinsky, 259 U. S. 503, 516. A fire inspection law which applied to hotels with 50 or more rooms, but not to hotels with 49 or less. Miller v. Strahl, 239 U. S. 426, 434. A law which required the licensing of physicians who during the preceding year had treated 11 or less persons, but not those who had treated 12 or more. Watson v. Maryland, 218 U. S. 173. An ordinance which prohibited the keeping of a private market within 6 squares of a public one but not within 7. Natal v. Louisiana, 139 U. S. 621. A statute which prohibited the herding of sheep within BRANDEIS, J., dissenting. 277 U.S. In Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 300, 301, the inheritance tax, in the case of strangers to the blood, exempted estates of $500, but did not allow that exemption to larger estates. Moreover, it prescribed 2 2 miles of a dwelling house, but not if a yard or more beyond. Bacon v. Walker, 204 U. S. 311. A law which prohibited the establishment of a carbon black factory within 10 miles of an incorporated town, but not if a rod more remote. Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U. S. 300, 324. A statute permitting, in a suit against a corporation, a change of venue where it had more than 50 stockholders, but not if it had 50 or less. Cincinnati Street Ry. Co. v. Snell, 193 U. S. 30. Statutes exempting from certain requirements banks whose transactions average $500 or more. Engel v. O'Malley, 219 U. S. 128; Dillingham v. McLaughlin, 264 U. S. 370. A tax law providing for the forfeit of tracts of 1,000 acres or more, but which does not provide for forfeiting, under like circumstances, tracts of 999 acres or less. King v. Mullins, 171 U. S. 404, 435. A statute which fixed the number of peremptory challenges to jurors at 8, but allowed 15 in cities having a population of over 100,000 inhabitants. Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68. Many other statutes involving the classification of cities according to population, under which a single resident more or less may affect vitally not only the power and duties of the municipality, but the rights and liabilities of persons resident therein. Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22; Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517, 548; Moeschen v. Tenement House Department, 203 U. S. 583; Northwestern Laundry Co. v. Des Moines, 239 U. S. 486, 495; Marcus Brown Co. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170, 198; Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140, 143; Radice v. New York, 264 U. S. 292, 296. 2 Compare the statutory provisions in Arkansas, Crawford & Moses Digest, 1921, § 10221; Kansas, Revised Statutes, 1923, § 79-1501; Maryland, Bagby's Code, 1924, § 124; Michigan, Compiled Laws, 1915, 14525; Nebraska, Session Laws, 1923, c. 187. See In re Fox's Estate, 154 Mich. 5. The more common type of statute which taxes only the amount above the exemption, e. g., Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 9, 69, likewise discriminates between different dollars. The constitutionality of such exemptions was affirmed as recently as Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U. S. 284, 289. Compare Minot v. Winthrop, 162 Mass. 113; Gelsthorpe v. Furnell, 20 Mont. 299; State v Alston, 94 Tenn. 674; In re Hickok's Estate, 78 Vt. 259. 32 BRANDEIS, J., dissenting. progressive rates, rising in steps with the amount of the gift and applying to the entire gift and not merely to the excess. Under the law a legatee of $10,000, being subject to a 3 per cent. tax, would receive net $9,700, whereas a legatee of $10,001; being subject to a 4 per cent. tax on the entire legacy would receive net only $9,600.96. The Court held the classification reasonable, saying: "The condition is not arbitrary because it is determined by that value [of the inheritance]; it is not unequal in operation because it does not levy the same percentage on every dollar; does not fail to treat all alike under like circumstances and conditions, both in the privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed.' The jurisdiction of courts is fixed by amounts. The right of appeal is. As was said at bar the Congress of the United States has classified the right of suitors to come into the United States courts by amounts. Regarding these alone, there is the same inequality that is urged against classification of the Illinois law. All license laws and all specific taxes have in them elements of inequality, nevertheless they are universally imposed and their legality has never been questioned." The Court has likewise sustained a statute which imposed an ad valorem tax upon telephone companies with annual earnings of $500 or more, while exempting others similarly situated whose earnings were less than $500, Citizens Telephone Co. v. Fuller, 229 U. S. 322, 329; a statute which imposed a license fee upon "all persons 3 Compare In re McKennan's Estate, 27 S. Dak. 136, sustaining a similar provision in Laws 1905, c. 54. Even where such rates do not apply to the total amount but only to that over a certain excess, they seem to violate the standards now laid down by the Court. But since Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 283, and Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 109, the validity of taxes of this type has no longer been open to doubt. BRANDEIS, J., dissenting. 277 U.S. engaged in the laundry busines but exempted concerns employing not more than two women, and steam laundries, Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59, 62;* an ordinance under which a $5 tax was laid upon merchants whose gross sales were $1,000, and a tax of $10 upon those similarly situated whose sales were $1,001, Clark v. Titusville, 184 U. S. 329, 331;5 an ordinance which laid a tax of $1,000 upon theatres whose admission was $1 or more, but only $400 upon those similarly situated whose admission prices were less than $1 and more than 50 cents, Metropolis Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 228 U. S. 61, 69-70. In the light of these decisions, I should have supposed the validity of the classification made by the Legislature of Kentucky to be clear. Recognizing that members of For statutes exempting small producers, borrowers, etc., from license taxes of various sorts, compare Florida Revised Statutes, 1920, §§ 842, 843, 855; Georgia Code, 1926, § 993 (115) and (124); Carroll's Kentucky Statutes, 1922, §§ 4224, 4238; South Carolina Code, 1922, § 5188; Tennessee, Public Acts, 1923, p. 258 (mortgage registration tax); Virginia, Tax Bill, § 922; West Virginia, Acts Extraordinary Session, 1919, c. 5. See Los Angeles Gas & Electric Corporation v. Los Angeles, 163 Cal. 621, 627; Cobb v. Commissioners, 122 N. C. 307, 312; Pipe Line Co. v. Hallanan, 87 W. Va. 396. 5 For stepped taxes of this type, compare California Political Code, 1920, §§ 3376, 3379; Florida Revised Statutes, 1920, §§ 839, 850; Georgia Code, 1926, § 993 (53) and (54); Nebraska Compiled Statutes, 1922, § 681; New Hampshire Public Laws, 1926, c. 225, § 91; Oregon Laws, 1920, § 6883; Shannon's Tennessee Code, Supp. 1926, § 712, pp. 200, 206, 208, 227, § 717; Utah Compiled Laws, 1917, § 1271, as amended by Laws, 1925, c. 112; Virginia, Tax Bill, §§ 46, 462, 109; Remington's Washington Compiled Statutes, 1922, § 3841, as amended by Laws, Extra Session 1925, c. 149; Wyoming, Laws 1925, c. 117, § 1. Compare Saks v. Mayor of Birmingham, 120 Ala. 190; In re Martin, 62 Kans. 638; Gordon v. City of Louisville, 138 Ky. 442; State v. Merchants Trading Co., 114 La. 529; Wayne Mercantile Co. v. Commissioners of Mount Olive, 161 N. C. 121; Salt Lake City v. Christensen Co., 34 Utah 38. Compare California Political Code, 1920, § 3380; Shannon's Tennessee Code, Supp. 1926, § 712, pp. 214, 220. 32 BRANDEIS, J., dissenting. the legislature of the State which made the classification, and members of the court which sanctioned it, necessarily possessed greater knowledge of local conditions and needs than is possible for us, I should have assumed that this classification, which obviously is not invidious, was a reasonable one, unless some facts were adduced to show that it was arbitrary. Compare Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. S. 245, 255; Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392, 397. No such facts have been adduced by the Company. On the other hand, facts called to our attention by counsel for the Commonwealth and of which we may take judicial notice, McLean v. Denver & Rio Grande R. R. Co., 203 U. S. 38, 50; Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U. S. 52, 61, show that the classification was adopted by the Legislature of Kentucky in an effort to equalize the tax burden incident to loans. The mortgage recording tax is a feature of the revenue system of at least nine states.' Its purpose in all is substantially the same-to supply an effective means for reaching this form of intangible property, which is likely to evade taxation under the general property tax. The recording tax is commonly accompanied either by a complete exemption of mortgage securities from other property taxation or, as in Kentucky, by exemption of such 7 Alabama, Acts 1903, p. 227; Kansas, Laws 1925, c. 273; Kentucky, Acts Special Session 1917, c. 11, § 9; Michigan, Acts 1911, p. 132; Minnesota, Laws 1907, c. 328, as amended by Laws 1913, c. 163, and Laws 1921, c. 445; New York, Laws 1906, c. 532, and Laws 1907, c. 340, amending Laws 1905, c. 729; Oklahoma, Session Laws 1913, p. 684; Tennessee, Acts 1923, p. 258, Acts 1925, p. 472; Virginia, Acts 1910, p. 488. See State v. Alabama Fuel & Iron Co., 188 Ala. 487; Middendorf v. Goodale, 202 Ky. 118; Union Trust Co. v. Common Council of Detroit, 170 Mich. 692; Mutual Benefit Insurance Co. v. County of Martin, 104 Minn. 179; People v. Ronner, 185 N. Y. 285; Trustees' Insurance Corporation v. Hooton, 53 Okla. 530; Pocahontas Consolidated Collieries Co. v. Commonwealth, 113 Va. 108; Saville v. Virginia Ry. & Power Co., 114 Va, 444, |