cuartel, where there were only a couple of guards stationed, and thus secured all the arms of the constabulary. The town people of Surigao took no part with Concepcion. Captain Clark, who was at his house some 200 yards away, at once proceeded to the scene, although only armed with a revolver, and shot two of the assailants, but was in turn himself cut down and killed. This gave the attacking force about 150 weapons-rifles, shotguns, and revolvers-and left the town and province without any effective force of constabulary, as the latter with their commander killed and themselves disarmed could offer no resistance. The provincial treasurer, Captain Kelly, and a few other Americans who were in the provincial building, with such arms as they could secure stood off the outlaws, who by that time had complete possession of the town, and the telegraph office being in the provincial building were able to telegraph to Manila and Cebu an account of what had happened. There was an army post at Iligan, in the adjoining province of Misamis, a comparatively short distance from Surigao. The civil governor, on receipt of information of what had happened and in view of the proximity of military forces to the scene, requested that the military commander of the district take charge of matters and proceed to suppress disorder, and accordingly General Lee and afterwards General Wint took control of affairs, placing Colonel Meyer, Eleventh Infantry, U. S. Army, in immediate charge and command. In the meantime Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, of the constabulary, began rapidly to throw constabulary detachments into Surigao, so that within forty-eight hours after the disaster there was quite a number of soldiers and constabulary in position to take the field, which they did at once and began a systematic search and pursuit of outlaws which resulted in the killing or capturing of most of them in short order. Nearly all of the captured weapons were recaptured. There was at this time quite a feeling of dissatisfaction and unrest in both of the provinces of Misamis and Surigao at the time of these occurrences, due to the taking of the census and the prevalence of the idea among the ignorant that their property was being scheduled in order to tax or confiscate it. As soon as the town of Surigao was captured, as above detailed, a small band of the people of Misamis took the field under one Flores, but he was also soon disposed of by the military forces.

The events thus narrated chronicle the most serious disaster which has happened to the constabulary since its organization. It could not have occurred but for the overconfidence and consequent carelessness of the senior inspector who, however, did all that a brave man could do to repair his mistake by the sacrifice of his life.

I have thus given a brief epitome of the most serious instances of resistance to constituted authority which have occurred during the past year. With perhaps the exception of San Miguel, in Rizal Province, none of them had the slightest political significance. Of all the leaders who have figured as above, San Miguel was the only one who did not have a previous record as an ordinary robber and most of them were fugitives from justice. San Miguel claimed to be, and doubtless was, the head of a movement semipolitical in character and which had its source in the plotting of a few reckless and unscrupulous men living in the city of Manila and who were leaders in the Nacionalista party, having for its ostensible object the ultimate independence of the Filipino people through "peaceful methods," what

ever that may mean. Probably the real director of the movement was Dr. Dominador Gomez, a Filipino physician, a Spanish subject married to a Spanish woman, who had been a surgeon in the Spanish army until a few months before, when he left Madrid, as has been alleged, under a cloud, and came to the Philippine Islands, passed the custom-house under an assumed name, looking for trouble. No better type of a professional agitator and blatherskite could well be found. He at once posed as a friend of the laboring man and became the successor of Isabella de los Reyes, who had been sent to jail for unlawful practices in connection with a labor organization of which he was the founder and head. Gomez also became the president of the Nacionalista party and started a newspaper called Los Obreros. Thus equipped, he was ready for business; proceeded to enroll members of his so-called labor organization, not only in Manila, but throughout the provinces, and to levy contributions, all of which went into his own pocket without question or supervision by anyone.

He and his colleagues began making speeches, writing articles, and presenting seditious plays to the natives, tending to stir them up again to the point of insurrection. He was in communication with San Miguel, Felizardo, and Montalon, of the outlaws already referred to, and encouraged them to continue resistance. It finally became necessary to arrest and prosecute him for these seditious actions and utterances, and also for misappropriation of money belonging to the labor union of which he was the head. He was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of four years, and is now being tried upon still another charge. This determined action by the authorities, together with the operations of the constabulary, put an end to this so-called political movement, if it can be thus dignified.

While the labors of the constabulary during the year have been constant and arduous, as has been shown, it must not be inferred from what has been said that there has been any considerable or formidable disorder except in the provinces above specifically referred to; on the contrary, the fact is that in the large majority of the provinces peace and order have prevailed unbroken and life and property have been safe, probably as much so as in most sections of the United States. American officials and private individuals have gone about the country generally unarmed and without molestation. At the time of this writing the islands are perhaps more quiet than ever before in their history. The speedy killing or the arrest and punishment, through the medium of the courts, of outlaws and other violators of the law it is believed has already produced a most beneficial effect and has borne in upon the minds of those likely to in the future depart from the paths of peace the knowledge that such a course is both unprofitable and dangerous. Perhaps the most important result of these operations has been the encouragement it has given the conservative and law-abiding people, who are in the majority, to denounce offenders and aid in their apprehension. Heretofore they have been inclined to compound with violators of the law and quietly submit to their depredations, but now, appreciating the vigorous efforts of the government for their protection, are giving valuable assistance. In many instances they have organized volunteer associations and have gone out with the constabulary acting as guides, and in some instances take themselves the initiative against the ladrones and kill or capture them. I am glad to say that this spirit is steadily growing and when it becomes general,

ladronism, which has so long been the curse of this people, is at an end. In the course of their operations the constabulary have gathered in nearly all of the firearms which had not theretofore been surrendered by the insurrectos and which still remained in the hands of lawless men. The details of the operations of the constabulary will be found set out in full in the accompanying report of Brig. Gen. Henry T. Allen, chief of the Philippines Constabulary, and of Colonels Scott, Baker, Bandholtz, and Taylor, assistant chiefs.

The act of Congress approved January 30, 1903, authorized the detail of companies of scouts to cooperate with the Philippines Constabulary when detailed for that purpose by the commanding general upon the request of the civil governor, and to be under the command for tactical purposes of the chief and assistant chiefs of the Philippines Constabulary, who are officers of the United States Army. This act was timely and its effect has been most beneficial. The Philippine Scouts are all Filipinos commanded by Americans selected from noncommissioned officers of the Regular Army or from civil life, and form a part of the general military establishment in the islands. As a result it was possible to supplement, wherever necessary, the constabulary with these scouts or such of them as were needed.

Majs. Gen. George W. Davis and James F. Wade, the division commanders, have invariably, upon the request of the civil governor, detailed scout companies for work with the constabulary. There have been thus detailed during the year 29 companies of Philippine Scouts, who have been under the command of the chief and assistant chiefs of the constabulary. They are entitled to their full share of credit for whatever has been done in bringing about the present very satisfactory conditions as to peace and order.

Some opposition has been manifested in military circles to this act of Congress which thus places the scout companies under the control of the chief and assistant chiefs of the constabulary. It has been asserted that the act is, to say the least of it, unadvisable and is in some ways a reflection upon the army officers ordinarily having these scout companies under their command, and that if the scouts were needed for the purpose of maintaining order they should be under the control and direction of the commanding officers of the department and their subordinates.

General Davis, in his report covering the period of military operations in the Philippines from October 1, 1902, to July 26, 1903, voices this sentiment, as follows:

It is greatly regretted that political considerations seemed to require the captains, field officers, and generals of the forces here to occupy the mortifying position which the execution of this law involved, viz, to be forbidden to lead into action the troops of their command whom they had organized, instructed for years, brought to a high state of efficiency, and whose material wants, under other leadership, they must still supply.

It does not seem to me, however, that this view of the matter is sound. In the first place, the act of Congress gives the rank of brigadier-general and colonel, respectively, to the chief and assistant chiefs of the constabulary, detailed for that duty from the Regular Army. The responsibility and importance attached to these positions well warrant the rank thus given. Their detail is made by the Secretary of War. It is not perceived why, when the public interest demands it, a temporary detail of Philippine Scouts, for service under these con

stabulary officers, is in any way a reflection upon the general officers who, prior to the detail, commanded them. It is simply a temporary transfer of command from one Regular Army officer to another. Whatever of value there is accruing by reason of the services of the scouts inures to the credit of the Army. The Philippine Scouts have only a company organization, they have never had a battalion or regimental formation except that several of the companies have been thrown into a battalion under the command of Major Carrington, U. S. Army, to be sent to the Louisiana Purchase Exposition at St. Louis. The chief and assistant chiefs of the constabulary are officers of mature age much senior in rank to the officers immediately in command of scout companies. Upon what principle the latter have any just cause for complaint is not perceived, as they still remain in command, nor is it easy to see upon what principle the general officer who commanded these scouts prior to the detail is subjected to any indignity, unless it be that of taking them from his command and placing them under another officer of equal rank. If when thus detached these companies were to be held together en masse or in large bodies and engaged in ordinary military operations there might be some force in the objection to their being thus detailed; but this is not the case, as they are used like the constabulary, in small detachments for police purposes. It is the exception that either a scout or a constabulary officer has under his immediate command as many men as a full company. It would therefore be impossible for the general of the division or his subordinate generals, from whose command these scouts are temporarily taken, to command them unless the whole constabulary force in a given district were turned over to them. If this were done, chief and assistant chiefs of constabulary might, with far more propriety, insist that they were being suspended as to their functions and thus discriminated against. Undoubtedly if there were anything like a general uprising which called for the intervention of the military forces the scouts would be under the command of their own officers, and doubtless also the entire constabulary would be placed under the direction of the division commander; but this is not the situation. There has not been at any time or in any instance anything more to deal with than a local band of outlaws, generally few in number and easily disposed of when overtaken. It has been more a question of guarding remote outlying towns and barrios against the raids of these marauders and of overtaking and killing or capturing them as speedly as possible. While the constabulary forces alone are adequate to perform this duty it could be done very much more expeditiously and economically by the two bodies acting in cooperation. Prior to the passage of this act, on several occasions the chief of constabulary in order to meet an emergency had concentrated in several of the provinces a considerable constabulary force, but thus to concentrate constabulary involved bringing detachments from various other provinces more or less remote; transportation is expensive and slow. To be able to call upon scout companies, stationed near any particular locality in which there is need, for reinforcing the local constabulary force is simply to aid the civil authorities in properly and cheaply suppressing disorder. Congress doubtless had this in view when it enacted the law complained of.

Again, it is to be observed that it would be misleading and therefore objectionable if every time a scout company were needed the civil governor were required to certify to the commanding general of the

division that he was unable with the force at his command to maintain order in any given locality, and that he required the aid of the military forces for this purpose; and it would be especially objectionable if as a condition precedent to the detail of a scout company it were necessary to turn over a large section of constabulary to a military commander and suspend all the ordinary functions of civil government in the disturbed district. The moral effect of such a course would be disastrous, in that it would indicate the inability of the civil authorities to cope with any situation of real difficulty and its complete dependency upon the military arm. It would have a tendency to produce the impression that the civil authorities have no confidence in the native police and dare not rely upon them in any emergency, thereby destroying their morale, and, what would be still more disastrous, convincing the mass of the people of our entire lack of faith in them and in their willingness to cooperate with us in maintaining order.

TELEGRAPH DIVISION.

Act No. 461, enacted September 12, 1902, provided for the organization of the telegraph division of the bureau of Philippine Constabulary. Logically, as this division is engaged in the transmission of intelligence, it would seem to belong to the bureau of posts, but consideration showed that it would be necessary, if it were so placed, to incur a much greater expense than if placed in the bureau of constabulary, as the latter was in a position to use, for the purposes of transportation of material, maintenance, etc., its ordinary machinery with little increased expense, while, had it been placed under the bureau of posts, an independent organization for this purpose would have been necessary. As an aid to military operations during the period of insurrection it was found necessary to construct telegraph and telephone lines through the instrumentality of the Signal Corps of the Army, connecting army headquarters at Manila with nearly every municipality in the islands in order that the military authorities might be in touch with the numerous detachments of troops garrisoning these muncipalities or engaged in operations contiguous thereto. Some 8,000 miles of wire and cable were thus laid. As peace was established and the garrisons of these outlying municipalities were drawn into larger stations, many of the established telegraph and telephone lines became no longer useful from a military standpoint and were abandoned. They were, however, of much value, indeed indispensable, for the proper carrying on of the civil which succeeded the military government and also for commercial uses. The telegraph division was therefore organized to meet these requirements. It has been engaged in taking over and repairing these lines from the Signal Corps as fast as has been practicable considering available resources.

The expressed purpose of the military authorities has been to turn over all the telegraph and telephone lines of the islands to the insular government, but the latter, owing to its inability to obtain skilled operators, has up to this time been able, through the telegraph division, to assume charge of only about 1,900 miles of telephone lines with 155 offices, and 553 miles of telegraph and cable lines with 23 offices. Owing to the immense demand for competent telegraph operators in the United States it has been almost impossible at anything like reasonable prices to obtain needed American