when the body is tired. The child tires more easily at one season than at another. The condition of the atmosphere, the weather, the time of day, all these affect normal power of endurance. Also rapid growth diminishes one's power of endurance. The child that has grown up quickly tires easily. Fatigue causes the child's mind to be less sensitive to interest or novelty. Also one order of studies fatigues the child more than another order of studies would.

It is obvious that whatever modifications are justified by the discoveries of the new psychology, they should not be left to hazard nor to the isolated action of individuals. The principles so far deduced have to do with pathology and neurology rather than with mental conditions in themselves considered; hence these principles reenforce the demand for the medical inspection of schools and school children. It is significant that this is exactly the result attained in Boston through the efforts of Dr. E. M. Hartwell, director of psychical training. Dr. Hartwell has approached the subject from the physiological standpoint, but with due appreciation of the psychical standpoint. In support of this statement, it is enough to refer to his discussions of the interrelation of mental, moral, and physical training in his report to the Boston school board for 1894. The report is a notable contribution to the vital statistics of the country, embodying the results of the most careful study that has yet been made as to the bearings of school life upon the health of school children. The extracts from this report included among the papers appended reiterate in an effective manner the very conclusions reached by specialists in psycho-physics.

Looking back over the history of the psychological awakening, it is perhaps no exaggeration to say that next to the initial impulse the most important incident of the movement is the recent return to the idea of unity.

The tendency in this direction is illustrated in the exercises at the annual meeting of the Massachusetts Schoolmasters' Club, the report of which is received just as this survey goes to press. The theme treated was psychology, and representative men had been invited to present their views on the relations of the old to the new pyschology.

Dr. Larkin Dunton, of the Boston Normal School, presented briefly the conception of mind and of its operations with which the students of the old psychology are familiar and emphasized particularly their applications to the teacher's work. The addresses of Dr. Harris and Dr. Münsterberg which are given here in full covered the double aspect of the subject. Unfortunately Dr. Hall's contribution to the discussion was not reduced to writing and hence was only preserved in a very fragmentary form.

THE OLD PSYCHOLOGY v. THE NEW.

By W. T. HARRIS, LL. D., United States Commissioner of Education.

[Delivered at the Massachusetts Schoolmasters' Club, April 25, 1895.]

I understand it to be the intention of those who proposed this question for discussion to include under the term "new psychology" only two classes of investigation, namely, what is known as "physiological psychology," dating from the discovery of Broca in 1861, and what is known as "child study," including the researches of Professor Preyer and of Dr. Stanley Hall, their coworkers and disciples.

All other studies of mind, from ancient times to the present time, whether based on induction or deduction, whether a priori, as rational · psychology, or a posteriori, as empirical psychology, should be called the "old psychology." It seems to me that both of those psychologies are of immense importance; that neither is a substitute for the other or to be neglected by the teacher who wishes to know scientifically the mind that he is supposed to educate. For 1 must hold that there is a constitution of the mind common to all rational beings-a rational nature which may be discovered by introspection and distinguished from the transient and variable characteristics which are determined in large manner by environment and conditions of development.

I would name as by far the most important knowledge from this source the distinction of the soul into several stages, as that manifested in plant life, called by Aristotlethe nutritive or vegetable soul; the soul as active in sensation and locomotion, or the animal soul; the rational soul manifested in imagination, memory, reflection, and in pure thought. The distinctions of active and passive reason made by Aristotle in his famous treaties on the soul, and so often rediscovered or verified by profound thinkers in the history of philosophy, is the principle of this classification of soul-activities. On it is founded the philosophical doctrine of the immortality of the soul. In fact, not only the doctrine of immortality, but also the doctrines of theism and the freedom of the will are based on this rock of the old psychology, developed by Aristotle out of the hints of Plato or Socrates. God, freedom, and immortality are the three good gifts of philosophy, according to Novalis. They are all derived from the insight that finds in pure thought the independent self-activity of the soul and sees in it the only possible type of being for a first principle of the world-a Creator. The idea of self-activity is, moreover, the basal idea of free will. The very concept of will is impossible on the basis of empirical thinking. For the understanding, as Coleridge defined it, deals with relations between objects, and finds causal relation everywhere, but not self-activity or will. It tries to explain each thing through its environment, and it never rests until it has traced the phenomena of an object to a ground in something else outside.

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That the fundamental condition of introspection is the admission of this idea of self-activity is evident if we consider that the world of self-consciousness contains only feelings, volitions, and ideas. Each one of these is twofold, implying subject and object. There are two poles to each. Feeling is nothing unless it has a subject that feels and unless the self that feels is the object of the feeling. So volition implies a self that acts, and, moreover, a determination or limitation of the subject issuing in an objective deed; a volition has the twofold aspect of subject and object. So, too, an idea is always thought as a determination of the self which thinks it or defines it-it is conceived by the mind; it, too, involves subject and object.

Now, by no possibility can external observation discover any such twofold objects in space and time. All objects are dead results or in a process of becoming so through some external cause. If we discriminate dead objects from living objects, and recognize plants, animals, and men before us, we do it because we interpret the forms, shapes, and movements before us as indicative of a self-determining soul within the object. We transfer to the object by an act of inference an internality of life, feeling, volition, or thought such as we know directly only by introspection, and can only know thus.

To expand this theme, one would show the importance of these distinctions of Aristotle, Aquinas, and Leibnitz in making an account of the spiritual life of man, an inventorying the principles of his civiliza tion and making clear and consistent his views of the world.

To live is one thing, but to give a rational and consistent account of one's life is a different and difficult matter. The old psychology succeeded in doing this by these fundamental distinctions, and all new attempts at psychology either prove abortive, or else soon fall into line with the old psychology, so far as these essentials are concerned-they end in affirming self-activity as more substantial than material things and in the admission of various grades of realization of this selfactivity or soul.

Another very important step in this recognition of the contents of self-consciousness which the German thinkers have added to the old psychology is the recognition of the characteristic of universality and necessity as the criterion of what is in the constitution of mind itself, as contradistinguished from experience or empirical content. By this, time and space, the categories of quality and quantity, the laws of causality, identity, and excluded middle, the ideas of self-activity, moral responsibility, and religion, all transcend experience, and are formed by introspection.

It is their application which constitutes experience, and experience would be impossible unless the mind had in itself these powers a priori, for these powers make experience possible. If we could not furnish the intuitions of infinite space and time, we could not perceive objects of experience, nor, unless we could furnish the category of causality could we refer our sensations to objects as causes.

Universal and necessary ideas are furnished by the mind itself and not derived from experience, although our consciousness of them may date from our application of them to the content of experience.

Formal logic, with its judgments and syllogisms, its figures and moods, should be regarded also as a part of rational psychology in so far as it reveals to us the forms of action of thinking reason.

All these contributions of the old psychology are of priceless value, as giving us the means to understand the place we occupy in the universe with our ideals of civilization. They furnish us directive power, they give us the regulative ideals of education, religion, jurisprudence, politics, and the general conduct of life.

But if the old psychology has furnished these substantial things, it has not furnished all that is desirable.

There is a realm of conditions which must be understood before man can be made to realize his ideals. The product of nature is an animal and not a civilized man. How can man react upon nature; how can he ascend out of his own natural condition; how can he rise from the stage of sense perception to that of reflection; how from mere reflection to mere thought; how can he put off his state of slavery to the category of thing and environment and rise to the category of selfactivity? This is to ask how he can ascend from a mechanical view of the world to an ethical view of it. Certainly he must know the bodily conditions that limit or enthrall the soul. He must be able to recognize what activity tends to fix the soul in lower order of thought and action and what exercises will tend to lift it to a higher order.

To enumerate some of these enthralling conditions through which the soul passes necessarily, if it ever comes to the highest, we must name the influences and attractions of one's habitat, its climate and soil, its outlook, its means of connection with the rest of the world. Then next there is the race and stock of which one comes, black, red, yellow, or white-northern or southern European-inheriting all the evil tendencies and all the good aspirations. Then the témperament and idiosyncrasy of the individual, as his natural talents or his geniushow deep these all lie as predetermining causes in his career. If he is alone the efficient cause or the free will-at least these conditions of habitat, race, and stock furnish the material that he is to quarry and build into the temple of his life-a parthenon, a pantheon, or only a mud hut or a snow house. Then come other natural elements to be regarded-those of sex-the seven ages from infancy to senility, the physical conditions that belong to sleep and dreams and the waking state, the health and disease of the body, the insane tendencies, the results of habits in hardening and fixing the life of the individual in some lower round of activity.

Of all these the laws of growth from infancy to mature age especially concern the educator.

There is for man, as contrasted with lower animals, a long period of helpless infancy. Prof. John Fiske has shown the importance of this fact to the theory of evolution as applied to man. Basing his theory on some hints of Wallace and Spencer, he has explained how the differentiation of the primitive savage man from the animal groups must have been accomplished. Where psychical life is complex there is not time for all capacities to become organized before birth. The prolongation of helpless infancy is required for the development of man's adaptations to the spiritual environment implied in the habits and arts. and modes of behavior of the social community into which man is born. He is born first as an infant body. He must be born second as an ethical soul or else he can not become human. The conditions are of extreme complexity. This is the most important contribution of the doctrine of evolution to education. Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler has pointed out that the Greek philosopher Anaximander, more than two thousand years ago, spoke of the prolonged period of infancy as a reason for believing that in the beginning man had an origin from animals of a different species from himself. The Greek did not perceive the relation of this prolonged infaney to the adjustment of the complex physical and spiritual activities of the child to his environment.

In the light of this discovery we may see what an important bearing the results of child study and physiological psychology will have on education; for is it not evident that if the child is at any epoch of his long period of helplessness inured into any habit or fixed form of activity belonging to a lower stage of development the tendency will be to arrest growth at that standpoint and make it difficult or next to impossible to continue the growth of the child into higher and more civilized forms of soul activity? A severe drill in mechanical habits, of memorizing or calculating, any overcultivation of sense perception in tender years, may so arrest the development of the soul at a mechanical method of thinking and prevent the further growth into spiritual insight.

Especially on the second plane of thought, that which follows sense. perception and the mechanical stage of thinking, namely, the stage of noticing mere relations and of classifying by mere likeness or difference, or even the search for causal relations, there is most danger of this arrested development. The absorption of the gaze upon adjustments within the machine prevents us from seeing the machine as a whole. The attention to details of coloring and drawing may prevent one from seeing the significance of the great work of art.

The habit of parsing every sentence that one sees may prevent one from enjoying a sonnet of Wordsworth. Too much counting and calculating may at a tender age set the mind in the mechanical habit of looking for mere numerical relations in whatever it sees. Certainly, the young savage who is taught to see in nature only the traces that