disbanded before they reached it. It was four afternoon when the Austrians, who had been engaged in combat from seven in the morning, came in front of this new and untouched division of the French army. They were instantly charged by Dessaix at the head of the ninth light brigade, while in that confusion which success, as well as defeat, always must occasion. Their progress was checked; and though Dessaix was slain and his followers repulsed, yet Buonaparte had obtained time to bring his battalions into order, and, uniting them with the reserve, he advanced as to a new battle. Even this charge of a new and fresh division the Austrians for a time sustained; but the confusion it occasioned among their fatigued and disordered ranks, gave an opportunity to Kellerman, who with his whole cavalry attacked their flank, and forced six battalions, whom the rapidity and fury of his movement had separated from the rest, to throw down their arms. The tide of the battle was then completely turned. The Austrians, hitherto successful in every point, but now totally unsupported, were routed and chaced beyond the Bormida with immense loss; while the French, who the whole day had been beaten from position to position, being sustained by repeated reserves, were at last enabled to wrest victory out of the hands of an enemy too fatigued to hold it.* In all the grand general actions of Buonaparte, the same principle can be discovered, namely, that of combining a prompt and vigorous mode of action with a concentrated order of battle, which it has been generally his good fortune to oppose to indecision, want of energy, and a prejudice in favour of an extended line. Where circumstances, as in the battle of Wagram, have, as it were, compelled his enemies to present a more collected front than usual, he has employed a still greater degree of concentration on his part, so as to ensure his having the last reserve which can be brought up. In short, he does not gain the battle by the perseverance of the soldiers engaged in it, but by renewing it by means of numerous reliefs. The perseverance is in the general and his plan of tactics, not in the troops; and the principle consists not in requiring it from the latter, but in See "Recueil de Plans de Battailes, &c., gagnés par Bonaparte, en Italie et en Egypte, et par deux Officiers de son Etat Major. A Paris et Leipsic." The following observations on the same engagement, by an author calling himself a Russian Staff Officer, but whose style and information argue him to be a Frenchman, may be received as corroborating those in the text:-"La journée de Marengo, où le Grand Consul parut, et fut en effet si fort au-dessous de sa réputation, prouve qu'à cette époque il n'avait dans l'art des battailes aucune supériorité sur ses rivaux ; mais elle lui apprit a connaître une importante vérité; savoir, qui'l n'est presque jamais un premier mouvement qui décide la victoire, que au contraire elle reste définitivement au général qui, après quelques heures d'un engagement opiniatre, tient à sa disposition un corps respectable de troupes fraîches. Le succès d'une réserve est dans ce cas rarement douteux, et il devient infailliblement la cause d'un succès décisif, si elle profite pour faire une attaque impétueuse, des dérangemens, des fluctuations inévitables dans la ligne ennemie, pendant le cours d'une action générale, et que son mouvement victorieux ait été incessamment soutenu par un changement analogue dans les mouvemens du corps de battaile."-Essai sur le Systeme Militaire de Bonaparte, &c. p. C. H. S. Officier D'Etat-Major Moscovite. London, 1811. Dulau et Cop. et Pannier. making up for their want of it. And it is a most admirable plan for a general, circumstanced like Buonaparte, whom extended means of every kind, as well as the great unity and promp. titude of combining different marching columns upon a given position, enable always to appear in the field with a numerical superiority. The old mode, by which a general used to avail himself of the advantage of numbers, was by extending his wings, so that their extremities might outflank and surround his enemy, as in the battle of Rosbach. But by this extension the line is exposed to be attacked by the concentrated force of the enemy in any given point, as really happened at that battle. (No. 4.) The system of Buonaparte is the very reverse of this, and consists, as we have seen, in condensing his line, leaving it in length barely equal at most to the enemy's front, and often much less extended, but strengthening it in depth, by placing one division in rear of another. It is this system of repeated reserves which enables him to avail himself of the superiority of numbers to its fullest extent, and to compel the enemy to put forth their whole strength in struggling with a force equal to their own, while he can bring up, at the chosen moment, reinforcements sufficient to throw the odds against them. That moment he waits for with the utmost coolness and patience, and even partial success does not induce him to anticipate its arrival by a premature motion in advance. The post of the emperor, or quartier-general, is at the head of the strong and numerous reserve which supports the centre. From that point all orders are issued, and to that point, with inexpressible celerity, all communications are made. În general, the French permit the enemy to com mence the attack, and content them. selves with maintaining a severe fire of musquetry and artillery. No regiment of infantry or cavalry is permitted to advance beyond the line of battle in order to charge; for in French tactics they adhere strictly to the military rule, that the particular movement of each battalion must always bear reference to the general movements of the whole body, a rule which is of course most easily attended to in a condensed and concentrated array, through which orders can be transmitted with accuracy and promptitude. On the other hand, they are prompt to avail themselves of the partial and unsustained advance of any part of the opposing force. Thus at Austerlitz the imperial horse guards of Alexander precipitated themselves on the French line, and broke through it. But it was an unsupported movement of indignant impatience; and no sooner were they in the rear of the line which they had broken, than they were themselves flanked and routed, or cut to pieces by the cavalry of Buonaparte's reserves. At Talavera, too, the gallant impetuosity of the guards endangered, by a rash advance, the victory of the day. But they were supported and covered by directions of a general, whose eye nothing escapes. The French then do not hazard these partial and dangerous movements, especially in the commencement of an action, considering it, and justly, as of more importance to preserve the unity of their order, than to grasp hastily at any subaltern advantage. They are aware that when the day is far advanced, the victory must remain with that party who can last bring into the field a strong force of fresh troops. It is often in the very moment that the enemy suppose them. selves victors that this unexpected apparition turns the scale of battle. Their advantages cannot have been acquired without loss, tumult, and disorder, and it is while they are in that state that they are suddenly pressed by fresh troops, who in this moment are permitted to indulge all their national vivacity of courage and enterprize. Thus in one of Buonaparte's bulletins concerning the battle of Friedland, it is stated, that after the conflict had continued a great part of the day, the emperor resolved to put an end to it, (here is a proof he was rather apprehensive of the result,) and came up with a strong reserve. We must leave it to those who wish to prosecute the study, to trace this principle of movement (it is a general one, and subject to various modifications) through the great general actions fought by Buonaparte,* cautioning him at the same time, that he is not to expect to discover it in the encounter of small armies, where all the ground is under the eye of both generals, and where neither could make a strong detachment in reserve without the other being aware of its existence, and making a similar reserve on his side to encounter it. He must also observe, that in some of Buonaparte's grand engagements, although the principle of the formation be the same, yet its operation is not so simple or so obvious at first sight as in the battle of Marengo. In some of these, as at Wagram and Jena, the same concentration, arising from a more than usual number of reserves, enabled the French general to render his own line impenetrable, whilst he turned his enemy's flank, or availed himself of any opening in their line to pierce it. But these latter uses to which reserves may be applied, are only resorted to by Buonaparte when the conduct of the opposing general is more than usually incautious. It remains to shew in what manner the French masque their formation, and occupy the attention of the enemy along the full extent of their long order of battle, while in fact they only oppose a short and condensed front to the centre of their line. This is accomplished by means of their numerous light troops, which were at first formed after the example of the irregular sharpshooters of America, as the readiest mode of training their conscripts. But the ge. nius of the French soldier seems particularly adapted to this light and skirmishing species of warfare. The loose order, or rather the dispersion of these tirailleurs, enables a number comparatively small to occupy the attention and harass the movements of the enemy's extended front, if unprovided with similar forces. Thus these numerous irregulars act as a screen to their own lines, while it is We again fortify an opinion formed long before the printing of his work, by the evidence of the Russian Staff-Officer, (if such he be) whose essay we have already quoted:-"Les victoires d'Jena, de Ratisbonne, de Wagram, furent dues au même principe, à le même manœuvre. Ainsi que je l'ai avancé, les Français laissent ordinairement commencer a leurs ennemis les premiers mouvemens. Or, ces premiers mouvemens n'étant jamais qu'une attaque isolée au lieu d'être dirigés comme devant être le commencement d'un mouvement général, quelque désordre qu'ils puissent causer dans la ligne des Français, ces derniers ont dans l'emploi immédiat de leur réserve les moyens non-seulement de réparer leur defection; ils rendront funeste à leurs ennemis, le mouvement victorieux mais inconsidéré, d'une troupe qu'on ne soutient pas." impossible for those who are assailed by them to discern whether they are supported by battalions, or in what order the French general is arraying his forces in the rear of this swarm of hornets. Thus they remain in complete ignorance of the French disposition, and dare not of course attempt to change their own; and while the wings waste their force, nay sometimes sustain heavy loss in encountering this harassing, and, as it were, unsubstantial enemy, their centre has to sustain the full weight of the French line, concentrated as we have described it. This mode of warfare was peculiarly severe on the Austrians; for it happened, by some unfortunate fatality, that in her passion for the Prussian discipline, that power judged it fit to convert the greater part of her Croats, the finest light troops in the world, into heavy battalions, and thus diminished their strength of this particular description of force at the moment when the fate of battle was about to depend upon it. The excellence of those light corps which Austria retained could not supply their great inferiority of numbers; and thus in that sort of minor battle of advanced guards, which is maintained by the light troops, and of which it is usually the object not to beat back the enemy, but to distract his attention, and, by engaging him in a confused struggle with a foe not the less formidable because yielding and almost invisible, to bring him up to their own line crippled and disheartened, the French acquired a superiority, which enabled them, without the least risque of being outflanked, to contract their own line within the extent necessary for employing the sooften-mentioned principle of reserves. But it may be asked, to what tends this exposition? The French have been almost uniformly victorious, and how avails it to what their victories can be ascribed? Our answer is twofold. Such an investigation as we have attempted leads us to due appreciation of the talents of Buonaparte, instead of blind terror or blinder admiration. We have no wish to insinuate a disrespect for his talents, having (as they unfortunately possess) the disposal of such extraordinary force at their command; in the words of a warrior speaking of his enemy, we grant him Strong, and skilful to his strength, Fierce to his skill, and to his fierceness valiant. But it will remain to be inquired whether his genius is of such a transcendant and overpowering nature as a distant contemplation of his exploits might induce us to believe. His plan, of which we have endeavoured to develope the principle, is indeed well fitted to ensure the most numerous of two encountering armies the full superiority of its numbers; but there is no brilliant genius requisite to the formation. It is not an invention like Frederick's discovery of a new principle of moving an extended line. The latter is like the discovery of a mechanical power, and must in one shape or other be useful while armies are opposed to each other. The system of Buonaparte is only a peculiar mode of employing the same power previously discovered, which may be destroyed by any counteracting system, or superseded by any improvement on the application of the principle uponwhich it turns. In all his great engagements, (that of Austerlitz perhaps excepted,) Buonaparte seems never even to have attempted manœuvering, that is, he never attempted to gain for his army a position which must give it an immediate and decided advantage over the enemy. Now this art we take to be the consummation of military ability, as being that by which military skill supplies the lack both of strength and of numbers. In the battles of the King of Prussia and other distinguished generals, we are led to augur the fortune of the day from the dispositions their ability enabled them to make relative to their enemy; and in the progress of the action we gradually observe our expectationsrealized. But Buonaparte's dispositions never authorize any conclusion as to his final success; and the imperfection of his positions, as well as the inferiority of his troops, is frequently conspicuous by the defeat of his army during the greater part of the day, until at length the fortune is turned by that in which his secret seems to consist, the appearance, namely, of a numerous reserve, fresh and in order. But it may be asked, is that not ability which secures to itself the effect of bringing up the last reserve? Undoubtedly it is, but of a subordinate and somewhat vulgar nature. It is the game of a chess player, who, conscious of superiority by a single piece, goes on exchanging man for man, because he knows that the lower he can reduce both parties, the more his numerical superiority will be likely to gain the ascendant. Independent, therefore, of the waste of human blood, which conquerors seldom attend to, Buonaparte's road to victory seems greatly to depend upon his bringing a predominating force into the field, and upon his enemy's pertinacious adherence to the infatuated system of exposing an extended line to the action of a deep and reinforced column. But the second object of our remarks is yet more important. Not only do we think the system of Buonaparte too obvious and too coarse to claim the praise of very high genius for the general who has trusted so constantly to it, but we conceive that it also admits of being easily counteracted. * Supposing that an enemy not inferior, at least not very much inferior in numbers, encountered Buonaparte with a line condensed like his own, covered in frout by sharp-shooters, supported by numerous and powerful reserves, and capable, from its concentration, of suddenly executing general and combined movements, his ordinary scheme is entirely disconcerted, and the two armies meet upon equal terms. Now where this is the case, uniform experience shews, 1st, That the bravery of the French, however The Russian Staff-officer gives the grand secret in a few words:-" Jái dit que la bataille d'Austerlitz avoit été pour Bonaparte le présage de ses victoires futures, qu'il était le maître DU GRAND SECRET. D'après ce que je viens de dire, et on ne peut contester que mes assertions ne reposent sur des faits nombreux, ce Grand Secret n'a pu en être un que pour les généraux sans intelligence que les souverains du continent, ont constamment opposés à l'usurpateur. Qu'y a-t-il en effet de plus connu que l'emploi d'un corps de réserve, et de plus simple que l'usage qu'en font les Français? Ils l'emportent par leurs mobilité, l'ensemble dans les mouvemens.... Généraux ! qui cherchent en vain la cause d'un tel avantage, ou feignez de ne pas l'apercevoir, supprimez vos bagages, ordonnez à vas génèraux subalternes d'étudier leurs manœuvres, de combattre a la tête de leurs divisions: aux capitaines de l'infanterie d'être à pied à la tête de leurs compagnies: changez l'organisation et la com position de vos états-majors, et vous serez aussi les maîtres du Grand Secret." |