amined. At present I shall only observe, that it is a strange way of arguing, to endeavour to prove, that the sanction of the law of nature is divine, because it is the same with the sanction of the law of Moses, which in our author's opinion was not divine.* Allow me, before I conclude this letter, to make a brief representation of that scheme of morality, or of the law of nature, which his Lordship's principles naturally lead to. The rule he lays down for judging of the law of nature, or of moral obligation, is this: That man is to judge of it from his own nature, and the system he is in. And man, according to his account of him, is merely a superior animal, whose views are confined to this present life, and who has no reasonable prospect of existing in any other state. God has given him appetites and passions; these appetites lead him to pleasure, which is their only object. He has reason indeed; but this reason is only to enable him to provide and contrive what is most conducive to his happiness; that is, what will yield him a continued permanent series of the most agreeable sensations or pleasures, which is the definition of happiness.† And if no regard be had to futurity, he must govern himself by what he thinks most conducive to his interest, or his pleasure, in his present circumstances. The constitution of his nature is his only guide; God has given him no other, and concerns himself no farther about him, nor will ever call him to an account for his actions. In this constitution his flesh or body is his all; there is no distinct immaterial principle; nor has he any moral sense or feelings naturally implanted in his heart; and therefore to please the flesh, and pursue its interest, or gratify its appetites and inclinations, must be his principal end. Only he must take care so to gratify them, as not to expose himself to the penalties of human laws, which are the only sanctions of the law of nature for particular persons. He may without any check of conscience debauch his neighbour's wife, when he has an opportunity of doing it safely; and needs be under no restraint to the indulging his lusts, from shame or modesty, which is only an artificial thing, owing to prejudice or pride. As to the refined sentiments of subjecting the appetites to reason, or the subjecting a man's own private interest, or that of his family, to the public good of the community, this cannot be reasonably done upon his scheme. It is urged indeed, that "the good of individuals is so closely connected with the good of society, that the means of promoting the one cannot be separated from those of promoting the other." But though it is generally so, yet it may happen in particular cases, that these interests may be separated. It may be more for a man's private interest to break the laws of his country; and if he can find his own private advantage, or gratify his ambition, his love of power, or of riches, in doing what is prejudicial to the community, there is nothing to restrain him from it, provided he can do it safely; for self-love is the centre of the whole moral system, and the more extended the circle is, the weaker it grows. So that * Works, vol. v. p. 91. + Ibid. p. 377, 378. Ibid. p. 103. the love of a man's country must be far weaker than his love of himself, or regard to his own particular interest, which must be his supreme governing principle and end. But I shall not pursue this any farther. How far such a system of morals would be for the good of mankind, it is easy to see; and it seems to me fairly deducible from Lord Bolingbroke's principles taken in their just connection, though I do not pretend to charge his Lordship with expressly acknowledging or avowing all these consequences; and sometimes he advances what is inconsistent with them. LETTER XXVII. An Examination of what Lord Bolingbroke hath offered concerning Revelation in general. He asserts that mankind had no Need of an extraordinary Revelation — The contrary fully shown.-A divine Revelation very needful to instruct men in the most important Principles of Religion, especially those relating to the Unity, the Perfections, and Providence of God; the worship that is to be rendered to him; moral Duty taken in its just Extent; the chief Good and Happiness of Man; the Terms of our Acceptance with God, and the Means of Reconciliation when we have offended him; and the Rewards and Punishments of a future State.-It may be concluded from the Necessities of Mankind, that a Revelation was communicated from the Beginning.-A Notion and Belief of this has very generally obtained.The wisest Men of Antiquity sensible that bare Reason alone is not sufficient to enforce Doctrines and Laws with a due Authority upon Mankind.—The most celebrated Philosophers acknowledged their Want of divine Revelation.-The Author's Exceptions against this examined.- Under Pretence of extolling the great Effects which a true divine Revelation must have produced, he endeavours to show, that no true divine Revelation was ever really given.- His Scheme tends, contrary to his own Intention, to show the Usefulness and Necessity of divine Revelation. SIR, ANY one that reads Lord Bolingbroke's Works with attention must be convinced, that one principal design he had in view, was to destroy the authority of the divine revelation in general, and of the Jewish and Christian in particular. I shall consider what he hath offered with regard to each of these; and shall begin with what relates to divine revelation in general. As to the possibility of an extraordinary revelation communicated from God to men, his Lordship hath no where thought fit expressly to deny it; though he hath made some attempts which seem to look that way. He frequently treats the notion of communion with God and communications from God to men, as a great absurdity, and the supposition of which is wholly owing to the pride of the human heart; and has declared, that he cannot "comprehend the metaphysical or physical influence of spirits, suggestions, silent communications, injection of ideas.-And that all such interpositions in the intellectual system cannot be conceived, without altering, in every such instance, the natural progression of the human understanding, and the freedom of the will." Yet in a long digression about inspiration, in his "Essay concerning the Nature, Extent, and Reality, of Human Knowledge," after having done what he could to expose and ridicule it, he expressly owns, that "an extraordinary action of God on the human mind, which the word inspiration is here used to denote, is not more inconceivable than the ordinary action of mind on body, or of body on mind."—And that "it is impertinent to deny the existence of any phenomenon, merely because we cannot account for it." But he urges, that "it would be silly to assume inspiration to be true, because God can act mysteriously, i. e. in ways unknown to us, on his creature man." Nor was any of the divines, whom he treats on all occasions with so much contempt, ever so silly, as to assume inspiration to be true, merely because it is possible. The actual truth of it must be proved by other arguments. I shall therefore take it for granted, that an extraordinary revelation from God to men, for instructing and directing them in the knowledge of important truth, of his will and their duty, is possible; and that such a revelation might be so circumstanced, as to be of real and signal advantage, our author himself seems sometimes willing to allow. After having observed, that we cannot be obliged to believe against reason, he adds, that "when a revelation hath all the authenticity of human testimony, when it appears consistent in all its parts, and when it contains nothing inconsistent with any real knowledge we have of the supreme all-perfect Being, and of natural religion, such a revelation is to be received with the most profound reverence, with the most entire submission, and with the most unfeigned thanksgiving." This goes upon a supposition that an extraordinary revelation from God is not only possible, but may be of signal benefit to mankind; and, if really communicated, ought to be received with great thankfulness. And he declares that he does presume to assert, that God has made no such particular revelations of his will to mankind;" though he adds, that the "opinion that there have been such revelations, is not in any degree so agreeable to the notions of infinite knowledge and wisdom, as the contrary opinion."§ not " What he principally bends himself to prove is, that mankind had no need of supernatural revelation; and that therefore it is no way probable that God would extraordinarily interpose to give such discoveries of his will. For this purpose he mightily extols the absolute clearness and perfection of the law of nature; from whence, he thinks, it follows," that God has made no other revelation of himself, and of his will to mankind." Many of the Fragments and Essays in his fifth volume are particularly intended to invalidate what Dr. Clarke had urged to show the need the world stood in of a divine revelation. See particularly from the twenty-third to the * Works, vol. v. p. 414, 415.-See concerning this above, Letter VII. ✦ Ibid. vol. iii. p. 468. ‡ Ibid. vol. iv. p. 279.—See also. vol. v. p. 201. § Ibid. p. 544. twenty-eight of his Fragments and Essays; as also the thirty-third and thirty-fourth. But if we abstract from the overbearing confidence, and assuming air, so familiar to Lord Bolingbroke, we shall find very little in those essays, which is of any consequence against what that very learned writer had advanced. The reflections that were made in my last letter on what his Lordship had offered concerned the absolute clearness of the law or religion of nature to all mankind, might suffice to show, that there is no just foundation for the inference he would draw from it. But it will be proper to enter upon a more particular and distinct consideration of this matter. And to set it in a fair light, I shall mention some things of high importance to mankind, with regard to which they stand in great need of particular instruction, and of having them cleared and ascertained by a divine revelation. Such are the articles relating to the unity, the perfection, and providence of God, the worship that is to be rendered to him, moral duty taken in its just extent, the chief good and happiness of man, the terms of our acceptance with God, and the means of reconciliation when we have offended him, and the rewards and punishments of a future state. 1. The first and fundamental principle of all religion relates to the unity, the perfections, and providence of the one true God, the supreme original Cause of all things, the Maker and Governor of the world. This is justly represented by our author as the angular stone of religion. And it comes to us confirmed by so many convincing proofs, that one would have been apt to expect that all mankind in all ages should have agreed in acknowledging it; and yet certain it is, that there is scarce any thing in which they have fallen into more pernicious errors, than in their notions relating to this great and fundamental article. This writer finds great fault with Mr. Locke for asserting, in his "Reasonableness of Christianity," that the heathens were deficient in the first article of natural religion, the knowledge of one God, the Maker of all things and yet this is no more than what Lord Bolingbroke himself acknowledges in strong terms. He observes, that "though the first men could doubt no more, that some cause of the world, than that the world itself, existed, yet a consequence of this great event, and of the surprise, ignorance, and inexperience, of mankind must have been much doubt and uncertainty concerning the first cause:* that the variety of the phænomena which struck their sense would lead them to imagine a variety of causes.-That accordingly polytheism and idolatry prevailed almost every-where, and therefore seems more conformable to human ideas abstracted from the first appearance of things, and better proportioned, by an analogy of human conceptions, to the uncultivated reason of mankind, and to understandings not sufficiently informed." He adds, that "polytheism, and the consequence of it, idolatry, were avowed and taught by legislators and philosophers, and they prevailed more * Works, vol. iii. p. 253. easily, because they were more conformable to the natural conceptions of the human mind, than the belief of one first intelligent Cause, the sole Creator, Preserver, and Governor of all things."* And though he insinuates, that "afterwards, when nations became civilized, and wise constitutions of government were formed, men could not be ignorant of this great principle," yet he owns, that "the vulgar among the Greeks and Romans, and all the learned nations of the east, acknowledged a multitude of divinities, to which they ascribed every excellence and every defect of their own nature." He endeavours indeed to apologize for them, by saying, that "the worship of this multiplicity of gods did not interfere with the supreme Being in the minds of those that worshipped them." But in plain contradiction to this, he elsewhere saith, that they lost sight of him, and suffered imaginary beings to intercept the worship due to him alone."§ And speaking of the crowd of imaginary divinities among the heathens, supercelestial and celestial gods, whole gods, and half gods, &c. he says, that they intercepted the worship of the supreme Being; and that this monstrous assemblage made the object of vulgar adoration." indeed nothing can be more evident than it is from all the remaining monuments of paganism, that the public worship prescribed and established by their laws was paid to a multiplicity of deities; nor was there any injunction in any of their laws, that the supreme God, and he only, was to be adored. The legislators, by his own acknowledgment, "thought it dangerous to cure, and useful to confirm, the popular superstition."¶ 66 And 66 were He is pleased indeed to give a magnificent account of the pagan mysteries, as what were intended by the heathen legislators for reforming the manners and religion of the people. He asserts as positively as if he knew it, that "there are good grounds to be persuaded, that the whole system of polytheism was unravelled in the greater mysteries, or that no more of it was retained than was consistent with monotheism, with the belief of one supreme self-existent Being:" and yet he ridicules those who pretend to give a minute and circumstantial account of those mysteries, as if they had assisted at the celebration of then.. "These rites," he says, kept secret, under the severest penalties, above two thousand years: how then can we hope to have them revealed to us now?"** owns however, that "the vulgar gods still kept their places there, and the absurdities of polytheism were retained, however mitigated: and that the lesser mysteries preserved, and the greater tolerated, the fictitious divinities which superstition and poetry had invented, such as Jupiter, Mercury, and Venus, as well as the rites and ceremonies instituted in honour of them, "which," he says, were practised even by those who were consummated in the greater mysteries." And that thus it was particularly in the Eleusinian mysteries, which were the most sacred of them all.++ It gives one * Works, vol. iii. p. 259, 260. Ibid. vol. iv. p. 80. ↑ Ibid. vol. iv. p. Ibid. p. 461. tt Ibid. p. 74. 199, 200. 66 He Ibid. vol. v. p. 305. ** Ibid. p. 58. |