represents the ascribing goodness and justice to God according to our ideas, to be what gives great advantage to the atheists with regard to the original of evil; as if he thought it impossible to reconcile the evil that is in the world with God's moral attributes, and the supposition of his being good and righteous and holy, as well as powerful and wise; he has taken great pains to confute his own arguments. For not a few of his fragments and essays in his fifth volume are taken up in endeavouring to remove and answer that objection, and to show that the evil there is in the present constitution of things in this world, is reconcileable to the justice and goodness of God, even according to the ideas we form of them.* He undertakes to defend the goodness of God against the atheists and divines. And having, as he pretends, done this, he proceeds to vindicate the justice and righteousness of God against the same confederates. Thus the same author who had used his utmost efforts to show, in opposition to the divines, that moral attributes, particularly justice and goodness, ought not to be ascribed to God according to the ideas we conceive of them, and that we cannot form any judgment concerning them, takes upon him afterwards to vindicate those very attributes against the divines, who, he pretends, are for destroying them. So strangely inconsistent is this writer's scheme, that on the one hand, with a view to invalidate the argument for a state of future retributions drawn from the moral attributes of God, he endeavours to take away those attributes, or confound them with the physical, and to show that there is no such thing as goodness or justice in God according to our ideas, nor any thing equivalent to them; and that the phenomena are repugnant to those attributes; and on the other hand, with the same view of weakening or destroying the argument for a future state from those attributes, he sets himself to prove, that the present state of things is sufficiently conformable to our ideas of the divine justice and goodness, and that these attributes are so fully exercised or displayed here, that there is no need for any further manifestation or display of them hereafter. I shall only produce one passage more, and it is a very remarkable one. Towards the conclusion of his last volume, when he pretends to draw a line of separation between natural and artificial theology, he observes, that by that, viz. natural theology, "we are taught to acknowledge and adore the infinite wisdom and power of God, manifested in every part of his creation, and ascribe goodness and justice to him wherever he intended that we should so ascribe them, that is, wherever either his works, or the dispensations of his providence, do as necessarily communicate these notions to our minds, as those of wisdom and power are communicated to us in the whole extent of both. Wherever they are not so communicated, we may assume very reasonably, that it is on motives strictly conformable to all the divine attributes, and therefore to goodness and justice, though unknown to us, from whom so many circumstances, with a relation to which the divine providence acts, must be often concealed; or, we may resolve all into the wisdom of God, and not presume to account for them morally."* The last part of this passage hath a reference to his scheme of resolving all into the divine wisdom. But you cannot but observe here, that after his repeated invectives against the divines, and against artificial theology, for ascribing moral attributes to God, justice and goodness, according to our ideas of them, he has in effect here acknowledged all that the divines themselves teach. They believe that God is always good and just, though they do not pretend to account for the exercise of goodness and justice in every particular instance; but that enough we know to convince us of both the notions of which, this writer himself here owns to be, in many instances at least, necessarily communicated to us from his works; and surely then we should endeavour to resemble him in these his moral perfections, as far as we know them. : Before I conclude this letter, I shall take some notice, because I shall not afterwards have so proper an opportunity for it, of what he hath observed concerning eternal ideas in God, and concerning the eternal reasons and fitnesses of things. He finds great fault with Dr. Cudworth, Dr. Clarke, and others, for talking of ideas in God, as if they supposed his manner of knowing to be exactly the same with ours; which certainly was far from their intention. He pronounces, that "the doctrine of eternal ideas in the divine mind has been much abused by those who are in the delirium of metaphysical theology. It cannot be understood in a literal sense." And he thinks such a way of talking is profane as well as presumptuous; and that it is silly too, and mere cant.”+ He has several observations, which are for the most part very just, to show, that God's manner of knowing is very different from ours, and that he does not know by the help or intervention of ideas as we do. I need not take particular notice of those observations, which contain little in them, that will not be acknowledged by those whom he has thought to oppose. The rash and improper use of the word ideas, as applied to God, hath no doubt led to mistakes, and to wrong and unwarrantable ways of expression; as any one must be convinced that knows what contentions there have been in the schools about the divine ideas, which have given rise to arrogant and foolish questions, scarce consistent with the veneration that is due to the supreme incomprehensible Being. Yet the modest use of that expression is not to be too rigidly censured. Our author himself, who blames it so much in others, hath on several occasions fallen into the same manner of expression himself. Thus he observes, that "it might be determined in the divine, ideas, that there should be a gradation of life and intellect throughout the universe :" and he repeats it again, "that this appeared necessary or fit in the divine ideas, that is, to speak more rationally, to the supreme divine reason or intention." Where he useth the term divine ideas as * Works, vol. v. p. 517. + Ibid. vol. iii. p. 356. Ibid. vol. v. p. 337. Ibid. p. 355-357. vol. v. p. 35-38. equivalent to the divine reason and intention, though he thinks the latter more proper. He elsewhere declares, that "the ideas of God, if we may ascribe ideas to him, no more than his ways, are those of man.' And in one of his most celebrated pieces, published in his own lifetime, he saith, that "God in his eternal ideas, for we are able to conceive no other manner of knowing, has prescribed to himself that rule by which he governs the universe he created." Here he not only ascribes ideas to God, but eternal ideas, by which God hath prescribed to himself a rule for his governing the world. This rule he there explaineth to be "a fitness arising from the various natures, and more various relations of things, in the system which he hath constituted;" which fitness he there supposeth to have been known to God in his eternal ideas. And yet he hath frequently inveighed against Dr. Clarke, for speaking of the eternal reasons and relations of things. This particularly is the subject of the second, fifty-eighth, and fifty-ninth of his fragments and essays in the fifth volume of his works. He treats that learned divine as if he maintained, that these reasons and fitnesses of things were real natures, existing independently of God, and co-eternal with him; and yet he himself, speaking of Dr. Cudworth and others, observeth, that when they talk of eternal ideas and essences independent on the will of God, "they do not mean by these eternal independent natures, any natures at all, but such intelligible essences and rationes of things, as are objects of the mind." And it is his own observation, that "God knew from all eternity every system that he created in time-the relations things should bear-and the proportions they should have;"§ and that "to the divine omniscience the future is like the present;" and therefore he thinks it improper to talk of prescience in God. He represents it as a great truth, that the whole series of things is at all times actually present to the divine mind, so that we may say properly, that God knows things, because they are actual to him." According to his own representation therefore it may be justly said, that all the fitnesses and relations of things were from the beginning actually present to the divine mind. And he accordingly declares, that God was determined by his infinite wisdom to proceed with his creatures in all the exertions of his power, according to the fitness of things;¶ or in other words, as he elsewhere expresseth it, God does not govern by mere arbitrary will, but always does that which is fittest to be done; and which he from all eternity saw would be fittest to be done. And this seems to be all that is really intended by those who speak of the eternal reasons and fitnesses of things. Whether therefore the manner of expression be strictly proper or not, this writer had no right to pass so severe a censure upon it as he has done, since it comes so near to his own. 66 But I believe you will think it is time to quit this subject, and pass on to some other things in Lord Bolingbroke's works, which Works, vol. v. p. 344. ↑ Idea of a Patriot King, in vol, iii. of his Works, p. 53. Works, p. 15. Ibid. vol. v. p. 457, 458. § Ibid. p. 7. relate to things of no small importance, and which will deserve a particular consideration. I am yours, &c. LETTER XXIV. The Doctrine of Divine Providence nearly connected with that of the Existence of God.-Lord Bolingbroke's Account of it considered. He acknowledges a general but denies a particular Providence, and asserts, that Providence relates only to collective Bodies, but doth not extend to Individuals.-The true Notion of Providence stated. What we are to understand by a particular Providence.-The Reasonableness of believing it, and the great Importance of it shown.-The contrary Scheme is absurd, and inconsistent with itself, and of the worst Consequence to Mankind.— The Objections against a particular Providence examined.- Concerning occasional Interpositions. They are not properly miraculous, nor Deviations from the general Laws of Providence, but Applications of those Laws to particular Cases — To acknowledge such Interpositions is not to suppose the World governed by Miracles, nor to introduce an universal Theocracy like the Jewish.-Angels may be employed in particular Cases as Ministers of Providence. SIR, THE doctrine of divine providence hath a very near connexion with that of the existence of the Deity, and is no less necessary to be believed. To acknowledge a God that brought all things into existence, and yet to deny that he afterwards taketh care of the creatures he hath made, or that he exerciseth any inspection over them, as a moral governor, or concerneth himself about their actions, and the events relating to them, is, with regard to all the purposes of religion, the same thing as not to acknowledge a God at all. It is one great excellence of the holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament, that they every where teach us to have a constant regard to the divine providence, as presiding over the universal system, and all the orders of beings in it, and as in a particular manner exercising a continual care and inspection towards mankind, observing all their actions, and ordering and disposing the events relating to them with infinite wisdom, righteousness, and goodness. But this doctrine of providence, which, one should think, ought mightily to recommend the Scriptures to every good mind, seems to have been one principal ground of the prejudices which Lord Bolingbroke hath conceived against those sacred writings. It is true, that he frequently affecteth to show a zeal for divine providence; he sets up as an advocate for its proceedings against the divines, who, he pretends, join with the atheists in misrepresenting and opposing it. But if his scheme be narrowly examined, it will appear, that, notwithstanding his fair pretences, he doth not acknowledge a providence in that sense in which it is most useful and necessary to believe it. He declares, that "in asserting the justice of providence, he has chosen rather to insist on the most visible and undeniable course of a general providence, than to assume a dispensation of particular providences.' He observes, that "the world is governed by laws, which the Creator imposed on the physical and moral systems, when he willed them into existence, and which must be in force as long as they last; and any change in which would be a change in the systems themselves. These laws are invariable, but they are general, and from this generality what we call contingencies arise."+ The course of things rolls on through a vast variety of contingent events; for such they are to our apprehension; according to the first impressions of motion that were given it by the first Mover, and under the direction of an universal providence."+ "As to the brute animals, they are left under the direction of instinct ; and as to men, God has given his human creatures the materials of physical and moral happiness, in the physical and moral constitution of things. He has given them faculties and powers, necessary to collect and apply these materials, and to carry on the work-this the Creator has done for us. What we shall do for ourselves, he has left to the freedom of our elections. This is the plan of divine wisdom; and we know nothing more particular, and indeed nothing more at all, of the dispensations of providence than this." This then is all the part he allows to providence in the moral world, that God has given man reason, and, as he elsewhere observes, passion,|| and has left him to the freedom of his own will, without ever concerning himself farther about the individuals of the human race, or exercising any inspection over men's moral conduct, in order to the rewarding the good, or punishing the bad. That this is his intention is manifest, by comparing this with other passages. He expressly declares, that "it is plain from the whole course of God's providence, that he regards his human creatures collectively, not individually, how worthy soever every one of them deems himself to be a particular object of the divine care." This, of God's regarding men collectively, not individually, is what he frequently repeats; and it appears to be a principal point in his scheme. With the same view he declares, that the sanctions of the law of nature relate not to individuals, but to collective bodies.** He finds fault with the notion, which, he says, obtained among the heathens, "that God was constantly attentive to the affairs of men."++ And he asserts, that "God may foresee, or rather see, all the most contingent events that happen in the course of his general providence; but not provide for particular cases, nor determine the existence of particular men."‡‡ He observes, that "the divine providence has provided means to punish individuals, by directing men to form societies, and to establish laws, in the execution of which civil magistrates are the vicegerents of providence; and when the immorality of individuals becomes that of a whole society, then the * Works, vol. v. p. 414. + Ibid. p. 416. || Ibid. p. 417. ++ Ibid. p. 211. Ibid. p. 379. |