ardent, is rather of a volatile and spirited nature, than what we term steadiness and intrepidity; and, 2dly, that where sufficient skill is united to the latter qualities, they, like what is called bottom by the prize-fighters, secure superiority in a long action. 3dly, The French general must be necessarily embarrassed and disconcerted by the neutralization of the very plan on which he had rested for conquest. For these combined reasons, we conceive, that if deprived of the benefit of this favourite mancuvre, the balance would probably incline against the French: Nay, we are able to shew an example in modern war, where Buonaparte's own system was successfully employed against himself by the Russian General Benningsen, at the battles of Pultusk and Eylau. In sustaining the French attack at Pultusk, the Cossacks and other light troops of the Russians formed as it were an outwork, or advanced battle, to their main-line, and not only completely overpowered the eclaireurs and tirailleurs, who were thrown forward, as usual, to protect and mask the advance of the French columns, but greatly embarrassed, interrupted, and crippled the columns themselves before they could reach the Russian position, properly so called. At Eylau, the counterpart of the French system was equally successfully provided against and counteracted by the Russians. Reserve after reserve was brought up by the French, but at the close of a long and desperate battle, the last reserve brought into action was that of the Russians. In both these battles, the Russians had decidedly the advantage, a fact which might have remained concealed from Europe, but for the clear, distinct, and able state

ment of Sir Robert Wilson in his late publication, which he himself invites the reader to contrast with the

partial and studiously confused bulletins of Buonaparte, which form part of his appendix. It may be supposed strange, that the generals of a much more uncultivated people should be able to imitate, and by imitating to foil, a system of tactics, before which the generals of Austria and Prussia had given way. But it should be remembered, that the Russians had conducted wars upon a very broad scale, and though their operations were against barbarians, they were, perhaps for that very reason, more certainly brought back to ge. neral principles, and freed from the prejudice of military men, who, having only studied in one school, expected their antagonist strictly to conform to their own game and their own rules for playing it. Let it be remembered, that it was a Russian Emperor, who, by simply covering his line-of-battle by a chain of closed redoubts, instead of the combined fortified lines then in use, broke, at Pultowa, those Swedish infantry, whom every general in Europe, nay, Marlborough himself, regarded with respect and apprehension. The French themselves were comparatively undisciplined when they devised this very system of reserves, as affording them the means of availing themselves of their numbers against the superior skill of their adversaries. We cannot forget the reproaches cast upon Lord Wellington as a Seapoy General. Had he not learned his art upon a broad and extended plan, such as India alone has yet afforded to a British general, where else could he have acquired the art of providing for the necessities of a large army, the principles of com

bination necessary for conducting its extended movements, in short, the complicated branches of military skill by which he is now driving before him those hordes, whose greatest disgrace it is, that they cannot shelter their abominable rapine and atrocity under the barbarous ignorance of Seiks or Mahrattas.

It may indeed be pleaded too just, ly, that the acknowledged imperfections in the Russian commissariat, the deficiencies of their staff, and, above all, the deplorable neglect of their government to supply and reinforce their armies, deprived them of the fruits of victory; while the active energy of Buonaparte drained his whole acquisitions of every soldier, or man who could be made such, to resume the field with a force superior to that which had foiled and defeated him. These considerations, however, do not respect our present subject, which refers merely to the field of battle, on which, we repeat, the Russians have neutralized Buonaparte's favourite manœuvre. It may be briefly noticed, that the inhabitants of the peninsula, less fortunate in facing him in the field, and who at Tudela experienced discomfiture from the effects of that system which we have detailed, have yet shewn, that when a general battle is lost, the advantages of the victory may be in a great degree intercepted. The inveterate and desperate hostility of the Spaniards and Portuguese, so widely diffused through the peasantry of the country, has utterly destroyed the boasted system of intercourse and communication, by which the march of one French column was made to correspond with that of all who were acting in the same kingdom. Near as the events and positions were, it is almost impossible that Massena

could have known the fall of Badajos when he broke up from Santarem, or that Soult anticipated the retreat of Massena when he himself fell back into Spain, instead of advancing into Alemtejo, to make a diversion, and afford support to the enfant gaté whom Fortune was dropping out of her arms. But the ge neral and inveterate enmity of the peasantry entirely annihilated all the fair system of unity and constant correspondence, which in Germany the French armies maintained at any given distance. Couriers, aids-decamp, orderly men, and disguised spies, were alike the objects of suspicion to the Ordenanza, who, rather than miss securing their letters, would steadily rip up their bowels,—a sad interruption to a regular and friendly correspondence. And thus these two great generals seem to have known little more of each other's motions, than if they had been next door neighbours in London. The self-devoted patriotism, with which the Portuguese destroyed every part of their own property, which could afford supply or assistance to the invading army, rendered the genius of the French for the commissariat department equally unavailing. Nay, even les grands moyens themselves have proved fruitless in a country, where Lord Wellington has declared, that none, even of the lowest description, forgot, through any compelled intercourse with the French, the duty which they owed to their country. We glance at these subjects, though distinct from that which we proposed to enlarge upon, merely to shew, that as the French system of tactics in the field of battle is far from infallible, so neither are the other means which they employ in facilita. ting the operations of the campaig

less liable to derangement, where the population of an invaded country is confident in their own leaders, and true to their own cause.

We now close these desultory observations, by stating, in justification of the tone of decision which we have presumed to adopt, that the theory they contain was deduced from an attentive perusal of the plans of Buonaparte's battles published at Paris. Yet we should have hesitated to offer them to the public on our slender authority, had we not found our opinion confirmed three years after we had embodied it in writing, by the excellent work of Sir Robert Wilson, and by a very stri

king treatise, entitled "Essai sur le Systeme Militaire de Bonaparte, par C. H. S. Major d'Etat Muscovite," which we have liberally quoted in our notes. These authorities coinciding with our own opinion so much beyond our expectation, led us to give our sketch to the public, in hopes that, thus supported, it may operate as a sedative in tranquillizing the mind of those who do not know more of the practice of war than we do ourselves; and we shall not quarrel with the true-blue Englishman who may think with Corporal Trim, that one home-thrust of the bayonet is worth it all.

WHILE the navy forms the great bulwark of British liberty, and ships are the chief instruments of our commerce, every attempt to afford a greater degree of safety to the mariner, and to give additional security to the adventures of the merchant, must be regarded as of national interest. In order to evince that a light-house upon the Bell Rock is calculated to serve the most important purposes, in facilitating the navigation of the North Sea and German Ocean, it is only necessary to advert to the situation of the Rock; and the brief account of the light-house, which we are enabled to lay before our readers, will be sufficient to shew that it is a work of much curiosity, and of no small enterprise.

The Cape or Bell Rock, lies about 11 miles in a south-west direction from the Read Head, in Forfarshire, and 30 miles north by east from St Abb's Head, in Berwickshire. These two headlands form the boundaries of the estuary or Frith of Forth, which is the principal inlet upon the east coast of Great Britain for vessels overtaken with an easterly storm, while navigating the German Ocean or North Sea.

This rock is almost one entire or continuous mass, having only a very few detached or separate pieces. It is a

red sandstone, very hard, and of a fine grit, with minute specks of mica. At low water of neap tides the rock is only partially left by the tide ; but its dimensions, as seen at low water of spring tides, are about 2000 feet in length, with an average breadth of 230 feet; and then the height of the north-east part, where the light-house is built, may be stated at four feet perpendicular above the surface of the water; but the south-west, or opposite end of the rock, is lower, and its surface is never fully left by the tide. The surface of the rock is very uneven, and walking upon it is diffi cult and even dangerous. Those parts which are higher, and consequently oftener left by the tide, are covered with muscles, limpets, whelks; and numbers of seals occasionally play about the rock, and rest upon it at low water. Those parts which appear only in spring tides, are thickly coated with sea weeds; as the great tangle (fucus digitatus,) and badderlocks, or henware (fucus esculentus,) which here grows to the length even of 18 feet. The redware cod is got very near the rock, and as the water deepens, the other fishes common in those seas are caught in abundance.

Such being the position of this fatal rock, appearing only a few feet