a distinct body of land, and that they were not entitled to participate in the funds of the Cherokee Nation.

The Court in that case decided that they were entitled to all of their rights as Cherokees by reason of their contract. The question of title to the land was not considered in that suit. It was not of any importance at that time.

Now, in this case we are only asking that the Cherokees maintain what was absolutely the facts. We have got the evidence; we have the proof; the records to show and to bear out all of the contentions of the Delawares in that agreement.

Mr. CASE. Of course, in respect to their rights as Cherokees the Delawares also secured a share or interest in the funds of the Chrokees which funds included $157,600.

Mr. WOODARD. That was as 985 is to 13,000, almost 14,000 so that was almost insignificant.

Mr. CASE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to direct a few questions to some other points in the bill. I would like to know whether there are any other suits pending at this time. I would like to have that question answered by counsel for the Department. Are there any other suits that may be filed under this act other than the two which are specifically mentioned here?

Mr. WOODARD. No, sir.

Mr. CASE. It appears from the wording of the bill, as it is drawn, that it reestablishes the right to file suits in general.

Mr. REEVES. I am of the opinion, Mr. Chairman, that this bill would permit the filing of other suits as enumerated on page 2 of the bill. That is, if the Indians have any other claims; if they have any other claims they could present them.

Mr. TRIMBLE. I don't see how it would, Mr. Reeves. The purpose of this bill is merely to reinstate these two suits in the Court of Claims.

Mr. REEVES. It provides:

And jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon the Court of Claims, and it is hereby authorized and directed, irrespective of the statutes of limitation

Mr. CASE. That is my point.

Mr. TRIMBLE. That applies only as far as these two suits are concerned.

Mr. CASE. That may be your understanding that that is as far as these two suits are concerned, but the wording destroys the statutes of limitation and it reenacts the jurisdictional bill and if there are "other claims they could be brought.

Mr. WOODARD. I get your point.

Mr. CASE. I think, then, an amendment should be made on that point, and further for this reason that lines 9 and 10 go further in expanding the jurisdiction of the original act.

Lines 9 and 10, on page 2 of this bill, provide that "the words 'de novo' and the clause and without regard to any decision finding or settlement heretofore had in respect of such claims' in the act of February 7, 1925, as amended," shall not apply to suits on claims filed after the approval of this act.

Therefore, if other claims could be filed after the approval of this act other than the suit specifically set forth, and we rule out previous findings or settlements, it would enlarge the jurisdiction of the original

act.

Mr. REEVES. I think that is correct.

Mr. WOODARD. Yes; I think that is correct; if you want to, limit it absolutely to these two suits and without the reenacting of this enabling act or for any other purpose.

Mr. TRIMBLE. Did you read lines 9 and 10 on page 2, Mr. Case? Mr. CASE. Yes.

Mr. TRIMBLE. It says, "shall not apply to suits on claims filed after the approval of this act."

Mr. REEVES. That would imply that additional suits might or could be filed after the passage of this act?

Mr. WOODARD. Yes.

Mr. HILL. What is your thought in regard to that?

Mr. WOODARD. It was our intention to limit it to these two suits. Mr. CASE. It also extends the time apparently of the original jurisdictional act.

Mr. TRIMBLE. That is necessary under the decisions of the court. Mr. HILL. Yes, that would be so far as these two cases are concerned. In the original bill, did you have a time limit?

Mr. WOODARD. No; there was no time limit set in the original bill. Mr. HILL. As it is now worded the bill would open the door for any suits that they wanted to file?

Mr. CASE. Yes.

Mr. WOODARD. They use the words "de novo." We are perfectly willing to have it limited to these two cases.

Mr. CASE. There is one other point. In the recent bills that we had up relating to the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, involving that case of Mr. Buckler's that was before the House yesterday we amended the bill to restore the right of appeal in two jurisdictional acts, but limited the appeal to questions of law.

Mr. TRIMBLE. That is all we want here.

Mr. CASE. The original wording of the bill said "both as to questions of fact and law" and the committee took the meaning along with the Attorney General that that was asking for a very special right of appeal. So we amended it and limited it to points of law and I wonder if in line 5 we should not amend it so that it reads, "with right to appeal on points of law".

Mr. TRIMBLE. That is the usual form.

Mr. WOODARD. Correct.

Mr. CASE. When we get to the executive session on these points. that I have raised, there will be no objection to limiting it to these two cases.

Mr. TRIMBLE. No; limit the appeal to questions of law.

Mr. WOODARD. Correct.

Mr. CASE. And also amending to make sure that you are not reenacting the original jurisdictional act for any number of claims? Mr. WOODARD. That is all right; you can do that.

Mr. HILL. Are you satisfied that that release cited by these Indians does not apply to 43396?

Mr. CASE. Well, under a strict interpretation that release probably covers that claim too. But, if it is true as the Secretary of the Interior says that the Indians were not aware of the right to the annual annuity of $1,000 I would be inclined to say that the Court of Claims should hear this on its merits.

My point is that the Secretary points out that no suit was pending for the amount of the appropriation under the 1805 treaty to which the Delawares now believe they are entitled, and that there will be some question whether or not they thought that claim was covered in the release since there was no formal claim or suit pending in the matter at the time.

Mr. TRIMBLE. In other words, neither of them knew of the existence of the claim. The Court of Claims has held that such releases are not a bar to recovery.

As to the effect of the release executed by the Delaware Tribe of Indians, wherein they accepted the sum of $150,000 for the release of certain suits pending in the court, it is submitted that neither the Delawares nor the United States had either of the present claims in mind at the time of the execution of this release.

Then the Delawares were not asserting any claim against the United States for annuity payments nor for the $157,600 paid for the land which they never received. The annuity had been forgotten by both parties. The suit involving the payment of $157,600 for the land, which was entitled The Delaware Indians v. The Cherokee Nation (193 U. S. 128), had just been decided by the Supreme Court. The Delawares never even dreamed that they had a claim against the United States at that time.

At the time of the execution of the release, however, the Delawares were prosecuting 12 suits in the Court of Claims against the United States, being Nos. 23104, 23162, 24067, 24645, 24926, 24927, 24928, 24929, 24930, 24931, 24932, and 24933. (See 72 C. Cls. 538.) Both the Delawares and the officers of the United States had in mind at that time the particular suits which were to be dismissed, and such suits covered all claims known to both parties at that time, and were all dismissed by the Delawares as agreed upon.

Under such circumstances a release executed by a business corporation would not be a bar to a suit, and here we are dealing with Indians. In the case of Federal Motor Truck Co. v. United States, 71 Court of Claims 545, the court reformed a release contract and perparties mitted the corporation to recover where a mistake has been by the in the amount due the corporation under a settlement contract. In this case was included an item for the payment of a subcontractor of $9,927.68 instead of $21,045.46, which was the correct amount. In its opinion the court said:

Both the plaintiff and defendant believed the item of $9,927.68 was the just amount due the subcontractor when the settlement contract was executed. Both of them were mistaken. It was a mistake of fact, not of law. The contract should be reformed.

Upon the facts the court awarded a judgment. The Indians are entitled to greater protection than an astute business corporation. The Indians are wards of the Government. In the case of Worcester v. Georgia (6 Pet. 515), Justice McLean, of the Supreme Court of the United States, said:

The language used in treaties with the Indians should never be construed to their prejudice. If words be made use of which are susceptible of a more extended meaning than their plain import, as connected with the tenor of the treaty, they should be considered as used only in the letter sense. * * * How the words of the treaty were understood by this unlettered people, rather than their critical meaning, should form the rule of construction.

Mr. HILL. I think that the report is to the contrary, and that the Indians had knowledge of those claims for many years and they certainly must have had that information on July 9, 1904, when they signed their release under the act. That was on July 9, 1904, and in his statement the Secretary said:

The release was signed by 90 Indians, $150,000 was paid to them and their attorneys, and action was taken to dismiss all suits then pending in the courts.

It may be said, however, that apparently no suit was pending for the amount of the appropriation under the 1805 treaty to which the Delawares now believe they are entitled. This would, no doubt, come under the heading "Claims" and be covered by the release.

Now, that is what the Secretary said, but you have not explained to me that they were not cognizant of that and they had a proviso inserted providing that the payment should be made after the Indians should have signed a writing stating that such payments were in full of all claims and demands of every name and nature of such Delaware Indians against the United States, and that they should discontinue all actions pending in the courts wherein they were plaintiff and the United States was defendant. I would like you to explain to me why the lawyers and the Indians were not cognizant of that.

Mr. ČASE. You are right on that, Mr. Chairman. I have been thinking more particularly about the larger claim and read the report relating to that, although I was under the impression that in the showing that was made at the time this bill was before the full committee that something was presented to indicate that the use of the word "claim" was understood by the Indians as meaning claims under which formal suits had been filed.

Mr. TRIMBLE. Mr. Chairman, on page 3 of this report here, where he is talking about 43399, it says:

The attorneys for the Indians are under the impression that the two cases mentioned above and in the bill should be tried under the original jurisdictional act without the defense of the United States of the release referred to. As above stated, the claim for annuities presented in Case No. 43399 would, no doubt, be covered by the release. It appears to be a valid claim, and as it was evidently unknown at the time the release was signed, apparent fairness to the Indians would, no doubt, necessitate a trial upon the merits without such defense.

Mr. CASE. That is Case No. 43399?

Mr. TRIMBLE. I am talking about annuities. The Secretary says in fairness to the Indians-that is the defense, and the Secretary says: "It was apparently unknown at the time the release was signed."

Mr. HILL. That is 43399?

Mr. TRIMBLE. Yes.

Mr. HILL. I am talking about the other one.

Mr. TRIMBLE. I beg your pardon.

Mr. WOODARD. The release that was signed by the delegate was signed on the 13th day of October 1904. The decision in the Delaware-Cherokee case

Mr. HILL. I beg your pardon; did you say the release was signed in October?

Mr. WOODARD. Yes; the release was signed on the 13th of October 1904.

Mr. HILL. Does that correspond with the statement in the report here?

Mr. WOODARD. What does the report state?

Mr. HILL. It said "when they signed that release under the act." It says in the report:

The Indians, however, have had knowledge of this claim for many years and should have had such information on July 19, 1904, as it was then in existence, when they signed a release under the act of April 21, 1904 (33 Stat. L. 222). which authorized the payment to the Delaware Tribe in the sum of $150,000 "in full of all claims and demands of said tribe against the United States."

Mr. WOODARD. Well, that is wrong.

Mr. TRIMBLE. We have a copy of it here.

Mr. HILL. I just want to get that clear.

Mr. WOODARD. The acceptance of the terms of the release was on October 13, 1904, and the release was finally signed the next year. Mr. HILL. At that time did they the Delawares-not have knowledge of the suit on claims?

Mr. WOODARD. That was just a short time after the decision in the Delaware-Cherokee suit. It was just a month or two after that decision. Of course, the Delawares had no idea then that they would make claim against the Government. They knew they had lost the Delaware-Cherokee suit. Our attorneys never had any idea at that time that the fault had been in not making the United States Government a party. The Delawares could not have possibly had in mind releasing the Government from anything in regard to that.

Mr. HILL. Well, if they had such outstanding men as Mathew Quay, certainly he was intelligent enough to give them advice as to what the signing of that release meant. Senator Quay certainly knew.

Mr. WOODARD. He was in the Senate at that time and if he had any part in Delaware affairs then I do not know. They had able attorneys, and why it was done, I do not know, but I know that the United States Government was not a party to that and that question was never raised until I made a contract with the Delawares to represent them.

Mr. HILL. Then, it was immaterial whether the United States was a party to the suit or not, because it says: "In full of all claims and demands of said tribe against the United States." Whether the United States was a party or not is immaterial; they were signing a release giving up all claims against the United States, and as they had men like Mathew Quay and others just as intelligent as he as attorneys, they certainly must have given them advice in regard to that matter. Mr. WOODARD. The point I am making, Mr. Chairman, is they could only release all claims they knew about at that time. At that time they did not know that they had any right against the Government; they did not know they had this annuity coming to them. As soon as they were informed of that they immediately took steps to recover it.

Mr. HILL. Do you mean to say their attorneys did not know it? Mr. WOODARD. They did not; none of them knew it. They have had two sets of attorneys and the question was never raised of the liability of the Government until I made my contract with the Delawares and that is the only reason I took it up when I realized the Government was responsible.

Mr. HILL. I have never found attorneys for Indians to be as lax as that.